The Great War of Our Time: The CIA's Fight Against Terrorism--From Al Qa'ida to ISIS (42 page)

Second, having the capabilities is not enough—a willingness of the frontline states to use them against extremist groups is also required. And here American diplomacy must take the lead. The State Department needs to be active in convincing countries to fight terrorism within their borders. And the president and his or her senior national security team must actively support this diplomacy. Third, we need to have global partners who are willing to take action outside their own borders when necessary—so that we are not the only country doing so. That’s another job for our country’s diplomats, including our top diplomat, the president of the United States. For example, this is what France did in Mali in January 2013.

The French government, growing increasingly concerned about the threat from al Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), took
action. AQIM, reinforced with thousands of weapons from the Libyan stockpile, had taken advantage of a security vacuum in the north caused by the political crisis in Mali. As a result AQIM was able to seize control of a large swath of territory approximately the size of Texas, imposing shari’a law and opening training camps for jihadists of all types. Understanding that France would be AQIM’s number one target, the French responded, putting thousands of troops on the ground and going toe-to-toe with the enemy, killing hundreds of terrorists, driving them back into the mountains, and denying them a vitally important safe haven. The US military supported this effort. The French are to be commended for this action. It is a model for what we need our other allies to do from time to time.

The Kenyans and Ethiopians took a similar step in Somalia in 2011. Deeply concerned about the growth of al-Shabab, an al Qa‘ida–associated terrorist group in Somalia, both countries acted in concert—the Ethiopians directly with their own troops, and the Kenyans using a surrogate force. As in Mali, this intervention was successful in killing hundreds of terrorists and taking valuable territory from them. Al-Shabab is weaker today as a result. The United States was less supportive of this venture—we had doubts about whether it would work or not—but now that it has, we should be providing as much support as possible.

Fourth, the United States needs to act when no one else is able. Whether the action is air strikes from manned or unmanned assets, action from Special Forces personnel on the ground either alone or in close support of others, or even the use of conventional military forces, the United States needs to be willing and able to act. And the leadership of the executive branch and Congress must explain to the American people why this is important. Leadership is not about following public opinion. Leadership is about guiding public opinion to a place that best serves American interests over the longer term.

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All of the above is necessary, but it is not enough to win the war over the long term, as more and more terrorists are created every day. To win the war over the longer term, we and our allies must address the issues that create terrorists in the first place. We must address the disease as well as the symptoms. We must undermine the jihadist appeal to disenchanted young Muslims. We must discredit the terrorists’ narrative that hatred and violence are the only mechanisms for dealing with the modern world and the resulting pressures on Islam. This effort essentially requires winning the war of ideas. But it also requires minimizing the number of disenchanted young Muslims through economic and social development. Counter-radicalization is a two-part effort.

Counter-radicalization has not been a major focus of the United States since 9/11, but action on this front is just as important as action on the intelligence, law enforcement, and military fronts. There have been steps in this direction, but much more needs to be done. Developing the policies to get at the root causes of why young men and some women join terrorist groups has never really gotten off the ground. For every hour that I spent in the Situation Room talking about counter-radicalization, I spent a thousand hours talking about dealing with young men who had already become radicalized. The dollars spent by our government on programs related to counter-radicalization are an infinitesimally small percentage of the government’s overall CT budget.

It is not unreasonable to ask, “Why have we not attacked the problem at its roots?” The answer is twofold. First, the priority will always be on those individuals who are trying to attack the United States. That will always take precedence over the longer-term issues. And, second, the issues involved in counter-radicalization are numerous and complex, and require a number of countries to take
the right steps. The issues involve good governance; anti-corruption; economic development; social service provision, particularly education; religious tolerance; and a host of other issues. Most important, for every narrative of al Qa‘ida’s, there must be a counter-narrative delivered loudly and widely—by the United States and our allies, by governments in countries where young people are radicalized, and by Islamic scholars and clerics..

One of the best examples of success in this area is Indonesia—the home to the largest Muslim population on the planet. Between 9/11 and 2006, Indonesia suffered sixteen terrorist attacks, resulting in more than three hundred deaths. In the next eight years, there were only five attacks, causing fourteen deaths. And, as of early 2015, only about 150 Indonesians had gone to fight in Syria, a remarkably low number for its population and for its terrorist past. While excellent intelligence and law enforcement work have played a role—and these tools will remain vital, particularly as many terrorists will be released from prison over the next few years—so have the Indonesian government’s counter-radicalization programs.

At the core of Jakarta’s program is a willingness to work with any entity that can reach young people with the right messages. The program is systematic and reaches almost every part of Indonesian society. The messages are essentially two—that the extremist interpretation of Islam is not consistent with the Koran, and that there is great value in tolerance.

Religious organizations in Indonesia are popular within society and are therefore an important channel for delivering the government’s counter-narrative to al Qa‘ida. Jakarta, for example, works with imams and mosques to offer a variety of perspectives on Islam, particularly to youth and student groups. Schools are also a focus—courses emphasize inclusion and tolerance. All the world’s religions are now studied, not just Islam, and schools are working to provide multiple perspectives on some of the issues that have played a role
in radicalization, such as the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians.

Popular culture is also used. The government communicates with young people through popular musicians who communicate carefully crafted messages aimed at counteracting radical ideas. Music with lyrics about tolerance as an alternative to extremism has become popular in Indonesia and indeed throughout Southeast Asia. All of this is supported by a variety of media—books, articles, newsletters, the Internet, television, and radio. TV and the Internet focus on urban populations. Radio stations reach rural areas.

All of this, of course, requires focus, effort, and resources. It needs to be done throughout the Muslim world. It needs to be led by the governments in question. And it needs to be supported by the United States.

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To me this is the most important chapter in the book, because it is about the threat from al Qa‘ida going forward and what we need to do to deal with it. But in sharing my thoughts in this chapter, I do not mean to imply that international terrorism is the only national security issue facing the United States. Quite the contrary. Terrorism is only one of many security issues we are facing as a country. Al Qa‘ida, as dangerous as it is, is only one of the things that keeps me up at night.

I believe national security issues can be put into two bins—national security threats and national security challenges that, if not managed effectively, could become threats. In addition to terrorism, the threats we face include “cyber”—cyber espionage, cyber crime, and cyber warfare—Iran, North Korea, narcotics and human trafficking, the intelligence activities of our adversaries, and others. The challenges we face are also many and include the rise of China, the Cold War–like behavior of Russia, the future stability of key
countries like Pakistan, and historic change in what is still the most important place on the planet—the Middle East.

Of the threats, two stand out to me—“cyber” and Iran. The online world of cyber is now the preferred method that intelligence services use in stealing national defense secrets. Several nations have the capability to attack our critical infrastructure—transportation, finance, energy, etc.—in a way that could literally bring our nation to a standstill. Cyber is used by both foreign governments and foreign companies to steal the intellectual property of American companies—to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars a year. Cyber crime, largely committed by organized crime groups, is now generating as much money as the illegal drug trade. And all of this is going to get worse as cyber tools spread to more adversaries and as even more advanced tools are developed.

On Iran, it is very easy to go immediately to the nuclear issue, but our problems with Iran are much deeper. Iran wants to be the hegemonic power in the Middle East; it wants, in short, to reestablish the Persian Empire, which at its height in 500 BCE controlled 45 percent of the world’s population. Moreover, many Iranian leaders believe that Israel should be wiped off the face of the earth. Iran itself practices terrorism as a tool of statecraft, and Iran supports terrorist groups that target Israel, including the most significant ones—Hezbollah and Hamas. Iran supports insurgent groups in the Persian Gulf that want to overthrow the governments there. It supports the Houthi insurgency in Yemen, which in early 2015 overthrew the legitimate government of Yemen. And on top of all that, is Iran’s nuclear program. Iran is going to be a problem for the United States for a long time to come.

Among the national security challenges, none is more important than China. The US-China relationship is the most important bilateral tie in the world. There are two sides to the relationship—one positive and one negative. The positive includes the economic
relationship between China and the United States, which is vital to both countries’ futures. In addition, based on meetings I had with my Chinese counterparts, there are more global national security issues where our interests overlap than where they are in tension, creating opportunities to work together. The negative side includes the fact that China is a rising power relative to the United States—and that China wants a greater say and greater influence in East Asia, where the US is currently in the driver’s seat; it also includes the fact that each country needs to prepare for war against the other (because our militaries are in close proximity to each other). Each plans for such a war, each trains for it, and each must equip its forces with the modern weaponry to fight it. Both of these trends on the negative side of the equation lead to tension in the relationship. The key question—the key challenge—is how to mitigate the downsides while taking advantage of the upsides to push the relationship forward. This will be a major task of the next president. President Obama began this agenda with his Asia-Pacific rebalancing and in his conversations with Chinese president Xi, and our next president must aggressively move the agenda forward.

The United States, of course, is going to have to deal with all these problems, and doing so successfully is going to require many things—including first-rate intelligence. Why? Because intelligence has never been more important than it is today. That is because without intelligence, policy-makers cannot understand many of these issues, cannot make policy on them, and, in most cases, cannot carry out the policy they establish. Just think about it this way: almost any expert, using open sources, can provide real insights on the eurozone crisis, German politics, or the Japanese economy. But only the intelligence community can provide insights on the plans, intentions, and capabilities of al Qa‘ida, the status of the Iranian nuclear program, or the capabilities of North Korean missiles. In short, this is a critical time to be an intelligence officer.

Dealing with these issues will also require educating our allies and adversaries alike on what the United States is all about. I was struck during my thirty-three-year career how many misperceptions there are of the United States and our policies. The Supreme Leader in Iran and the leadership of North Korea, for example, both believe that the United States wants to overthrow their regimes and is working to do so. That is not true. Russian president Putin believes that the United States was behind the protests in the streets of Kiev that began the Russia-Ukraine crisis. That is not true. The number of misperceptions and even conspiracy theories is large and worrying—because it both creates threats and makes managing them difficult.

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I remember visiting with Afghan president Karzai in Kabul in late 2010 only a few weeks after WikiLeaks, an online organization that publishes secret information, posted on its website and disseminated to several news organizations thousands of US State Department cables. The documents were provided by Chelsea Manning, who was serving with the US military in Iraq. Many of the cables reported on discussions that US diplomats had with foreign leaders as well as our diplomats’ thoughts on a large variety of foreign policy issues. The damage to US foreign policy was immediate and significant.

When I walked into Karzai’s office that day, the first thing he said to me was “Congratulations, Michael.” I said, “Mr. President, congratulations for what?” “For WikiLeaks,” he said. I said, “Mr. President, I don’t follow you. I don’t understand.” He said, “WikiLeaks was a brilliant CIA operation. Now foreign leaders will not talk to the State Department; they will only talk to CIA. Great job.” I jokingly responded, “If only we were that good.” But to Karzai
this was not humor. He really believed it. He really believed that CIA had leaked thousands of classified State Department documents to get a leg up in the bureaucracy. It was an example of the kind of misperceptions and conspiracy theories that abound in the world.