Read The Last Man in Russia: The Struggle to Save a Dying Nation Online
Authors: Oliver Bullough
inherited other values from his
family, and that made him no Pavlik
Morozov. He did not inform on his
own father, although his father
attended secret religious ceremonies,
nor on his grandfather.
By the end of the 1940s, the
gulag camps all across the Soviet
Union contained more than 2.5
million people – a million more than
in 1945 – and a similar number of
people were in internal exile. From
the second half of 1948 onwards, the
police began rearresting former
political prisoners by the alphabet.
‘I have long noticed your anti-
Soviet spirit. You have read one or
two sermons, and you’re already
conceited. You want to reshape
everything,’ said the professor who
taught the students how to preach.
Dmitry, when asked his opinion of
the Bolshevik killing of the tsar and
his family, replied that it was brutal,
and that he pitied the children. That
was an unwise thing to say, and by
now the authorities had their eye on
him. He had always loved writing.
Inspired by the Psalms, he used
poems as a way of exploring the
same issues he liked to debate: his
country, history, God.
One older fellow student asked
to read his poems. Dmitry, a village
boy and untrained in the ways of the
security services, assented. The
student handed the poems to the K G
B.
Prosecutors seized on a poem of
his that described Stalin as an
‘executioner’
and
the
‘first
destroyer’. Father Dmitry’s brother
Vladimir gave me a package of
poems in Berezina, but I could not
find this one among them. Perhaps
he destroyed any other unwisely
political ones long ago. The poems I
was given had gently nationalist
themes, but nothing so outspoken.
‘Russia, I think of you always /
and I am greatly concerned for your
destiny,’ says one. Another tells how
he loves Russia for ‘her tears, which
she shares with him’. I wondered
how many of these poems had been
read by his fellow students.
In the corridor of photos, I took
out a torch so we could better see the
faces in the pictures. One of these
men informed on him to the police.
Who knows what reasons led him to
denounce his fellow student? Often
informers were people who were
themselves at risk of arrest –
children of kulaks, or members of
supposedly suspicious minorities
such as Jews or Poles – who were
forced
to
denounce
or
be
denounced.
Then again, a seminary with its
concentration of believers was likely
to have been a particular focus of
suspicion, and agents would have
kept a close watch on what was
happening there. In the 1940s, there
is said to have been at least one
informer for every six or seven
families in Moscow as a whole, and
the Church would have been under
still closer scrutiny. Perhaps then the
man who sent Father Dmitry to jail
was just doing it for money or a
better flat.
The night before his arrest,
Father Dmitry wrote later, he
dreamed that a cross came towards
him, that he carried it on his right
shoulder and that it became heavier
and heavier, until he woke up. He
was arrested in central Moscow
while calling on a sick friend.
He had to wait until Stalin’s
death
before
studying
at
the
reopened seminary in Sergiev Posad.
He was arrested before Easter 1948,
and the seminary did not move out
of central Moscow until the autumn.
His troubles are not mentioned in
the official history of the college.
Stalinism is too embarrassing an
episode to be remembered at all in
fact, and the book describes the
1940s simply as a busy time when
the trainee priests had to share their
premises with several educational
establishments already based in
Sergiev Posad. The chapel was home
to a social club, the historian wrote,
and students played ball on the open
ground between the seminary and
the cathedral.
‘The schoolchildren with their
cries
and
running
about,
the
grownups hurrying about their
affairs, the students playing their
games – all of this created an
atmosphere of vanity, of hubbub,
having nothing in common with a
monastery. On top of this was a club
built next to our bedrooms and
classrooms,’ he wrote. A reader
knowing nothing of the context
would assume these were the only
difficulties the priests faced, and the
book
does
not
record
Father
Dmitry’s arrest or the undoubted
lesson it must have taught the others
of the dangers of speaking out.
The book does list Father Dmitry
as graduating from the seminary, the
first part of the institution. But he is
not listed as having finished the
second part of the college – the
academy – until 1960. There is no
explanation why it took him a
decade longer than anyone else to
complete his education, but those
were the years he spent in the camps.
I stepped out of the seminary,
musing over the strange amnesia that
had settled over the place. I walked
out of the green gates and pushed
through
the
crowds
to
the
Assumption Cathedral, where the
students worshipped and sang the
liturgy on Father Dmitry’s first visit
here.
The sweet smell of perfume and
the cool gloom were a comfort after
the heat, glare and dust of the yard.
Candles flickered, lighting the pillars
as they towered up to the dome. A
huge heavy gold screen bore rank
after rank of saints in their strange,
stylized clothing.
Jesus said, when asked whether it
was correct to pay taxes, ‘Render
unto Caesar the things which are
Caesar’s, and unto God, the things
that are God’s.’ It is an injunction
that theologians have struggled to
interpret ever since, as it apparently
demands complete obedience to the
government while also demanding
obedience to God.
Western theologians come from
a tradition where the pope ruled the
Church and kings ruled countries.
They are able to separate the two
kinds of authority and create a
doctrine of resistance to secular
authority if conscience demands it.
But Orthodox theologians have
never had that luxury, making the
bishops’ task of relating to a
government that explicitly wanted to
destroy the Church very hard.
Orthodox Churches draw their
lineage back to the traditions of the
Byzantine Empire when the emperor
was both the ruler of the state and
the protector of the Church. There is
no theological basis for rebelling
against the government, since it is
assumed to be from God, even when
that government is sworn to the
Church’s destruction.
‘Every religious idea, every idea
of God, every flirting with the idea
of God, is unutterable vileness,’ said
Lenin. ‘Millions of filthy deeds, acts
of violence and physical contagions
are less dangerous than the subtle,
spiritual idea of a God decked out in
the smartest “ideological” costumes.’
Stalin’s
restoration
of
the
Orthodox Church was marked by
the almost complete penetration of
the hierarchy by the security organs.
Patriarch Alexy I, who headed the
Russian Orthodox Church after its
restoration, was highly valued by the
K G B as an agent of influence,
according to documents smuggled
out of Russia by former K G B
archivist Vasili Mitrokhin.
‘The Russian Orthodox Church
supports the totally peaceful foreign
policy of our government, not
because the Church allegedly lacks
freedom, but because Soviet policy
is just and corresponds to the
Christian ideals which the Church
preaches,’ said Patriarch Alexy in
1955.
Bishops remained sycophantic to
the end, praising Khrushchev and
later communist leaders even while
the K G B were arresting Christians.
Where now the Catholic Church in
Poland is able to praise believers
who
were
oppressed
by
the
communist government, and to expel
collaborators, the Orthodox Church
in Russia has a much harder time.
This is partly because it does not
have a core of leaders who resisted
the government.
Anatoly Oleynikov, the last
deputy chairman of the K G B, said
in 1991 that only 15–20 per cent of
priests refused to work with the
security organs. Priests who refused
to help the K G B were not
promoted, and thus were denied
access to the highest positions. The
last two Soviet-era patriarchs –
Pimen and Alexy II – were full K G
B agents.
Even though the communist
regime is gone, the Church is still
unsure how to relate to those priests
like Father Dmitry who were
imprisoned for the faith. As the little
history of the seminary shows, it
often finds it easier to ignore the fact
that they ever existed.
This identification of the Church
with the state was not new of course.
The Church had been almost
completely suborned to the tsarist
state
as
well.
But,
before
communism, it could pretend to be
serving God by doing so, since the
tsarist government supported the
Christian faith. The Soviet state was
committed to eradicating religion,
and expended considerable effort in
attempting to do so. According to
Father Dmitry, his fellow priests
being trained in Sergiev Posad only
very rarely put up a fight against the
state’s atheism.
‘They made informers out of the
students at the spiritual academy, and
out of priests. They called them in
and started to play on their sense of
truth, on their love of the homeland,
promised them better positions.
Sadly, positions in the Church,
although the Church is separated
from the state, are assigned by the
secular authorities,’ Father Dmitry
wrote later. ‘I was never called in
anywhere, not when I studied in the
academy, nor when I became a
priest. One academy student who
gave in to them, a weak-willed but
kind man, told me in secret that I
was considered a double-dyed anti-
Soviet, a desperate person.’
The name of the man who
informed on Father Dmitry was
Vasily
Petrovykh.
Petrovykh
graduated in 1947 and served as a
priest in a remote village in the
Kostroma region to the east of
Moscow, which was not much of a
reward for co-operating with the
security services. Still, he had a wife
and two sons, so perhaps he was not
given a choice. Besides, co-operation
was so widespread that not everyone
who helped the security services
could be given a high-profile job.
Back on the station platform,
cheap posters announced special
church services in aid of those in
prison; for those suffering from
depression, apathy, desolation and
suicidal thoughts; and for the dead.
The
Church,
despite
its
long
repression
and
then
its
close
association with a brutal regime, has
returned to its role as the comforter
of the lowest in society.