The Meaning of Ichiro (61 page)

In 2002, Kintetsu Buffaloes slugger Norihiro Nakamura declared free agency and experimented with the idea of going elsewhere,
holding serious talks with the Hanshin Tigers as well as the New York Mets, but found himself uncomfortable with the strangeness
of the new process. Nakamura and the Mets had nearly come to an agreement for a two-year deal worth $7 million, but he backed
out at the last minute, upset over a premature leak about his contract in the U.S. media, before he had had a chance to convey
his decision to Kintetsu and Hanshin.

“It may be the difference between the Japanese and American styles. But I first wanted to decline the offers (from Kintetsu
and Hanshin) by following the Japanese way of
giri
and
ninj
and then accept an offer from the Mets…. This factor accounts for turning 180 degrees at the last minute.”

His wife was reportedly relieved at his decision to stay in Japan and remain with the Buffaloes, worried as she was about
how she was going to raise three little girls in a big intimidating city like New York.

Nakamura summed his experience up by saying, “Japan is a world of
giri-ninj
.
America is a severe country where you can often say what you want to whomever you want. But I chose the way of
giri-ninj
.
That’s why things got so messed up. I don’t think I’ve hurt my image at all. I kept to my policy and things eventually worked
out. But the free agency system is really bothersome”
(Nikkan Sup
tsu,
February 14, 2002, p. 4).

About Attendance Figures and the Tokyo Dome

All teams in Japan inflate their attendance reports, somewhat, but none as blatantly as the Tokyo Yomiuri Giants. The Tokyo
Dome became the home of the Tokyo Giants when it was completed in 1987. The capacity of the Dome, according to stadium officials
and Yomiuri executives, was 56,000, which was the attendance the Giants reported for every game they played there until the
late ‘90s when the figure was reduced to 55,000. This change reflected an actual reduction in the number of seats. However,
an unauthorized count of the seats in the Dome in 1990, conducted by this author and published in the weekly magazine
Shukan Asahi,
revealed a total of only 42,761 seats, while a subsequent count of maximum standing room totaled some 3,000. The publication
of this news had absolutely zero effect on subsequent attendance reports.

About the Irabu Affidavit

An important document of reference was a declaration that Hideki Irabu dictated in February 1997 and had translated into English.
In 17 pages, it described in detail his dealings with Lotte in his efforts to reach the major leagues as outlined in
Chapter
6
. It includes his description of the infamous secret letter he was required to sign, Shigemitsu’s adventures with George
Steinbrenner, and the trade to San Diego against his will. Irabu signed the document on February 13, 1997, and submitted it
as evidence to the MLB Executive Council held shortly thereafter in San Diego. As a sworn affidavit, it subjected him to perjury
charges if false. Since Lotte did not formally respond to it at the hearing, it was regarded as a truthful account of what
actually happened.

The secret letter proffered to Irabu was the type of solution one often saw in harmony-conscious Japan, with distinct facets
in two different dimensions—surface and reality. The Japanese even had terms to describe them:
tatemae
and
honne.

“I subject myself to your will,” Irabu had said rather dramatically, as he signed the secret letter. He revealed later that
he and Nomura had been particularly persuaded by the team official’s use of the word “sincerity” to describe his attitude
toward the accord. Sincerity was a word that in Japanese meant everything, and in this case, Irabu believed, imposed on the
Marines a “very high duty and obligation.” (Later, when push came to shove, Lotte would refuse to confirm that such a deal
had ever been made, but again, failed to refute Irabu’s account at the San Diego Executive Council hearing.)

To Shigemitsu, the Yankees refusal to accept his proposal was clear evidence that the Yankees were not demonstrating the all-important
“sincerity” on their part. According to the Irabu affidavit, he added that of all the major league owners that he knew, George
Steinbrenner was the worst. He said that if Mr. Steinbrenner were sitting next to him he would turn his back on him.

“If Irabu had the name John Smith,” from Gene Orza author interview, January 25, 1998. Also see transcript of Orza’s argument
before the Executive Council in San Diego, February 27, 1997. Orza’s “blond hair and blue eyes” remarks were prompted by an
off-the-cuff statement he’d overheard by an MLB team executive, to the effect that the flow of Asian players into the United
States had to be “controlled.” Nomura also charged discrimination, noting that there were high school stars in America who
were offered more money to sign than what San Diego had offered Hideki Irabu, a proven professional.

About Restrictions on Foreign Membership on Japanese and U.S. Teams

It should be noted that American professional baseball has its own restrictions. According to Jeff Pfeifer of MLB, while there
are no U.S. government restrictions for P-1 type visas, meaning those for major league players with valid big league contracts,
there are restrictions for the second type of visa used, H-2B, which is for minor league players. Each year MLB requests a
certain number of H-2B visas from the U.S. Labor Department, submitting a lengthy report regarding usage and requests. Each
year, the number varies but is close to 1,300. In 2003, the total stood at 1,350. Each club annually receives a different
amount depending on past usage and current requests. Numbers vary from club to club, from 35 to 45. Again, however, there
is no limit on P-1 visas (Jeff Pfeifer, MLB NY, via Jim Small MLB Tokyo, December 8, 2003).

Also, according to the officials at the
nyukoku-ka
(immigration office) of the
homusho
(Ministry of Justice), there are no limits on foreign baseball player visas. If the Tokyo Giants decided they wanted to employ
70
gaijin senshu
on their farm team and the NPB said okay, there is no law in Japan prohibiting it. Visas would be granted to all. The limit
imposed of four players on each “varsity” is a policy of NPB (author interview December 8, 2003).

“Back in the Meiji Era … according to the
Asahi Shimbun
…” to end of paragraph. See “Pointing a nondiscriminatory finger …” Jane Singer,
Asahi Shimbun,
October 30, 2002. Also
see “Nikkan Sup
tsu,
July 15, 1991. A survey conducted by
Japan Today,
October 5, 2003, found that 48.9 percent of respondents thought the Japanese word
“gaijin”
was racist or derogatory; 37.5 percent said “no”; 13.6 percent said “I don’t know.” “Kinugasa wasn’t really Japanese.”
Chrysanthemum and the Bat,
p. 203.

About Minorities

Some observers like to paint NPB as an equal opportunity employer that accepts people regardless of race, creed or color and
criticize those who emphasize the “Japaneseness” of the game. They point out that there have been hundreds of North and Latin
Americans that have played the game, as have ethnic Koreans, Chinese and men of mixed ancestry. “Let’s stop calling it the
Japanese game,” you will hear, “and instead refer to it as the game in Japan.” It would be easier to agree with those sentiments
if NPB removed its restrictions on the number of foreign players allowed per team and at the same time removed the restrictions
limiting the participation by foreigners in the All-Star Games to three position players and one pitcher. Such restrictions
have kept many a league leader in batting or other categories at home watching on TV.

It would also be easier to accept the theory that the NPB is one big melting pot if Korean players did not feel compelled
to hide their identities for fear of social ostracism.

This writer personally knows of several players and coaches in Japan with Korean backgrounds who will talk about their ancestry
privately but refuse to discuss it in public. I know of one lawsuit that resulted when a player was identified by a teammate
in a Japanese magazine as having Korean grandparents on one side of his family. The fact of the ancestry was not disputed.
But the propriety of its publication was. The magazine offered to run an apology that stated, “We’re sorry so-and-so identified
you as being part Korean.” The subject was so sensitive that the player’s lawyer demanded the reference to Korean be taken
out of the apology. Thus, the apology read simply, “We’re sorry we identified you as we did.”

About the NPB Schedule

The NPB schedule has varied over the years. The most common schedule has been 130 games, and experiments were occasionally
made with 135- and 140-game seasons. The Pacific League tried a 150-game schedule briefly in the early 1960s; both leagues
went to a 140-game schedule in 2001. In 2004, the PL introduced a new post-season playoff system involving the top three teams
to decide the league’s Japan Series entry.

About the Strike of 2004

The 20-day strike of 2004 opposing contraction was supported by over 80 percent of the fans, according to survey after survey.
More than a million fans signed a petition against reducing the number of teams. After experiencing a decade of recession
and seeing the dream of lifetime employment—once considered a basic right by company employees—virtually disappear through
restructuring, downsizing and corporate malfeasance, they were in a mood to be sympathetic. (Japanese banks, were, at the
time, said to be holding nearly a trillion dollars worth of bad loans, much of that believed to be tied to organized crime
groups.) Twenty thousand fans lined up just to get into the Fukuoka Dome, home of the Japan Champion Daiei Hawks, to meet
and get player autographs the weekend of the strike. Said one fan interviewed on TV, “This is better than a real game. We’d
never get this close otherwise.” Added another attendee, “It’s great to see them finally stand up to the owners. I wish they
had done it sooner.”