The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics (187 page)
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Authors: Iain McLean
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obligation
To become obliged to do something is to ‘bind oneself’ to do it—‘oblige’ and ‘bind’ are Latin and Anglo-Saxon equivalents. Thus obligations must be incurred by a specific act; typically, this act will be a promise, but promises take many forms, including debts, contracts, partnerships, marriages, treaties, and conventions. Often, therefore, it is functionally necessary that the incurring of an obligation be accompanied by some solemn ceremonial, a symbolizing of the commitment, involving rings, seals, bibles, signatures, or other suitably symbolic actions and artefacts. It is also important for the meaning of the obligation that it be made, and be seen to be made, voluntarily and not under duress.
In this strict sense, political obligation is a rare and elusive thing. Naturalized citizens of a country and commissioned military officers may have political obligations of a conditional form, but the vast majority of us did not choose the state into which we were born, have no real option to leave it, and have made it no promises. To derive a general obligation in this sense, to accept the state and to obey the directives of its officials, is to attempt to square the circle. Some of the most determined attempts to achieve this end are to be found in
Locke's
Two Treatises of Government
, published in 1690. Locke derives a ‘tacit’ consent to the laws of a state in the mere act of travelling through that state's territory and an act of choice from the failure to emigrate to the great unclaimed lands of America. The first argument stretches meaning to destruction and the second is now outdated. More recent theorists, such as Robert Nozick and John Rawls , have posited a hypothetical contract between the individual and the state; this argument suggests that we should ask of a state whether it is the sort of state we would join if states were the sort of things that are joined. This form of argument posits an interesting standard for the appraisal of states, but generates only hypothetical obligations, not real ones. The strict sense of obligation also implies that we have no obligation to our parents since we could not have asked to be born and such was their control over us that any promises we make to them must be considered cases of duress.
Hobbes
, in chapter 20 of
Leviathan
, derives an obligation to obey one's mother in the state of nature, since she has the choice whether to nurture us or not. However, Hobbes's account completely lacks any sense in which we might be said to bind ourselves. The question of our obligation to our children is less easily dismissed. There is no act of commitment
per se
in the procreation of children unless we take the sexual act to be a kind of promise in itself. Few people would accept this, but it is also difficult to accept that no obligation is incurred by procreation. But when is it incurred? At conception? At birth? At the point at which it is decided to proceed with the pregnancy? What are the relative moral obligations of the man and the woman? Surely a woman who is involuntarily pregnant, the victim of a rape, can have no obligation to her offspring? These questions are located in a profoundly difficult area of ethics.
The strict sense of obligation is not the only sense. People often refer to obligations as if the word meant the same as ‘duties’; in this sense our obligations are what we ought to do according to a set of rules which are deemed to apply to us irrespective of any consent or contract we may have made. When
A
talks about
P
's duties, he may mean what the law prescribes that
P
should do, or what it is generally expected in society that he should do or what
A
thinks he ought to do. All of these senses suggest empty and tautologous ideas of political obligation: ‘You ought to obey the state because the (state) law says so’ would be a dangerous proposition if it were not so unconvincing. Strict senses of obligation may render the question of political obligation unanswerable, but looser senses leave it meaningless.
Perhaps the most profound question about political obligation concerns whether we need a theory of obligation at all. Locke was convinced that he did need such a theory, both to justify the Glorious Revolution and to prevent permanent revolution.
Hume
and Adam
Smith
, writing over half a century later, under a more stable regime, considered such a theory to be as unnecessary as it was impossible. Benevolence and sympathy lead us to co-operate with each other and the needs of the general well-being urge us to a tolerant co-operation with the state. These are the real foundations of the stable commercial society which both welcome, and Hume suggests that they are far more secure foundations than would be a precise doctrine of obligation, which would prescribe when we should and should not accept the order imposed by the state.
LA
In this strict sense, political obligation is a rare and elusive thing. Naturalized citizens of a country and commissioned military officers may have political obligations of a conditional form, but the vast majority of us did not choose the state into which we were born, have no real option to leave it, and have made it no promises. To derive a general obligation in this sense, to accept the state and to obey the directives of its officials, is to attempt to square the circle. Some of the most determined attempts to achieve this end are to be found in
Locke's
Two Treatises of Government
, published in 1690. Locke derives a ‘tacit’ consent to the laws of a state in the mere act of travelling through that state's territory and an act of choice from the failure to emigrate to the great unclaimed lands of America. The first argument stretches meaning to destruction and the second is now outdated. More recent theorists, such as Robert Nozick and John Rawls , have posited a hypothetical contract between the individual and the state; this argument suggests that we should ask of a state whether it is the sort of state we would join if states were the sort of things that are joined. This form of argument posits an interesting standard for the appraisal of states, but generates only hypothetical obligations, not real ones. The strict sense of obligation also implies that we have no obligation to our parents since we could not have asked to be born and such was their control over us that any promises we make to them must be considered cases of duress.
Hobbes
, in chapter 20 of
Leviathan
, derives an obligation to obey one's mother in the state of nature, since she has the choice whether to nurture us or not. However, Hobbes's account completely lacks any sense in which we might be said to bind ourselves. The question of our obligation to our children is less easily dismissed. There is no act of commitment
per se
in the procreation of children unless we take the sexual act to be a kind of promise in itself. Few people would accept this, but it is also difficult to accept that no obligation is incurred by procreation. But when is it incurred? At conception? At birth? At the point at which it is decided to proceed with the pregnancy? What are the relative moral obligations of the man and the woman? Surely a woman who is involuntarily pregnant, the victim of a rape, can have no obligation to her offspring? These questions are located in a profoundly difficult area of ethics.
The strict sense of obligation is not the only sense. People often refer to obligations as if the word meant the same as ‘duties’; in this sense our obligations are what we ought to do according to a set of rules which are deemed to apply to us irrespective of any consent or contract we may have made. When
A
talks about
P
's duties, he may mean what the law prescribes that
P
should do, or what it is generally expected in society that he should do or what
A
thinks he ought to do. All of these senses suggest empty and tautologous ideas of political obligation: ‘You ought to obey the state because the (state) law says so’ would be a dangerous proposition if it were not so unconvincing. Strict senses of obligation may render the question of political obligation unanswerable, but looser senses leave it meaningless.
Perhaps the most profound question about political obligation concerns whether we need a theory of obligation at all. Locke was convinced that he did need such a theory, both to justify the Glorious Revolution and to prevent permanent revolution.
Hume
and Adam
Smith
, writing over half a century later, under a more stable regime, considered such a theory to be as unnecessary as it was impossible. Benevolence and sympathy lead us to co-operate with each other and the needs of the general well-being urge us to a tolerant co-operation with the state. These are the real foundations of the stable commercial society which both welcome, and Hume suggests that they are far more secure foundations than would be a precise doctrine of obligation, which would prescribe when we should and should not accept the order imposed by the state.
LA
Ockham , William of
(
c
.1285–1349)
William of Ockham was not a systematic political philosopher, but he developed ideas on sovereignty and discussed natural rights. On sovereignty, he was original in the emphasis he placed on the right and freedom of the people to choose their ruler and form of government. On rights, which were mainly rights to property, he distinguishes between natural and conventional right, and both from permission. A natural right is a legitimate power (in conformity with right reason) that is anterior to human convention. The Franciscans have the natural right to property, which they renounce, yet they have permission to use things that they do not own, which is revocable (
usus nudus
or
facti
), as distinct from permission, which gives a right, for example tenancy (
usus iuris
).
CB
c
.1285–1349)
William of Ockham was not a systematic political philosopher, but he developed ideas on sovereignty and discussed natural rights. On sovereignty, he was original in the emphasis he placed on the right and freedom of the people to choose their ruler and form of government. On rights, which were mainly rights to property, he distinguishes between natural and conventional right, and both from permission. A natural right is a legitimate power (in conformity with right reason) that is anterior to human convention. The Franciscans have the natural right to property, which they renounce, yet they have permission to use things that they do not own, which is revocable (
usus nudus
or
facti
), as distinct from permission, which gives a right, for example tenancy (
usus iuris
).
CB
Official Secrets Acts
The UK Official Secrets Act 1989 declared it unlawful to disclose information relating to defence, security and intelligence, international relations, intelligence gained from other departments or international organizations, intelligence useful to criminals, or the interception of communications. The Act replaced the all-embracing 1911 Official Secrets Act. The origins of reform lay in the failure of governments to successfully prosecute under the 1911 Act. In 1985 Clive Ponting , a Ministry of Defence civil servant who had disclosed information relating to the Falkland War to the Labour MP Tam Dalyell , was acquitted under section 2(1)(a) of the 1911 Act on the grounds that he had disclosed information which the jury decided was in the interests of the state. Further, in 1988 the Law Lords ruled that
Spycatcher
, a book written by a former security service employee, Peter Wright , and already published abroad, could not be suppressed by the government. Hence, the specification of categories in the 1989 Act was designed to render crucial the nature of information disclosed, leaving motives for disclosure irrelevant, and thus ensuring successful prosecution if such cases arose again. Claims that the specification of categories of information not to be disclosed can lead to more open government in relation to freedom of information on matters not included in these categories are generally dismissed on the grounds that the categories themselves are very broad.
JBr
Spycatcher
, a book written by a former security service employee, Peter Wright , and already published abroad, could not be suppressed by the government. Hence, the specification of categories in the 1989 Act was designed to render crucial the nature of information disclosed, leaving motives for disclosure irrelevant, and thus ensuring successful prosecution if such cases arose again. Claims that the specification of categories of information not to be disclosed can lead to more open government in relation to freedom of information on matters not included in these categories are generally dismissed on the grounds that the categories themselves are very broad.
JBr
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