The Gathering Storm: The Second World War (105 page)

When I had had the first tank made twenty-five years before, I turned to Tennyson d’Eyncourt, Director of Naval Construction, to solve the problem. Accordingly I broached the subject in November to Sir Stanley Goodall, who now held this most important office, and one of his ablest assistants, Mr. Hopkins, was put in charge with a grant of one hundred thousand pounds for experiments. The design and manufacture of a working model was completed in six weeks by Messrs. Ruston-Bucyrus of Lincoln. This suggestive little machine, about three feet long, performed excellently in the Admiralty basement on a floor of sand. Having obtained the active support of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Ironside, and other British military experts, I invited the Prime Minister and several of his colleagues to a demonstration. Later I took it over to France and exhibited it both to General Gamelin and later on to General Georges, who expressed approving interest. On December 6, I was assured that immediate orders and absolute priority would produce two hundred of these machines by March, 1941. At the same time it was suggested that a bigger machine might dig a trench wide enough for tanks.

On February 7, 1940, Cabinet and Treasury approval were given for the construction of two hundred narrow “infantry” and forty wide “officer” machines. The design was so novel that trial units of the main components had first to be built. In April, a hitch occurred. We had hitherto relied on a single Merlin-Marine type of engine, but now the Air Ministry wanted all these, and another heavier and larger engine had to be accepted instead. The machine in its final form weighed over a hundred tons, was seventy-seven feet long, and eight feet high. This mammoth mole could cut in loam a trench five feet deep and seven-and-a-half feet wide at half-a-mile an hour, involving the movement of eight thousand tons of soil. In March, 1940, the whole process of manufacture was transferred to a special department of the Ministry of Supply. The utmost secrecy was maintained by the three hundred and fifty firms involved in making the separate parts, or in assembling them at selected centres. Geological analysis was made of the soil of Northern France and Belgium, and several suitable areas were found where the machine could be used as part of a great offensive battle plan.

But all this labour, requiring at every stage so many people to be convinced or persuaded, led to nothing. A very different form of warfare was soon to descend upon us like an avalanche, sweeping all before it. As will presently be seen, I lost no time in casting aside these elaborate plans and releasing the resources they involved. A few specimens alone were finished and preserved for some special tactical problem or for cutting emergency anti-tank obstacles. By May, 1943, we had only the pilot model, four narrow and five wide machines, made or making. After seeing the full-sized pilot model perform with astonishing efficiency, I minuted “cancel and wind up the four of the five ‘officer’ type, but keep the four ‘infantry’-type in good order. Their turn may come.” These survivors were kept in store until the summer of 1945, when the Siegfried Line being pierced by other methods, all except one was dismantled. Such was the tale of “Cultivator Number 6.” I am responsible but impenitent.

Appendix K, Book II

B
RITISH
M
ERCHANT
V
ESSELS
L
OST
BY
E
NEMY
A
CTION
D
URING THE
F
IRST
E
IGHT
M
ONTHS OF THE
W
AR

(
Numbers of ships shown in parentheses
)

Appendix L, Book II

OPERATION “ROYAL MARINE”

1. It will be possible to begin the naval operation at any time at twenty-four hours’ notice after March 12. At that time there will, as planned, be available two thousand fluvial mines of the naval type, comprising three variants. Thereafter a regular minimum supply of one thousand per week has been arranged. The detachment of British sailors is on the spot, and the material is ready. All local arrangements have been made with the French through General Gamelin and Admiral Darlan. These mines will, it is believed, affect the river for the first hundred miles below Karlsruhe. There is always risk in keeping men and peculiar material teed-up so close (four to six miles) to the enemy’s front, although within the Maginot Line. The river is reported to be in perfect order this month. It will probably be deepened by the melting of the snows in April, involving some lengthening of the mine-tails; also the flow from the tributaries may be temporarily stopped or even reversed.

2. The air force will not be ready till the moon is again good in mid-April. Therefore, unless our hand is forced by events, it would seem better to wait till then, so as to infest the whole river simultaneously, and thus also confuse the points of naval departure. By mid-April the air force should have a good supply of mines which could be laid every night during the moon in the reaches between Bingen and Coblentz. All mines of both classes will become harmless before reaching the Dutch frontier. Before the end of April it is hoped that a supply of the special mines for the still-water canals may be ready, and by the May moon the mines for the mouths of rivers flowing into the Heligoland Bight should be at hand.

3. Thus this whole considerable mining campaign could be brought into being on the following timetable:

Day
1. Issue of proclamation reciting the character of the German attacks on the British coasts, shipping, and river mouths, and declaring that henceforth (while this continues), the Rhine is a mined and forbidden area, and giving neutrals and civilians twenty-four hours’ notice to desist from using it or crossing it.

Day
2. After nightfall, deposit as many mines as possible by both methods, and keep this up night after night. The supply by that time should be such as to keep all methods of discharge fully employed.

Day
28. Begin the laying of the mines in the still-water canals and river mouths, thereafter keeping the whole process working, as opportunity serves, until the kind of attacks to which we are being subjected are brought to an end by the enemy, or other results obtained.

4. The decisions in principle required are:

(
a
) Is this method of warfare justified and expedient in present circumstances?

(
b
) Must warning be given beforehand, observing that the first shock of surprise will be lost? However, this is not considered decisive, as the object is to prevent the use of the river and inland waterways rather than mere destruction.

(
c
) Should we wait till the air force are ready, or begin the naval action as soon as possible after March 12?

(
d
) What reprisals, if any, may be expected, observing that there is not natural or economic feature in France or Great Britain in any way comparable with the Rhine, except our coastal approaches, which are already beset.

5. It is desirable that the Fifth Sea Lord, who has the operation in charge, should go to Paris on Thursday, concert the details finally, and ascertain the reactions of the French Government. From the attitude of M. Daladier, General Gamelin, and Admiral Darlan it is thought these will be highly favourable.

W. S. C.

Appendix M, Book II

NAVAL LOSSES IN NORWEGIAN CAMPAIGN
A
PRIL
–J
UNE
, 1940

G
ERMAN
N
AVAL
L
OSSES
, A
PRIL
–J
UNE
, 1940

Ships Sunk

Ships Damaged