The Civil War: A Narrative: Volume 1: Fort Sumter to Perryville (145 page)

Davis had not come armed to the encounter, but after staggering back from the slap he had gone around the lobby asking bystanders for a weapon. At last he came to a certain Captain Gibson. “I always carry the article,” Gibson said, producing a pistol from under his coat. Davis took it, and as he started up the stairs Gibson called after him, “It’s a tranter trigger. Work light.” So when Nelson turned from Buell’s door and started toward him, Davis knew what to do. “Not another step farther!” he cried; and then, at a range of about eight feet, shot the big man in the chest. Nelson stopped, turned back toward Buell’s door, but fell before he got there. “Send for a clergyman; I wish to be baptized,” he told the men who came running at the sound of the shot. Gathering around him, they managed to lift the 300-pound giant onto a bed in a nearby room. “I have been basely murdered,” he said. Half an hour later he was dead.

Buell had Davis placed in arrest, intending to try him for murder,
but before he could appoint a court or even prepare to conduct an investigation—indeed, before Nelson’s blood had time to dry on the rug outside his door—he found that he no longer had any authority in the matter. The second blow had landed. Halleck’s order for Buell’s removal, issued at Lincoln’s insistence, was delivered by special courier that morning. The courier, a colonel aide of Halleck’s, acting under instructions similar to the ones given in Frémont’s case the year before—that is, the order was not to be delivered if Buell had fought or was about to fight a battle—had left Washington on the 24th, before Lincoln or Halleck knew the outcome of the race for Louisville. Three days later, learning that Buell had reached the Ohio ahead of Bragg, Halleck wired the colonel: “Await further orders before acting.” But it was too late. At noon of the 29th the reply came back: “The dispatches are delivered. I think it is fortunate that I obeyed instructions. Much dissatisfaction with General Buell.” On its heels came a wire from Buell himself: “I have received your orders … and in further obedience … I shall repair to Indianapolis.”

The government thus was put in the position of having sacked the man who, in some quarters at least, was being hailed as the savior of Louisville and his home state of Ohio. The reaction was prompt. Three congressmen and a senator from the region wired that the double catastrophe of Nelson’s death and Buell’s supersession had produced “great regret and something of dismay.… In our judgment the removal of General Buell will do great injury to the service in Kentucky.” However, the courier had carried not one message, but three: a brief note informing Buell that he was relieved, a War Department order appointing George Thomas to succeed him, and a letter warning the new commander that the general-in-chief expected “energetic operations.” Thomas answered without delay: “General Buell’s preparations have been completed to move against the enemy, and I therefore respectfully ask that he may be retained in command. My position is very embarrassing.” Halleck replied: “You may consider the order as suspended until I can lay your dispatch before the Government and get instructions.” This was a way out, and Lincoln took it; the order changing commanders was suspended, “by order of the President.” Whatever doubt there was that Buell would be willing to turn the other cheek and expose himself to another buffeting was removed by the acknowledgment he sent the following day: “Out of sense of public duty I shall continue to discharge the duties of my command to the best of my ability until otherwise ordered.”

That was the last day of September. By then he had completed the reorganization, incorporating the green men with the seasoned men—seasoned, that is, by marching, if not by fighting; his army still had never fought a battle on its own—for a total of better than 75,000 effectives. This was half again more than were with Bragg and Smith,
he knew, but he was also aware that, except for the few recruits they had managed to attract in the Bluegrass, their troops were veterans to a man, whereas no less than a third of his own had barely progressed beyond the manual of arms. Whatever qualms proceeded from this, on the first day of October he moved out. Too busy to concern himself with Nelson’s slayer or spare the officers for a court to try him, he recommended that Halleck appoint a commission to look into the case. But nothing came of this, not even the filing of charges. Later that month a Louisville grand jury indicted Davis for manslaughter, but nothing came of this either; he was admitted to bail and released. Presently he was back on duty, having acquired a reputation as a man whom it was advisable not to provoke.

Buell had ten divisions, nine of them distributed equally among three corps led by major generals, with Thomas as second in command of the whole. The march was southeast, out of Louisville toward Bardstown, and the army made it in three columns, a corps in each, commanded (left to right) by Alexander McCook, T. L. Crittenden, and Charles Gilbert. Bragg was in that direction, Smith at Frankfort. Buell figured his chances were good if he could keep them divided and thus encounter them one at a time; less good—in fact, not good at all—if he had to face them both at once. So he feinted toward the latter place with a division detached from McCook, supported by the large 15,000-man tenth division, composed almost entirely of recruits under Brigadier General Ebenezer Dumont. That way, Buell would not only cover Louisville; but also, by confusing his opponents as to his true objective, he might keep them from combining against him in the battle he was seeking at last. After four months of building and repairing roads and railroads, tediously advancing and hastily backtracking, enduring constant prodding from above, he was about to fight.

Down in Mississippi all this while, Van Dorn and Price had been pursuing separate courses, neither of which had produced anything substantial even in the way of a diversion. Not only were they independent of each other; Van Dorn was also independent of Bragg, and now that he (and Isaac Brown) had accomplished the salvation of Vicksburg, the diminutive Mississippian had larger things in mind than keeping Grant amused along the lower Tennessee border while Bragg got all the glory in Kentucky. After the loss of the
Arkansas
and Breckinridge’s repulse at Baton Rouge, Van Dorn had abandoned his “Ho! for New Orleans” notion and shifted his gaze upriver, reverting to his earlier slogan: “St Louis, then huzza!” His plan was to swing through West Tennessee, skirting Memphis to pounce on Paducah, from which point he would move “wherever circumstances might dictate.” So when Price, mindful of Bragg’s instructions to harry the Federals in
North Mississippi, called on his former chief for aid, Van Dorn replied that he would rather have Price join
him
. Price declined. Nettled, Van Dorn invoked his seniority and appealed directly to the Secretary of War: “I ought to have command of the movements of Price, that there may be concert of action.… Bragg is out of reach; I refer to you.” Davis himself wired back: “Your rank makes you the commander, and such I supposed were the instructions of General Bragg.”

Van Dorn had what he wanted. But Price had already moved on his own, striking for Iuka, twenty-odd miles down the Memphis & Charleston Railroad from Corinth, the fortified eastern anchor of Grant’s contracted line. September 14, as Price’s nearly 15,000 troops approached, the badly outnumbered Union garrison retreated in haste, leaving a quantity of confiscated cotton and army stores behind. Price burned the one and appropriated the other. It was now his intention to march on Middle Tennessee, to which Bragg informed him the Federals were retiring; but finding that this was not entirely the case—that Grant, though he had sent three of his five left-flank divisions to Buell, still had the other two near Iuka under Rosecrans—he hesitated to leave such a substantial force in his rear. While he was pondering this dilemma and distributing the captured stores, the problem was solved by the arrival of a courier from Van Dorn’s headquarters at Holly Springs, sixty miles west of Corinth, informing Price that the President had authorized his fellow Mississippian to order a junction of the two armies, under his command, for whatever “concert of action” he had in mind.

The Missourian’s intention was to stay in Iuka until he heard from Van Dorn just what it was he wanted him to do; then he would move out, more or less at his leisure, in whatever direction Van Dorn advised in order to combine the two commands for a resumption of the offensive. However, this was overlooking Grant’s plans in the matter—and Grant intended not only to interrupt Price’s leisure, but also to destroy him. In fact, he said later, “It looked to me that, if Price would remain in Iuka until we could get there, his annihilation was inevitable.”

By “we” he meant himself and Rosecrans, whose two divisions contained about 9000 effectives, and he also meant Ord, who would advance from Corinth with another two divisions, leaving a strong garrison to man the fortifications in case Van Dorn pushed east from Holly Springs for an assault while he was gone. Price had 15,000 men; Rosecrans and Ord had 17,000 between them. This in itself was by no means enough of a preponderance to assure the annihilation Grant expected, but he had designed a tactical convergence to accomplish that result. Ord would swing north and descend on Iuka from that direction, while Rosecrans came up from the south. Once Price had his attention thoroughly fixed on the former, the latter would fall on his rear; so that the rebels, demoralized and cut off from all avenues of escape,
would have to choose between death and capitulation. Advised of the plan, both of Grant’s subordinate commanders were as optimistic as their chief, though Rosecrans warned: “Price is an old woodpecker,” meaning that he would be hard to take by surprise.

Accordingly, on September 17 (while Lee, with his back to the Potomac, was defending Sharpsburg against McClellan, and Wilder, with his back to the Green, was surrendering Munfordville to Bragg) Ord moved twelve miles down the Memphis & Charleston to Burnsville, where Grant established headquarters, having instructed Rosecrans to concentrate at Jacinto, eight miles south. From these two points, the four divisions were to push on to within striking distance of Iuka the following day in order to deliver their sequential north-south attacks soon after dawn of the 19th. But that was not to be. Rosecrans reported that one of his divisions had been so badly delayed that he could not be in position before midafternoon of the appointed day. Ord moved up on schedule, however, establishing contact with the Confederate cavalry outposts, and Grant used the waiting time to engage in a bit of psychological warfare.

Last night he had received from the telegraph superintendent at Cairo a dispatch concerning the Battle of Antietam. According to this gentleman, the news was very good indeed: “Both sides engaged until 4 p.m. at which time Hooker gained position, flanked rebels, and threw them into disorder. Longstreet and his entire division prisoners. General Hill killed. Entire rebel army of Virginia destroyed, Burnside having reoccupied Harpers Ferry and cut off retreat.… Latest advices say entire rebel army must be captured or killed, as Potomac is rising and our forces pressing the enemy continually.” Grant sent the message forward to Ord, who passed it on to the Confederates this morning under a flag of truce. “I think this battle decides the war finally,” he explained in a covering note, “and that upon being satisfied of its truth General Price or whoever commands here will avoid useless bloodshed and lay down his arms. There is not the slightest doubt of the truth of the dispatch in my hand.” The reply was prompt. Formally employing the third person, Price said flatly that he did not believe the report was true, but “that if the facts were as stated in those dispatches they would only move him and his soldiers to greater exertions in behalf of their country, and that neither he nor they will ever lay down their arms—as humanely suggested by General Ord—until the independence of
the Confederate States shall have been acknowledged by the United States.”

Psychological warfare having failed to produce the desired result, Grant told Ord to go ahead with the opening phase, diverting Price’s attention northward, though he warned: “[Rosecrans] is behind where we expected. Do not be too rapid in your advance … unless it should be found that the enemy are evacuating.” Ord moved forward, encountering light resistance, but since there still was no word that the southward escape route was blocked, Grant told him to halt within four miles of the town “and there await sounds of an engagement between Rosecrans and the enemy before engaging the latter.” Ord did so, and the afternoon wore on. About 6 o’clock he received a message written two hours before by the commander of his lead division: “For the last twenty minutes there has been a dense smoke arising from the direction of Iuka. I conclude that the enemy are evacuating and destroying the stores.” Ord pushed forward tentatively, but still hearing no sound of conflict from the south, halted his troops in line of battle, and there they remained through twilight into darkness, a northwest wind blowing hard against their backs. His total loss for the day, in both divisions, was 1 man wounded.