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precise or rigid fashion, we all arrived with a body of doctrine of a constructive character on which we were broadly united.

The first paper assembled the reasons why our main objective for the campaign of 1942 in the European theatre should be the occupation of the whole coastline of Africa and of the Levant from Dakar to the Turkish frontier by British and American forces. The second dealt with the measures which should be taken to regain the command of the Pacific, and specified May, 1942, as the month when this could be achieved. It dwelt particularly upon the need to multiply aircraft-carriers by improvising them in large numbers. The third declared as the ultimate objective the liberation of Europe by the landing of large Anglo-American armies wherever was thought best in the German-conquered territory, and fixed the year 1943 as the date for this supreme stroke.

I gave these three papers to the President before Christmas. I explained that while they were my own personal views, they did not supersede any formal communications between the Staffs. I couched them in the form of memoranda for the British Chiefs of Staff Committee. Moreover, I told him they were not written expressly for his eye, but that I thought it important that he should know what was in my mind and what I wanted to have done and, so far as Great Britain was concerned, would try to bring to action. He read them immediately after receiving them, and the next day asked whether he might keep copies of them. To this I gladly assented.

Although I had not had any formal reply to my letter of October 20 on these subjects
1
which Mr. Attlee had presented, and did not indeed expect one, I felt that the President was thinking very much along the same lines as I The Grand Alliance

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was about action in French Northwest Africa. In October I could only tell him what our British ideas and plans were while we remained alone. We were now Allies, and must act in common and on a greater scale. I felt confidence that he and I would find a large measure of agreement and that the ground had been well prepared. I was therefore in a hopeful mood.

P
ART
I

T
HE
A
TLANTIC
F
RONT

December 16, 1941

Hitler’s failure and losses in Russia are the prime
fact in the war at this time. We cannot tell how great the
disaster to the German Army and Nazi régime will be.

This régime has hitherto lived upon easily and cheaply
won successes. Instead of what was imagined to be a
swift and easy victory, it has now to face the shock of a
winter of slaughter and expenditure of fuel and equipment on the largest scale.

Neither Great Britain nor the United States have any
part to play in this event, except to make sure that we
send, without fail and punctually, the supplies we have
promised. In this way alone shall we hold our influence
over Stalin and be able to weave the mighty Russian
effort into the general texture of the war.

2. In a lesser degree the impending victory of
General Auchinleck in Cyrenaica is an injury to the
German power. We may expect the total destruction of
the enemy force in Libya to be apparent before the end
of the year. This not only inflicts a heavy blow upon the
Germans and Italians, but it frees our forces in the Nile
Valley from the major threat of invasion from the west
under which they have long dwelt. Naturally, General
Auchinleck will press on as fast as possible with the
operation called “Acrobat,” which should give him
possession of Tripoli, and so bring his armoured
vanguard to the French frontier of Tunis. He may be
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able to supply a forecast before we separate at Washington.
2

3. The German losses and defeat in Russia and
their extirpation from Libya may of course impel them to
a supreme effort in the spring to break the ring that is
closing on them by a southeastward thrust either
through the Caucasus or to Anatolia, or both. However,
we should not assume that necessarily they will have
the war energy for this task. The Russian armies,
recuperated by the winter, will lie heavy upon them
from Leningrad to the Crimea. They may easily be
forced to evacuate the Crimea. There is no reason at
this time to suppose that the Russian Navy will not
command the Black Sea. Nor should it be assumed that
the present life-strength of Germany is such as to make
an attack upon Turkey and a march through Anatolia a
business to be undertaken in present circumstances by
the Nazi regime. The Turks have fifty divisions; their
fighting quality and the physical obstacles of their
country are well known. Although Turkey has played for
safety throughout, the Russian command of the Black
Sea and the British successes in the Levant and along
the North African shore, together with the proved
weakness of the Italian Fleet, would justify every effort
on our part to bring Turkey into line, and are certainly
sufficient to encourage her to resist a German inroad.

While it would be imprudent to regard the danger of a
German southwest thrust against the Persian-Iraq-Syrian front as removed, it certainly now seems much
less likely than heretofore.

4. We ought therefore to try hard to win over French
North Africa, and now is the moment to use every
inducement and form of pressure at our disposal upon
the Government of Vichy and the French authorities in
North Africa. The German setback in Russia, the British
successes in Libya, the moral and military collapse of
Italy, above all the declarations of war exchanged
between Germany and the United States, must strongly
affect the mind of France and the French Empire. Now
is the time to offer to Vichy and to French North Africa a
blessing or a cursing. A blessing will consist in a
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promise by the United States and Great Britain to reestablish France as a Great Power with her territories
undiminished. It should carry with it an offer of active
aid by British and United States expeditionary forces,
both from the Atlantic seaboard of Morocco and at
convenient landing-points in Algeria and Tunis, as well
as from General Auchinleck’s forces advancing from
the east. Ample supplies for the French and the loyal
Moors should be made available. Vichy should be
asked to send their fleet from Toulon to Oran and
Bizerta and to bring France into the war again as a
principal.

This would mean that the Germans would take over
the whole of France and rule it as occupied territory. It
does not seem that the conditions in the occupied and
the hitherto unoccupied zones are widely different.

Whatever happens, European France will inevitably be
subjected to a complete blockade. There is of course
always the chance that the Germans, tied up in Russia,
may not care to take over unoccupied France, even
though French North Africa is at war with them.

5. If we can obtain even the connivance of Vichy to
French North Africa coming over to our side we must be
ready to send considerable forces as soon as possible.

Apart from anything which General Auchinleck can
bring in from the east, should he be successful in
Tripolitania, we hold ready in Britain (Operation “Gymnast”) about fifty-five thousand men, comprising two
divisions and an armoured unit, together with the
shipping. These forces could enter French North Africa
by invitation on the twenty-third day after the order to
embark them was given. Leading elements and air
forces from Malta could reach Bizerta at very short
notice. It is desired that the United States should at the
same time promise to bring in, via Casablanca and
other African Atlantic ports, not less than a hundred and
fifty thousand men during the next six months. It is
essential that some American elements, say twenty-five
thousand men, should go at the earliest moment after
French agreement, either Vichy or North African, had
been obtained.

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6. It is also asked that the United States will send
the equivalent of three divisions and one armoured
division into Northern Ireland. These divisions could, if
necessary, complete their training in Northern Ireland.

The presence of American forces there would become
known to the enemy, and they could be led to magnify
their actual numbers. The presence of United States
troops in the British Isles would be a powerful additional
deterrent against an attempt at invasion by Germany. It
would enable us to nourish the campaign in French
North Africa by two more divisions and one complete
armoured division. If forces of this order could be added
to the French army already in North Africa, with proper
air support, the Germans would have to make a very
difficult and costly campaign across uncommanded
waters to subdue North Africa. The Northwest African
theatre is one most favourable for Anglo-American
operations, our approaches being direct and convenient
across the Atlantic, while the enemy’s passage of the
Mediterranean would be severely obstructed, as is
happening in their Libyan enterprise.

7. It may be mentioned here that we greatly desire
American bomber squadrons to come into action from
the British Isles against Germany. Our own bomber
programme has fallen short of our hopes. It is
formidable and is increasing, but its full development
has been delayed. It must be remembered that we
place great hopes of affecting German production and
German morale by ever more severe and more
accurate bombing of their cities and harbours, and that
this, combined with their Russian defeats, may produce
important effects upon the will to fight of the German
people, with consequential internal reactions upon the
German Government. The arrival in the United
Kingdom of, say twenty American bomber squadrons
would emphasise and accelerate the process, and
would be the most direct and effective reply to the
declarations of war by Germany upon the United
States. Arrangements will be made in Great Britain to
increase this process and develop the Anglo-American
bombing of Germany without any top limit from now on
till the end of the war.

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8. We must however reckon with a refusal by Vichy
to act as we desire, and on the contrary they may rouse
French North Africa to active resistance. They may help
German troops to enter North Africa; the Germans may
force their way or be granted passage through Spain;
the French fleet at Toulon may pass under German
control, and France and the French Empire may be
made by Vichy to collaborate actively with Germany
against us, although it is not likely that this would go
through effectively. The overwhelming majority of the
French are ranged with Great Britain, and now still
more with the United States. It is by no means certain
that Admiral Darlan can deliver the Toulon Fleet over
intact to Germany. It is most improbable that French
soldiers and sailors would fight effectively against the
United States and Great Britain. Nevertheless, we must
not exclude the possibility of a half-hearted association
of the defeatist elements in France and North Africa
with Germany. In this case our task in North Africa will
become much harder.

A campaign must be fought in 1942 to gain possession of, or conquer, the whole of the North African
shore, including the Atlantic ports of Morocco. Dakar
and other French West African ports must be captured
before the end of the year. Whereas however entry into
French North Africa is urgent to prevent German
penetration, a period of eight or nine months’ preparation may well be afforded for the mastering of Dakar
and the West African establishments. Plans should be
set on foot forthwith. If sufficient time and preparation
are allowed and the proper apparatus provided, these
latter operations present no insuperable difficulty.