The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam From the Extremists (28 page)

Was there a theology of “holy war” in the sense of “On- ward, Christian soldiers” in the Catholic faith? The answer has to be no, as the Islamic theological tradition did not have a notion of holy war. Islam lacked anything like the institution of papal authority that could make determinations on the di- vine status of a war. The main difference is that in Christianity there was an institution that could decisively and conclusively award a military force the status of being Crusaders or pil- grims in God’s army and guarantee redemption to these sol- diers. In Islam no one, not even the caliph or a high-ranking jurist, had the formidable power of guaranteeing redemption or rendering a military campaign holy or divine. Jihad simply meant to strive hard or struggle in pursuit of a just cause.

“Holy war” (in Arabic
al-harb al-muqaddasa
) is not an ex- pression used by the Qur’anic text or Muslim theologians. In Islamic theology, war is never
holy;
it is either justified or not—and if it is justified, those killed in battle are considered martyrs. However, martyrdom is within God’s exclusive province; only God can assess the intentions of individuals and the justness of their cause, and ultimately, whether they deserve the status of being a martyr. The Qur’anic text does not recognize the idea of unlimited warfare, and it does not consider the simple fact that one of the belligerents is Muslim to be sufficient to establish the justness of a war. In other words, the Qur’an entertains the possibility that a Muslim

combatant might be acting unjustly, and if so, then that Mus- lim is not engaging in jihad. According to the Qur’an, war might be necessary, and might even become binding and oblig- atory, but it is never a moral and ethical good.

The Qur’an does not use the word
jihad
to refer to warfare or fighting; such acts are referred to as
qital
. While the Qur’an’s call to jihad is unconditional and unrestricted, such is not the case for
qital
. Jihad is a good in and of itself, while
qital
is not. Jihad is good because it is like the Protestant work ethic: hard work toward a good cause.
Qital
—war—however, is a different matter altogether. Every reference in the Qur’an to
qital
is restricted and limited by particular conditions; but exhortations to jihad, like the references to justice or truth, are absolute and unconditional. On every single occasion that the Qur’an exhorts Muslims to fight, it hastens to qualify the ex- hortation by a command to believers to not transgress, to for- give, or to seek peace. Although this fact is recognizable by simply reading the text of the Qur’an, this textual reality has strangely eluded a large number of Muslim and non-Muslim scholars of the Qur’an. Nevertheless, it is beyond dispute that the Qur’an never endorses the military option without condi- tioning that choice in some significant way.

Although the Qur’an does not condone the notion of unlim- ited warfare or the concept of holy war, the historical circum- stances of medieval Muslim jurists, writing especially in the ninth and tenth centuries, deeply influenced how these jurists read and interpreted the Qur’anic text. During this historical period, nations and empires, in the absence of a peace treaty, considered themselves in a state of perpetual warfare with all others. In the medieval age, conquering and vanquishing the weak was an accepted part of the customs and practices of na- tions and empires. As is evidenced by numerous historical ex- amples, including the law of the Greeks, the Romans, the

Byzantiums, the Lombards, the Frankish Kingdom, the King- dom of the Visigoths, the Kingdom of the Ostrogoths, the Mongol tribes, the Crusader states, and many others, through- out the medieval period states and nations regularly invaded each other in a relentless competition for dominance. If nations sought to avoid the danger of invasion, the accepted practice was that the weaker nation, pursuant to an agreement, paid a monetary tribute to the stronger nation. While nations or em- pires of roughly equal strength often concluded treaties of non- belligerence and developed trade interests between them, the fact remained, however, that any ambitious ruler could easily abrogate any existing treaty and return to war. This is why any reader of medieval history would notice the seemingly endless saga of invasions and counterinvasions, as well as the constant rise and decline or fall of nations and empires.

This was the prevailing context during the formative years of Islamic law, roughly from the eighth through the tenth cen- turies. Writing on the topic of international law, Muslim jurists incorporated the practices of their day and age in their inter- pretations of the Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet. Dis- cussing the interpretations and conceptions of medieval jurists is not indulging in mere historical trivia; rather, these medieval determinations have been at the forefront of some of the worst Western misconceptions about Islam, and also have had a sub- stantial impact upon the puritanical worldview in the contem- porary age.

Many Muslim jurists divided the world into what they called the two abodes: the abode of Islam (
dar al-Islam
) and the abode of war (
dar al-harb
or at times called
dar al-kufr,
the abode of infidels). Historically, the concept of the abode of Islam was very similar to the papal concept of the lands of Christendom in the twelfth century.
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Although the word
abode
is a literal translation of the word
dar,
the intended meaning

was the territories and jurisdictions of Muslim authorities versus the territories and jurisdictions of non-Muslims. There- fore, in essence, a substantial number of jurists thought of the world as divided between the territories or lands of Muslims and the territories or lands of non-Muslims.

According to this dichotomous view, Muslims and non- Muslims were presumed to be in a perpetual state of war until Muslims were able to defeat non-Muslims once and for all. According to a considerable number of jurists writing dur- ing this formative period in Islamic law, Muslims must give non-Muslims one of three options: convert to Islam, pay the poll tax, or fight.
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It was not deemed necessary that all of hu- manity convert to Islam, but it was believed to be imperative that Muslims seek to become the supreme masters of the world. Therefore, according to the advocates of the dichoto- mous view, religious differences and diversity were tolerated as long as the existence of these differences did not challenge Muslim political supremacy and dominance. Consequently, war was always necessary to ensure the supremacy of Muslims over non-Muslims. Advocates of the dichotomous view con- tended that in the harshly competitive medieval world, it was imperative that Muslims ensure that they be the dominators and not the dominated. Proponents of this view presumed any non-Muslim nation to be in a hostile relationship with Mus- lims unless there was an agreement providing otherwise, and expressed their opposition to peace treaties that did not have an expiration date—in most cases, they advocated a term of ten years. This view was not exceptional in medieval times. Treaties at that time did not exist in perpetuity—treaties could be dated to expire in ninety-nine years, but some expiration date had to exist. Although dating treaties was common in the law of nations, as far as the jurists of the dichotomous view were concerned, a nonbelligerence treaty was considered an

unfortunate concession to political realities. The normal state of affairs and usual condition was that the two abodes, of Islam and war, would be in everlasting conflict—fighting it out until one managed to dominate the other.

It bears emphasis that the presumed permanent state of war between Muslims and non-Muslims more than anything was a function of the historical context many of the early jurists lived in. This permanent state of war had little to do with reli- gious beliefs or convictions. Rather, the reason for this posi- tion was that many jurists created a legal presumption that unless proven otherwise, non-Muslims pose a threat to Mus- lims. According to the prevailing norms of international rela- tions at the time, unless there was an affirmative agreement to the contrary, every nation or empire in existence assumed itself to be in a belligerent relationship with the rest of the world. Accepting this context as a given, many Muslim jurists pre- sumed any non-Muslim nation to be in a hostile relationship with Muslims, and therefore, Muslims to be in a perpetual state of self-defense unless there was a peace treaty or agree- ment or customary practice providing otherwise. Therefore, for instance, according to many jurists, the Byzantium Empire and the Venetian states were presumed to pose a threat to the Islamic Empire unless they concluded a peace agreement with Muslims. And in fact both the Byzantiums and Venetians in different historical periods signed peace treaties with the Mus- lim states in Egypt and Syria. The same presumption existed vis-à-vis the so-called Frankish nations, but in this case, the Crusader invasions proved that the presumption was justified. Although the idea that the world is divided between the ter- ritories of Muslims and the territories of non-Muslims had a substantial impact upon Islamic jurisprudence, it is not sup- ported by either the Qur’an or the Sunna. Both sources do mention that all Muslims should think of themselves as a sin-

gle people belonging to one nation, but they do not divide the world into two abodes, and they do not say that Muslims should be in a perpetual state of war with non-Muslims. The only abodes that the Qur’an speaks of are the abode of the Hereafter and the abode of earthly life, with the former de- scribed as clearly superior to the latter. The Qur’anic and Prophetic teachings proclaiming that all Muslims belong to a single nation were meant to emphasize the moral bond that unites all Muslims and the fact that Muslims should em- pathize with each other as brothers and sisters. The idea that the world ought to be divided into two camps constantly at war with each other finds very scant support in Islamic pri- mary sources.

The dichotomous view of the two abodes, however, was not the only dominant perspective throughout Islamic history. Most jurists writing around the same time, especially after the tenth century, argued that instead of a two-part division of the world, there was a third category—the abode of nonbelliger- ence or neutrality (
dar al-sulh
or
al-’ahd
)—an abode that was not Muslim, but that had a peaceful relationship with the Mus- lim world, either through a formal peace treaty or through es- tablished customary practice. In relation to this abode, violent jihad had no role to play. In fact, if a group of Muslims at- tacked or committed violence against a neutral abode, this would not only be considered a sin but this group must also be punished and forced to compensate the government of the neutral territory for any damage caused. In the very first cen- turies of Islam, for instance, non-Muslim Nubia and Abyssinia enjoyed a friendly status with the Islamic Empire and were considered neutral states. Throughout Islamic history various non-Muslim states concluded peace treaties with either the Abbasid Empire or, after its disintegration, with one of the Is- lamic dynasties. Treaties of nonbelligerence providing for

trade relations were concluded even with Crusader states in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Therefore, reading the histor- ical practice, the opponents of the dichotomous view argued that a tripartite or three-abode division of the world more ac- curately described the reality of interstate relations and con- duct.

It is important to note, however, that as to this third abode, what was required was a treaty or customary practice preserv- ing reciprocal nonbelligerence and nonviolence. Friendly or amicable relations were not required. Therefore, a group of Muslims could not use the lack of friendly relations as an ex- cuse to violate a treaty or status of nonbelligerence and attack a non-Muslim state. Therefore, for instance, today the United States has treaties of nonbelligerence with many Muslim coun- tries, including Saudi Arabia. According to classical law, a group of Saudi citizens could not use a set of claimed grievances to attack the United States as long as the treaty of nonbelligerence existed.

As Muslim history progressed, the dichotomous and the tri- partite views of the world became increasingly untenable and unrealistic. Many jurists from all over the Islamic world writ- ing especially after the twelfth century, rejected the two- or three-abode division and started theorizing that the world was divided into many kinds and types of abodes. So, for example, many classical jurists argued that regardless of the political af- filiation of a particular territory, the real or true abode of Islam was wherever justice existed (
dar al-’adl
), or wherever Muslims could freely and openly practice their religion. Ac- cordingly, if Muslims could live safely and openly practice their religion in the United States, for example, then the United States would be considered a part of the Muslim abode. Therefore, it is possible for a territory to be ruled by non-Muslims with Muslims a small minority, and yet the terri-

tory be treated as part of the Muslim world. This would mean that this territory could not be fought and violent jihad against such a territory would not be legitimate.

Some classical jurists even argued that there was an abode of formal Islam and an abode of true Islam. In other words, if the territory was governed by an unjust Muslim ruler, it would be considered the abode of formal Islam. However, the terri- tory that is free from the control of an unjust ruler and where Islam is practiced correctly would be considered the abode of true Islam. Put simply, a large number of classical scholars the- orized that the categorization of two or three abodes was too simplistic, and that instead there should be many types of abodes—each abode describing the moral and ethical quality of the particular land and polity in question. Some jurists even went as far as saying that when injustice and corruption fill the lands, the abode of true Islam is to be found in the hearts of the pious.
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