The Kennedy Half-Century (20 page)

By the time of his speech, Kennedy had settled on a somewhat bellicose approach to Berlin. “Seven weeks ago to night I returned from Europe to report on my meeting with Premier Khrushchev and the others,” he began, his eyes flitting between his notes and the camera. “In Berlin, as you recall, [Khrushchev] intends to bring to an end, through a stroke of the pen, first our legal rights to be in West Berlin—and secondly our ability to make good on our commitment to the two million free people of that city. That we cannot permit.” The president warned about the sacrifices that would be required to
protect West Berlin. “In the days and months ahead, I shall not hesitate to ask the Congress for additional measures, or exercise any of the executive powers that I possess to meet this threat to peace. Everything essential to the security of freedom must be done; and if that should require more men, or more taxes, or more controls, or other new powers, I shall not hesitate to ask them.” In the short term, he would need an extra $3.2 billion, additional soldiers, sailors, and airmen that would require a massive expansion of the draft, authority to activate the reserves, and more “non-nuclear weapons, ammunition, and equipment.”

Kennedy’s call for public sacrifice echoed the themes that he had outlined in his inaugural address (“… we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship … to assure the survival and the success of liberty”). He added that he was “well aware of the fact that many American families will bear the burden of these requests.” Jobs and educations would be interrupted; “husbands and sons will be called away; incomes in some cases will be reduced. But these are burdens which must be borne if freedom is to be defended—Americans have willingly borne them before—and they will not flinch from the task now.”

Contemporary Americans may be stunned to read these words. In recent years, presidents have often avoided asking citizens to make sacrifices even in wartime. Taxes must never be raised, nor expenditures reduced in other areas to support an emergency priority. Nor can citizens be expected to serve in the military; that essential element of national defense is provided only by a relative handful of volunteers. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, for example, President George W. Bush called neither for a military draft nor even for a “homeland security and war on terrorism” tax that most Americans would willingly have paid. Instead, he told Americans to “get down to Disney World” and to “enjoy life, the way we want it to be enjoyed.”
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Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were put on the national credit card and added to a burgeoning debt, while taxes were simultaneously reduced further. In 1961, however, most Americans were willing to put the country’s best interests ahead of their own. The Great Depression and World War II generations were used to, and expected to make, sacrifices in order to secure their nation domestically and internationally.

Part of Kennedy’s speech, however, sent a chill down the spines of Americans: “In the event of an attack, the lives of those families which are not hit in a nuclear blast and fire can still be saved—if they can be warned to take shelter and if that shelter is available. We owe that kind of insurance to our families—and to our country.” It was a message intended to convince Congress to spend more money on civil defense.

Kennedy also presented the Soviets with their escape hatch: “We recognize the Soviet Union’s historical concern about their security in Central and
Eastern Europe, after a series of ravaging invasions, and we believe arrangements can be worked out which will help to meet those concerns, and make it possible for both security and freedom to exist in this troubled area.” The president expressed his willingness to seek a solution through “quiet exploratory talks” or either “formal or informal meetings.” He hoped that “military considerations” would not “dominate the thinking of either East or West.” Nevertheless, Kennedy appeared to accept de Gaulle’s assertion that Khrushchev was bluffing, and left it to Moscow to decide whether there would be war or peace. Kennedy closed with an appeal for backing from his fellow citizens: “In meeting my responsibilities in these coming months as president, I need your good will, and your support—and above all, your prayers.”
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By and large, the press interpreted the speech as hard line and downplayed the president’s peace overtures. As expected, the public rallied around their commander in chief while lawmakers approved funding for virtually all of Kennedy’s specific requests.
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JFK still hoped to avoid a fight. What he had intentionally left out of the speech was just as important as what he had included in it. When the Warsaw Pact Council convened in early August 1961, East German Communist leader Walter Ulbricht pointed out that Kennedy had limited his comments “to the protection of West Berlin—thus signaling NATO’s intention of doing nothing as long as the East did not encroach on its rights.” Ulbricht therefore proposed closing the border between East and West Berlin, a plan known as “Operation Chinese Wall” that had been tossed around in Communist circles for several years. Khrushchev approved the scheme, and in the early hours of August 13, East German troops began building the infamous, 103-mile-long Berlin Wall, running through the center of the city and dividing the eastern and western sectors. West Germans were shocked and demanded a forceful response, but Kennedy kept his cool. The press photographed a smiling Kennedy sailing around Nantucket Sound—not the image of a chief executive in crisis mode. JFK knew that a wall was better than a war. Besides, the Communists were showing the world how pathetic their system really was; only failed regimes build fences to keep people in.

Still, the president had to reassure West Germany of America’s commitment to its security. He dispatched a “small battle group of fifteen hundred military men to travel on trucks down the autobahn through East Germany to West Berlin”; the troops received a warm welcome as they rolled through the city’s shopping district. Kennedy also sent General Lucius Clay—the hero of the 1948 Berlin airlift—and Vice President Johnson to meet with Mayor Willy Brandt and boost Berlin’s spirits. The strategy worked. Johnson “rode to the city center in an open car cheered by 100,000 spectators lining the roads. Stopping the car repeatedly, he plunged into the appreciative crowds,
shaking hands, distributing ball point pens, and responding with visible emotion to the displays of enthusiasm.” From a security standpoint, it was a risky move, but it convinced the besieged residents of West Berlin that they had a friend in the White House.
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Tensions over Berlin gradually eased during the month of September. Kennedy spoke about the dangers of nuclear war before the United Nations and began a friendly correspondence with Khrushchev. At the same time, the defense analysts Kaysen and Rowen produced a thirty-three-page memo entitled “Strategic Air Planning and Berlin” that Kaysen sent to General Maxwell Taylor, one of Kennedy’s primary military advisers, questioning the wisdom of using the full U.S. nuclear arsenal (more than 5,500 weapons) no matter the scale of the conflict. Instead, it recommended pinpoint strikes against Soviet air bases and missile sites that would bring a quick and relatively bloodless victory. In short, Kaysen and Rowen were proposing “a plan to wage
rational
nuclear war.” Kennedy, who read at least a summary of the memo, remained wary and asked probing questions. How could the president maintain control once the war began? And wasn’t there a danger of using more bombs than were necessary? He revisited these questions during an October 10 security meeting when Paul Nitze, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, presented him with a four-point plan for dealing with any new crisis in Berlin. Point four of Nitze’s report echoed Kaysen’s recommendations: the United States might be able to achieve its objectives by waging a limited nuclear war. Kennedy again asked how he could keep a limited war from turning into a holocaust. His advisers could not give him a good answer. Secretary of Defense McNamara thought that “neither side could be sure of winning by striking first.” Secretary of State Rusk said that “the first side to use nuclear weapons will carry a very grave responsibility and endure heavy consequences before the rest of the world.” Yet Nitze still believed that the United States could win a nuclear war and warned about the consequences of allowing the Soviets to strike first.
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Kennedy left the matter unresolved, but he decided to send Moscow a strong message about the West’s military prowess. He authorized Roswell Gil-patric, the deputy secretary of defense, to boast in public about America’s nuclear superiority. It was a very different approach from the one he had adopted during the campaign about the alleged “missile gap” with the Soviet Union. Whether then-Senator Kennedy really believed that the gap existed remains a source of debate among historians.
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In any case, his campaign statements on the issue were erroneous. As president, he acknowledged as much by allowing Gilpatric to publicly trumpet America’s sizable nuclear advantage.

At a dinner in Hot Springs, Virginia, Gilpatric told a roomful of businessmen that the United States possessed “a nuclear retaliatory force of such
lethal power that an enemy move which brought it into play would be an act of self-destruction on his part.” The deputy secretary backed up his assertion with specifics, citing the “six hundred heavy bombers and many more medium bombers,” “six Polaris submarines … carrying… ninety-six missiles,” and “carrier strike forces and land-based theater forces” that could utterly destroy any enemy. And to remove all doubt, he made it clear who that enemy was: “In short, we have a second strike capability which is at least as extensive as what the Soviets can deliver by striking first. Therefore, we are confident that the Soviets will not provoke a major nuclear conflict.” Gilpatric’s comments angered Khrushchev, who was also upset over Kennedy’s decision to deploy Jupiter missiles to Turkey.
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In order to close the gap and create a bargaining chip for Berlin, Khrushchev deployed nuclear missiles to Cuba the following year. The end of one crisis thus planted the seeds for the next, a far worse one that would bring the world to the brink of Armageddon. Moreover, Khrushchev ended the Soviet ban on atmospheric nuclear tests and allowed Russian tanks in East Berlin to take aim at American tanks positioned on the other end of the Friedrichstrasse. Kennedy’s braggadocio had backfired; the Soviets were more determined than ever to challenge America’s strength.
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On January 11, 1962, the president reviewed the accomplishments of his first year in office during his State of the Union address.
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The Alliance for Progress, he said, had brought hope and a renewed faith in the United States to Latin America. More money would be needed for the Alliance in the coming year to fend off the challenge of Communism. The Peace Corps had expanded into fourteen countries and given the world “a glimpse of the best that is in our country.” The organization’s main problem was that it could not keep up with global demand for volunteers. And by helping people, the president said, the United States was also helping the cause of freedom. In Laos, that meant supporting a neutral government composed of the nation’s various factions, including the Communist Pathet Lao. Kennedy acknowledged that there was still work to be done in Laos to achieve a final peace settlement but asserted that “the spread of war—which might have involved this country also—and a Communist occupation have thus far been prevented.” Moreover, peace in Laos would help ease tensions in Vietnam, “where the foe is increasing his tactics of terror—where our own efforts have been stepped up—and where the local government has initiated new programs and reforms to broaden the base of resistance.” The U.S. government would continue to help South Vietnam resist Communist aggression. It would do the same for the people of West Berlin.

Black Americans, he asserted, deserved equal employment opportunities, “the right to vote, the right to travel without hindrance across state lines, and the right to free public education.” “As we approach the one hundredth anniversary,
next January, of the Emancipation Proclamation,” the president intoned, “let the acts of every branch of the government—and every citizen—portray that ‘righteousness does exalt a nation.’ ” Nonetheless, Kennedy had avoided making the truly tough decisions on civil rights; the events of 1962 would force him to move farther down freedom road.
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Hoping to put the Bay of Pigs embarrassment behind him, Kennedy avoided mentioning Cuba in his speech. Instead, he relied on the soaring rhetoric that had inspired the nation and helped him win the White House. Like presidents who had preceded him, Kennedy believed that America had a special role to play in nurturing and protecting liberty: “A year ago, in assuming the tasks of the presidency, I said that few generations, in all history, had been granted the role of being the great defender of freedom in its hour of maximum danger. This is our good fortune; and I welcome it now as I did a year ago. For it is the fate of this generation—of you in the Congress and of me as president—to live with a struggle we did not start, in a world we did not make. But the pressures of life are not always distributed by choice. And while no nation has ever faced such a challenge, no nation has ever been so ready to seize the burden and the glory of freedom.”
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The space race is a useful reminder that the rivalry between the two superpowers wasn’t completely destructive, with all by-products generating doom and gloom. The Cold War produced some social dividends, and the contest for space exploration yielded scientific breakthroughs that have made our lives easier. Computer technology received an early boost from the space race, as well as devices as diverse as aerodynamic golf balls, comfortable running shoes, scratch-resistant lenses, and machines that check blood pressure, to mention just a few.