The Grand Alliance (177 page)

Furious will have to do some more work on ferrying
aircraft to Takoradi. Victorious would be well placed in

“Force H.” This would leave Illustrious, Formidable, and
Indomitable, as they come to hand, together with Eagle
and Argus, for the needs of the Eastern triangle and the
Mediterranean. You ought to be very well off by the end
of the year.

Pray let me have your thoughts on the above.

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First Sea Lord to Prime

28.VIII.41.

Minister

Please see attached proposed disposition of capital
ships and aircraft-carriers:

1. This question had been under review before
receipt of your minute, and was again reviewed after its
receipt.

2. The chief difference between your suggestion and
the proposed disposition is in the allocation of King
George V class and Nelson class. I fully appreciate the
attractiveness of sending one of the King George
Vclass to the Indian Ocean when fully worked up, but
after considering this most carefully I cannot recommend it, for the reasons given in this memorandum.

3. I do not consider that any of the King George V

class should be sent abroad until fully worked up, for
the following reasons: (a) A ship cannot work up unless
she has all the necessary targets at her disposal. (b) If
a ship does not get an uninterrupted working-up period
she never really recovers from it. (c) With a combination
of the intricate machinery and electrical installations,
and sixty per cent of the crew being men under twenty-one who have never been to sea before, it is inevitable
that mishandling of material should occur at first. It is
therefore essential that the working-up should be
carried out in proximity to a dockyard or contractor’s
yard.

4. It is unfortunate that we cannot achieve the
redistribution of capital ships earlier, but the number of
ships under repair or refitting prevents this. As long as
both Bismarck and Tirpitz were afloat we had to postpone refits.

5. The situation as regards aircraft-carriers is also
unsatisfactory, but this is due to action damage to
Illustrious and Formidable and essential refits to
Furious and Ark Royal.

CAPITAL SHIP AND AIRCRAFT- CARRIER DISPOSITIONS

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The date in parentheses against the name of a ship is the date on which she will arrive on her station.

Reasons for the Proposed “Final Dispositions”

Home Fleet and Force H

(1) The Atlantic is the vital area, as it is in that ocean and that alone in which we can lose the war at sea.

(2) As long as
Tirpitz
is in being it is essential to have two ships of
King George V
class available to work in company.

(3) A combination of a
King George V
and a
Nelson
is not a satisfactory one, owing to their difference in speed.

(4) In order to have two
King George V’s
available at all times it is necessary to have three of that class in home waters, to allow for one being damaged by torpedo, bomb, or mine or refitting.

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(5) It is considered that the third ship can be in

“Force H” at Gibraltar and that all three ships need not be at Scapa.

(6) If the
Tirpitz
did manage to break out, she could paralyse our North Atlantic trade to such an extent that it would be essential to bring her to action at the earliest possible moment, and we could not afford to have one of the
King George V’s
absent from the scene of operations.

(7) The capital ship in “Force H” should not only be able to resist air attack, but should also be fast. This combination is only obtained in the
King George V

class.

(8)
Malaya
is allocated to Home Fleet, as it is necessary to have one capital ship in the Atlantic in addition to
King George V
class for the following duties: (
a
) Escorting important troop convoys.
(b)
Giving cover to convoys east of 26° W. in emergency. (
c
) To back up

“Force H” for operations in Western Mediterranean when necessary.

(9)
(a) Ark Royal
is not shown in the dispositions, as she has to refit on relief by
Indomitable
and will not be available until April ‘42.
(b) Eagle
is not shown in the dispositions, as she is being kept available in home waters for “Pilgrim” [occupation of the Canary Islands].

Trincomalee

(10) It is proposed to send
Nelson, Rodney,
and
Renown
to Trincomalee or Singapore, for the following reasons:
(a) Nelson
and
Rodney
will eventually form part of the Eastern Fleet, when it is possible to form one, which is dependent on the availability of cruisers and particularly of destroyers.
(b) Nelson
and
Rodney
will give the best backing to the “R” class when the Eastern Fleet is formed, and the combination will form the most homogeneous fleet we can provide as regards speed. (
c
) Until we can form a fleet in the Far East which is capable of meeting a Japanese force of the strength they are likely to send south, it is necessary to deter Japanese action in the Indian Ocean. By sending capital ships to escort our convoys in the Indian Ocean we hope to deter the Japanese The Grand Alliance

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from sending any of their battleships to this area. By sending a battle-cruiser and aircraft-carrier to the Indian Ocean we hope to deter the Japanese from sending their eight-inch cruisers to attack our trade in this area.

It is not considered that the substitution of one of the
King George V
class for one of the above would give sufficient added security to justify the disadvantages which her absence from the home area would involve, as her speed is inadequate to run down a Japanese eight-inch cruiser.
(d)
Depending on the situation at the time, and if war with Japan has not broken out, it may be found desirable to send
Nelson, Rodney, Renown,
and the aircraft-carrier to Singapore in the first instance, as they would thus form a greater deterrent. If war eventuated they would have to retire to Trincomalee.
(e)
Owing to the necessity to refit
Ark Royal
it will not be possible to send a large carrier to join this force until April, ’42, unless we take
Indomitable
away from “Force H.”
Indian Ocean Troop Convoy Escorts
It is proposed to send the four “R” class to the Indian Ocean now, for the following reasons: (
a
) They are no longer required for North Atlantic convoy escort.
(b)
They will eventually form part of the Eastern Fleet, and until this time it is desirable to keep them in waters where they will be free from air and U-boat attack. (
c
) By employing them for escorting troop convoys they will relieve the cruiser situation.
(d)
Their presence in the Indian Ocean, together with
Nelson, Rodney,
and
Renown,
will go some way to meet the wishes of Australia and New Zealand for the Far East to be reinforced.

Interim Dispositions to Strengthen Indian Ocean
It is necessary to retain the
Repulse
in home waters until
King George V
is again available on September 3.

Repulse
will escort W.S. 11, and subsequently arrive at Trincomalee on October 7.

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Prime Minister to First Sea

29.VIII.41.

Lord

It is surely a faulty disposition to create in the Indian
Ocean a fleet considerable in numbers, costly in
maintenance and man-power, but consisting entirely of
slow, obsolescent, or unmodernised ships which can
neither fight a fleet action with the main Japanese force
nor act as a deterrent upon his modern fast, heavy
ships, if used singly or in pairs as raiders. Such dispositions might be forced upon us by circumstances, but
they are inherently unsound in themselves.

2. The use of the 4 “R’s” for convoy work is good as
against enemy eight-inch cruisers. But if the general
arrangements are such that the enemy is not afraid to
detach an individual fast, modern battleship for raiding
purposes, all these old ships and the convoys they
guard are easy prey. The “R’s”, in their present state,
would be floating coffins. In order to justify the use of
the “R’s” for convoy work in the Indian and Pacific
Oceans it would be necessary to have one or two fast
heavy units, which would prevent the enemy from
detaching individual heavy raiders without fear of
punishment. We should inculcate the true principles of
naval strategy, one of which is certainly to cope with a
superior force by using a small number of the best fast
ships.

3. The potency of the dispositions I ventured to
suggest in my minute is illustrated by the Admiralty’s
own extraordinary concern about the Tirpitz. Tirpitz is
doing to us exactly what a K.G.V in the Indian Ocean
would do to the Japanese Navy. It exercises a vague
general fear and menaces all points at once. It appears,
and disappears, causing immediate reactions and
perturbations on the other side.

4. The fact that the Admiralty consider that three K.

G.Vs must be used to contain Tirpitz is a serious
reflection upon the design of our latest ships, which,
through being under-gunned and weakened by hangars
in the middle of their citadels, are evidently judged unfit
to fight their opposite number in a single-ship action.

But, after making allowances for this, I cannot feel
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convinced that the proposal to retain three K.G.V’s in
the Atlantic is sound, having regard (a) to the American
dispositions which may now be counted upon, and (b)
to the proved power of aircraft-carriers to slow down a
ship like Tirpitz if she were loose. It also seems unlikely
that Tirpitz will be withdrawn from the Baltic while the
Russian Fleet remains in being; and, further, the fate of
Bismarck and all her supply ships must surely be
present in the German mind. How foolish they would be
to send her out, when by staying where she is she
contains the three strongest and newest battleships we
have, and rules the Baltic as well! I feel therefore that
an excessive provision is being made in the Atlantic,
and one which is certainly incomparably more lavish
than anything we have been able to indulge in so far in
this war.

5. The best use that could be made of the “R’s”

would be even at this late date to have them rear-moured against aircraft attack and used as a slow-moving squadron, which could regain for us the power
to move through the Mediterranean and defend Malta
indefinitely.

6. I must add that I cannot feel that Japan will face
the combination now forming against her of the United
States, Great Britain, and Russia, while already preoccupied in China. It is very likely she will negotiate with
the United States for at least three months without
making any further aggressive move or joining the Axis
actively. Nothing would increase her hesitation more
than the appearance of the force I mentioned, and
above all a K.G.V. This might indeed be a decisive
deterrent.