The Long Game (22 page)

The words were important, but reassurance had to be more, which raised the question of whether and how much more the United States and Europe would step up. The Ukraine crisis generated a surplus of
breathless talk about frayed alliances, a vacuum of leadership, and European jitters about American withdrawal. Yet on this score the reality turned out to be better than it seems. While some see the Ukraine crisis and the threat of a resurgent Russia as exposing fundamental weaknesses in the transatlantic security alliance, NATO's response has revealed more of the alliance's strengths than its shortcomings. In fact, events since 2014 have brought about the most significant shift in the transatlantic security relationship since NATO's entry into Afghanistan after 9/11.

It began with the military component. Since the end of the Cold War, American troops have been flowing out of Europe due to smaller budgets and to deal with priorities elsewhere. But from the moment the Ukraine crisis erupted in 2014, US and allied forces have been streaming back into Europe, maintaining a persistent land, air, and sea presence in NATO's eastern front-line states.

For the United States, this includes a persistent rotational presence of troops in Poland and the three Baltic countries of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. The US military is also prepositioning war-fighting equipment like tanks and artillery in those locations—a possibility that an infusion of $1 billion in additional funds from the Congress in 2014, known as the “European Reassurance Initiative,” made possible. And in 2016, the administration decided to quadruple its defense spending in Europe—from $789 million to $3.4 billion—with emphasis on strengthening the most vulnerable European partners. The debate is no longer whether the US military should maintain such a robust force presence in Europe, but how large and specifically where it should be.

Along with the stationing of troops, the American and European militaries have pursued an aggressive sequence of major military exercises. The most significant series of American military training in Europe since the end of the Cold War took place in 2015. That summer, approximately 15,000 troops from 19 NATO countries participated in
“Allied Shield,” an exercise to enhance interoperability, readiness, and responsiveness. And in the summer of 2016, as many as 12,000 US troops took part in a Polish-led military exercise, dubbed “Anaconda.” Such efforts enhance NATO countries' capabilities to work and fight together, making clear to Russia that the alliance's commitment to collective defense remain steadfast.

Beyond these immediate responses, the Ukraine crisis jump-started NATO's discussions about building more military muscle. For years, US defense leaders had been hectoring their European partners to increase military spending, warning of the dangers of a “two-tiered” alliance of NATO haves and have-nots. Too often, this was perceived as more of a theoretical debate against some future, ill-defined foe. But the egregious display of Russian militarism in Ukraine, and later in Syria, caused many NATO partners, particularly countries like Germany, Poland, and the Baltics, to finally step up and invest more in defense (however welcome, this still remains only a modest step forward as too many NATO members still lag behind).

Perhaps most important has been the shift in the debate about the purpose of NATO itself. Until the Ukraine crisis, some wondered if NATO was still relevant at all—questions that seemed to be asked every few years since the end of the Cold War. For example, ahead of the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, we worried that one of the dominant questions would be what the Alliance's purpose would be after its drawdown from Afghanistan. Yet the crisis in Ukraine (as well as the exploding crisis to Europe's south and the insecurity emanating from North Africa) clearly demonstrated NATO's enduring relevance, galvanizing the US and the Europeans to do more to protect themselves. Vladimir Putin did more to make the transatlantic alliance relevant than any US policymaker could have wished.

T
HE THIRD PART
of the strategy was to support Ukraine. Since 2014 the United States has pledged billions of dollars to help reform
and rebuild the Ukrainian economy. It has also provided strong political support, showering the new Ukrainian leadership with high-level visits and attention. Nevertheless, in Washington, the chief metric of support has been the degree to which the Obama administration is willing to provide military assistance.

The context is important. Ukraine was not a country the United States had a particularly close military relationship with. The military was deeply corrupt, and Russia was its closest partner. Ukraine's defense industry, which between 2009–2013 was the eighth largest arms exporter in the world, was closely tied to Russia. During the democratic protests in Ukraine, we were concerned the Ukrainian military would intervene on the side of the Moscow-backed government and crack down on the protestors. Both the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs called their Ukrainian counterparts to warn them not to intervene, and to their credit, they kept their forces off the streets. Yet after the Russian-backed government fell and the new leadership came to power, we were still wary.

When the new government in Kiev took power, Ukraine's leaders made clear that they wanted our help to make their military more capable and professional. The administration responded by designing a reform program to help them in three ways, starting with providing Ukraine assistance to meet basic needs for its military operations against Russian-backed insurgents. Washington was the first to respond to Ukraine's requests for help, and with over $750 million committed by 2016 in security and technical assistance, it remains by far the single largest donor. This support included rations for deployed military forces and vehicles like Humvees, communications gear, night-vision goggles, helmets, body armor, and surveillance equipment for the border guards.
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Such efforts have been criticized as too little and too slow—especially since the US was not providing weapons. Moreover, Washington's careful process and elaborate rules for sending military assistance
make quick delivery frustratingly difficult. However, in less than a year, the United States had jump-started its military relationship with Ukraine, committing exponentially more than it had provided in the entire previous decade combined. In the early months of the crisis, we had no budget for Ukraine, so every dollar we used had to be taken from somewhere else. As one of my Pentagon colleagues memorably put it at the time, we were left looking for loose change between the budgetary couch cushions.

That quickly changed. In 2013, the United States spent less than $10 million on security assistance for Ukraine; in 2016, it allocated over $300 million.

Beyond immediate needs, the Ukrainian military required help through training and exercises. NATO and Ukraine had worked together since the mid-1990s, and Ukraine had hosted military exercises with the US and European allies. But prior governments in Kiev, especially under the Moscow-backed regime, never gave priority to NATO interoperability (having compatible equipment and common methods and standards), and they starved the military of proper equipment and training. Since 2014, Ukraine's new leadership has wanted to develop a military oriented toward the West. To do so, the Pentagon started training Ukrainian troops, including a National Guard and special operations forces. It has also built a robust exercise program—including such initiatives as the September 2014 “Rapid Trident” exercise, involving over 1,200 NATO troops on Ukrainian soil. This has helped the Ukrainians improve their ability to defend themselves—and sends an unmistakable signal to Moscow.

Finally, and perhaps of most long-term importance, the United States has embarked on a program to help Ukraine reform—and in some cases, rebuild—its defense institutions. They need advice on how to spend their defense budget more wisely; plan for a new navy (which was swallowed by the Russians in Crimea); and to grow and empower a generation of non-commissioned officers. Ukrainian defense leaders
are quite candid that the biggest obstacle to reform is a military mindset that remains largely oriented toward the Soviet way of doing things, so they want assistance in improving military education.

IS “MORE” STRONGER?

Despite these moves to punish Russia, reassure our allies, and provide Ukraine with political, economic and military support, Obama's response is seen as another example of chronic indecision and weakness. Critics blame the reset as the original sin that gave Putin the incentive to act aggressively, asserting that Obama has compounded the problem by responding tepidly to Putin's annexation of Crimea and support for the rebels in Ukraine's east and by allowing Moscow to gain the upper hand in Syria.

Most critics' arguments can be summed up with two words: “do more.” They believe the United States should have been more tough with Russia from the beginning. They believe the United States should have done more to support Ukraine. They believe the United States should have been more involved in the diplomacy to help bring an end to the crisis. They believe the United States should have done more to reassure our NATO partners. And in Syria, they assert the US should have done more to push Russia back.

But what would a policy of “more” look like, and would it have been more effective?

A
S THE FORMER
US ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul points out, Obama's actions are comparable to Ronald Reagan's response to the Soviet-backed crackdown against solidarity in Poland in 1981, when the United States also imposed stiff sanctions on Moscow (but with one big difference—the Reagan administration acted unilaterally, leaving the Europeans incensed). Obama's response was far more robust than George W. Bush's reaction to the Georgia invasion in
2008, Lyndon Johnson's response to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, or Dwight Eisenhower's actions after the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956.
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Most importantly, one wonders how Putin is benefiting from his behavior in Ukraine. Yes, Russia has occupied Crimea and holds sway over seven percent of Ukraine's territory in the East. Both are unacceptable and pressure must stay until they are reversed (and the US should not accept Russia's annexation of Crimea, just as it never accepted the Soviet Union's annexation of the Baltics).

Yet overall, Russia is not stronger as a consequence of Putin's actions. At a time when many Russian officials believe they need to be diversifying their economy, it is contracting at 4% in 2015 numbers. The ruble is at an all-time low. Russia is more isolated in the world community than it has been since the Soviet era. Russia is subject to sanctions applied not just by the United States, but also by its closest trading partners in Europe. And while Russia was once Ukraine's main partner, now the Kiev government is rushing closer toward Europe and the US.

When considering the strategic ledger, it is not clear how Russia has the upper hand. But commentators seem stuck on what McFaul calls the “myth of Putin's strategic genius.” Obama is incredulous at critics who say Putin has been outwitting him: “I'm always struck by the degree to which people buy this narrative,” Obama says.
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Russia's 2015 military escalation in Syria—and sudden deescalation in March 2016—only poured fuel on this fire. Moscow's motivation in Syria is simple: to protect Assad. In Putin's mind, he's defending a basic principle against “outside intervention” to bring down an allied government—as he has angrily watched what has happened over the last 15 years to former Russian allies like Serbia, Iraq, Libya and Ukraine. While the scale of Russia's military role in the Syrian conflict became far greater—with more than four thousand troops and fifty combat aircraft involved—it was hardly new. Russia has been there from the beginning of the crisis as one of
Assad's only allies and chief weapons suppliers. Russian military personnel have been on the ground throughout (after all, that was key to the safe removal of Syria's chemical weapons).

Seen this way, Putin's moves have been driven primarily by fear and weakness, not confidence and strength. He saw his only ally left in the Middle East on the ropes, and therefore Russia had to come to its defense. “The fact that Putin had to send his own troops and own aircraft and invest in this massive military strength,” Obama said, “it was a testament to the weakness of Assad's position.” Russia wants to maintain the only military outpost it has in the region, anchored by a key naval facility in Tartus, Syria. Beyond that, Obama asked, “what is it that Russia thinks it gains if it gets a country that has been completely destroyed as an ally, that it now has to perpetually spend billions of dollars to prop up?”
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With military escalation, Russia showed it could put some points on the scoreboard. Putin's actions have maintained the status quo and saved Assad (so far). But at what cost?

As in Ukraine, it is hard to see how this improves Putin's strategic position. His endgame is hard to discern. Perhaps, some argue, Putin just wants to be geopolitically relevant. Or he has his eyes on a bigger prize: by stepping in where the United States has refused, Russia is trying to fill a leadership vacuum in the Middle East.

However, Putin's open alliance with Iran, Hezbollah, and Assad only isolates Russia in the region. Going after the very Syrian opposition that countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Turkey have expended tremendous resources in trying to supply—and propping up a regime that is Israel's sworn enemy—is hardly a winning strategy to become the dominant outside power in the region. Moreover, it seems likely that Russia's continued support for Assad will continue to boomerang back on Moscow by making it an even more enticing target for Sunni extremists, as the October 2015 terrorist attack on the Russian civilian airliner over Sinai made clear.

While Russia's military escalation has bolstered Assad, it has only made Syria worse—and thus increased refugee flows to Europe, which Putin likely sees as a positive side effect (some have called this Putin's “militarization of migration,” although this probably gives him too much credit for strategic intent). In response, Obama has avoided a knee-jerk reaction and instead practiced strategic patience.