The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq - The Alastair Campbell Diaries (6 page)

Back at Number 10, TB, Jonathan, David Manning and I had a session pre TB’s phone call with Bush. TB was worried by the reluctance to have a G8, felt it showed they were looking inwards when they should be looking outwards. They should be using now to bind in Russia and France. He also felt we had to do more to bind in Pakistan, who were going to be absolutely vital in all this. The call took place at 1.45. It was clear that the wobbly Bush of the last call had become the hawk again. He said this was a war and they would win. They wanted OBL dead or alive. Afterwards TB seemed a bit alarmed, said ‘My God, fasten your seatbelts.’ He said people would understand Afghanistan, but if he went for Afghanistan and Iraq together, it would be absolute madness. He was quite troubled, said we had to think of a way of getting to the US for a face-to-face meeting. He said he needed to see him in a room, and look in his eyes, not do all this on phone calls with fifteen people listening in. Bush would be getting lots of conflicting advice, and TB said he could sense that in the change of tone from call to call. We had to persuade Bush that we had to go for OBL and the Taliban but if he went for Iraq the Russians and the French would peel off. He asked DM to make sure he stayed in permanent contact with Condi [Condoleezza Rice, US National Security Advisor] and make sure they did nothing too rash. We got over Geoff H, Jack S and CDS.

TB went through his assessment of the US plan – ultimatum to yield up OBL and then let outside body move in to get rid of the camps. Alternatively, hit OBL straight away possibly going for the Taliban. And the next step is to look to other countries, including Iraq, and other countries not even linked to OBL. He said their instinct was to resolve the WMD [weapons of mass destruction] question quickly. We needed to consider what such a strategy would be and what part we would play in it. He said his advice very strongly will be to deal with Afghanistan very distinctively, whereas to go for Iraq would be certain to lose Russia and France from any international support. He said they had definitely moved to action mode but we still had an opportunity to mould things in the right direction. He said he was confident he could persuade him that to go beyond Afghanistan for four countries at once was World War territory.

CDS asked if there was any indication of how they intended to hit Afghanistan. TB was not aware they were currently planning anything
beyond missile attacks. Geoff said there had been talk of special forces going into Afghanistan. CDS said it was possible to attack mountain camps as a way of showing we were not scared of putting our boots on their soil. Geoff said [Donald] Rumsfeld [US Defense Secretary] had been looking for reasons to hit Iraq. They definitely wanted regime change and that was the channel of advice that Bush had been getting since the election. Jack said they would be mad to do Iraq without justification because they will lose world opinion. TB said ‘My job is to try to steer them in a sensible path.’ He said we had to separate these two missions. He said their line of argument will be that it does not matter whether you did the Trade Center, if you are in the business of terrorism, then we are going to put you out of business. It’s possible to be sympathetic to that but the political consequences are all too obvious. We cannot ignore that’s where they are. We are talking very big issues here. He said even in the most benign circumstances this is going to be difficult.

TB said they all needed to keep in close touch with opposite numbers. He was worrying about which camp would be having most influence on Bush. We also agreed it might be sensible for Guthrie to go to see [General Pervez] Musharraf [President of Pakistan]. TB said afterwards he felt Bush was getting bad advice, that we had the right strategy and we had to persuade him of that. He would feel so much better if he could see him face to face. It was a bit alarming just how different the two calls had been. After the first, TB was worried he wasn’t doing enough, and now he was talking about taking out anyone who might harbour terrorists. TB asked CDS to refine the paper on military options. Ed Richards [senior policy adviser on media business issues] came to see me about Gavyn Davies
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getting the BBC chairmanship, which was likely to break next week.

The aftermath of the attacks was still totally dominating the media, stories moving more to the human tragedy as well as the diplomacy. TB had a meeting first thing with C, Lander, [Francis] Richards, Scarlett, Wilson, Jonathan, Manning and me. They kept saying there was more and more evidence pointing to OBL. But as TB and I agreed later, nothing that would stand up in a court of law. There was real unease among our side now, that the Americans would do something to fracture the coalition that was being built up. Scarlett said there
was evidence of real tensions in Pakistan. Lander reported three people arrested with false passports at Gatwick. Manning said Colin Powell [US Secretary of State] had spoken to Jack and sounded worried. There was no doubt some in the US had an agenda, led by Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz [Deputy Defense Secretary], to see this as a revenge against Iraq for not finishing the Gulf War. Lander briefed TB on some of the difficulties we were facing on the issue of people using the UK to plan terrorism. TB just sat shaking his head when he told him about someone who we knew to be planning terror in India, that this was accepted by the tribunal, but we couldn’t kick him out. We discussed the need for changes to human rights law and civil liberties. DM had mentioned to Condi that TB thought they should meet soon. TB, Jonathan and I were all casually dressed. The spooks were all in dark suits and carrying their battered briefcases. TB said to them, if I didn’t know you were all so young, I’d say there was a generational gap.

He felt he should probably see Schroeder on Wednesday, Chirac Thursday, then the US. He called a couple of times later when I was out running, was now at that stage where he was testing his own thoughts by constantly setting out the same position and trying to find weaknesses. It was basically ultimatum, act, follow-through short, medium and long term. But we would need to be building support at every stage and he was obviously worried about the American capacity on that front. TB was getting a good press here and even more so overseas, especially the States. I couldn’t help thinking that though this was a total disaster, and was going to wipe out chunks of his domestic diary, if leadership was important, here was a real opportunity to show it. The Sundays arrived, wall to wall on the attacks. The main live news story was Bush’s meeting at Camp David, where he said the US must get ready for war and that OBL was the prime suspect. TB was getting a good press, GWB a bad press. [James] Naughtie’s second instalment [of his serialised Blair/Brown book,
The Rivals
] was running which focused on me, and GB’s fears about my diary.

TB was doing CNN so I went in for a pre-meeting with him and David Manning. DM said they were looking at an ultimatum followed by a 48-or 72-hour wait. The noises from the Taliban were getting more and more aggressive. Thousands of refugees were pouring over the border. Pakistan was clearly going to have a hard time whatever. Robin [Cook, former Foreign Secretary, now Leader of the House of
Commons] was on
Frost
for us and the BBC were really pissed off that TB did CNN. It was a good interview. We went over all the really tough questions, but a few of them never came. I had an argument with CNN who were initially refusing to release the whole interview to other broadcasters but in the end they did.

TB said he sensed Bush would end up in the right place, that some of the stuff on the phone calls had clearly been for the benefit of internal consumption, which was why he really wanted to meet him soon, without anyone else there. ‘I hope to God he’s not listening to some of the people round him, because we need to be wary of them.’ He was more confident. Chirac was pretty clear that they could hit Afghanistan but no further. Schroeder was in a bit of a problem at home and not quite so strong. Jospin was all over the shop because of his coalition [government] situation and Chirac was going to make it as hard for him as he could. TB wanted to get a message of support for Musharraf. He later called me to say we must get out the message about how closely the Americans were consulting us, as whatever they thought about them, that would make the other Europeans want to get closer.

Up to the flat to see TB and told him that the US were suggesting that he went to Congress with Bush. ‘Oh yeah,’ said TB. I said it was serious and I was worried about it because it would play into the whole poodle thing. John Kerr [permanent secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Office] called to say it would be ghastly, that the whole thing would become an orgy of US patriotism, with TB in a kind of nod-along role. I felt we should only do it if TB also spoke, but wasn’t sure if that was even doable. Charles Clarke [Labour Party chairman] told him later that there were real anxieties around about Bush and that people around the world saw TB as the only person who could restrain him. He said it was an awesome responsibility. Clare Short had gone on [Andrew] Rawnsley’s [BBC Radio 4
Westminster Hour
] programme last night and had said something that let them write government split and tension headlines. TB later wrote to her. He was really angry, said it sent exactly the wrong signal to the Taliban about our seriousness of intent. Jack and I had a long chat before his
Today
programme interview and agreed he should move the story on by echoing the line on OBL and saying that we had our own evidence that all pointed his way.

TB spoke to Musharraf later who said the risks he was taking were real and he needed real help. He seemed keen on the suggestion of
Guthrie going out. At the 8.30 intelligence meeting, there was no real knowledge of where OBL was. Lander reported on some of the people under surveillance here. There was a really gloomy mood. There was talk from the US of concerns that OBL had acquired some kind of basic nuclear capability, and worries of a possible chemical, biological or radiological attack. At TB’s military meeting, Geoff Hoon and CDS were both focusing on the difficulties of any military offensive. Boyce was very unlike Guthrie as CDS, who had always been pretty can-do. Boyce was quite soft-spoken, very polite, but I wondered if he wasn’t something of a fellow depressive. Geoff said he had had some difficult chats with Rumsfeld. CDS said only six per cent of Afghans have electricity. They don’t even have fuel dumps that we would recognise as such. There’s nothing really there, very few targets. TB said they had to know that we would hurt them if they don’t yield up OBL. David Manning said we had to do more to help the Northern Alliance.
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Lander and CDS said the heroin trail should also be hit. They said more people had been killed by heroin than died last Tuesday.

We were now planning a series of visits for TB, Berlin, Paris, Washington, New York. He was worried about Congress unless he spoke. Then came news there would be an EU summit on Friday. All a bit of a nightmare. TB had lunch with [Italian Prime Minister Silvio] Berlusconi who was wearing a pile of make-up and his hair was dyed jet black. He was reasonably supportive on the idea of military action ‘provided not too many people die’. TB said there was no such thing as a painless war. He said either the US will see the international community rallying to them or there will be a battle internally and the isolationists will win. His worry was people show support up to the point where the shooting starts. He said we had to divide this into two – Afghanistan, and the broader terrorist apparatus. In respect of the second part, the decisions are for the long term.

Berlusconi emphasised that we had to make clear this was not a war against Islam. TB said it was important we got Arab countries as part of our coalition. The best signal of all would be a restart of the Middle East peace process. There was a real risk that [Israeli Prime Minister Ariel] Sharon sees this as an opportunity to say that [Palestinian leader Yasser] Arafat equals OBL. He said it was important we all made clear to Israel this should not be an opportunity to settle scores but on the contrary we should have the objective of reinvigorating the peace process. There was something very odd about Berlusconi. He didn’t seem quite in control of his body, his arm
movements were a bit weird and most of the time he addressed himself to the interpreter rather than TB. They had a fairly lacklustre discussion on Europe and the euro. The Federal Reserve cut interest rates while they were having lunch. TB then had a big Africa meeting and we had a discussion of sorts on his [party] conference speech.

Sandy Berger [former National Security Advisor to Bill Clinton] was in town. He was looking a lot thinner, younger and happier, said he was exercising five days a week. He felt TB was doing well, that a position of total support was the best because he could influence from that position in private. He felt TB had a lot of respect because of our experience re the IRA and we should be saying this is not a war that you just win or lose, but a war you constantly manage. The New York Stock Exchange reopened but the economic impact was growing.

TB was at Chequers for a meeting with a group of officers. He had a chat with Jiang Zemin [Chinese premier]. He was getting a very good press as a kind of international interlocutor. Bush was going down pretty badly everywhere apart from the States. We were getting more and more work done on the nature of the Taliban. There was a bit of a discussion as to whether it was the kind of trip Cherie [Blair, TB’s wife] should go on. I did the morning meeting. Geoff Hoon was doing fine. Tessa told me relatives were getting more and more angry but not with us so much as with the general situation. GB went up after interest rate cuts and the economic scene was getting more and more difficult. I started work on a note for Karen Hughes [AC’s opposite number in the White House] about the system we had put in place for Kosovo. If anything, this situation was going to be even more complicated and difficult. There were a stack of meetings to plan visits, particularly the US. I was really worried about him looking like a poodle at Congress. There was to be a church service and also a visit to ‘Ground Zero’. The main news story of the day was the toing and froing of the Taliban about whether to hand over OBL. They prevaricated by saying ‘clerics’ would decide.