The New Tsar (91 page)

7 
. Kasyanov, p. 226.

8 
. Vladimir Ryzhkov, “The Liberal Debacle,”
Journal of Democracy
15, no. 3 (July 2004).

9 
.
New York Times
, Jan. 9, 2004.

10 
. Itar-Tass, Feb. 13, 2004.

11 
. Goldfarb and Litvinenko, p. 308.

12 
. Interfax, Feb. 10, 2004.

13 
.
New York Times
, Feb. 3, 2004.

14 
.
Kommersant
, Nov. 11, 2006.

15 
.
New York Times
, March 6, 2004.

16 
. OSCE’s Election Observer Mission Report, June 2, 2004.

17 
. Baker and Glasser, p. 325.

18 
. Kasyanov, p. 241.

19 
. Ibid., p. 241.

20 
. Anna Politkovskaya,
Putin’s Russia
(London: Harvill Press, 2004), p. 274.

21 
.
Vedomosti
, March 2, 2004.

22 
.
Novaya Gazeta
, Oct. 11, 2007. Fradkov became the head of the foreign intelligence service in 2007, underscoring his presumed background.

23 
. Felshtinsky and Pribylovsky, p. 80.

24 
. Official Kremlin International Broadcast, March 16, 2004.

25 
.
Vremya Novosti
, March 15, 2004.

26 
. Ryzhkov, pp. 54, 57.

27 
.
Vedomosti
, March 29, 2004; Khodorkovsky reprinted the letter, including a translation, on his website,
www.khodorkovsky.com
.

28 
. The most authoritative and exhaustive account of the siege in Beslan is C. J. Chivers’s horrifying reconstruction based on interviews with the hostages, “The School,”
Esquire
, June 2006, p. 140.

29 
.
New York Times
, May 10, 2004.

30 
.
New York Times
, May 12, 2004.

31 
.
New York Times
, Sept. 2, 2004.

32 
. Aslambek Aslakhanov, Putin’s chief adviser on Chechnya, quoted in Baker and Glasser, p. 23.

33 
. Hutchins and Korobko, p. 292.

34 
. Soldatov and Borogan, p. 159.

35 
.
Kommersant
, Sept. 3, 2004.

36 
. Ledeneva, p. 36. She cites an unnamed official who had been forced to repeat the lie about the number of hostages and, like others, had been “broken” by Beslan. He “had become a different person when he returned from Beslan,” she writes.

37 
. Politkovskaya,
Is Journalism Worth Dying For?
pp. 251–52.

38 
. Soldatov and Borogan, p. 157.

39 
.
New York Times
, Sept. 4, 2004.

40 
. Ibid.

41 
. Soldatov and Borogan, p. 159.

42 
. Ibid., p. 162.

43 
.
New York Times
, Sept. 4, 2004.

44 
. Putin’s full remarks, as translated by
The New York Times
, Sept. 5, 2004.

45 
.
Moskovskiye Novosti
, Sept. 17–23, 2004.

46 
. Author interview with Aleksandr Drozdov, executive director of the Yeltsin Center, in Moscow, June 2014.

47 
.
Marie Mendras,
Russian Politics: The Paradox of a Weak State
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), p. 185. At the annual Valdai meeting in the wake of the attack, Putin made a similar comment; he recalled the election dispute he mediated in Karachayevo-Cherkessia as the head of Yeltsin’s Security Council as an example of how dangerous elections were, according to Clifford Kupchan, one of those in attendance.

48 
.
New York Times
, Sept. 15, 2004.

CHAPTER 15: THE ORANGE CONTAGION

1 
.
New York Times
, Dec. 20, 2004.

2 
. J. V. Koshiw,
Abuse of Power: Corruption in the Office of the President
(n.p.: Artemia Press, 2013), p. 149.

3 
. Roxburgh, pp. 108–9.

4 
. Ibid., p. 116.

5 
. Ibid., p. 129.

6 
. Anders Aslund,
How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy
(Washington, DC: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009), p. 170.

7 
. See also “It’s a Gas—Funny Business in the Turkmen-Ukraine Gas Trade,” a report by Global Witness, available on its website,
www.globalwitness.co.uk
.

8 
.
Kyiv Post
, July 29, 2004.

9 
. Koshiw, p. 136.

10 
. Boris Volodarsky,
The KGB’s Poison Factory: From Lenin to Litvinenko
(Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2009), p. 98.

11 
. Aslund, p. 180.

12 
. A full transcript of Putin’s lengthy interview is on the Kremlin online archive, Oct. 27, 2004.

13 
. Mark MacKinnon,
The New Cold War: Revolutions, Rigged Elections and Pipeline Politics in the Former Soviet Union
(New York: Carroll & Graf, 2007), p. 181.

14 
. Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Ryabov, “Russia’s Role in the Orange Revolution,” in Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul, eds.,
Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), p. 158.

15 
. Ibid., p. 157.

16 
.
New York Times
, Nov. 22, 2004.

17 
. Roxburgh, p. 138.

18 
.
New York Times
, Dec. 3, 2005.

19 
. Author interview with Viktor Yushchenko, 2006.

20 
.
Kyiv Post
, Oct. 29, 2009.

21 
. RIA Novosti, Feb. 24, 2005.

22 
.
Peter Baker,
Days of Fire: Bush and Cheney in the White House
(New York: Doubleday, 2013), p. 383.

23 
. Bush, p. 432.

24 
. Rice, p. 366.

25 
.
New York Times
, Oct. 9, 2005.

26 
. The passage comes from a translation online of a Russian newspaper in Paris,
(or
Revival
), published June 27, 1925. The translation, author unknown, appears at
www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/30343571/posts
. Hill and Gaddy discuss Ilyin in
Mr. Putin
, pp. 106–107, as does Geraldine Fagan in
Believing in Russia—Religious Policy After Communism
(London: Routledge, 2013).

27 
.
New York Times
, July 3, 2005.

28 
.
New York Times
, May 17, 2005.

CHAPTER 16: KREMLIN, INC.

1 
. Interview with a former senior Kremlin official, who spoke only on condition of anonymity, April 2013. Both Thane Gustafson and Richard Sakwa argue that Putin’s role in the assault on Yukos was less premeditated and more improvisational than often portrayed by his critics, though the result remained the same.

2 
. Gustafson’s
Wheel of Fortune
provides an excellent history of the Soviet and Russian oil industry and the Yukos auction. See especially chapter 5, “The Russian ‘Oil Miracle.’ ”

3 
. Cited in Baker and Glasser, p. 347.

4 
. A decade later, in July 2014, the Permanent Arbitration Court ruled that the case was “a deliberate and sustained effort to destroy Yukos, gain control over its assets and eliminate” Khodorkovsky as “a potential political opponent.” See court’s ruling, July 18, 2014,
Yukos Universal Limited v. The Russian Federation
, p. 30.

5 
. Sakwa,
Quality of Freedom
, p. 92. He argues that Putin did not initiate the prosecutorial assault, but was convinced by others that it was necessary. He describes the “politburo” as behind the dismantling of Yukos on p. 106.

6 
. Gustafson describes the history of Rosneft in
Wheel of Fortune
, chapter 8, “Russia’s Accidental Oil Champion: The Rise of Rosneft.”

7 
.
New York Times
, Oct. 28, 2004.

8 
. Gustafson, p. 343.

9 
. Ibid.

10 
. See Gustafson’s chapter 8.

11 
.
New York Times
, Dec. 20, 2004.

12 
.
New York Times
, Dec. 21, 2004.

13 
.
Moscow Times
, Dec. 29, 2004.

14 
.
Putin himself acknowledged this in an interview with Spanish journalists on February 7, 2006, available in the Kremlin’s online archive.

15 
. Gustafson, p. 348.

16 
. The Permanent Arbitration Court cited Putin’s statement as damning evidence that the auction was a vast conspiracy; see the court’s ruling, July 18, 2014,
Yukos Universal Limited v. The Russian Federation
, p. 330. See also
The Financial Times Alphaville
blog, July 28, 2014,
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2014/07/28/1910622/yukos-putins-loose-lips/
.

17 
. A translation was posted by Khodorkovsky’s supporters during the trial at
http://mikhail_khodorkovsky_society_three.blogspot.com/2005/04/final-statement-in-meshchansky-court.html
.

18 
. Richard Sakwa,
Putin and the Oligarch: The Khodorkovsky-Yukos Affair
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2014), p. 107.

19 
. Associated Press, June 25, 2005.

20 
. Kraft recounted the pressure from the White House in remarks at a charity benefit in his honor at Carnegie Hall in New York, as reported by the
New York Post
, June 15, 2013.

21 
.
Boston Globe Magazine
, March 19, 2007.

22 
. A diplomatic cable by the American ambassador, William Burns, dated April 2, 2007, released by WikiLeaks in 2010.

23 
. Treisman, p. 115.

24 
.
Moscow Times
, April 19, 2005.