The Channel Islands At War (14 page)

German military government in the Channel Islands had been lenient in some respects: at first, when they thought the occupation would not last: later, because it suited them to build good relations for the benefit of the garrison; and most frequently when they were dealing with people in their own class among the Island rulers. But their occupation rule was in the end as destructive, futile, and negative as Fascist and military rule was in the rest of Fortress Europe. The goodwill and work of those like von Aufsess and Knackfuss, was never more than icing on the cake. The real substance of occupation was a military machine maintaining itself in power by overwhelming force, threatening savage penalties, and using secret police informers and quislings. There was a change of personnel for the worse in 1944, but even the so-called moderates like von Schmettow were loyal to the orders of the F
ü
hre
r to stand firm.

Morrison's report as always continues to make extraordinary reading because he concluded after talks with Carey and Coutanche in May 1945, i was told that on the whole the behaviour of the Germans had been correct, particularly in the early days ... Early this year however, when Vice-Admiral
Hüffmeier
took over the command from General Schmettow, there was a stiffening of the German attitude, but apparently without a great deal of difference to the practical outcome."

To tens of thousands of starving Islanders and soldiers this would have seemed a strange conclusion about the five years of military rule they had just experienced, although the Island rulers would have tended to agree with the Home Secretary.

The Island Governments and the Germans

If Hitler's forces had come to Britain in 1940 who would have been the co-operators and collaborators in the ruling class to fulfil the Vichy role of their counterparts elsewhere in Europe? The British ruling class was not put to this test, but it seems unlikely they would have behaved any differently from their European counterparts, particularly as many in the Conservative party had expressed support for Hitler in the past, and there were several pro-Fascist and 'peace' groupings in the establishment.

On the Channel Islands, part of the ruling class was faced with the problem of collaboration or resistance and chose a path described by Cruickshank as 'passive co-operation'. Herbert Morrison, in May 1945, hurried to stress that the Island rulers had 'succeeded to a remarkable extent in getting the best possible treatment from the Germans commensurate with the avoidance of any semblance of collaboration', and this has always been the official line. It was still supported by Cruickshank in his history when he stated that "it would be difficult to voice any criticism of their conduct of affairs', stressing 'they did so much that was right under circumstances of the greatest possible difficulty'.

Collaboration has become a politically ugly word. It had many meanings shading into one another like the colours of a rainbow, and it was brought about by a variety of motives. Those who collaborated might be gullible, frightened, indifferent, or greedy rather than politically committed. In everyday life collaboration was more a matter of economic gains and social advantages than overt support for German actions or ideals. It was often a matter of turning a blind eye, failing to complain or help resistance, perhaps betraying opposition by informing, lying low and profiting from the black market or German contacts. Such acts are hard to prove in peacetime, but evidence of their committal lies in the preservation of office and livelihood by virtually all the Island rich and rulers during a period when ordinary Islanders suffered the full miseries of German rule.

Nazi subversion policies were well tuned to produce among conquered peoples, organizations and rulers willing to co-operate provided they might 'endure the war, without thereby forfeiting any of their patriotism'. This phrase occurred in a German report in September 1941 about their

rule in the Islands, and neatly encapsulates the policy of 'golden bands' described in the last chapter. The Island rulers faced with this policy came from a narrow wealthy class little accustomed to democratic ways, and it was easy enough for them to mix with people of comparable rank and position from abroad. Hitler ensured the Channel Islands officers and administrators were often drawn from aristocratic, conservative Bavarian and Prussian circles so that men like von Aufsess and von Schmettow might get on with people like Coutanche and Carey.

It was made clear to the Island governments that if they obeyed German orders their own lives would continue relatively undisturbed. They would get the perks and privileges of office, and, if they wanted them, of the black market. They would be free from prosecution for such offences as having a wireless, and would secure exemptions in such matters as billeting or deportation. Their jobs would be safe and their property left intact. It is understandable that almost to a man the Island government officials preferred to co-operate on these terms rather than face the consequences of resistance: the sack, the threat of punishment, or possible use as a hostage. With individual exceptions, and a small number of protests at particular acts, the Island rulers in Sark, Guernsey and Jersey did as they were told for five years. They helped individuals on some occasions, and claimed the overall impact of their policy was to benefit the Islanders by leaving them in office to do their best for their fellow citizens, and reduce German hostility and possible severity.

They could rightly point to a lack of any support from the United Kingdom which left the Island governments isolated and vulnerable. Proud though they were of their ancient liberties and traditions. Island governments were little more than county council officials in a large English county, appointed with no thought that they would have to take major political decisions, or deal with a massive German occupation. Any actions they took might lead to reprisals of the kind they were familiar with in neighbouring France.

In December 1943, an order was issued reducing the Island butter ration by half, and members of the Guernsey administration complained. The Germans insisted on the cuts, and the Island government accept
ed them. The Reverend John Leale
, attorney-general and acting president of the Controlling Committee wrote to Carey, the bailiff, to explain their action. He said that, 'Had the Committee refused to carry out the order it must have ceased to function either by its resignation or by its dismissal, it being too optimistic to think that the Occupying Force would overlook a flat refusal. Others would have had to be found cither by the States or the Germans to take our place, and the newcomers' first duty would have to be to do what we refused to do. Rightly or wrongly the Committee came to the conclusion that either resignation or refusal - while they might savour of the heroic - would lead nowhere and would be detrimental to the Islands' interests.'

The decision to act in this way 'rightly or wrongly' had certain consequences. Not only did they carry on the government efficiently and enforce occupation law as required, they issued a string of orders urging people to obey the Germans, report
law-breakers, hand over escaped prisoners, oppose escape
rs, and commit no sabotage. They may have protested in private, but in public they were seen to carry out orders including illegal reduction of rations, enforcement of labour on military sites, prosecution of Jews, and the carrying out of deportation. They made little effort to protect the property of the evacuees entrusted to their care, and rarely provided legal representation at trials of Islanders before the Military Court. Once on the slippery slope of 'passive co-operation' there was no attempt to distinguish between actions and laws they might reasonably be expected to carry out, and those that were degrading or oppressive. It is hard to see this as other than a form of collaboration. The Island rulers played a part, by their example, in encouraging ordinary Islanders to collaborate in various ways as black-marketeers, informers, and Jerry bags.

The German garrison was dependent to some extent on the goodwill and labour of the Islanders for its maintenance. This put the Island governments in a position to bargain, or at least to test the waters of German disapproval. Apart from Sherwill and Le Quesne no officials were imprisoned, and the latter arrest was seen by German officials as an error. There was a certain amount of belt-tightening in the governing class, but by and large they lived a privileged existence throughout the occupation. For them the policy worked. It was a model and moderate occupation. What is far less clear is the degree to which the policy actually helped the Islanders as a whole. There is little evidence that occupation was other than a frightful experience for many, and a miserable one for all except those openly collaborating, involved in the black market, or in government circles.

When the lieutenant-governors withdrew in June 1940 the Home Office issued the following instructions to the Island rulers: it is desired by His Majesty's Government that the Bailiff shall discharge the duties of lieutenant-governor, which would be confined to civil duties, and that he should stay at his post and administer the government of the Island to the best of his abilities in the interests of the inhabitants, whether or not he is in a position to receive instructions from His Majesty's Government."

As a result Carey and Coutanche assumed new roles as heads of the executive, and consulted their fellows on how to organize the government on a wartime footing. This was the only instruction known to have been received by the Island rulers. All that happened when the Germans took over was that the Island Commander exercised a power of veto, and the Island greffier or registrar was required to register as laws both Island and German orders.
Alderney
was of course deprived of all government with the departure of Judge French, and Sark received no instructions. The Germans simply stated that orders by the Island Commander 'will automatically have effect on the Island of Sark.'

The government of the Islands were in personnel and structure, antiquated and undemocratic, in some parts feudal and autocratic, and this meant that under the Germans the same narrow circle retained their hold on affairs. They continued to exercise their paternalistic role which admirably suited German purposes. The bailiff, Victor Carey's first order after Occupation read: 'The public are notified that no resistance whatever is to be offered to those in military occupation of this Island. The public are asked to be calm, to carry on their lives and work in the usual way, and to obey the orders of the German Commandant'. The adoption of this line by all prominent members of Island governments was certainly some justification for ordinary people on the Islands contemplating resistance to decide that it was futile under such circumstances. As Frank Falla said, "it was made clear that anyone who stepped out of line could expect no sympathy, understanding or help from the local government'.

While the Island authorities were willing to support German orders publicly, and co-operate wit
h the Germans in catching escape
rs or saboteurs, they were equally unwilling to oppose in public German violations of the law and the Hague Convention. They sometimes seem to have forgotten who were the enemy. John Lealc, for example, told the States that, 'There must be no thought of any kind of resistance. Should there be any resistance, we can only expect that the more dire punishment will be meted (out). I say this, the man who even contemplates resistance should the Germans come is the most dangerous man in the Island and its most bitter enemy."

Those who resented what happened and committed acts of resistance like smuggling out information, or spreading news about German defeats, came to despise this paternalistic government and press for reform. In 1944 an MI9 report referred to the way certain people were benefiting from the black marke
t in high places which von Aufse
ss said involved many deputies and jurats from the Island states or parliament. The report remarked that, 'Probably as a result of this graft a new party has been formed on the Island called the Jersey Democratic Society. This is not a resistance group. It is a movement with a post-war aim. It leads the campaign for the abolition of Jersey's feudal system, and independence, by publishing and distributing illegal pamphlets.'

At the end of the war, an attempt by the Jersey Democrats to have the conduct of the Island government investigated was ignored by the British military government, and the old system was quickly restored, although changes making it more democratic were introduced later.

In everyday life the Islanders remained under their traditional form of government made even less democratic by the Germans. The Island parliaments or states had little power to initiate laws, and had only a minority of directly elected members: in Guernsey for example, it was 18 out of 57 deputies. There were also archaic restrictions on who might stand for the states. Jews, atheists and freemasons were excluded in Guernsey. In the states sat other groups of members like the jurats who were elected by the sitting members for life, and tended to control the government departments. The states were forbidden to hold any kind of election, and were summoned only rarely to bolster severe German orders, or unpopular measures to which the Island governments had agreed. Civilian government therefore rested almost entirely in the hands of two new bodies set up by Carey and Coutanche. On Guernsey, a controlling committee was formed on 21 June and met four days later, and on Jersey a similar body called the superior council met on 24 June and assumed full powers three days later. Each executive body consisted of seven or eight jurats and Crown officials with their assistants and secretaries. Each member presided over a small government department responsible for key functions amongst which probably the most important was the essential commodities committee presided over by Sir Abraham Laine" in Guernsey and Philip Le Masurier in Jersey.