The Cold War: A MILITARY History (55 page)

CONCLUSION

Aircraft development proceeded at a frantic pace throughout the Cold War, as Western air forces sought to retain what was thought to be a technological lead over the Warsaw Pact. As a result, many new fighter and light-bomber designs appeared, although by no means all of them entered service.

There were two significant changes during the period. The first of these was that, whereas in the 1940s and 1950s the aircraft and its engines had been the most glamorous and expensive part of the package, from the 1960s onwards the airframe simply became a carrier for a complex package of avionics and electronics. The cost of the latter represented by far the largest proportion of the overall package.

A further factor was that in the 1940s and 1950s the time from concept to service entry was very short, even though the designs were pushing contemporary technology to its limits. The F-86 Sabre, for example, took just three years from conception to realization. That compares well with the seven years it took to get the F-111 into service, and over ten years for the F-15. On the other hand, the F-86 was in front-line service with the US air force for less than ten years, while the F-111 and F-15 had served for twenty-three and fourteen years respectively by the time the Cold War ended, and had many years to go after that.

fn1
These firms were the forerunners of the contemporary British Aerospace (BAe), Daimler-Benz Aerospace and Alenia, respectively. Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands also took part in the initial feasibility study. The first two did not join the consortium set up in March 1969, while the Dutch did, but then withdrew in July 1969.

30

Warsaw Pact Air Forces

THE SOVIET AIRCRAFT
industry produced some remarkable aircraft during the Cold War, and its products were watched with special intensity by Western intelligence agencies and media. The early development of such aircraft was always shrouded in mystery, and first vague reports were usually followed by very blurred and heavily retouched photographs. The first firm indications of the shape and performance then came either when the type entered service with 16th Air Army in East Germany or when it appeared at one of the rare Soviet air displays. In the 1980s, however, the US government took to publishing blurred photographs taken from satellites, showing new prototypes on the flight line at testing centres such as Ramenskoye.

The early revelations were always accompanied by speculative articles in the Western technical and defence press, usually overestimating the type’s performance and its significance to the West. The first reliable assessment of a new type’s performance came only when it was exported or used in a war somewhere in Asia, Africa or the Middle East, where it could be compared against Western aircraft. Not infrequently this resulted in a reversal of the earlier assessment, with the aircraft’s performance and capability then being undervalued, although this was often because the aircraft was being flown by less highly skilled pilots and with a less effective ground-control system than would have been available in a war on the Central Front.
^fn1
A further factor was that export aircraft were frequently equipped to a lower standard, especially in radar and electronic countermeasures, than were Soviet air-force versions.

In contrast to the numerous manufacturers on the NATO side, tactical aircraft flown by the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact air forces were the products of just two design bureaux, both in the Soviet Union.
^fn2
The better known – at least in the early days of the Cold War – was the Mikoyan and Gurevich (MiG) bureau, whose name first achieved international prominence when the MiG-15 fighter burst on the scene in the Korean War. The first major jet-powered attack aircraft of significance to NATO, however, was the MiG-17 (NATO = ‘Fresco’) which entered service in the mid-1950s and carried a 500 kg bombload over a combat radius of some 700 km. Next came the MiG-21 (NATO = ‘Fishbed’), although the original versions were air-superiority fighters. The later MiG-21bis had a ground-attack capability, enabling it to deliver a 2,000 kg payload over a radius of some 700 km. Whereas the MiG-17 and the MiG-21 were air-superiority fighters with a secondary ground-attack capability, however, the swing-wing MiG-27 (NATO = ‘Flogger’) was designed specifically for the ground-attack mission, being capable of carrying a 4,000 kg load over a 540 km radius on a ‘lo-lo-lo’ (low level out, low level over the target, low level back) mission profile.

The second design bureau, named Sukhoi, produced some excellent aircraft. The Sukhoi Su-7 (NATO = ‘Fitter’) entered service in the late 1960s and was capable of delivering a 2,500 kg load, but over a radius of only 350 km, although when the aircraft was fitted with swing wings and redesignated Su-17M (NATO = ‘Fitter C’) this was increased to some 685 km with a 2,000 kg payload. The next to appear was a totally new design, the Sukhoi Su-24 (NATO = ‘Fencer’), which entered service in 1974 and was one of the finest attack aircraft of its era, being capable of delivering an 8,000 kg ordnance load to any target in the Central Region, including most of Spain and all but a very small part of the United Kingdom.

A totally different design was the Sukhoi Su-25 (NATO = ‘Frogfoot’), with high speed and agility providing protection, although the pilot also sat in a titanium-protected cockpit. The Su-25 carried a 4,000 kg load of bombs and rockets, and entered service in time to be committed to the war in Afghanistan in 1981. It would undoubtedly have given a good account of itself in an attack on the Central Front.

The Soviet air force’s Frontal Aviation command and most other Warsaw Pact air forces also used the Mil Mi-24 (NATO = ‘Hind’) series of attack helicopters, which again showed the difference between Soviet and Western approaches to equipment development. In the West the tendency was to develop totally new equipment, but the Soviets took the engines, drive system and main rotor of the well-tried Mil Mi-8 transport helicopter and
married
them to a new fuselage. A new tail rotor and stub wings of the type used on the Mil Mi-6 completed what was to become an extremely effective combat helicopter, which established a fearsome reputation in Afghanistan.

Apart from the aircraft themselves, the Soviets also developed a wide range of aircraft weapons. Further, the all-weather capability improved dramatically too, as did the offensive and defensive ECM capabilities.

Dramatic improvements were also made to the Warsaw Pact air defences – the ability to resist NATO offensive air operations. The SAM systems in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries and the western military districts of the Soviet Union grew rapidly in both numbers and sophistication over the years, as did the air-defence fighters.

THE SOVIET AIR FORCE

Like most organizations on both sides in the Cold War, the Soviet air force changed its internal organization over time. For the greater part of the Cold War, however, it consisted of five operational commands: Frontal Aviation, Long-Range Aviation, Air Transport, Fighter Aviation and Naval Aviation. The most significant of these to the Central European battlefield was Frontal Aviation (
Frontovaya Aviatsiya
), which, in the latter half of the Cold War, was equipped with some 5,000 aircraft, of which approximately 4,000 were in eastern Europe facing NATO. Frontal Aviation’s specific roles were:

Soviet doctrine ensured that there was the closest possible co-operation between ground and air forces, with air-force representation at frontal and divisional level. Air strikes were considered to be an extension of the artillery fire plan, with priority being placed on command posts, tactical nuclear-delivery systems, communications systems, and neutralization of enemy artillery systems. A particular priority was to undertake pre-emptive strikes against enemy nuclear-delivery systems when it appeared probable that they were about to launch a nuclear strike of their own. In the counter-air battle, enemy airfields would have been the highest-priority targets. At all levels commanders of Frontal Aviation and air-defence forces were collocated to ensure that the two systems were always in co-operation and not in conflict.

Frontal Aviation was organized into tactical air armies of varying sizes,
depending
upon their strategic importance. The majority were deployed in eastern Europe, with each of the western military districts having its own air army, as did each of the four groups of Soviet forces in the Warsaw Pact countries. By far the most powerful, however, was the 16th Tactical Air Army, which was stationed in East Germany as part of GSFG.

A tactical air army was normally composed of a fighter division and a fighter-bomber division (each subdivided into regiments and squadrons, each of four flights of four aircraft), an independent reconnaissance regiment and a helicopter regiment. The 16th Tactical Air Army was, however, much larger, and in the mid-1980s it comprised one fighter division, two fighter-bomber divisions and two mixed fighter/fighter-bomber divisions, all of three regiments each, plus five helicopter assault regiments, three reconnaissance regiments and two aviation transport regiments. In the late 1980s these totalled some 900 fixed-wing aircraft and 400 helicopters.

Large Soviet air assets were also stationed in other Warsaw Pact countries in peacetime. Soviet elements in Czechoslovakia before 1968 were small, but following the invasion they grew rapidly and in the 1980s comprised a fighter regiment, an interdiction regiment and a ground-attack regiment, plus five helicopter regiments.

Soviet air units in Hungary were part of the Southern Group of Forces and consisted of three fighter regiments, a ground-attack regiment and two helicopter regiments.

Soviet air-force elements stationed in Poland were allocated to the Northern Group of Forces and had a particularly important task in protecting the Soviet lines of communication and providing air cover for Soviet troops moving forward into East Germany. The forces included one fighter division (three regiments), an independent attack regiment, a reconnaissance regiment and two helicopter regiments. In addition, there were two regiments of Su-24 interdictors, part of the 24th Tactical Air Army, whose missions were long-range attacks on targets in western Europe.

OTHER WARSAW PACT AIR FORCES

Czechoslovakia

The Czechoslovak air force was usually the first of the non-Soviet air forces to receive the most modern Soviet equipment. The 10th Tactical Air Army consisted of two air divisions equipped with fighters and fighter-bombers, one reconnaissance regiment (three squadrons), five helicopter regiments (three squadrons) and a transport regiment. The 7th Air Army was responsible for air defence and consisted of three missile divisions, each of two regiments, plus two fighter divisions, each of three fighter regiments (eighteen squadrons).

Hungary

Hungary maintained an air force that was somewhat different to others in the Warsaw Pact, as it was not independent but was an integral part of the army. The air-defence element consisted of three fighter and three SAM regiments, while the limited tactical element consisted of two ground-attack regiments (reduced to one in 1980) and one reconnaissance regiment. The air force also operated one regiment of helicopters.

East Germany

The East German air force was wholly committed to operations as tasked by the Soviet 16th Tactical Air Army in support of the combined Soviet and East German ground forces. It comprised two air divisions, one with two fighter/ground-attack regiments, the other with three, each regiment having three ten-aircraft squadrons. There were also two reconnaissance squadrons, a transport regiment and three helicopter regiments. Air-defence elements comprised seven SAM regiments. All equipment came from the Soviet Union, except that all trainer aircraft were of Czech origin.

Poland

Poland maintained the largest Warsaw Pact air force outside the Soviet Union, comprising three fighter-bomber divisions (eighteen squadrons), two reconnaissance regiments (six squadrons), two transport regiments and three helicopter regiments. For many years the National Air Defence Force was a separate service and co-operated extremely closely with the Soviet air force in the air defence of the Soviet lines of communication between the USSR and the forward elements in East Germany. In the late 1980s, however, the Air Defence Force was integrated into the air force, while remaining organized into three air-defence corps (one to each Polish military district), each of one air-defence division (three fighter regiments) and one SAM division. All front-line aircraft were of Soviet design, but Polish and Czech trainers and some Polish helicopters were also used.

fn1
Western pilots flew many Soviet aircraft following the end of the Cold War. In general, their comments were that reliability and serviceability were poorer than had been thought in the West, but performance and capability were much better. The German
Luftwaffe
, for example, initially decided to sell the MiG-29s it inherited from the East German air force, but once it had taken full measure of their capabilities (and had solved the maintenance problems) it decided to retain them.

fn2
Not all Warsaw Pact aircraft were of Soviet design. All Pact air forces used the Czech L-29 Delfin trainer, for example.

PART VI

THE MAJOR ISSUES

31

The Mechanics of Going to War

ONE OF THE
greatest problems facing NATO was that, as a defensive alliance, it could only
react
to Warsaw Pact aggression or threat of aggression. Of necessity, it required time to implement the many measures required to bring its forces and individual member nations on to a war footing. Thus there was a heavy dependence upon accurate and timely strategic warning which would indicate that Warsaw Pact offensive operations were imminent, and upon which firm decisions could be made to set the mobilization process in train.