The Caged Virgin: An Emancipation Proclamation for Women and Islam (7 page)

Let the Muslim Voltaires of today work in a safe environment on the enlightenment of Islam, which will lead to an international enlightenment, as the power of reason and individual responsibility frees the minds of individual Muslims of the burden of the hereafter, the constant feelings of guilt, and the temptation of fundamentalism. We would learn to feel responsible for our problems and the areas in which we lag behind. Let us have a Voltaire.

I
mmigrants are expected to adopt certain standards and values that are part and parcel of Western society and to behave accordingly. The debate around integration denounces the behavior of Muslims who do not meet these standards but often fails to tackle the underlying causes. Westerners condemn polygamy, vendetta, and abuse of women; we want to improve education and increase employment; we see the causal link between unfinished school careers and criminality. And yet we prefer not to discuss the cultural and religious backgrounds of these wrongs and problems. We readily pass over the fact that traditional customs and orthodox religious opinions stand in the way of integration.

It is clear that “old forms and thoughts” will continue to influence Muslims for a long time to come. Archconservative imams, marriage to imported partners, the increased interest in Islamic teachings, and watching TV stations with fundamentalist leanings all contribute to this. Western integration policy should therefore address the regrettable correlation between the limited cultural development of large sections of the Muslim population and their social disadvantages.

The basic principles of traditional Islam, combined with the old customs of the ethnic groups, clash with the elementary values and standards of Western society. Failing to adopt the values of the host society or adhering to the standards of the country of origin explains to a large extent why many Muslims in the Netherlands are falling behind socially and economically. With the help of the work of three writers—Karen Armstrong, Bernard Lewis, and David Pryce-Jones—I argue that the Islamic faith lends itself more than any other to the preservation of premodern customs and traditions. For in Islam, culture and religion are very closely connected, and verses from the Koran legitimize many practices that—in the eyes of Westerners—are unacceptable. The mental world of Islam is a reflection of the stagnation that entrapped this religion a few centuries after its birth.

This premodern mentality will continue to work against Muslim integration in the West. But there are four different models to solve the problems of integration: the political-legal model, the (purely) socioeconomic model, the multicultural model, and the sociocultural model. To a greater or lesser extent, each takes into account the cultural-religious background of Muslim immigrants.

SOCIAL RELEVANCE

Of course, immigrants from Surinam, the Antilles, (Christian) Ghana, and China (to name but a few groups) also have problems, but Muslims have very specific difficulties that stem from religion and culture when it comes to adjusting to a modern, Western society. This is “religion as a culture-forming factor, with a system of values and morals derived from ideas about Divine Truth, and on the basis of this, a community, which is a natural translation of a higher moral order.” The drop in the number of young Muslims who attend the mosque by no means implies that these young people do not regard themselves as Muslims. For many nonpracticing Muslims, the essence of their identity and the system of values and morals by which they live remain Islamic.

Muslims in the Netherlands and other Western European countries are immigrants from Turkey and Morocco who have come to find work and have had children there. In the year 2000 these Dutch communities counted 309,000 and 262,000 registered people, respectively. In addition, the past decade has seen a considerable influx of asylum seekers, from Iraq (38,000), Somalia (30,000), Afghanistan (26,000), and Iran (24,000). In 2000 a total of approximately 35,000 people had arrived in the Netherlands from Pakistan, Tunisia, and Algeria. As a consequence of family reunion and childbirth, these communities are expected to increase dramatically over the next few decades. A few facts:

 

Muslims now form the biggest ideological category within the immigrant community. In absolute figures this means 736,000 Muslims. Most Muslims remain strongly focused on their own communities and have a very high proportion of marriages to foreign Islamic partners (almost three-quarters of Turkish and Moroccan marriages) as opposed to the low proportion of marriages to native Dutch partners (probably under 5 percent). “The vast majority, especially those who come from Islamic countries, do not converge…. Their demographic profile is traditional, and what is particularly striking is that the first and second generations seem no different in this respect.” The preservation of old customs (such as marrying and having children early) in a modern society becomes a substantial obstacle to social mobility and integration. And the children from these families with parents who have had little or no education will follow in their parents’ footsteps. “And of course your social mobility depends very much on having been in education for a certain period of time, which is in conflict with marrying young and having children early.”

 

 

Muslims in the Netherlands reside predominantly in the deprived areas of the big and middle-sized cities. They are generally poorly educated. The majority of Turks and Moroccans come from the lowest socioeconomic strata in their native countries. A good proportion of asylum seekers has scarcely any education. The dropout rate from schools among Muslim children is relatively high. Even girls who go on to higher education are forced into marriage by their families and will often break off their education. Unemployment among Muslims is still two to three times higher than among the native population. Those who do have jobs often work in areas sensitive to economic fluctuations such as retail and catering. Their dependence on social welfare is relatively high. Crime rates are disproportionately high. Frank Bovenkerk and Yucel Yesilgöz even call these figures alarming.

 

 

Since the attacks of 9 /11 and the results of the May 15, 2002 election (the national parliamentary elections in the Netherlands)—the main issue of which was the integration of minorities and the integration of Muslims into Dutch society—the question of Muslim integration has become more urgent. The tone of the discussions is turning grimmer, and in the media much attention is given to the radical political dimension of Islam, to which Muslims in the Netherlands, as elsewhere in the West, seem susceptible.

 

THE WORLD OF ISLAM

In their effort to understand Islam, researchers often separate the religion from its social origins. They describe the theological diversity within Islam, recount its philosophical history, or portray Islam as a spiritual inner journey. Hardly anyone has analyzed the origins of this world religion from a sociological point of view.

This is not surprising, given the fact that Islam had no real presence in Western Europe until recently and was a subject for research only among an exclusive, small circle of classical orientalists whose methods and personal interests colored their findings. There is also very little sociological research into Islam by established Muslim academics.

Lewis and Pryce-Jones discuss three closely linked characteristics of the mental world of traditional Islam. According to them, the religious-cultural identity of Muslims is characterized by:

 

A hierarchical-authoritarian mentality: “The boss is almighty; others can only obey.”

 

 

Group identity: “The group always comes before the individual”; if you do not belong to the clan/tribe you will be treated with suspicion or, at best, not be taken seriously.

 

 

A patriarchal mentality and culture of shame: The woman has a reproductive function and must obey the male members of her family; failure to do so brings shame on the family.

 

The Islamic identity (view of mankind and the world) is based on groups, and its central concepts are honor and disgrace, or shame. “Honor” is closely linked to the group. The relevant groups, in order of size, are the family, the clan, the tribe, and, ultimately, the community of the faithful
(ummah).

Within the community of the faithful, the fact that someone claims to be a Muslim is enough for other Muslims to regard that person as closer to them than any non-Muslim. Muslims feel an emotional bond with their oppressed brothers and sisters elsewhere in the world. When a group of Muslims—no matter where—is suffering or being oppressed (Kashmir, Palestine), the community of the faithful is commonly depicted as a bleeding body in pain.

Within the tribe or race, a person from the same region or country is closer to you than anyone from a faraway country. This does not necessarily imply sharing the same nationality (a modern concept). A Turkish Kurd feels kindred to a Kurd from Iran or Iraq, and—because of an extended history of war and hostilities—
not
to his Turkish neighbors.

Within the family and the (sub)clan circles, it is a source of honor to have as many sons as possible. This is why men often marry young and will have more than one wife. The subordinate position of women is a consequence of the cultural desire to have many sons. There are two reasons. First, children always adopt their father’s name and never their mother’s (i.e.,
her
father’s name). When the woman marries someone outside the subclan and has children, she serves the interests of the rival subclan. Because of the distrust of rival (sub)clans (you never know, they might grow stronger and more aggressive and attack you), it is customary to encourage marriage among cousins. The wish to have so many sons can lead to an uncontrollable surge in the population. And marrying family members comes with considerable health risks for the offspring.

Second, a woman can tarnish her father’s honor, and consequently that of his clan, often incurring dreadful repercussions. She may do this by wearing the wrong kind of clothing outside the home or by going out with a boyfriend before marriage. Punishments include verbal warnings, physical abuse, expulsion, and even murder. The outcome is almost invariably that no man will subsequently want to marry her. Not only does the family lose status, but the woman remains a financial burden. Her presence in the parental home is a permanent reminder of the shame she has brought upon her family and the clan. In other words, the individual is completely subordinate to the collective. Every child has to learn its social skills in a culture of shame, which centers on the concepts of honor and disgrace. There is no room whatsoever for the values of freedom and individual responsibility in this way of thinking. The first rule a child is taught is to obey the adults in his or her family. Boys, moreover, learn from a very early age to give as good as they get. Aggressive behavior is functional in this culture and serves the purpose of avoiding public humiliation by others.

This premodern culture closely resembles a concept called the General Human Pattern (GHP), a pattern that was found in all societies at one time, except today’s. In this model developed by Dutch philosopher Jan Romein, man feels that he is part of nature; he wants to use it without feeling an obsessive need to scrutinize all its secrets. The GHP mind thinks in a particular way: concrete rather than abstract; it resorts to images rather than concepts. Conscious organization and planning play a much less important role for him than in modern societies. In the GHP mind, power and authority are absolute and unassailable. Anyone who opposes the authorities is punished. Finally, work as a necessary function in society in this mind-set is not regarded as a blessing, but as a curse and a burden. Doing nothing is a luxury desired by all but granted to only a few.

ISLAM AND THE TRIBAL MENTALITY

Islam began in a tribal society. The monotheism of Islam marked a sharp break with the polytheism that had prevailed on the Arabian Peninsula until then. The new faith inspired Muhammad’s tribe in its constant battle to fend off neighboring tribes. Muhammad preached charity: once conquered, tribes were not enslaved if they converted to Islam and joined in the battle against nonbelieving tribes. This gave the Muslim religion a strongly expansionist character: much importance is attributed to the conquest and conversion of those who do not believe in Allah. Islam adopted some pre-Islamic spiritual traditions, such as praying, fasting, and giving alms. The relationship between Muhammad and his god is vertical: God is almighty, He is one, and Muhammad obeys His commands. The relationship between Muhammad and his followers is simple and the same: Muhammad’s will is the law.

The Koran prescribes the ideal ordering of society with rules primarily designed to bring under control the tribal anarchy of the time, with its extremely violent fights against and among clans and tribes. In
The Closed Circle,
David Pryce-Jones describes how this tribal system functioned. In a vicious cycle of violence, one tribe tried to dominate another, which meant that there was a permanent struggle for power within the tribe, the clan, and the family. At the top of every family, clan, or tribe stood one man. Often this captain had acquired his position through cunning and violence. For instance, Muhammad had managed to get a number of tribes to accept important political and social (and eventually also economic) regulations that supported values central to the tribal way of life, such as maintaining the tribe’s honor and the redistribution of property. These laws brought a lasting solution to the problems between rival tribes and forced them to become allies. The fighting continued, but only against tribes outside the Islamic circle.