The Historians of Late Antiquity (42 page)

Theodoret provides an abbreviated account of Julian’s early life. After a brief mention of Julian’s pious early years and his inability to build the martyr’s shrine (3.2), Theodoret moves forward to 351. With the emperor Constantius in the west and the pious Christian Gallus appointed Caesar, Julian, Theodoret says, decided to seize power for himself. Socrates had attempted to link Julian’s desire to rule with his conversion to paganism in the person of Maximus, who was portrayed as both treasonous and blasphemous. Theodoret has taken this linkage even further. His Julian, driven by lust for power, decided to learn the magical arts which will ensure his victory (3.3). He traveled through Greece on a tour of magicians and seers who might predict the future for him. An anecdote which Theodoret drew from Gregory Nazianzen suggests that Julian did not so much undergo a conversion from Christianity as willed himself to be blind to its truth. A seer whom Julian met in Greece brought forth certain demons inside a temple for divinatory purposes, but when Julian
instinctively made the sign of the cross, the demons fled. Julian questioned the man, who claimed the demons had left not from fear, but rather from simple displeasure at the tactlessness of Julian’s behavior. Julian, tricked by this explanation, was initiated into idolatry, “so lust for power stripped the wretched man of piety” (3.3.5). Theodoret paints the picture of a Faustian Julian who sold his soul in order to rule the empire. His Julian is also the most cruel and the least learned, and Theodoret provides none of the complexity or contradictions of the man which Socrates and Ammianus give.

Victory in Gaul and the accession in Paris

As war threatened on the Persian frontier, Constantius decided to risk the elevation to power of Julian, his only surviving nephew. In November 355 Julian was appointed Caesar and was married to Constantius’ sister in order to further cement their alliance. In order to defeat the usurper Magnentius in Gaul in 351, Constantius had encouraged various barbarians against him. Magnentius was now gone, but serious disturbances continued in the province. It was expected that Julian would serve merely as a figurehead in Gaul, while Constantius himself and his generals restored order (Athanassiadi 1981/92: 52–88; Bowersock 1978: 33–45; Blockley 1972a).

Julian, despite his complete lack of military training, took to the soldier’s life. His forces had great success in restoring order in Gaul, most notably at the Battle of Strasbourg (357), which was the subject of a monograph by Julian himself (Eun.
fr
. 17). It seems that Julian’s advisors, men appointed by Constantius, made many of the key decisions. Julian often quarreled over power with these advisors, and he maintained later that Constantius had purposely set up his Caesar in Gaul without resources in the hope that the emperor would rid himself of a rival.

After Julian was credited with the victory at Strasbourg, Constantius, who had faced numerous crises of usurpation during his reign, began to look upon his Caesar with some trepidation. Julian and others, it seems, began to entertain thoughts of Julian coming to power one day by various possible routes. A letter written by Julian to his close friend and advisor Oribasius suggests as much (
ep
. 14). Julian recounted, probably in 359, that he had had a dream in which a tall tree collapsed while a fresh new shoot grew alongside it. Julian’s dream, of course, implies only that he would
succeed Constantius, not that he planned an active conspiracy to overthrow the emperor (Baldwin 1975: 91).

In February 360, Constantius demanded that more than half of Julian’s soldiers be sent to him in the east, where a Persian offensive was expected. Some felt that he envied Julian’s successes in Gaul and wished to contain the Caesar’s ability to challenge him. Julian publicly acquiesced and encouraged his troops to do so, despite unrest among his soldiers and the circulation of an anonymous broadsheet protesting the order. The Gallic troops, who would have been compelled to travel thousands of miles from their homes and families, were particularly exercised by the transfer. Later that night, soldiers surrounded Julian’s quarters and demanded his appearance, whereupon he was crowned as Augustus.

Few events in late antiquity have inspired more modern debate than the circumstances surrounding Julian’s revolt, and in particular the question of Julian’s own responsibility, if any, for his elevation. It has been suggested that he aimed at supreme power years before his elevation, with evidence drawn from his military operations in 359, which were said to be timid in order to amass strength for a revolt (Müller-Seidl 1955). More broadly, many scholars have doubted the version presented by Ammianus and by Julian himself, of a Caesar reluctantly forced into revolt, and have presented evidence either of premeditation or of backroom machinations which led up to the seizure of power (Barnes 1998: 153–5; Drinkwater 1983: 370–83; Bowersock 1978: 46–54).

After the proclamation, some months passed, during which Julian corresponded with Constantius in increasingly bitter tones in an attempt to be recognized as the emperor’s equal without war. Finally, in 361, Julian formally broke with Constantius and moved his army swiftly through northern Italy to occupy the Balkans. Constantius began to move his army west to confront Julian in civil war when he caught a fever and died in Cilicia on 3 November 361, leaving Julian as sole ruler of the Roman world.

Ammianus presents a detailed account of the debate among Constantius, his wife Eusebia, and his advisors, as to the advisability of Julian’s elevation to Caesar, and adds an elaborate description of his presentation to the soldiers and Constantius’ speech of introduction (15.8). Ammianus artfully provides an introduction of Julian which is simultaneously directed to the soldiers and to the reader himself. The soldiers examine Julian’s face carefully for signs of what sort of emperor he might prove to be, and then break out into sustained applause, claiming that Julian’s
selection was not the act of Constantius but rather of the divine will. The moment is marked by Julian’s wry quote of Homer, that he is seized by “purple death” (15.8.17), a reference to the royal color, which is matched by Ammianus’ triumphant quote of Vergil, “I am undertaking a greater task” (15.9.1). In addition to preparing the reader for Julian’s future military successes in Gaul, Ammianus foreshadows his future religious policies, quoting a blind old woman in Vienna who heard his name and exclaimed, “This man will restore the temples of the gods!” (15.8.22).

After a short digression on the Gauls, Ammianus begins his sixteenth book with a formal praise of the Caesar, telling the reader that what follows may read like a panegyric but is in fact entirely truthful. He compares Julian to the greatest of emperors, Titus, Trajan, Antoninus Pius, and Marcus Aurelius. He adds that the young Julian’s successes in Gaul are all the more outstanding and deserving of praise because of his inexperience and the surprise with which his successes were met (16.1). Later in this book, Ammianus provides a more detailed section of praise of the Caesar (16.5). His ascetic and “philosophic” nature are particularly highlighted. Julian ate only the common food of the soldiers, and on the rare occasions when he slept he did so in rough blankets. In addition to studying philosophy, he was conversant in poetry, rhetoric, and literature. Ammianus adds some administrative anecdotes which demonstrate Julian’s wit and his sense of justice, and concludes by mentioning his tremendous success in the reduction of the burden of taxation upon the Gauls. Despite these moments of idealization, however, Ammianus frequently portrays Julian in the course of the narrative as fearful or uncertain and prone to human emotions and inclinations. The portrayal of this complexity of character has long been admired as one of Ammianus’ greatest accomplishments (Fontaine 1978).

Ammianus provides us with by far the most detailed description of Julian’s activities in Gaul in the 350s (Matthews 1989: 87–93; Blockley 1972a). While Ammianus’ account is biased, he provides enough information to deconstruct the story he tells. His Julian in Gaul is a military genius who must constantly struggle against the interference of Constantius’ generals. The generals are not so much incompetent but rather are working toward the Caesar’s failure for sinister reasons, and Constantius himself continually works to undermine Julian’s success out of jealousy. Throughout the narrative, details of Constantius’ pompous display (16.10) and military failure (18.7–10, 19.1–8) contrast with Julian’s simplicity and
success. Closer investigation, however, might encourage the reader to sympathize with Constantius’ professional generals, who often gave good advice and who were undoubtedly annoyed by the interference of a novice and a figurehead. Constantius also was clearly responsive to Julian’s concerns. For example, after Marcellus failed to support Julian militarily in 356, he was dismissed by the emperor, and Marcellus’ attempt to denounce Julian at court before Constantius was unsuccessful (16.4, 7). Ammianus relates these facts with enough innuendo to cloud the matter, by pointing out that Constantius’ ears were open to every slander. In 357 Julian had his greatest success at the Battle of Strasbourg, which made his military reputation. The battle was the subject of a lengthy rhetorical set piece in Ammianus, which derives in part from Julian’s own account of the battle (16.12; Blockley 1977). Again the glory of the presentation of the battle is undercut by a stray detail which Ammianus includes, revealing that at a key moment Florentius, one of Constantius’ generals, ensured a Roman victory by overruling a decision of the Caesar (16.12.14; Barnes 1998: 152–3; Matthews 1989: 91–2).

Ammianus’ full account of the events at Paris in February 360 leading up to Julian’s acclamation sharply rejects any conspiracy. His account can be considered a reflection of the “official” version insofar as many, though not all, of the details are present in two other important sources friendly to Julian: Libanius’
Funeral Oration for Julian
(
or
. 18) and Julian’s own
Letter to the Athenians
, written not long after the acclamation in the hope of winning allies for the looming civil war with Constantius.

Ammianus claims that Constantius used the supposed need for troops in the east as a pretext for the withdrawal of Julian’s troops, when in reality the emperor simply envied his Caesar’s success and growing reputation. Julian’s anxiety at Constantius’ orders was derived not from thoughts of his own safety or power, but from public-minded fear for the future security of Gaul after the sharp diminishment of his troop strength (20.4). It was not Julian’s idea, writes Ammianus, but that of the notary Decentius, that the troops should all gather in Paris before their departure. Julian spoke pleasantly to the soldiers he knew, arranged for the transport of their families to the east, and even entertained the officers at dinner. Throughout this period, however, “he encouraged them with gentle words to hasten cheerfully to the emperor,” and assured them that Constantius would amply reward them (20.4.12). That evening, of their own accord, the soldiers revolted, acclaiming him as Augustus
all night. Although he gave a speech refusing the honor, fear eventually compelled Julian to accept, and he promised that he would reward his men for their service.

Critics of Ammianus’ account have often focused on his mention of the officers’ dinner, which Julian conspicuously fails to mention in his own account of the evening. The existence of such a dinner is certainly compatible with several more conspiratorial accounts of the acclamation. Julian himself may have instructed some officers to support him, or others may have taken advantage of the situation to orchestrate the “spontaneous” uprising of the soldiers. Nothing in Ammianus’ account, however, demands such an interpretation (Matthews 1989: 93–100).

The theories of conspiracy behind Julian’s elevation usually rely most heavily upon certain fragments of Eunapius, whose approach to this period of Julian’s life must therefore be carefully investigated. Eunapius, in a manner more blunt and crude than that of Ammianus, claims that Constantius continually sought to undermine Julian out of envy and anger (
fr
. 20). Eunapius declines to discuss the details of the Battle of Strasbourg, saying that he was unwilling to try to rival Julian’s own work, although his own ignorance of military matters probably played a role in this decision as well (
fr
. 17). Eunapius’ Julian nobly restrains his troops from plunder and teaches them virtue (
fr
. 18.1). He negotiates brilliantly with the Chamavi, who respect him as a god (
fr
. 18.6).

There can be no question that Eunapius presented Julian as completely justified in his revolt against Constantius. Zosimus describes Constantius’ attempt to transfer troops to the east as part of a plot by the emperor to gradually remove all power from Julian, whom he envied (3.8.3–4). Did Eunapius go further and provide evidence of a conspiracy, instigated by pagans, to gain the throne for Julian? Two passages from Eunapius’
Lives of the Sophists
have often been misread to suggest this, but David F. Buck has clearly demonstrated the difficulties with such an interpretation (Buck 1993). The fragments are as follows. “Having summoned the priest from Greece and having performed with him certain things known only to themselves, he was roused for the destruction of the tyranny of Constantius. Oribasius of Pergamum and a certain Euhemerus from Libya joined him in these activities” (
fr
. 21.1). Compare this further comment on Oribasius: “he excelled in other virtues so much that he even made Julian emperor” (
fr
. 21.2).

Buck convincingly argues that both of these fragments refer, not to the evening of the elevation, when the possibility of manipulating
the troops remained, but to some time after Julian’s acclamation, as he prepared to meet Constantius in civil war. Ammianus remarks that Julian several times performed secret rites which reassured him that Constantius would soon die (21.1.6–7). Common sense suggests that even if Eunapius were aware of such a conspiracy of pagans behind Julian’s usurpation, he would refrain from discussing such a discreditable fact about his hero in a laudatory history. If Eunapius had recounted such a conspiracy, it would certainly have been reported by Zosimus. Zosimus, however, provides an account similar to that of Ammianus, where Julian is obedient toward Constantius and distressed at being compelled to accept the crown. If Zosimus for some reason had suppressed Eunapius’ account, then certainly one of the many sources hostile to Julian and to paganism would have recorded these details. Thus, although it remains possible that some conspiracy lay behind Julian’s elevation to the throne, Eunapius did not in fact write about one in his
Histories
.