The King's Cardinal: The Rise and Fall of Thomas Wolsey (Pimlico) (150 page)

When, early in May, Wolsey asked the English envoys to inform the pope that the trial was about to begin, he also instructed them to inform him of an Anglo-French decision to mount a major campaign against Charles.
¹⁶⁹
This could have been just what was needed to stiffen Clement’s resolve to side with Henry, but not, perhaps, if during the previous month rumours had reached Rome that the French were on the point of making a separate peace with Charles.
¹⁷⁰
It was just such a possibility that had been the Achilles heel in all Wolsey’s plans since 1526. Charles would always wish to sell the return of the dauphin and his brother for the highest price possible, while Francis would wish to pay the lowest, and it was the difficulty of arriving at a figure acceptable to both which, as was argued earlier, had given Wolsey an outside chance to dominate events. The snag was that if the moment ever came when Charles felt he had to break the Anglo-French alliance and so neutralize France, then he had only to lower his price and Francis was more or less bound to accept, for his honour demanded that his sons be returned to him sooner rather than later.

During the winter and early spring of 1528-9 as Charles’s difficulties in Germany mounted, so the need to get the French off his back brought that moment ever closer. At the same time the failure of Lautrec’s expedition and the virtual collapse of the league’s resistance made any reasonable offer by Charles especially attractive to Francis, for after two years of fighting and negotiation there appeared little likelihood that the alliance with England would bring about the return of his children. The negotiations culminating in August 1529 in the ‘ladies’ peace’ of Cambrai, so-called because they were supervised by the two ladies of Savoy, Louise and Margaret, need not concern us. What does need to be stressed, because so often a contrary impression is given,
¹⁷¹
is that the Treaty of Cambrai did not take Wolsey by surprise. Rumours of talks were reaching him as early as November 1528.
¹⁷²
The fact that both he and Henry often spoke as if no separate agreement between Charles and Francis would be signed is not in itself evidence that they did not take the negotiations seriously: to have said anything else in public would have been a terrible admission of defeat which could have served no purpose, except, perhaps, to frighten Clement off.
¹⁷³
As it was, Wolsey did his best to buy off the French by offering them military support, something that he had studiously refrained from doing up until this point, and more money, his efforts culminating in Suffolk’s and Fitzwilliam’s mission to France in late May.
¹⁷⁴
There is some indication that Wolsey’s
inducements had some effect, and, at any rate, Francis was not sure until the very last moment that Charles’s terms were acceptable.
¹⁷⁵
In the end, however, the prospect of the speedy return of his sons was more compelling than anything Wolsey had to offer, and in that respect the English could never have prevented Cambrai. Moreover, it was only the necessity of obtaining the divorce that made it the severe setback that it was. In other respects Cambrai resembled the Treaty of Noyon of 1516. This, too, had appeared to signal a major setback, as Wolsey’s ostensible allies made their peace with the then enemy, France, but in fact it turned out to be the prelude to his greatest diplomatic triumph, the Treaty of London. Similarly, in 1529 Wolsey might well have been able to recover lost ground, given more time, because, as he pointed out himself, it was most unlikely that Francis and Charles would remain allied for long, and the return of the princes was a card which could only be played once.
¹⁷⁶
But time was not on Wolsey’s side, and Cambrai was undoubtedly a serious blow to his hopes of obtaining a divorce.

Cambrai is but one of the ways in which Charles was able to escape the noose which Wolsey had so strenuously striven to catch him in, but in the end not only did he have more to offer than Wolsey did, but, perhaps even more important, he was better placed to deliver it. For Francis there was the return of his sons, for Clement the return of papal territory and the restoration of Medici control over Florence. Charles, for his part, was able to secure better terms for himself by picking off his potential opponents one by one than by submitting to the outcome of a summit conference which would have had its ground plans drawn up in advance by Wolsey. Another gain was that he was not compelled to desert his aunt’s cause.

In surveying the story of Wolsey’s efforts to find a solution to Henry’s matrimonial difficulties, it is tempting to think that he could never have been successful. Henry did not have a good case in law. For him to win, Wolsey needed to secure the pope’s connivance to an act of injustice that would have been at the expense of a close relation of the most powerful man in Europe. Moreover, this act needed to be so dressed up that it could convincingly be presented as being entirely just. In other words, the deck was stacked against Wolsey from the start. However, what has been argued here is that there were times when the cards might have fallen the right way, especially in the spring and early summer of 1528 when Lautrec’s military successes were putting pressure on Clement to acquiesce to Henry’s and Wolsey’s wishes. Lautrec’s death and the collapse of the French invasion of Italy were terrible setbacks, and ones which, like so many others, was essentially outside Wolsey’s control. The French handling of affairs in Italy was unsure, leading to the defection of Andrea Doria and the consequent loss of Genoa and Savona; and, on Wolsey’s own admission, the loss of the latter broke his heart.
¹⁷⁷
The refusal of Venice to hand back Ravenna and Cervia has been given more prominence in this account than
usual, for if Venice had not refused, then Clement might have rejoined the League of Cognac, and this in turn might well have secured his support for the divorce. It was not to be, but short of going to war with Venice, who just happened to be a leading member of the League, it is difficult to see what more Wolsey could have done to persuade Venice to comply with Clement’s wishes. But while the fickleness of
Fortuna
and the realities of Imperial power help to explain Wolsey’s failure, what of his own contribution? It is possible to argue that a completely different strategy, in which the emphasis had been on speed and in which there had been little concern for appearances, might possibly have succeeded and without what was in the end necessary for success, a ‘break with Rome’. Here this argument has been rejected. Given the hostility to the divorce in England, and the overriding need to safeguard the succession, appearances were of the utmost importance. This being so, the only feasible strategy was to apply the kind of pressure diplomacy and attention to legal detail that Wolsey so determinedly displayed. The task that Henry presented him with was one that in his heart of hearts he may not have approved of, but nonetheless he loyally devoted all his considerable intelligence and negotiating skills to it. When he failed, he was made to pay a very high price.

¹
Technically what Henry was seeking would be called a decree of nullity, but it would be too perverse not to use the word divorce.

²
My account is very dependent on H. A Kelly,
Matrimonial Trials
; Parmiter; and Scarisbrick,
Henry
VIII
, pp.147 ff., where very full documentation is to be found. For letters and instructions of 7,000 words and more see
inter alia LP
, iv, 4897, 4978, 5050, 5270, 5428, 5523.

³
LP
, iv, 3140.

⁴
LP
, iv, 3140.

⁵
LP
, iv, 3420.

⁶
LP
, iv, 3400, 3422, 3423. For Henry modifying his instructions see his uncalendared letter to Knight in Gairdner,
EHR
, xi, pp.685-6.

⁷
Ehses,
Römische Dokumente
, pp.14-16. It was dated 23 Dec. 1527.
LP
, iv, 3749-51 for Knight’s negotiations. For Wolsey’s view that it and the commission that Knight had also secured for Wolsey to act in the matter were ‘as good as none at all’ see
LP
, iv, 3913.

⁸
The chief evidence for this is the five or more years that passed before Henry broke with the papacy, but for a specific recognition of the point see Pocock, i, p.153 (
LP
, iv, 4251); also
LP
, iv, 5156.

⁹
LP
, iv, 4360, where it is placed in early June. But Henry’s worry that Campeggio had not arrived in France suggests that he knew that the cardinal had set off from Italy, which he did on 25 July. None of the Henry/Anne love letters are dated but see Byrne, pp.53-85, 430-1.

¹⁰
LP
, iv, 4648.

¹¹
Parmiter, p.73, n.1.

¹²
This the view of the Imperial ambassador, Mendoza (
Sp. Cal
., iii (ii), pp.432-3, 790, 847, 877) and the Venetian ambassador, Falier (
Ven. Cal
., iv, p.212). Cavendish has Wolsey going down on bended knee to persuade Henry not to seek a divorce.; see Cavendish, pp.74-5. For Henry’s statement in court that Wolsey ‘had been rather against me in attempting and setting forth thereof’, see Scarisbrick,
Henry
VIII
, p.153.

¹³
The chief source for such a view is to be found in More’s biographers, Nicholas Harpsfield and William Roper; see Harpsfield,
Life and Death
, pp.40-4;
Pretended Divorce
, p.175; Roper, pp.29-31.

¹⁴
Very much a composite account, so difficult to footnote, but recent historians have tended to favour some version of it, perhaps in part because it makes it easier to reconcile the conflicting evidence; see Elton,
Reform and Reformation
, pp.104-11; Ives,
Anne Boleyn
, pp.131 ff.; Mattingly,
Catherine of Aragon
, pp.178-9, 188-9; A.F. Pollard, pp.221-3.

¹⁵
For Charles himself making use of this explanation see
LP
, iv, 3844.

¹⁶
Harpsfield,
Life and Death
, pp.42-3; Mattingly, pp.178-9.

¹⁷
Cavendish, p.35.

¹⁸
See pp.156 ff., 387.

¹⁹
Maxwell-Lyte,
University of Oxford
, p.422; Mitchell, pp.74-7, 78-81 for evidence that such a visit took place, but it is difficult to fit it into Wolsey’s known itinerary.

²⁰
LP
, iv, 995.

²¹
Tyndale,
Exposition and Notes
, p.309.

²²
LP
, iii, 728;
Sp. Cal
., iii (ii), p.110.

²³
Mattingly,
Catherine of Aragon
, pp.152-60.

²⁴
Sp. Cal
., iii (ii), pp.110-11.

²⁵
Sp. Cal
., iii (ii). p.433.

²⁶
Sp. Cal
., iii (i), p.108.

²⁷
Sp. Cal
., iii (i), p.1018.

²⁸
Guiccardini, p.401.

²⁹
LP
, iv, 4649.

³⁰
Le Grand, iii, p.186 (
LP
, iv, 4865).

³¹
Scarisbrick,
Henry
VIII
, p.153.

³²
Le Grand, iii, p.186 (
LP
, iv, 4865).

³³
Pocock, i, p.212 (
LP
, iv, 4981) instructions to Warham, Tunstall and other councillors deputed to conduct the interview with Catherine; see also Gairdner,
EHR
, xii, p.238 for some corrections to Pocock.

³⁴
Sp. Cal
., iii (ii), pp.884-5 for Mendoza’s account of the interview.

³⁵
In information sent from both the English ambassador to France and from Sylvster Dario returning from a mission to the emperor;
LP
, iv, 4961; see also
LP
, iv, 4909, 5016;
Sp. Cal
., iii (ii), pp.878, 887.