The Edward Snowden Affair (14 page)

On Tuesday BAH announced, “Edward Snowden, 29, was an employee of our firm for less than 3 months, assigned to a team in Hawaii. Snowden, who had a salary at the rate of $122,000, was terminated June 10, 2013 for violations of the firm’s code of ethics and firm policy.”
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The salary disclosure appears out of place. However, this was a coy jab by BAH to discredit Snowden. In its introduction to the whistleblower,
The Guardian
team had stated, “He has had ‘a very comfortable life’ that included a salary of roughly $200,000.” The press took BAH’s cue. Numerous news outlets claimed Snowden’s 61 percent reported difference in pay brought his character and intent into question. Since Snowden had exaggerated his salary, people automatically started to wonder what else he might have embellished.

The
Post
contacted Greenwald for comment. Being the ever vigilant attorney, Greenwald highlighted BAH’s use of the phrase “rate of $122,000.” He conjectured BAH had listed Snowden’s prorated pay.
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If this were the case, his year-end total would have been at least $488,800. Snowden would personally settle the matter six days later during a live Internet chat. When asked point blank, “Did you lie about your salary? What is the issue there? Why did you tell Glenn Greenwald that your salary was $200,000 a year, when it was only $122,000?” He responded, “I was debriefed by Glenn and his peers over a number of days, and not all of those conversations were recorded. The statement I made about earnings was that $200,000 was my ‘career high’ salary. I had to take pay cuts in the course of pursuing specific work. Booz was not the most I’ve been paid.”
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When asked by BAH why he was willing to incur such a substantial pay cut, he undoubtedly commented upon how he favored the idyllic locale, that he would be further expanding his résumé atop the job affording him new IT experiences.

As one side of the world vainly grasped at the ghost of Snowden, people a quarter of the way around the globe had already found him.

Shortly after noon the following Monday, Snowden was forced out of the Mira. A mass Twitter effort had identified his location using Poitras’ video. The purported giveaway was the particular design of a lamp within the hotel room despite Poitras trying to throw people off with a view of Victoria Harbor from Greenwald’s hotel.
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His whereabouts and activities for the next 13 days were veiled in the fog of ambiguity and rumor. It was presumed he relocated to a safe house.
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What could not be refuted was that he quickly went back to work. Within the next 48 hours, while the U.S. government began preparing charges against him, Snowden gave an interview to the Chinese English-language periodical, the
South China Morning Post
(
SCMP
).

Theories began to circulate that he was a Chinese double agent. Others believed he was defecting. Though he would later inform the online community that he’s chosen China because he required “a country with the cultural and legal framework to allow me to work without being immediately detained,”
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the intelligence community knew why he was there. He wanted to personally ensure the delivery of SIGINT information which would reinforce Greenwald’s June 7 U.S. cyberattack exposé. Conducting the interview was yet another risky move, especially since the world now knew who he was. Instead of contenting himself with gathering the data, delivering it to the press, and refusing further involvement, then seeking personal safety in a country without an American extradition treaty, he continued his mission. He would tell the
SCMP
, “I am not here [in Hong Kong] to hide from justice; I am here to reveal criminality.”
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Snowden admitted in his interview with Greenwald that most would assume his choice of destinations to be a mistake because “people think ‘Oh China, Great [Internet] Firewall.’”
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But he had done his homework. He was not in China, he was in Hong Kong. Unlike mainland China, where Internet usage and free speech are restricted, Hong Kong mirrored traditional American freedoms of expression.
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As later witnessed in news coverage, without reservation or impediment from regional authorities, protesters went to the streets of Hong Kong in support of Snowden.
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Hong Kong was a British colony until it was returned to China in 1997. Due largely to its English influence and extreme Westernization by Eastern standards, China granted Hong Kong almost exclusive autonomy with the exception of militarization and foreign policy.
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Though these two components might appear crucial for Snowden, Hong Kong’s judiciary system is likewise independent of China. He was aware that surrender proceedings with Hong Kong were lengthy and would buy him time. (Only mainland China could extradite him, and it was not “technically” legally possible for Beijing to remove Snowden from Hong Kong under the latter’s “One Country, Two Systems” agreement.)
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He would buy himself even more time by disclosing data which would further incriminate the U.S. government in China’s eyes. It would endear him to the Chinese and give Hong Kong even greater pause in detaining him. Snowden also anticipated that the White House would trip over its own hubris and unintentionally give Hong Kong legitimate reason not to hand him over.

When compared to Gellman and Greenwald’s reports, the
SCMP
’s coverage of Snowden’s disclosures is extremely short and sparse. This is because the newspaper tried to stretch headlines using a one-hour interview with Snowden.

Remembering China is 13 hours ahead of the U.S., the
SCMP
ran a teaser article, “Whistle-blower Edward Snowden talks to South China Morning Post,”
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on Wednesday, June 12, at 8:51 p.m. local time. A day later, “Edward Snowden: US government has been hacking Hong Kong and China for years”
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was published. The article reports Snowden had provided the newspaper with documents containing evidence the NSA had been hacking into Hong Kong and mainland China since 2009. The agency had expressly targeted Hong Kong’s civilian population: Chinese University, public officials, various businesses and students. This was not traditional cyberwarfare. None of the Sino-related hacking paperwork showed any evidence of attacks upon Eastern military systems. Snowden added, “We [the U.S.] hack network backbones—like huge Internet routers, basically—that give us access to the communications of hundreds of thousands of computers without having to hack every single one.” Chinese University is one of the six major Chinese Internet hubs. It is home of the Hong Kong Internet Exchange, and all of the city’s Internet traffic is routed through the university system.

The next day “Edward Snowden: Classified US data shows Hong Kong hacking targets
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” appeared. It is a follow-up to the previous report and states the documents suggesting American intrusion of civilian networks include specific dates and IP addresses of Hong Kong and mainland computer systems. The data also lists whether a hack assignment had been completed or a particular computer system was perpetually monitored. As Snowden would relay in a later
SCMP
report concerning the evidence, “[T]he specific details of external and internal Internet protocol addresses could only have been obtained by hacking or with physical access to the computers.” A 75 percent success rate is noted. Snowden clarifies, “The primary issue of public importance to Hong Kong and mainland China should be that the NSA is illegally seizing the communications of tens of millions of individuals without any individualised suspicion of wrongdoing. They simply steal everything so they can search for any topics of interest.” Both whistleblowing articles include the annotation that the confiscated NSA documents could not be independently verified. Clearly the U.S. government was not willing to acknowledge them.

The Chinese government immediately set to finding proof of U.S. intrusion. Security Secretary Lai Tung-kwok quickly assured Hong Kong’s Legislative Council there was no evidence the Internet Exchange had been compromised, though it was obvious it had been monitored.
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Given the constant cyberespionage parlaying between the two countries, the official response was likely a testament to the world of the exchange’s integrity, especially since China asked the U.S. government to respond to the claims. Behind the public relations veil, hacking was already known, but mainland China was the suspect.

At Snowden’s request, the
SCMP
sat on more confidential information. His motive was manifold because he wanted to keep the fire hot and
The Guardian
had a time-sensitive report the world needed to read without distraction. The subsequent
SCMP
articles also contained personal, incriminating information Snowden wanted known but didn’t need considered as the U.S. government processed criminal charges. In the words of the
SCMP
’s editor-in-chief, Xiangwei Wang, the newspaper agreed to let the “dust settle.”
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In a little over a week, Snowden had set the American populace and Chinese people against the U.S. government. He now had his sights set on Britain. The journalistic barrage would be quick and unrelenting. By the end, several of the world’s most powerful countries would be demanding immediate responses from England as well as what was slowly becoming clear was its spying partner, America.

A week after Snowden had gone public and two days after the
SCMP
went into greater, more incriminating detail about American surveillance in China, Ewen MacAskill led a team of Guardian journalists with “GCHQ intercepted foreign politicians’ communications at G20 summits.”
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Whereas the SCMP’s exposés only made reference to unseen, unverified directives and forms,
The Guardian
provided its readers with primary documentation. The article’s sources are a top secret January 20, 1999 briefing paper, various classified documents and confidential PowerPoint slides all provided by Snowden. The report debuted a day before the eight wealthiest countries—all of which were potential targets of the headline spying—were to meet in Ireland at the annual G8 Summit.

Started in 1999, the G20 Summit is the once biannual and now annual aggregation of 19 of the world’s top financial leaders with the European Union (EU) as the final member. They represent two-thirds of the world’s population and 80 percent of its gross product and trading. Its purpose is to discuss and examine international economic policy issues which lie outside the scope and capability of any one particular country or organization to address. Due to the growth of other world nations, in 2009 the G20 replaced the G8—started in 1975—as the main economic forum for wealthy nations.

MacAskill and Co. offer no quarter from the beginning: “Foreign politicians and officials who took part in two G20 summit meetings in London in 2009 had their computers monitored and their phone calls intercepted on the instructions of their British government hosts, according to documents seen by the
guardian
. Some delegates were tricked into using Internet cafes which had been set up by British intelligence agencies to read their email traffic.” GCHQ’s stated eavesdropping agenda was to learn each country’s negotiating position and leverage so Britain could have tactical advantage during the April and September 2009 meetings. However, Snowden’s documents make clear the confiscated user access data, i.e., user names and passwords, was intended to be used to continue spying on various nations’ officials after the summit ended: “[We] were able to extract key logging info, providing creds for delegates, meaning we have sustained intelligence options against them even after [the] conference has finished.” England’s specific targets were its allies South Africa and Turkey. South Africa was a crucial swing vote. With the latter, Britain’s objective was to “establish Turkey’s position on agreements from the April London summit” and its “willingness (or not) to cooperate with the rest of the G20 nations.” The overriding concern was the various countries’ positions and attitudes regarding financial reform after the 2008 global banking meltdown.

British intelligence had already hacked into South Africa’s foreign affairs network in 2005. It had gathered information by “investigating” the country’s telephone lines and compromising diplomats’ user accounts. The mission was successful, because South Africa updated its systems shortly thereafter. GCHQ countered by immediately installing electronic backdoors “to increase reliability.”
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Multiple delegates had been led into Internet cafes that had email filtration and keystroke logging software installed on the diners’ computers. For wireless communications, remote relays retrieved the politicians’ cell phone data, which was telecast almost live to 45 stand-by GCHQ analysts. The analysts would make their assessments then “provide timely information to UK ministers.” Keystroke logging is the recording of what is being typed as it is being typed. This permits the viewer to see the content of any document as it appears on the screen as well as login information, including passwords and phrases, as it is being entered. Over 20 new email “selectors” were obtained by GCHQ.

The Guardian
highlights that the covert directives originated at the senior level during then-prime minister Gordon Brown’s time in office. Once finalized, orders were issued to various ministers. They were therefore sanctioned by the British government. Like the NSA’s data intercepts within Hong Kong and mainland China, none of the G20 targets were under any suspicion of wrongdoing by GCHQ. Britain legally justified its eavesdropping with the 1994 Intelligence Services Act, which states clandestine foreign intelligence is “in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom in relation to the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Island.”
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Britain had given itself permission to spy if not doing so risked financial loss or inhibited economic growth.