The Concise Oxford Dictionary of World Religions (1409 page)

tman) and render change impossible. What already substantially exists, they argued, would not need to be produced; and what does not substantially exist already could never come into being from a state of non-existence. Thus real existence cannot be predicated of dharmas, but neither can non-existence, since they clearly present themselves as having a mode of being of some kind. The conclusion of the M
dhyamaka was that the true nature of phenomena can only be described as an ‘emptiness’ or ‘voidness’ (
dharma-
nyat
, i.e. ‘emptiness of self’); and that this emptiness of self-nature is synonymous with the principle of dependent origination (see
PATICCA-SAMUPP
DA
) as taught by the Buddha. This process of reasoning is fully set out in N
g
rjuna's concise verses in the
M
la-M
dhyamaka-K
rik
, the root text of the system.
There were implications also for
soteriology
: since emptiness is the true nature of what exists there can be no
ontological
basis for a differentiation between
nirv
na
and
sa
s
ra