The Devil Soldier (43 page)

By the end of the first week in July, Ward was ready to march south and join forces with Li. Indeed, in the wake of the Chung Wang’s withdrawal from eastern Kiangsu with his best troops (which neither Li nor Ward could have known was temporary), both imperialist commanders were beginning to look beyond the liberation of the Shanghai region and toward a linkup with Tseng Kuo-fan’s troops at Nanking. Participating in the capture of the rebel capital was a cherished goal of Ward’s: One of the items found among his personal effects after his death was a detailed map of Nanking. In a letter to Tseng on July 10—written as his own troops and those of the Ever Victorious Army were beginning joint operations in the Chin-shan-wei area—Li felt secure enough about Ward and his army to hazard proposing the project to his mentor:

Ward has more than four thousand men.… The Taotai Wu has offered the valiant services of Ward to help an assault on the Shui-hsi Gate at Hsia-kuan [in Nanking]. He would be able to sail there in a few days. As I, Hung-chang, dare not give immediate permission, you, my Teacher, may kindly send me your instruction, and ask my elder Yuan [Tseng’s brother Tseng Kuo-ch’üan] what he thinks of it.… [Ward’s] Army is like a foreign army, and Admiral Hope treats it with favour. But the men are provided with Chinese rations and money. As they have often heard of the great name of my Teacher, they will obey your orders.

For the moment, Tseng Kuo-fan was reluctant to use the Ever Victorious Army in the Nanking area. He did not rule out the possibility in the future, but he felt that Ward’s army first needed to further test and prove itself in Kiangsu. This was just as well, for in mid-July Ward had more than enough to keep him busy in the Shanghai area.

On July 16 about a thousand of Ward’s men hurried to engage a rebel column near Chin-shan-wei that had fought its way past a detachment of Li’s army in an effort to reestablish the Taiping presence in the Pootung peninsula and cut the imperialist lines of supply and retreat. Ward was able to frustrate this rebel threat before sundown on the sixteenth, and after dispensing with it he immediately coordinated with Li’s forces for a nighttime assault on Chin-shan-wei itself.

The battle plan at Chin-shan-wei was
Ward’s, made during a council of war with the other imperialist commanders. Although most still regarded him as a foreigner, the Chinese officers listened and obeyed as Ward directed that Chin-shan-wei be invested on all four sides and subjected to a powerful artillery bombardment: the same basic scheme that had been used with repeated success during the thirty-mile-radius campaign. This time, however, the guns all belonged to the Ever Victorious Army, and the storming troops—though some were led by Westerners—were all Chinese. It was a signal moment.

According to Li Hung-chang, the rebel garrison in Chin-shan-wei began to withdraw from the city during the night, even before Ward’s guns had opened fire. Possibly the garrison had heard of the fate of other cities that had been subjected to pummeling by guns manufactured in the West. Or Li may well have invented this detail to downplay the importance of Ward’s participation in the battle and magnify his own role. Despite Li’s respect for Ward, it would not have been the first nor would it be the last time that such misrepresentation occurred. By all accounts, at any rate, Chin-shan-wei was in imperial hands by the morning of July 17. Ward later told Burlingame that his men were responsible for the city’s capture “although I find the Governor has credited himself and [his] troops with it, but then as they had been badly whipped the day previous to my taking it and had retreated to the rear you can imagine how much credit they really deserve.”

Ward and Li Hung-chang’s rivalry was thus in evidence once again at Chin-shan-wei, but there continued to be no real sense of bitterness about the competition. Immediately after Chin-shan-wei, Ward and Li again discussed an assault on one of Nanking’s water gates, to be made by the powerfully armed and ever more numerous river steamers of the Ever Victorious Army. Li had not yet received Tseng Kuo-fan’s thoughts on such an idea, and, on the chance that his teacher might agree, Li ordered Ward to prepare his men for the operation by moving north and seizing the port of Liu-ho, on the Yangtze. A rebel trading center occupied by Taiping troops as well as pirates working in affiliation with the Heavenly Kingdom, Liu-ho served as a base from which the rebels could harass the trade of Shanghai and Kiangsu province generally.
Its recapture would involve amphibious operations, making it a logical spot to rehearse an attack on Nanking.

Ward embarked for Liu-ho from Wu-sung on July 29 with four of his steamers and, upon arriving at what he called the “piratical den,” immediately began to destroy the rebel fortifications with his mounted guns. After an extensive bombardment Ward’s infantry landed and attacked. The fighting was bitter, but the Ever Victorious Army soon gained the upper hand: The rebel defensive works were, in Ward’s own words, “destroyed completely,” and a collection of merchant vessels and captives held by the rebels were set free. Ward learned that the Taipings in Liu-ho had been planning a major raid against Ch’ung-ming Island, situated at the mouth of the Yangtze and vital to the safety of Shanghai’s trade. Like the battle for Kao-ch’iao in February, Ward’s success at Liu-ho had been particularly well-timed.

Following his return to Sung-chiang, Ward was informed of
Tseng Kuo-fan’s desire that the Ever Victorious Army “try out their guns” a bit more before participating in any attack on Nanking. Tseng suggested the recapture of Ch’ing-p’u and Chia-ting, and, accordingly, Ward began to make plans for another attempt on the city that had been so troublesome to him. Li Hung-chang agreed to play a role in the assault and instructed Ward’s old associate Li Heng-sung to clear an approach to Ch’ing-p’u so that the body of the Anhwei Army could move west unimpeded. On August 5 Li Hung-chang’s troops arrived before Ch’ing-p’u’s rebuilt outer works, where they were soon joined by Ward and the Ever Victorious Army.

Before Ward had left Sung-chiang, he had received a letter from Wu Hsü reminding him that, once Ch’ing-p’u was taken, he should not allow the Ever Victorious Army to engage in any looting activities that would give ammunition to Ward’s critics in the Chinese bureaucracy. Referring to himself again as “your foolish younger brother,” Wu told Ward that “your only duty is to attack the city. As soon as the city has been taken over, give it to Colonel Cheng [one of Li Hung-chang’s officers]…. Please do not let the Ever Victorious Army enter the city, in order to avoid blame and condemnation in the future. This is most important and I beg you to give it your attention.” Wu’s admonitions were hardly
necessary: Ward was only too aware, after the thirty-mile-radius campaign, of the cost of allowing troops to run wild after taking a city. In drawing up his battle plan, Ward assigned no garrisoning role to his two thousand troops; instead, they were to perform their traditional function of breaching and storming.

Li Hung-chang’s various imperialist units were assigned to the north, east, and west gates of the city. The Ever Victorious Army would launch the main attack on the southern gate, supported by Li Heng-sung’s troops. The battle began on August 7. Ward’s steamers opened fire on the Taiping defenses—the
Hyson
even managing to pound its way into the city moat—and the Ever Victorious Army along with the Chinese troops busied themselves destroying the rebel outworks. On the following day, Ward attacked the south gate but was repulsed. According to
the
Peking Gazette
, the official Chinese government organ, this failure resulted from a “want of courage” on the part of the Chinese units attacking in support of Ward. Once again frustrated by Li Heng-sung, Ward awaited the arrival of five hundred of his own men from Sung-chiang. The additional troops joined him on August 9, and Ward prepared to attack again on the tenth.

According to Forester, the Ever Victorious Army’s artillery at this latest battle of Ch’ing-p’u was commanded by an Italian colonel called Sartoli. Dr. Macgowan referred to this man as Major Tortal, but both agreed that he was, in Forester’s words, “an expert in gunnery who had gained his experience under Garibaldi.” (Whether or not Ward had met Sartoli earlier in life is unknown; it is nonetheless noteworthy that so many of Ward’s officers had served in campaigns and with leaders that Ward himself either had actually or was rumored to have been involved with.) On August 10 Sartoli’s batteries set to work on the south gate of Ch’ing-p’u again and soon effected a ten-foot breach in the walls. Ward himself then led a storming party toward the walls, although according to Dr. Macgowan it was Ward’s Filipino aide, Vincente Macanaya, who was first into the breach. Unfortunately the Italian Sartoli insisted on joining the storming party and was killed on the walls. But Ward pressed on. “The work of General Ward’s men was steady and sure,” said the
Gazette
, “… and under the shelter of the smoke, they scaled
the wall. With firedarts [rockets] and bayonets they advanced against the Rebels and killed numbers of them. Seeing this the Imperialists rushed in a body and took possession of the city.”

Immediately, the Taipings began a hasty withdrawal through the north and west gates, where imperialist units were lying in wait. Hundreds of Taipings were killed during ensuing ambushes. These, however, were secondary actions. Even in Peking, it was clear who had pulled the laboring oar during the attack: “General Ward,” said the
Gazette
, “has, many times before, led his men against this city of Ch’ing-p’u …, but especially in this battle he was regardless of personal danger in leading and urging his soldiers on to the slaughter. For this he is worthy of our highest praise.” In reporting the battle to Tseng Kuo-fan,
Li Hung-chang similarly gave the lion’s share of the credit to Ward, describing his comrade as leading “his men forward while at the same time, he kept firing with rockets and guns. Most of the outrageous brigands on the walls fell and our troops made an assault to get in.” Ward himself summed up the action to Burlingame by saying simply, “I took Ch’ing-p’u in fine style by breaching and storming.”

Some three thousand imperialist troops were deposited in Ch’ing-p’u as a garrison, after which Ward returned to Sung-chiang, then went to Shanghai. He called on Li Hung-chang and once more asked that his army be allowed to play a role in Tseng Kuo-fan’s siege of Nanking. “Ward has seen me to-day,” Li wrote to Tseng on August 14, “and urges me to transfer him to help attack Nanking. He says that he could arrive there in three days—without fail. After victory, the wealth and property in the city would be equally shared with the Government’s troops; and so forth. As I, Hung-chang, have received your Excellency’s letter saying that there are already enough troops without further reinforcement, I ask for the matter to be deferred pending your instruction.”

Denied a part in the Nanking fighting, Ward soon turned his attention south to Ningpo, where the Taipings were gathering for what looked to be a concerted effort to retake the port. As he began to make provisions for taking a large body of troops to reinforce Major Morton’s detachment (in what would be his first action outside Kiangsu province), Ward also took time to write to Burlingame and
warn him of the “free city” movement that was gaining momentum among Shanghai’s foreigners.

On July 26, the
North China Herald
had echoed many Westerners’ sentiments about the constant problems of lawlessness, refugees from the interior, and inefficient imperial administration in Shanghai by declaring that “the formation of one central and responsible executive power emanating from a legislative assembly, empowered to draw up a code of laws for general purposes, is becoming an absolute necessity.”
Li Hung-chang was aware that the foreigners were quite serious in proposing this usurpation of Chinese authority: He told Tseng Kuo-fan on August 14, “Whether this arrangement is possible remains to be seen. Permission to do so, of course, rests with the Tsungli Yamen.… As I, Hung-chang, replied in an official letter to the Tsungli Yamen, no guarantee can be given that they [the foreigners] will not get possession of the city. In such a case everything would depend on the Court’s decision. It is like walking on ice. I am very worried.”

For his part, Ward had no illusions about the laxity and corruption of Chinese officials in Shanghai: “Actually if I had not my foot so deeply in the mire,” he told Burlingame on August 16, “I would throw them all overboard.” Yet Ward would not put his weight behind what he called “squatter sovereignty,” again demonstrating that his ties to China were quite genuine. The fact that Li Hung-chang never seriously questioned Ward’s loyalty (even if he did sometimes try to take credit for battles that rightly belonged to Ward) further shows the extent of Ward’s commitment. By late August, Li was heightening his attacks on Ward’s principal Chinese associates, Wu Hsü and Yang Fang, complaining that they were using irresponsible and illegal methods to raise money to pay the Ever Victorious Army. Wu especially, said Li, “is to be guarded against like a bandit or a brigand. How difficult it is for one who is in authority!” Yet there was no such criticism of Ward, no suggestion that simply because he was being paid by Wu and Yang he was also a party to their “fraudulent tricks.”

In fact, far from being a party to Wu’s and Yang’s more extreme frauds and embezzlements, Ward was ultimately a victim of them. In his August 16 letter to Burlingame, Ward claimed that not only Wu and Yang
but Li Hung-chang as well “actually owe some 350,000 tls. [taels] to me & my friends for advances made on acct. of wages, etc.” While the figure is impossible to prove—it would later be the subject of a decades-long lawsuit by Ward’s family against the Chinese government—the basic accusation is almost certainly true. Ward was in the habit of supplying his men out of his own pocket when the flow of money from Shanghai was slow: Prompt and regular payment of his men remained one of the keys to his success. In supposing that all these accounts would eventually be put right, Ward took risks with his personal finances that ultimately proved disastrous.