The Grand Alliance (60 page)

In this grim battle the German command was not alone in playing the highest stakes. The events of these forty-eight hours of sea-fighting convinced the enemy, and no further attempts at seaborne landings were attempted until the fate of Crete had been decided.

May 22 and 23 were costly days for the Navy. The destroyer
Greyhound
in Rear-Admiral Rawlings’s squadron was bombed and sunk. Rear-Admiral King, senior officer of the now combined forces, ordered two other destroyers to rescue survivors and the cruisers
Gloucester
and
Fiji
to protect them against air attack, which was incessant and increasing. This delayed the whole fleet and greatly prolonged the air attack upon them. At 2.57 P.M. on the twenty-second, Rear-Admiral King, informed that their A.A.

ammunition was running short, told the two cruisers to withdraw at discretion. At 3.30 P.M. the
Gloucester
and
Fiji
were reported approaching the fleet from astern at high speed under heavy aircraft attack. Twenty minutes later the
Gloucester,
hit by several bombs, was brought to a full stop, badly on fire, and with her upper deck a shambles. The
Fiji
had no choice but to leave her, and, having lost contact with the Fleet and being short of fuel, she steered more directly towards Alexandria with her two destroyers. Three hours later, after surviving nearly twenty attacks by formations of bombers and having fired all her heavy A.A.

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ammunition, she fell a victim to an M.E.109 which approached unseen through the clouds. There was a heavy explosion. The ship took a list, but still made seventeen knots, until another attack came and three more bombs struck home. At 8.15 P.M. she capsized and sank, but 523

out of her company of 780 were picked up from the water by her two destroyers, which returned after dark.

Meanwhile the Fleet, twenty miles to the westward, had been subjected to recurrent air attacks, during which the
Valiant
was hit, but not seriously damaged. At 4 P.M.

Captain Lord Louis Mountbatten, in the
Kelly,
with four other destroyers of the latest type, with which flotilla we had just reinforced the Central Mediterranean, arrived from Malta and joined the Fleet. After dark his destroyers were sent back to search for survivors from the
Gloucester
and
Fiji.
But this work of mercy was brushed aside by the Commander-in-Chief in favour of patrolling the north coast of Crete during the dark hours. Here again was a right decision, however painful. All the night of the twenty-second Mountbatten’s destroyers patrolled off Canea, while Captain Mack in the
Jervis
and three others scoured the approaches to Heraklion. One caique crowded with troops fell to the
Kelly,
another was set on fire, and at dawn the destroyers withdrew to the southward.

During the night Admiral Cunningham learned the general situation and of the loss of the
Gloucester
and
Fiji.
Owing to a clerical error in the signal distribution office at Alexandria it appeared to him as if not only the cruisers, but the battleships also, had expended nearly all their A.A.

ammunition. At 4 A.M., therefore, he ordered all forces to retire to the eastward. In fact the battleships had ample

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ammunition, and Cunningham has stated since that had he known this he would not have withdrawn them. Their presence the following morning might possibly have prevented another disaster which must now be recorded.

At dawn on the twenty-third the
Kelly
and
Kashmir
were retiring at full speed round the west of Crete. After surviving two heavy air attacks they were overtaken at 7.55 A.M. by a formation of twenty-four dive bombers. Both ships were quickly sunk, with a loss of 210 lives. Fortunately the destroyer
Kipling
was near by, and, despite continuous bombing, rescued from the sea 279 officers and men, including Lord Louis Mount-batten, while she herself remained unscathed. Next morning, while still fifty miles away from Alexandria, and crowded from stem to stern with men, she ran completely out of fuel, but was safely met and towed in.

Thus, in the fighting of May 22 and 23 the Navy had lost two cruisers and three destroyers sunk, one battleship, the
War spite,
put out of action for a long time, and the
Valiant
and many other units considerably damaged. Nevertheless, the sea-guard of Crete had been maintained. The Navy had not failed. Not a single German landed in Crete from the sea until the battle for the island was ended.

The Commander-in-Chief did not know as yet how well he had succeeded.

The operations of the last four days [he signalled on the twenty-third] have been nothing short of a trial of strength between the Mediterranean Fleet and the German Air Force…. I am afraid that in the coastal area we have to admit defeat and accept the fact that losses are too great to justify us in trying to prevent seaborne The Grand Alliance

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attacks on Crete. This is a melancholy conclusion, but it must be faced. As I have always feared, enemy command of air, unchallenged by our own air force, and in these restricted waters, with Mediterranean weather, is too great odds for us to take on except by seizing opportunities of surprise and using utmost circumspection….

It is perhaps fortunate that H.M.S.
Formidable

[aircraft carrier] was immobilised, as I doubt if she would now be afloat.

To this the Admiralty replied at once: If it were only a duel between the Mediterranean Fleet and the German Air Force, it would probably be necessary to accept the restrictions on the movements of the Fleet which you suggest. There is, however, in addition the battle for Crete. If the Fleet can prevent seaborne reinforcements and supplies reaching the enemy until the Army has had time to deal successfully with all airborne troops, the Army may then be able to deal with seaborne attacks. It is vitally important therefore to prevent a seaborne expedition reaching the island during the next day or two, even if this results in further losses to the Fleet. Their Lordships most fully appreciate the heavy strain under which your fleet is working.

As the agony in Crete approached its climax, I telegraphed to President Roosevelt:

23 May 41

Battle in Crete is severe, because, having no
airfields within effective range, we cannot bring any air
force into action either to aid the defence or protect our
patrolling squadrons. Two of our cruisers and two
destroyers were sunk today. We are destroying many
of the highest class German troops, and have sunk at
least one convoy.

And to Wavell:

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23 May 41

Crete battle must be won. Even if enemy secure
good lodgments fighting must be maintained indefinitely
in the island, thus keeping enemy main striking force
tied down to the task. This will at least give you time to
mobilise “Tiger Cubs” and dominate situation Western
Desert. While it lasts it also protects Cyprus. Hope you
will reinforce Crete every night to fullest extent. Is it not
possible to send more tanks and thus reconquer any
captured aerodrome? Enemy’s exertions and losses in
highest class troops must be very severe. He cannot
keep it up for ever. Following for General Freyberg from
me: “The whole world is watching your splendid battle,
on which great events turn.”

The Chiefs of Staff were in full accord, and telegraphed to the Commanders-in-Chief:

24 May 41

Our difficulties in Crete are great, but from all the
information we have so are those of enemy. If we stick
it out enemy’s effort may peter out. It seems to us
imperative that reinforcements in greatest strength
possible should be sent as soon as possible to island to
ensure the destruction of the enemy already landed
before they can be seriously reinforced. The vital
importance of this battle is well known to you, and great
risks must be accepted to ensure our success.

Admiral Cunningham replied to the Admiralty message of the twenty-third:

C.-in-C.

26 May 41

Mediterranean

to

Admiralty

Their Lordships may rest assured that determining
factor in operating in Aegean is not fear of sustaining
losses, but need to avoid loss which, without commen-surate advantage to ourselves, will cripple Fleet out
here. So far as I am aware, enemy has not yet suc-The Grand Alliance

369

ceeded in getting any considerable reinforcements to
Crete by sea, if indeed he has sent any at all, though I
agree this may soon be appreciable.

2. Surely we have already sufficient experience of
what losses are likely to be. In three days two cruisers
and four destroyers were sunk, one battleship is out of
action for several months, and two other cruisers and
four destroyers sustained considerable damage. We
cannot afford another such experience and retain sea
control in Eastern Mediterranean.

3. In point of fact, supply by sea has not yet come
much into picture, as, despite loss and turning back of
his convoys, enemy is so prolific in air that for the
moment he is able to reinforce and keep his forces
supplied by air at will. This process is quite unchecked
by air action on our part, and sight of constant unhindered procession of Ju. 52’s flying into Crete is among
factors likely to affect morale of our forces.

4. I feel that their Lordships should know that effect
of recent operations on personnel is cumulative. Our
light craft, officers, men, and machinery alike are
nearing exhaustion. Since “Lustre” [Greece] started, at
end of February, they have been kept running almost to
limit of endurance, and now, when work is redoubled,
they are faced with an air concentration beside which, I
am assured, that in Norway was child’s play. It is
inadvisable to drive men beyond a certain point.

5. I have been able to do rather more than was
foreshadowed. Each night destroyers and cruisers
sweep north coast of Crete, we have bombarded
Maleme, and this morning attacked Scarpanto. Melos is
also receiving attention from a submarine…. I have not,
however, yet received reinforcements of reconnaissance aircraft which I so earnestly requested.

6. Since writing above I learn H.M.S. Formidable
and H.M.S. Nubian have been hit by bombs and are
returning to harbour. I have no details.

Still heavier trials lay before this resolute Commander-in-Chief, to which he proved himself more than equal.