The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam From the Extremists (3 page)

It is important to note that the two orientations described in this book cut through the Sunni and Shi’i sectarian divide. I have not attempted to describe the differences between Sunni and Shi’i theology here because there is an abundance

of published material that discusses those differences, and be- cause those differences are not relevant to the puritan-versus- moderate divide. Sunnis can be puritan or moderate according to the same criteria and distinguishing characteristics as Shi’is. A puritan Sunni tends to believe in the same ideas and come to the same conclusions as a puritan Shi’i. The same is true of Shi’i and Sunni moderates.

MODERATES AND PURITANS: WHY THIS TERMINOLOGY?

Choosing the right terminology to label a set of beliefs and convictions is always difficult. Labels do not just
describe;
they also
judge
. Moreover, what seems moderate to one per- son could appear extreme to another.

I chose the terms
moderate
and
puritan
largely by a process of exclusion. The Qur’an, the Holy Book of Islam, enjoins Muslims to be a moderate people. Moreover, the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad report that when confronted by two extremes, the Prophet would always choose the middle. In other words, the Prophet of Islam was always described as a moderate man who tended to avoid falling into extremes. Hence, the word
moderate
has roots in the Islamic tradition, and it conveys the normative disposition that the vast majority of Muslims are supposed to have.

Those I am labeling as
moderates
have been variously de- scribed as
modernists, progressives,
and
reformers
. None of these labels works as well, for me, as
moderates
.

The term
modernists
implies that a particular group deals with the challenges of modernity while others are reactionary—living in the past or seeking to return to the past. The fact is, however, that the relationship of all Islamic

thinkers and activists with the past is a complex matter. (Is- lamic thinkers and activists, as opposed to secularists, are those who pursue private or public political, sociological, or economic agendas while considering Islam to be their authori- tative, but not necessarily exclusive, frame of reference.) From a sociological perspective, fundamentalist Islamic groups are thoroughly a product of modernity, and of modernist ideolo- gies such as nationalism. Furthermore, whether the so-called fundamentalists are rooted in the Islamic tradition is highly disputed. All Islamic groups, regardless of their orientation, are part of a modern reality which they, for better or worse, help shape and define.

The terms
progressives
and
reformers
are helpful, but they have serious shortcomings as well. Many moderates claim to reflect the true and authentic Islam. In one way or another, they contend that they do not change the religion for the bet- ter but instead attempt to call Muslims back to the original faith. There is no question that the positions of such Muslims tend to be liberal rather than conservative, but the relationship of liberalism to progress or reform is a complicated philosoph- ical question that cannot be exhaustively treated in this book. Liberalism typically connotes the adoption or pursuit of values that are oriented toward greater individual liberty. However, there is no predictable relationship between liberalism and re- form or progress. Some of the worst dictators in history, such as Joseph Stalin and Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser, implemented re- forms that led to socioeconomic progress in their countries, and yet these dictators were not liberal-minded in any sense of the word. Ironically, liberal values are not always achieved by moving forward; sometimes they are achieved by harkening back to tradition. For example, certain aspects of the Islamic tradition are far more liberally oriented than modern ideas ac- cepted by Muslims.

Aside from the issue of liberalism and its relation to reform and progress, there are other reasons that dissuade me from using the terms
reformers
and
progressives
. It might be that a minority of Muslims are reformers or progressives, but in terms of Islamic theology and law, the
majority
of Muslims are moderates. Progressiveness and reformism are positions often adopted by an intellectual elite, but moderation more aptly describes the religious convictions of the majority of Muslims.

Those I am calling
puritans
have been described by various writers as
fundamentalists, militants, extremists, radicals, fa- natics, jihadists,
and even simply
Islamists
. I prefer the label
puritans,
because the distinguishing characteristic of this group is the absolutist and uncompromising nature of its be- liefs. In many ways, this orientation tends to be purist, in the sense that it is intolerant of competing points of view and con- siders pluralist realities to be a form of contamination of the unadulterated truth.

Although many have used the label
fundamentalists,
it is clearly problematic.
All
Islamic groups and organizations claim to adhere to the fundamentals of Islam. Even the most liberal movement will insist that its ideas and convictions bet- ter represent the fundamentals of the faith. In the Western context, using the term
fundamentalists
to describe extremist Christian groups that insist on the literal meaning of scripture, regardless of the historical context of a text, appears to be quite reasonable. But as many Muslim researchers have noted, the term
fundamentalist
is ill-fitted for the Islamic context be- cause in Arabic the word becomes
usuli,
which means “one who relies on the fundamentals or basics.” So the expression
Islamic fundamentalism
conveys the unavoidable misimpres- sion that only fundamentalists base their interpretations on the Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet—the basic or

fundamental sources of Islamic theology and law. However, many liberal, progressive, or moderate Muslims would de- scribe themselves as
usuli
s
,
or fundamentalists, without think- ing that this carries a negative connotation. In the Islamic context, it makes much more sense to describe the fanatical re- ductionism and narrow-minded literalism of some groups as
puritanical
(a term that in the West invokes a particular his- torical experience that was not necessarily negative).

The terms
extremists, fanatics,
and
radicals
do offer reason- able alternatives. Most certainly, the Taliban and al-Qa’ida are extremists, fanatics, and radicals; and linguistically, extremism is the opposite of moderation. Nevertheless, considering the thought of these groups on a range of issues, it appears that they are consistently and systematically absolutist, dichoto- mous, and even idealistic. On certain issues, such as how they interpret the legacy of the Prophet and his Companions, these groups tend to be absolutist, unequivocal, and puritanical, not extremist or radical. In other words, the groups I am dis- cussing in this book are not always, and on every issue, fanat- ical, radical, or extremist, but they are always puritanical. The earmark of their thinking is its absolutist and unequivocal quality, not its fanatical, radical, or extremist nature.

Although words connoting a level of extremism or fanati- cism have their appeal, the term
militant
is clearly misguided. If by this term one means the willingness to use force, this des- ignation is not very helpful. Islam, Christianity, and Judaism all accept that under certain circumstances the use of force is justified. On the other hand, if by
militant
one means the ten- dency to use excessive force, this label is so broadly applicable as to be unhelpful: it would apply to some Islamic groups, yes, but also to the policies of many factions and nations. If by
mil- itant
one means the willingness to use offensive and aggres- sive, instead of purely defensive, force—well, practically

everyone
claims to use force only in self-defense. Furthermore, militancy is not helpful in describing the attitudes of these groups toward women or minorities, for instance.

Recently, some writers have started to use the word
ji- hadists
to describe people like the Taliban and al-Qa’ida. I will discuss the issue of jihad later, but as a label it is misguided, lending confusion instead of clarity to understanding the uniqueness and particularity of the puritan orientation.

Some commentators have tried to differentiate between Muslims and Islamists (meaning those who believe in politi- cal Islam), and typically these commentators try to brand Is- lamism as the source of danger to civilized societies. Both expressions—
Islamism
and
political Islam
— are vague and broad enough to cover any form of Islam that a particular commentator might wish to disparage. In general, Islamists are Muslims who believe that Islamic theology and law should serve as an authoritative frame of reference in any so- cial or political condition. But using Islamic theology and law as an authoritative frame of reference does not necessar- ily mean believing in a theocratic state or imposing draco- nian laws upon an innocent group of people. It could simply mean drawing inspiration from Islamic ethics and morals in matters of public concern, and adopting positions endorsed or inspired by Islamic jurisprudence regarding a public issue. In short, using Islam as a source of authority could range widely from the most benign and noncoercive situations to a full-fledged theocratic state that dominates how people think and act.

Nevertheless, commentators who disparagingly use the la- bels
political Islam
or
Islamist
draw a line between the private and public sphere: Islam practiced privately is deemed accept- able, but any intrusion into the public sphere is treated as dan- gerous and unacceptable. Many Muslims would say that this

amounts to proclaiming that Muslims may practice their reli- gion but that they may not take their religion too seriously. Muslims are permitted to practice their religion within the confines of their private lives, but they may not intrude with their religion upon the public sphere. The exact role that reli- gion should play in the public arena is far from a settled issue in either democratic theory or democratic practice. Religion may play a variety of roles in the public arena without the polity becoming a theocracy. Consider, for instance, the prominent roles that religious parties play in Israeli politics, and yet Israel is not a theocratic state. Even a country like the United States, which in comparison to the majority of Western liberal democracies has adopted the least compromising ver- sion of the doctrine of separation between church and state, is not immune. Recently, we have seen Christianity’s influence in the public sphere increase markedly because of the strong reli- gious convictions of high-ranking officials in the executive branch of the U.S. government. The idea that religion must be kept within the strict confines of the private sphere in order for a worthwhile democracy to exist is too simplistic, and it does not reflect the reality of successful democracies. Imposing this dichotomy between the private and public spheres upon Muslims and demanding that they adhere to a strict separa- tion between church and state, otherwise disparagingly refer- ring to them as Islamists or political Islamists, can only be described as arrogant, if not imperialist.

Curiously enough, Islam does not even have a church per se that can authoritatively set down the true canonical Islam; therefore, the doctrine of separation of church and state, strictly speaking, is not applicable to the Islamic context. The origins of Western democratic theory were based on prevent- ing the Catholic Church from controlling and monopolizing the public sphere.

Early Western secularists of the seventeenth and eighteenth century wished to sharply curtail the powers of the Catholic Church, and in fact, several Western theorists thought that the Reformation and particularly Protestant theology was an ade- quate solution to the problem of religious hegemony over the public sphere and to horrendous atrocities such as the Inquisi- tion, witch hunts, and the killing of heretics.

Islam, however, has had a very different experience with re- ligion. In Islamic history, the absence of an institutional church ensured that religion could not monopolize or control the pub- lic sphere. Rather, religion or the representatives of Shari’a law were always forced to compete to influence the public sphere in a variety of ways. Importantly, throughout Islamic history there has never been a single voice that represents the Shari’a law or the canons of religion. Historically, the Islamic faith and Shari’a law have been represented by several competing schools of the- ological and jurisprudential thought, the most powerful and notable of these organized into privately run professional guilds. Although the state often claimed to rule in God’s name, the legitimacy of such claims were challenged by these profes- sional guilds.

The Protestant Reformation did not seek to remove religion from the public sphere altogether but to challenge the monopoly and religious despotism of the Catholic Church. In- terestingly, among other things, this Reformation sought to bring to Europe a religious and political dynamic that already existed in Islam. Even most European democratic theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not envision that there would be a complete divorce between the state and reli- gion.
1
After the French and American revolutions, secular the- orists developed democratic theory in ways that would have been entirely unrecognizable and even shocking to the thinkers of the Protestant and Catholic Reformations. This historical

overview underscores an important fact that is lost on many Muslims and non-Muslims in the modern age: theocratic gov- ernment—in other words, government that rules in God’s name and that, so to speak, represents God and His law in the public sphere—is anathema to Islamic history and theology. A true theocracy would necessarily mean that there is only one correct point of view in Islamic theology and law, and all the rest are erroneous or illegitimate. Instead of Shari’a being rep- resented by various competing schools or guilds, with all of them having an equal claim to legitimacy, the state would ef- fectively become a church, dictating the canon of the faith and treating all who disagree as heretics.