The Last Days of George Armstrong Custer (18 page)

George Crook returned to the regular rank of lieutenant colonel after the war and commanded the Twenty-third Infantry in Idaho Territory, where he fought against Northern Paiutes during the Snake River War of 1866–68 in the deserts of southern Idaho and eastern Oregon—eventually forcing a surrender. In 1871, at the request of President Ulysses S. Grant, Crook was placed in command of the Department of Arizona to contend with Chiricahua Apache. Crook won great acclaim by developing a successful strategy of using small, mobile detachments and recruiting surrendered Apache to track renegade Apache. By 1873 the Apache had been relatively subdued, and the following year Crook was rewarded with a brigadier general's star.

Now, in 1875, he was given command of the Department of the Platte and assigned the dubious task of removing the miners who had been trespassing in the Black Hills to prospect for gold.

Late in July, Crook called a meeting with the miners and issued an ultimatum, which diplomatically suggested that the miners would have an opportunity to prospect the area once it had been opened in the near future, but for the present they must depart. The miners were quite impressed with Crook's forthrightness, and most agreed to comply. They even drew up a proclamation that thanked the general for “the kind and gentlemanly manner with which his command have executed his (the President's) order.”

Crook's ability to reason with the miners can be attributed in part to his folksy, if not somewhat eccentric, personality. He was an imposing man, standing well over six feet, braided his parted blond whiskers, wore canvas coveralls rather than a uniform, and preferred riding a mule instead of a horse.

Nevertheless, newspapers, especially those from nearby Dakota towns, ignored the ban on mining and jumped on the golden bandwagon and promoted these towns as the ideal places from which to outfit and enter the Black Hills.

There remained skepticism in some circles, however, over the validity of Custer's discovery, which was partially due to high-profile people such as geologist Newton Winchell and Fred Grant, the president's son, claiming not to have personally observed any gold. The government therefore authorized another expedition into the Black Hills in the summer of 1875 to confirm Custer's conclusions.

This expedition was headed by New York School of Mines geologist Walter P. Jenny, with escort provided by six cavalry and two infantry companies under Lieutenant Colonel Richard I. Dodge. Although Jenny reported that it would be difficult for individual miners to extract enough gold with primitive pan and rocker to make it worth their while, he confirmed that the Black Hills did indeed hold rich mineral deposits that could be profitable if sophisticated mining equipment was utilized.

Jenny's guarded opinion meant little to the public. Gold had been confirmed, and the rush to strike it rich commenced in earnest.

Red Cloud, Spotted Tail, and other Lakota Sioux chiefs were invited to Washington, D.C., in that summer of 1875, believing that the meeting would pertain to agency business. To their surprise, the government requested that they sign over the title to the Black Hills. The chiefs refused, saying they lacked authority to make such an important decision.

The government, however, promised to reward the Lakota well should they sell the Black Hills. Spotted Tail was asked to estimate the worth of the region, which he subsequently set at between $7 and $40 million and enough provisions to provide for seven generations of Sioux.

The tribe was split over that proposal to sell the Black Hills to the United States government. Those members who resided on the reservation approved of the idea, thinking only of the rewards that they would receive. Another faction, led by medicine man Sitting Bull and warrior Crazy Horse, vowed that this sacred land would be sold only over their dead bodies.

The Allison Commission, named for its chairman, Iowa senator William B. Allison, convened near Red Cloud Agency in September 1875 to discuss the sale. The commission members were greeted with a show of hostility from the younger warriors, who disrupted the proceedings and threatened severe reprisals against any chief who dared sign a treaty giving away the Black Hills.

Senator Allison proposed that the Sioux accept $400,000 a year for mining rights or the United States would buy the Black Hills for $6 million. The offer was declined.

The commission returned to Washington empty-handed and recommended that Congress simply offer whatever value they judged was fair. If the Lakota refused to sell at that price, rations and other provisions should be terminated.

Prior to the Civil War, the government had established an Indian policy that called for removing offending tribes to the Great Plains, where they could live on one big reservation in a region where the whites had no interest. After the war, however, whites became interested in the Plains—both for crossing to points to the west and for settling—and Indian resistance was dealt with by military force. At that point, the government had two choices when setting policy with respect to the Indian—annihilation or assimilation. On the one hand, the military, including George Armstrong Custer, were predictably proponents for war, which did not sit well with President Grant. On the other hand, Grant was becoming frustrated with his failing peace policy.

The Lakota Sioux did not make it easy for the proponents of assimilation to maintain their stance. Warfare was fundamental to the way of life for young males in the tribe. Warriors gained status by brave deeds performed in battle with their enemies. Warfare was both a sport and ceremony and closely related to the supernatural.

Young men would journey alone to a mountaintop and meditate without food or rest until a vision appeared to them. This image would become an important part of a warrior's protection and preparation for battle for the remainder of his life. Crazy Horse, for example, would never enter battle without painting his body with white hail spots, a streak of lightning on one cheek, and a brown pebble tied behind his ear.

Horses were the Sioux medium of exchange. An individual's wealth was measured by the number of horses he possessed. Therefore, stealing horses from rival tribes became the primary target of raids. All-out war was generally waged only to defend their village or hunting ground. Counting coup was the act that brought the most glory upon a warrior. This meant closing with an enemy and, with a sacred stick or hand-to-hand, striking the first blow or wound. A coup could also be awarded for saving a life or stealing a horse. The reward for each coup was an eagle feather that could be worn in the warrior's war bonnet on future raids.

Consequently, the Lakota Sioux would be required to abandon traditional warring rituals and ceremonies and promise to live in peace to even consider assimilation. Those military officers who had experienced the fighting abilities of the fierce Sioux warriors could not imagine these men laying down their weapons and living in peace alongside enemy tribes, much less white people.

One factor in favor of the Sioux, however, was that the public believed that enough Blue and Gray blood had been shed on the continent and for that reason they favored trying a peaceful approach to the Indian problem. By the time Ulysses S. Grant won the election of 1868, major treaties had been negotiated and reservations for the various tribes set aside. Grant made an admirable effort to treat the Indian with fairness. In his 1869 inauguration speech, he had stated: “The proper treatment of the original occupants of this land—the Indians—is one deserving of careful study. I will favor any course towards them which tends to their civilization and ultimate citizenship.”

Shortly thereafter, he announced his federal Indian policy, which endorsed his goal of acculturating the Indians and eventually inviting them to become United States citizens. His plan of action became known as the “peace policy,” due to its intended mission, which was “the hitherto untried policy in connection with Indians, of endeavoring to conquer by kindness.”

Grant affirmed his intentions by appointing Ely Parker, a full-blooded Seneca Indian who had become his friend in Illinois, commissioner of Indian affairs, the first Indian to hold that post. Incidentally, Parker had been Grant's aide at Appomattox when he and Robert E. Lee signed the surrender papers.

The president had initially assigned mainly army officers for duty as Indian agents, but in 1870 Congress banned military personnel from serving in civil service positions. At that time Grant refused to make patronage appointments and instead chose Indian agents from Christian denominations, which then set to work implementing the process of peacefully relocating tribes to reservations where they could be protected by the army.

Grant believed that his “Quaker policy,” as it was called, would pacify the Indians and encourage them to accept his policies. The churchmen had final authority on the reservation, but Grant warned that “a sharp and severe war policy” would face those tribes that would not submit to the reservation.

The president personally assisted in the effort by entertaining many tribal leaders in the White House over the years—including Lakota Sioux chiefs Red Cloud and Spotted Tail. Many of the chiefs toured various cities, and the United States Indian Commission organized Indian lectures in New York and Boston.

Grant also helped to raise funds—both public and private—for the assimilation of Indians into white society. “Friends of the Indian” reform groups also were established and raised a considerable amount of money for education and other expenses necessary to bridge the cultural gap.

Politics, however, played a major role in Grant's Indian policy. The Interior Department and the army, which claimed that they could police Indian agencies better than government bureaucrats, waged a behind-the-scenes battle over the direction of Indian affairs. Even Grant's old military colleagues were surprised and angered over the president's decision to favor civilian control over that of the military.

Unfortunately for all concerned, Grant's compassionate approach toward the Indian failed to bring an end to Indian hostilities on the Plains. By late 1875, the economy was still adversely affected by the Panic of 1873. The public was clamoring for the government to acquire the Black Hills and its gold deposits. The Sioux and Cheyenne were abandoning the reservations to roam free and once again sought to display their dominance over the Plains with acts of violence that endangered the traveling public and denied the possibility of settling Western territories.

The frustration over the Black Hills and Indian raids in the unceded territory finally came to a head. Grant lost patience with the peace policy and was persuaded by Generals William T. Sherman and Philip Sheridan to permit the military to find a solution.

President Grant issued an order on December 6, 1875, stating that all Indians must report to the reservation by January 31, 1876. Otherwise, the Interior Department would assign disposition of the hostiles to the War Department.

This ultimatum was carried by runners to those Sioux and Cheyenne who were known to be camped along the Yellowstone River and vicinity. In all fairness, it should be noted that it would have been extremely difficult for the Indians to move at that time of year even if they had wanted to comply with the order—ponies were weak from lack of forage and winter travel could be hazardous to families.

It was evident, however, that Sitting Bull and his kinsmen never intended to obey the order. They regarded themselves as free to roam as they pleased and vowed to protect their culture and traditions—even if it meant an armed confrontation with the mighty United States of America.

On February 1, 1876, as stated in the order, those Indians were deemed hostile, and General Phil Sheridan set in motion plans for an immediate campaign designed to catch the Indians.

But there was missing one man who was the most experienced and trusted Indian fighter in the country. He had been the victim of the president's retaliation for his testimony at the Belknap hearings and cooled his bootheels in Washington when he should have been in Dakota Territory. There had been one attempt at returning to his duty station, but he had been met on the way in Chicago and ordered to return to Washington to get his clearance papers in order and pay customary visits to General Sherman and the president.

Finally, on May 6, a desperate Custer sent the following telegram to President Grant:

I have seen your order transmitted through the General of the Army directing that I not be permitted to accompany the expedition to move against hostile Indians. As my entire regiment forms a part of the expedition and I am the senior officer of the regiment on duty in this department I respectfully but most earnestly request that while not allowed to go in command of the expedition I may be permitted to serve with my regiment in the field. I appeal to you as a soldier to spare me the humiliation of seeing my regiment march to meet the enemy and I not share its dangers.

Generals Sherman, Sheridan, and especially Terry, who realized the need for Custer's experience, interceded on Custer's behalf.

On May 8, the president grudgingly relented and gave permission for Custer to join the march for the Little Bighorn Campaign. But the Dakota column would be commanded by General Alfred Terry—another slight to Custer's prestige. Terry's best days were behind him, and he was by no means a capable field officer any longer or, perhaps more important, a man of action in the same vein as Custer.

Regardless, that same day, Custer, thrilled by the decision, rushed to Fort Abraham Lincoln to lead the Seventh Cavalry on what would be his final campaign.

 

Eight

First Blood

The strategy for the Little Bighorn Campaign was designed primarily by Generals Alfred H. Terry and George Crook. Crook had experience in the Black Hills and had subdued the Apache in Arizona. Terry was an administrator who had sat on various commissions and had experience and knowledge of dealing with the Lakota. He was for all intents and purposes retired from active participation in battle but brought to the table the lessons he had learned from past events.