The Gathering Storm: The Second World War (92 page)

No more decisive stopper on a positive amphibious plan can be imagined, nor have I seen a Government or Minister who would have overridden it. Under the prevailing arrangement, the Chiefs of Staff worked as a separate and largely independent body without guidance or direction from the Prime Minister or any effective representative of the supreme executive power. Moreover, the leaders of the three services had not yet got the conception of war as a whole, and were influenced unduly by the departmental outlook of their own services. They met together, after talking things over with their respective Ministers, and issued
aides-mémoires
or memoranda which carried enormous weight. Here was the fatal weakness of our system of conducting war at this time.

When I became aware of this right-about-turn, I was indignant, and questioned searchingly the officers concerned. It was soon plain to me that all professional opinion was now adverse to the operation which only a few days before it had spontaneously espoused. Of course, there was at hand, in passionate ardour for action and glory, Sir Roger Keyes. He was scornful of these belated fears and second thoughts. He volunteered to lead a handful of older ships with the necessary transports into Trondheim Fiord, land the troops and storm the place, before the Germans got any stronger. Roger Keyes had formidable credentials of achievement. In him there burned a flame. It was suggested in the May debates that “the iron of the Dardanelles had entered into my soul,” meaning that on account of my downfall on that occasion I had no longer the capacity to dare; but this was really not true. The difficulties of acting from a subordinate position in the violent manner required are of the first magnitude.

Moreover, the personal relations of the high naval figures involved were peculiar. Roger Keyes, like Lord Cork, was senior to the Commander-in-Chief and the First Sea Lord. Admiral Pound had been for two years Keyes’ staff officer in the Mediterranean. For me to take Roger Keyes’ advice against his would have entailed his resignation, and Admiral Forbes might well have asked to be relieved of his command. It was certainly not my duty in the position I held to confront the Prime-Minister and my War Cabinet colleagues with these personal dramas at such a time and upon an operation which, for all its attractiveness and interest, was essentially minor even in relation to the Norwegian campaign, to say nothing of the general war. I therefore had no doubt that we must accept the Staff view in spite of their change of mind, and the obvious objections that could be raised against their mutilated plan.

I accordingly submitted to the abandonment of “Hammer.” I reported the facts to the Prime Minister on the afternoon of the eighteenth, and though bitterly disappointed he, like me, had no choice but to accept the new position. In war, as in life, it is often necessary, when some cherished scheme has failed, to take up the best alternative open, and if so, it is folly not to work for it with all your might. I therefore turned my guns round too. I reported in writing to the Co-ordinating Committee on April 19 as follows:

1. The considerable advance made by Carton de Wiart, the very easy landings we have had from Andalsnes and other ports in this southern fiord, the indiscretions of the press pointing to a storm of Trondheim, and the very heavy naval forces required for this operation called “Hammer,” with the undoubted major risk of keeping so many valuable ships so many hours under close air attack, have led the Chiefs of Staff and their deputies to advise that there should be a complete alteration of the emphasis between the two pincer attacks and the centre attack; in the following sense: that the main weight should be thrown into the northern and southern pincers, and that the central attack on Trondheim should be reduced to a demonstration.

2. Owing to the rapidity with which events and opinions have moved, it became necessary to take a decision of which the Prime Minister has approved, as set out above, and orders are being issued accordingly.

3. It is proposed to encourage the idea that a central attack upon Trondheim is afoot, and to emphasise this by a bombardment by battleships of the outer forts at the suitable moment.

4. Every effort will be made to strengthen Carton de Wiart with artillery, without which his force is not well-composed.

5. All the troops we have now under orders for “Hammer” will be shoved in as quickly as possible, mostly in warships, at the various ports of the Romsdal Fiord to press on to Dombas, and then, some delaying force being sent southward to the Norwegian main front, the bulk will turn north towards Trondheim. There is already one brigade (Morgan’s) ashore beyond Andalsnes with the six hundred marines. The brigade from France and the supporting Territorial brigade will all be thrown in here as quickly as possible. This should enable Dombas to be secured, and the control to be extended to the more easterly of the two Norwegian railways running from Oslo to Trondheim, Storen being a particularly advantageous point. The destination of the second demibrigade of Chasseurs Alpins, the two battalions of the French Foreign Legion, and the thousand Canadians, can for today or tomorrow be left open.

6. The position of the Namsos force must be regarded as somewhat hazardous, but its commander is used to taking risks. On the other hand, it is not seen why we cannot bring decisive superiority to bear along the Andalsnes-Dombas railway, and operate as occasion serves beyond that most important point, the object being the isolation of Trondheim and its capture.

7. Although this change of emphasis is to be deprecated on account of its being a change, it must be recognised that we move from a more hazardous to a less hazardous operation, and greatly reduce the strain upon the Navy involved in “Hammer.” It would seem that our results would be equally achieved by the safer plan, and it does not follow that they will be delayed. We can certainly get more men sooner onto Norwegian soil by this method than the other.

8. It is not possible to deprive Narvik of its battleships at the moment when we have urged strenuous action.
Warspite
has therefore been ordered to return [there]. Some further reinforcement will be required for Narvik, which must be studied at once. The Canadians should be considered.

9. At the same time, the sweep of the Skagerrak will now become possible to clear away the enemy anti-submarine craft and aid our submarines.

The next day I explained to the War Cabinet the circumstances in which it had been decided to call off the direct assault on Trondheim, and stated that the new plan which the Prime Minister had approved was, broadly, to send the whole of the 1st Light Division of Chasseurs Alpins to General Carton de Wiart for his attack on the Trondheim area from the north and to send the regular brigades from France to reinforce Brigadier Morgan, who had landed at Andalsnes and had pushed on troops to hold Dombas. Another Territorial brigade would be put in on the southern line. It might be possible to push part of this southern force right forward to reinforce the Norwegians on the Oslo front. We had been fortunate in getting all our troops ashore, without loss so far (except of the ship carrying all Brigadier Morgan’s vehicles), and the present plans provided for the disembarkation of some twenty-five thousand men by the end of the first week in May. The French had offered two further light divisions. The chief limiting factor was the provision of the necessary bases and lines of communication on which the forces were to be maintained. The bases would be liable to heavy air attack.

The Secretary of State for War then said that the new plan was little less hazardous than the direct attack on Trondheim. Until we had secured the Trondheim aerodrome, little could be done to offset the heavy scale of enemy air attack. Nor was it altogether correct to describe the new plan as a “pincer movement” against Trondheim, since while the northern force would bring pressure to bear in the near future, the first task of the southern force must be to secure themselves against a German attack from the south. It might well be a month before any serious move could be made against Trondheim from this direction. This was a sound criticism. General Ironside, however, strongly supported the new movement, expressing the hope that General Carton de Wiart, who when reinforced by the French would have, he said, quite a large force at his disposal, a large part of which would be highly mobile, might get astride of the railway from Trondheim to Sweden. The troops already at Dombas had no guns or transport. They should, however, be able to hold a defensive position. I then added that the direct assault on Trondheim had been deemed to involve undue risk both to the Fleet and to our landing-parties. If in the course of a successful assault the Fleet were to lose a capital ship by enemy air action, this loss would have to be set against the success of the operation. Again, it was obvious that the landing-parties might suffer heavy casualties, and General Massy took the view that the stake was out of proportion to the results desired, particularly as these could be obtained by other methods. The Secretary of State for War, having justly pointed out that these other methods offered no sure or satisfactory solution, was content they should be tried. It was evident to us all that we had, in fact, only a choice of unpleasant courses before us, and also a compulsion to act. The War Cabinet endorsed the transformation of the plan against Trondheim.

I now reverted to Narvik, which seemed at once more important and more feasible since the attack on Trondheim was abandoned, and addressed a note to my Committee as follows:

The importance and urgency of reaching a decision at Narvik can hardly be overrated. If the operations become static, the situation will deteriorate for us. When the ice melts in the Gulf of Bothnia, at the latest in a month from now, the Germans may demand of the Swedes free passage for their troops through the ore-field in order to reinforce their people in Narvik, and may also demand control of the ore-field. They might promise Sweden that if she agreed to this in the far North, she would be let entirely alone in the rest of the country. Anyhow, we ought to take it for granted that the Germans will try to enter the ore-field and carry succour to the Narvik garrison by force or favour. We have, therefore, at the outside only a month to spare.

2. In this month we have not only to reduce and capture the town and the landed Germans, but to get up the railway to the Swedish frontier and to secure an effective well-defended seaplane base on some lake, in order, if we cannot obtain control of the ore-field, to prevent its being worked under German control. It would seem necessary that at least three thousand [more] good troops should be directed upon Narvik forthwith, and should reach there by the end of the first week in May at latest. The orders for this should be given now, as nothing will be easier than to divert the troops if in the meanwhile the situation is cleared up. It would be a great administrative advantage if these troops were British, but if this cannot be managed for any reason, could not the leading brigade of the Second French Light Division be directed upon Narvik? There ought to be no undue danger in bringing a big ship into Skjel Fiord or thereabouts.

3. I should be very glad if the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff could consult with an officer of equal standing in the War Office upon how this need can be met, together with ships and times. Failure to take Narvik will be a major disaster, and will carry with it the control by Germany of the ore-field.

The general position as it was viewed at this moment cannot be better stated than in a paper written by General Ismay on April 21.

The object of operations at Narvik is to capture the town and obtain possession of the railway to the Swedish frontier. We should then be in a position to put a force, if necessary, into the Gullivare ore-fields, the possession of which is the main objective of the whole of the operations in Scandinavia.

As soon as the ice melts in Lulea in about a month’s time, we must expect that the Germans will obtain, by threats or force, a passage for their troops in order that they themselves may secure Gullivare and perhaps go forward and reinforce their troops at Narvik. It is, therefore, essential that Narvik should be liquidated in about a month.

The object of operations in the Trondheim area is to capture Trondheim, and thereby obtain a base for further operations in Central Norway, and Sweden if necessary. Landings have been made at Namsos on the north of Trondheim and Andalsnes on the south. The intention is that the Namsos force will establish itself astride the railway running eastward from Trondheim, thus encircling the Germans there on the east and northeast. The force landed at Andalsnes has as its first role the occupation of a defensive position, in co-operation with the Norwegians at Lillehammer, to block any reinforcement of Trondheim from the main German landing at Oslo. The road and railways between Oslo and Trondheim have both to be covered. When this has been achieved, some troops will work northward and bring pressure to bear on Trondheim from the south.

At the present moment our main attention is directed to the Trondheim area. It is essential to support the Norwegians and ensure that Trondheim is not reinforced. The capture of Narvik is not at the present moment so urgent, but it will become increasingly so as the thaw in the Gulf of Bothnia approaches. If Sweden enters the war, Narvik becomes the vital spot.

The operations in Central Norway which are now being undertaken are of an extremely hazardous nature, and we are confronted with serious difficulties. Among these, the chief are:

First, that the urgent need of coming to the assistance of the Norwegians without delay has forced us to throw ashore hastily improvised forces – making use of whatever was readily available.

Secondly, that our entry into Norway is perforce through bases which are inadequate for the maintenance of big formations.