The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789 (125 page)

Only innocents in Congress could have believed in voting for such instructions that they were serving their own country. Astute men, including the commissioners, recognized that though Franco-American purposes were in general similar, in several important particulars they were different. Fishing rights in the Newfoundland Banks and the right to dry their catch ashore were of vital interest to Americans, especially those in New England. Boundaries also concerned them: to the north they did not wish to have the Canadians pushing south into the Ohio, and to the west they insisted that the Mississippi River should serve as their border. Spain at this time claimed considerable territory east of the river. None of these matters seemed of such interest to the French as to persuade them to change their plans for either peace or war. Vergennes in fact, early in 1781 would have agreed to peace that guaranteed Britain and America the territory each held in America. Britain of course held New York City and much of the Carolinas and Georgia.

Spanish interests also differed considerably from America's. Although Spain in 1779 had entered the war against Britain, in 1782 it had not yet recognized the United States. Spain's abiding interest was Gibraltar. Spanish diplomats had met secretly with the British in 1780 about the war and had not troubled to notify their French allies of the fact.

The British themselves, though looking for a settlement with America and an end to the war with their enemies on the Continent, wanted to retain their old colonial possessions. Shelburne, to whom it fell to supervise negotiations after he came to head the ministry on Rockingham's death in July, sought to separate France and the United States. If he could play one against the other, favorable terms might be obtained in the European settlement.

To represent Britain in the informal talks that began in April, Shelburne sent Richard Oswald to Paris. Oswald was a Scot, a merchant, and a much more astute man than his political masters in the ministry believed. Years before when he was young he had lived for a time in Virginia, and he still owned land in America. He had money -- made in the Seven Years War and in the slave trade -- and no political ambitions. His manner of presenting himself seemed to suggest that he was too old and philosophical for politics. He was known to Laurens, who had acted as his Charleston agent in the slave trade. Altogether, Oswald was the sort to get along with Franklin; both were comfortable men with few illusions and with their passions under control.
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The two first saw one another in April, and Franklin took Oswald to Vergennes soon after. They did not accomplish much before the summer. Oswald lacked a formal commission when they began, and Franklin lacked colleagues, with Jay sitting unhappily in Madrid awaiting some sign of recognition from Spain and Adams maneuvering at The Hague for a loan for his country. Laurens, whom Oswald had bailed out of the Tower and brought to the Continent, sank into inertia produced perhaps by sickness and grief over the death of his son, Colonel John Laurens, killed in action in August 1782.
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The talks almost froze at one point: Oswald's instructions did not include recognition of United States independence as a preliminary to negotiations; the Americans insisted that Britain must recognize independence before a treaty of peace was agreed upon. Franklin also pressed for accession of Canada to the United States. By late summer all parties began to move slowly toward agreement. The battle of the Saints in April made the French a bit more reasonable; their commander in the West Indies, Grasse, was captured and his fleet damaged, though not destroyed, by Admiral Rodney. The British soon sensed after a secret meeting in England with Rayneval, Vergennes's secretary, that the French were not much interested in defending American claims to the fisheries or to Canada. But the British feared the outcome of a Spanish expedition against Gibraltar. The Americans, principally Franklin and Jay, who reached Paris on June 23, feared what was going on in secret between their ally -- the French -- and their enemy -- the British.

In September, Jay and Franklin agreed to proceed with negotiations if Oswald's commission was altered to permit him to treat with them as the representatives of the United States.
The formula adopted was

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ambiguous -- Congress took it as recognition of American independence; the Shelburne ministry did not and, had negotiations broken off, would doubtless have denied that Britain had recognized the United States.

What happened in the next three months may have taken place on diplomatic quicksand, but the results were solid enough and preliminary articles of peace were signed on November 30 by the Americans and the British commissioners. A few hours before the signing, Franklin sent Vergennes word that agreement had been reached. He did not admit of course that, in negotiating, the American delegation had violated its instructions from Congress to consult the French and to follow their advice. The Americans had not, however, violated the treaty obligations to France, for the agreement with Britain was not to go into effect until France and Britain concluded peace.

The first article of the treaty stated that "His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States . . . to be free Sovereign and independent States. . . ." After this supremely important article, boundaries were taken care of: in the north, a line close to the present-day line; in the south, the thirty-first parallel; in the west, the Mississippi River. The old American fishing rights off Newfoundland and the St. Lawrence were guaranteed along with "the Liberty" to dry and cure fish in the unsettled bays, harbors, and creeks of Nova Scotia, the Magdalen Islands, and Labrador. Creditors "on either side" were to meet "no lawful Impediment" in collecting debts "of the full value in Sterling Money." "heretofore contracted"; and Congress was to recommend earnestly to the state legislatures to return confiscated property of British subjects. This article, which has to be read in full to be appreciated, dealt with the tricky issue of loyalist property. The article slid over the question of how much a recommendation by Congress would be worth. If loyalists believed that Congress could force the states to act on their behalf, they were soon to change their minds. 29

The treaty also provided that there would be no further confiscations of property or prosecutions of persons for actions taken in the war; that the British would withdraw their forces "with all convenient speed"; that the Mississippi River would be open to navigation by citizens of both Britain and the United States, and that any conquests of territory made before the articles of peace arrived in America would be returned.

Agreement between the Americans and the British stimulated the French, who wanted to end the drain on their treasury the war created,

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29

The text of the "Preliminary and Conditional Articles of Peace" is reprinted in Bemis, Diplomacy, 259-64.
and on January 20, 1783, they and their ancient enemy signed preliminary articles of peace. Spain and Britain agreed on peace at the same time, and orders went out to suspend all military operations. The way to agreement had been eased by events -- the great Spanish attack on Gibraltar had failed in September and, of course, the Americans had settled. Spain did not receive Gibraltar, but Britain did cede Minorca, which had fallen in the war to the Spanish, and east and west Florida.

All parties signed the definitive articles of peace on September 3, 1783. In America, General Carleton who had replaced Henry Clinton performed the melancholy tasks of packing up the army and evacuating America. By the end of 1783, the United States was free of British troops except for the detachments still occupying posts in the Northwest.

The celebrations in America greeting the news of peace often included a long series of toasts. Americans lifted their glasses to the "United States," "Congress," the "American Army," "GeneralWashington," the "memory of the heroes who died in war," the "Peace Commissioners," "Louis XVI," "Rochambeau," and others on a list that must have drained bottles and barrels by the score. The toasts expressed joy and indicated to some extent how Americans explained their victory. Understandably, no one drank to King George III, Lord George Germain, Henry Clinton, Earl Cornwallis, William Howe, or to the British army and navy. Had these Americans been more interested in explaining their victory than celebrating it they might have mentioned the British. For the Americans had not simply won the war, the British had also lost it.
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The British faced problems in the war unlike any they had ever faced, and as rich as their past was, it furnished only limited guidance. The war was not just another struggle in the wilderness of the New World. The army and navy knew America; they had fought there before, and had fought well. The war was in part a civil war against a people in thirteen colonies who gained determination as they fought and sacrificed. The military problems of dealing with this people were baffling; not only were they at a great distance and scattered from Maine to Florida, they were full of surprises. Few in Britain had imagined that the Americans could pull themselves together and create a central government

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and an army -- and then fight year after year. Fewer still sensed their "political enthusiasm," as Burke had styled their near-fanaticism for selfgovernment.

The successful conduct of a war required that the objectives of the war be stated. Because the British did not fully understand the struggle they were engaged in, they failed to think through their purposes -most importantly their political purposes. Did they mean to crush their colonies militarily by destroying the institutions the Americans created to carry on the conflict? Or, did they mean to achieve a reconciliation by a blend of firmness and conciliation, limiting the effectiveness of the American army and thus allowing the loyalists to assert political control? With no clear objective laid out, strategy and military operations followed an erratic course even before the entrance of the French. The belligerence of the French transformed the problems the British faced but produced no greater clarity.

Failures in political comprehension were responsible in part for failures in command, strategy, and operations. Command remained a difficult problem for the ministry throughout the war. Britain did not send brilliant generals to America; as a tactician, especially in the heat of battle, Cornwallis may have been the best. The commanders in chief, William Howe and Henry Clinton, lacked strategic vision and daring. Their government probably could not have supplied them with these qualities but it could have given them firm direction and, had it possessed energy itself, might have infused them with drive and zeal. The government at home failed, however, to direct and to stimulate its generals.

Nor did if use the navy well. Before 1778, the sea belonged to Britain. France's decision to fight changed all that, but the ministry never really tried to assert its control of the sea. Instead, on the insistence of Sandwich, it kept much of its strength at home while the French, who showed no great imagination themselves, operated pretty much as they wanted to in the West Indies until Rodney defeated Grasse in 1782. And by then there was no saving the colonies from independence.

British command in America suffered from still other disabilities. Every commander in chief knew that reinforcements would be difficult to come by, knowledge which bred caution in leaders already convinced that battle must be risked only as a last resort. Naval commanders were more prepared to seek out the enemy. But Keppel proved unwilling to try to blockade the. French in their European bases, and in America Arbuthnot was simply sluggish. There was another problem: the scarcity, age, and decrepitude of many British ships.