The Mafia Encyclopedia (82 page)

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Authors: Carl Sifakis

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BOOK: The Mafia Encyclopedia
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Page 233
a measure of finesse and underworld respectability because he talked more of using his brains to get ahead. He formed a new gang and went into rumrunning and rackets involving laundry services and coal deliveries. He was such a steady producer that Tammany's Jimmy Hines provided him protection. Madden now moved as an equal among such criminals as Luciano, Costello, Waxey Gordon, Longy Zwillman, Louis Lepke, and the Bug and Meyer team of Bugsy Siegel and Meyer Lansky.
When in the early 1930s Vince ''Mad Dog" Coil was running around Manhattan kidnapping and murdering top criminals, it was Owney who kept him talking on the telephone until gunmen showed up to cut off the Mad Dog's connection. Also in the 1930s Madden moved into the boxing world, catapulting a hapless Primo Carnera into the heavyweight boxing championship. Carnera ended up without a penny but Owney made a million dollars out of the deal.
In 1932 Owney had to go back to prison for a short stint as a parole violator, and when he got out he was subjected to various harassment arrests. With Prohibition over and mobsters scrambling for new rackets, Madden, having accumulated several million dollars, decided to retire. He moved to Hot Springs, Arkansas, a town he saw to be very ready for corruption. Hot Springs already had a reputation as a "cooling off" spot for criminals on the run and Madden opened several casinos for Lansky there, consulting often with Carlos Marcello in New Orleans.
It was a nice quiet existence, and from time to time some of the boys would come down to Hot Springs when on the lam. Bugsy Siegel came, so did Luciano before he gave up on the prostitution charge that would send him to prison. Owney was the king of Hot Springs with the local cops performing heroic works keeping him from being annoyed by pesky journalists. They had better had since if he was dissatisfied with their performances he'd have them transferred or broken.
Owney achieved a considerable measure of respectability. He married the postmaster's daughter and in 1943 became an American citizen. It was his wife who pleaded his case at his naturalization hearings. "We are fighting a World War to do away with intolerance and persecution," she said. "I believe Mr. Madden is entitled to some consideration."
By the time he died in 1965 he had achieved a status somewhere between a good ole boy and a Southern gentleman.
Mafia
It is useful in a historical sense to trace the origin of the Mafia back to Sicily. In many respects, however, the history is confusing because the Mafia today is not the same one that emerged at the end of the last century.
The American Mafia is really only a little over a half century old, and it came into being when Lucky Luciano and his alliesincluding Jewish gangsters in large numberswiped out the last important Old World Mafia leaders: Joe the Boss Masseria and Salvatore Maranzano. This new Mafia had no tolerance for the old ideas of the Sicilian mafiosi. The old "Mustache Petes" felt that "honor" had to be maintained either by avoiding or by warring against other ethnics and indeed other Italians. Settling old vendettas was more important than making money. These ideas were preposterous to the new mafiosi, who moved with other ethnics to organize the underworld in the most efficient methods. This new Mafia cooperated with others to increase crime profits, and they killed only those who stood in the way of profits.
In order to secure profit as the primary Mafia objective, many of the old Mustache Petes were eliminated and mobsters did this almost by instinct from about the middle of Prohibition on. Luciano was not the first to rebel against the old guard, but since he converted the East Coast Mafiawhich composed probably more than half the numbers of the mafiosi nationallyhis action was the most significant.
For many years our understanding of the Mafia has been limited by argument on whether there even was a Mafia. In the recent decades that argument has been more or less settled, and the principal argument remaining is whether or not organized crime and the Mafia are one and the same thing.
In part the confusion revolves around an understanding of the real nature of organized crime. Some observers argue that organized crime has existed since the earliest days of the nation and, indeed, earlier. This is true if the mere acting in concert of a number of criminals means that crime is "organized." But organized crime achieves its status not only by the fact of groups of practitioners, but also by a network of agreement between such groups. Organized crime is syndicate crime in which certain activities are apportioned out to the various gangs and honored in the main by these gangs. For instance, New York mobs accept the primacy of New England mobs in New England, and if they have to come into New England territory, permission is required. Gangs in one area may be asked to carry out a killing for a gang from another area, and it has the right and duty to carry out such a killing. No rewards are paid in matters of territorial rights. This was never the case in pre-Prohibition crime. The Bloody Tubs gang in Baltimore in the 19th century, for instance, had no such obligation to take care of the needs of the Dead Rabbits or the Daybreakers or other criminal organizations in New York.
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Prohibition and the nature of the crime business it engendered required intercourse between mobs in different cities. Al Capone in Chicago was dependent on booze supplies from Canada coming through Detroit where the Jewish Purple Gang dominated. A rapport developed between these groups. If the Purples needed a killing of a recalcitrant member who had fled to Illinois, it fell to the Capones to see that their problem was resolved. Similarly, Capone could not send his own killers to Detroit to handle a job. The Purples would not permit this and would probably have killed such intruders for the insult. Instead, Chicago would request Detroit to take on the hit assignment.
It was a new form of cooperation in the underworld, and although it hardly worked to perfection at all times, mobsters came to appreciate the concept. Thus disparate Jewish mobs, Italian mafiosi and non-mafiosi, some Irish, Polish and even WASP criminal organizations, joined together in a de facto union. In 1931 the gangs organized a national crime syndicate on a permanent and efficient basis, largely through the handiwork of Lucky Luciano and Jewish mobster Meyer Lansky.
At the time the Mafia forces, extended to include Italian gangsters from any part of Italy rather than just Sicilians, were hardly the most dominant. No census exists of the composition of the syndicate at the time, but if one judges by cities involved, it is possible that Jewish mobsters actually outnumbered mafiosi. It is not a matter of great moment since cooperation between Italian and Jewish criminals had long become a matter of course. The Italians had felt the poverty of the homeland and the Jews their ghettos of Europe. Both arrived at the same time and both felt the same lash of discrimination in America.
Typical of this Jewish-Italian cooperation was the composition of the national syndicate's infamous enforcement arm, Murder, Incorporatedabout half Jewish and half Italian. A rapport developed between the two groups that did not develop in the main with Irish gangsters, who throughout the 19th century had dominated American crime and who found themselves being threatened by the expanding activities of both the Italians and Jews. As a result, probably more Irish criminals were wiped out in the establishment of organized crime in America than any other national grouping.
But a fundamental difference ultimately emerged to separate what may be called the Jewish and Italian Mafias. The Italians united in a structured organization with crime families, an order based on a leader or boss, an underboss or two (the second sometimes called a consigliere, although such duties had different meanings with different crime families), a number of capos or lieutenants, and then a group of soldiers. This hardly composed the entire crime family, but was probably only a minority composition of the group. Some clamored and hoped and even bribed to become "made" members of the family, while others had little such interest. Luciano had sanctioned this order within the new American Mafia. Although he personally had little interest in such trappings, he came to realize that after the brutal New York wars of 1928 to 1931, many of the survivors still clung to their upbringing of mafioso organization with the need to render fealty to a leader.
The Jewish mobsters showed no need for such a structure and indeed felt little loyalty to their own areas of operation. When the Dalitz forces of Cleveland and the Purples of Detroit saw criminal revenues in their areas decreasing and new and greater opportunities developing in Florida and Nevada gambling, for instance, they dissolved their operations (or turned them over to local mafiosi) and moved on. The Mafia could hardly transfer its entire operation in such a manner. The very structure of the organization kept them tied to a geographical sphere of operation.
Yet, its structure gave the Mafia its very lifeblood. By the 1960s or 1970s a fundamental change was taking place in organized crime. The Mafia, rather than withering away, as many experts had predicted, actually was gaining in strength while the Jews declined. This was hardly the result of any purge or falling out between the groups, but rather the result of the different organizations among them. The Jewish mobsters were empire builders, not dynasty builders. Nepotism among Jewish gangsters was virtually non-existent and their removal from ghetto life produced a decreasing supply of fresh young punks eager to step into crime. Among the mafiosi the situation was different. When the Jewish mobsters of the 1920s and '30s died off, more often than not they were replaced by Italians. The switch from Longy Zwillman to Jerry Catena in New Jersey serves as an example. As the ravages of age hit the longtime syndicate mobsters, the structure of the Mafia filled the void.
We understand very little about the Mafia and are misled by a great number of mythsthat there is nothing unique about mafiosi (and their Jewish counterparts); that the Mafia is dying; that there is any such thing as ethnic succession in organized crime. But the Mafia is an exploitive society, not only of its victims but also of its practitioners, a quality from which it derives much of its strength and ability to renew itself.
Organized crime developed in America as a pure aberration, something new on the world scenenot even seen in Sicily, the birthplace of the Mafia. There were three fundamental reasons for the genesis of organized crime in the 1920s and its continuing growthProhibition, the Great Depression and J. Edgar Hoover.
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Previously the country was plagued by the great criminal gangs of
un
organized crime, criminal groups that found allies and protectors among the aspiring politicians of the day. For the aid rendered them by the gangs, the politicians overlooked their minor peccadilloes of bashing open a few heads among the honest citizenry now and then, of looting the waterfront and banks, of fielding armies of prostitutes. The important thing was that the gangs could win elections and maintain the politicians in power by intimidating voters at election time.
There were gangs such as the Dead Rabbits, the Bowery Boys, the Whyos and many more. The last important such gangs were the 1,500-member primarily Jewish Monk Eastman Gang and the equal-numbered Italian Five Points Gang under Paul Kelly. But shortly before the First World War these organizations had turned into liabilities for the political power structure. Reform movements were spreading and the politicians could no longer allow the gangs to rob and kill (often to order with detailed price lists) and expect Tammany or its local equivalent in other cities to offer protection. The politicians, concerned with their own survival, turned their backs on the gangsters and allowed frequent arrests and imprisonments, and the great gangs started to fall apart.
There were no rackets that could support such a criminal establishment and splinters of the gangs fought each other for control of what rackets were available, such as unionbusting, strikebreaking and the like. None of this meant that crime as an institution was finished or that citizens could walk the streets in total safety, but rather that the die was cast and criminality as a way of life rather than merely as a youthful, generally ghettoized activity was waning. The Great War took many gangsters away from home and further fractionalized their organizations and many returned home in 1919 to face a most unusual prospectactually seeking work to survive.
Then the first major break occurred for the future of criminality. The nation, unlike other advanced Western nations, embarked on a fatal but "noble experiment" of social legislation, the outlawing of demon rum by the Prohibition amendment. Instantly, the great criminal gangs coalesced again. As Prohibition was doomed to fail and criminals gained a popular image as bootleggers, the seeds of organized crime were planted. The criminals became far richer than they had ever been before. It was no longer necessary for them to curry favor with the politicians. They were the great source of wealth in the country and they bought the politicians and the police in wholesale lots. The politicians of the 1920s could not dictate to criminals as their predecessors had done; they had to come to them hat in hand and palms open.
At the coming of Prohibition, the main occupants of the ghettos were predominantly recent immigrants, the Italians and Jews. Criminality within these ghetto ethnic groups was exactly the same as it had been when the Irish were there and would remain the same later on when blacks and Hispanics moved into the ghettos. But the Jews and Italians achieved their primacy in crime at the time when crime really paid. Although this alone was inducement to remain in crime, still with Repeal many of the bootlegging criminals dropped out of crime to live off their acquired wealth.
But a second development further institutionalized crimethe Great Depression. Ethnic progression should have moved many of these ethnic groups out of the ghettos but they were frozen there by the economic climate. Ghetto youths, progressing beyond the usual mindless ghetto crime, saw no salvation save in crime. They flocked to the new criminal syndicates and provided a glue that held the Jews and Italians to their criminal organizations.
The Great Depression coincided with the LucianoLansky plan to take syndicate crime national, a program that met practically no federal resistance. This third development, or non-development, saw J. Edgar Hoover spending all his time fighting communists and what he perceived to be the deadliest peril of all to the nationjuvenile car thieves. He would not fight organized crime, declaring it and the Mafia to be myth, a position he would hold for more than three decades until he was carried, figuratively screaming and kicking, into battle against organized crime and the "Cosa Nostra" (a term invented to give him an out for his years of insisting there was no Mafia). In fact, Hoover paid so little attention to organized crime that, as historian Albert Fried noted, "one could accuse him of dereliction of duty." And a strong case could be made that the leaders of organized crime had their own special ways for "stroking" Hoover to keep him most docile.
In any event organized crime thrived in the Depression and beyond, and the Mafia perhaps most of all, if not in revenues (Lansky alone probably ended up with a personal fortune in the $300 to $400 million range) certainly as the surviving structure. Helping that development was the aforementioned exploitive nature of the Mafia.
In the Mafia, the boss soaks and exploits his under boss, the underboss the capos, the capos the soldiers and the soldiers the "non-made" hangers on. This may best be illustrated in the loan-sharking racket. The crime boss in a typical operation finances much of the action by advancing money to his underboss and/or capos for about one percent weekly interest. This is not what you would call a risk loan. The boss's underlings are fully responsible for the principal and interest and

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