The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq - The Alastair Campbell Diaries (113 page)

I spoke to Hoon who said that a man had come forward who felt he was possibly Gilligan’s source. He had come forward and was being interviewed today. GH said his initial instinct was to throw the book at him, but in fact there was a case for trying to get some kind of plea bargain – say that that he’d come forward and he was saying yes to speaking to Gilligan, yes he said intelligence went in late, but he never said the other stuff. It was double-edged but GH and I agreed it would fuck Gilligan if that was his source. He said he was an expert rather than a spy or full-time MoD official. GH and I agreed to talk tomorrow.

I was meanwhile doing my letters re BBC behaviour as well as a bit for TB. TB [public service reform] speech went OK but low-key. I was talking to TB, Peter M, Ben Bradshaw and later John Scarlett. We needed to work out our strategy for Monday. Godric said there was a case for us simply saying we had been cleared, the ball was now in the BBC court, and wait for their response before further action. Peter said we should be nice about the BBC and get ready to go for them on Monday. TB wanted closure. Peter M was being extremely helpful at the moment, and I was grateful that he was turning his mind to it. Ben Bradshaw ditto. Soames was in a bit of a panic after his interview and saying nobody must know that I helped him set it up, because I was such a bête noire for the Tory Party. Meeting on EMU, in which I was falling asleep the whole time.

The BBC story seemed to be moving our way. The governors were to meet tomorrow to discuss it. The BBC started briefing aggressively that they would stand by their story and warn the governors it would be the end of BBC independence if they backed down. I spoke to TB and we agreed I should send a fairly emollient letter to the governors, and a file, to set out our side of the story vis-à-vis the BBC, and say it was not about attacking independence, or a broader attack, but dealing with one specific set of allegations.

Jack called a couple of times to say he felt he should do the bulk of Monday’s media, and I should be low profile. I was not so sure. He later called to say the FAC was going to be in Rome on Monday, so no point in a Commons statement, but we had to work out a line. I agreed with Jack that it had to be about the BBC story because that was where the focus was. There was a case for saying nothing and going up to do discussion stuff, e.g. do we do a phone-in or
discussion with BBC. Catherine Rimmer went into the office to put together the file for the governors. Meanwhile I was dealing with the car, which had been broken into, then took the boys to various sports events, then saw Gavin [Millar] again, who having read through everything felt I had an open-and-shut case for libel but that we should wait and see what the BBC said on Monday.

I was out running when Martin Sheehan [press officer] called to say the
Sunday Telegraph
were doing Dyke presenting new evidence to the governors to justify the story, the
Observer
saying that C met [John] Humphrys and [Kevin] Marsh [editor of
Today
] shortly before the
Today
programme story. I organised a conference call with C and a colleague of his. C said – and I knew this – that he met them a few weeks before this story, but when Humphrys recently said in his interview with John Reid that he had sources too, C’s colleague got on to Humphrys to be assured he did not mean C. We agreed that they call the Press Association and BBC – or get the FCO to – and say they discussed nothing that would add to Gilligan’s story and they should stop digging. It was a big So What. C agreed we should say it added nothing to the story. It looked like the last desperate throes, but it was possible the governors would go for it and back Dyke. C wanted to get Humphrys to deny the story.

I ran home, exhausted, and got the papers. They were pretty tricky. It was also still not clear whether the FAC would clear me or not, or had split on party lines. Alex F called from the women’s final at Wimbledon, said he had been at the same table as Gavyn Davies, who seemed pretty out of sorts. Later I did a conference call with Tessa and Ben Bradshaw to go over their interviews tomorrow. Tessa called later to say she had really tried to speak to me but I never returned calls or messages. It was true that I was to a large extent trying to rely on my own resources.

Ben Bradshaw did well on
GMTV
. I called Hillary Clinton before she did
Frost
, so that she had the full picture. TB’s
Observer
words on the BBC and me were leading the news.
⁶⁵
I spent much of the weekend
talking to TB and Geoff H re the ‘source’, the man who felt he was the source because his colleagues said he sounded like what Gilligan was saying. He had come forward earlier in the week to confide that he’d seen Gilligan in a hotel, that he’d made some of these comments, but not others, for example about me. GH, like me, wanted to get it out that the source had broken cover to claim Gilligan had misrepresented him. TB and I had a long chat about it and TB was worried, felt that he or GH ought to tell the FAC about this. His worry was that it could lead to them reopening the inquiry. I wanted, as GH did, to get it to the BBC governors that we may know who the source was, that he was not a spy, not involved in the WMD dossier and was a WMD expert who advised departments. TB was fine about that but backed off after speaking to Omand, who felt the guy had to be treated properly and interviewed again. GH and I felt we were missing a trick.

I suggested to GH to speak to TB to try to persuade him we should do this and maybe GH should speak to Sambrook and tell him that he was a nobody re the dossier. GH said he was almost as steamed up as I was. TB said he didn’t want to push the system too far. But my worry was that I wanted a clear win not a messy draw and if they presented it as a draw that was not good enough for us. We were getting the files to the BBC and when the governors arrived, the BBC put out a line that they never said we lied, so we hit back on that. Michael Howard on Sky said I was the most malevolent influence ever. TB felt that we should not push [MoD permanent secretary] Kevin Tebbit/David Omand too hard, and could maybe bring it out tomorrow if we needed it. TB was also feeling that we had to have something for the ISC to go for and that could be this. Jack – who’d spoken to Donald Anderson – said that the Tories had not supported the report so it was going to be split on party lines, and unclear and very messy.

As the governors met, it was clear we were heading for a bad day tomorrow. TB said we had to get it on to the issue of the UK media culture. ‘It is a disgrace the BBC are behaving like this, it really is.’ He said to me how are you feeling about it? I said fed up about the whole thing. He said don’t be fed up. It’s important and we have to keep to it. All this media stuff is really important and we had to stick to it. I was suddenly feeling stressed, exhausted, deflated. Tom Kelly was briefing and said the press were bored with the story. The problem was I’d felt we were going to win and it was going to be a messy draw at the FAC.

Source idea went nowhere as he had to be interviewed again by Martin Howard [deputy chief of Defence Intelligence], DIS and
Personnel. TB called to tell me not to worry. Martin Sheehan called after the BBC governors broke up and I listened to Gavyn Davies’ statement. Dyke had got them on to the same line, defending the story, extending it to general issue of coverage. It was pretty poor, but clear they were all going along with the BBC line, if not defending the story. TB and I agreed the line that would put the focus on the claim that they never said we were lying, and we made clear what the central allegations still were.

There was a demo outside the house. I slept badly. Endless FAC blurb on the radio. I spoke to Peter M before going out, and did a good clip before getting into the cab. I felt it could go any way really. I was feeling a bit under siege, and very tired. Up to see TB. We were not clear what it was going to say, but he said we should make clear that we were not going for BBC independence, but they had to correct the story. TB’s feeling was that we had to press ahead with it and be robust, but also look for a way out with the BBC. We met in my office – Jack, his officials, Clare Sumner, Godric, John S – to wait for the [FAC] document to arrive. A first reading seemed fine for me but less brilliant for the government as a whole re WMD. It was pretty clear-cut re me, but with Tory amendments. But even those did not support the BBC story. I did a quick skim read, some good, some bad.

Then round with Jack and John S to see TB who was meeting Kevin Tebbit, Omand and others re ‘the source’. He was an ex-inspector, who advised the government, was aware of information going into the dossier but not involved in drawing it up. He’d once sat next to Jack as an expert at a select committee. Kevin said the guy claimed he never mentioned me. He was a bit of a show-off though. Felt that maybe Gilligan just put in the stuff about me. It was agreed he should be interviewed again, and then we should get it out that the source was not in the intelligence community, not involved in drawing up the dossier. Agreed we should be saying the source was misrepresented by Gilligan. TB was keen for Tebbit and Omand to be in control of the process. I watched the FAC press conference. Donald Anderson very clear re me. [Sir John] Stanley said I was a sideshow, Bill Olner and Gisela Stuart [Labour MPs and FAC members] were supportive. Tories and Andrew MacKinlay not too bad for me, and overall the impact was pretty positive.

TB said we have to be forensic about getting up the main points about the BBC allegations. Just before Jack [Straw] was due to go out in the street, John Stanley said the BBC was ‘wrong’ re the central
allegations against me, so we put that into Jack’s clip and he added that they must apologise. Sambrook was up defending the BBC, saying the report justified the decision to broadcast the story as the parties were split, etc. Everyone at our end said he came across as pathetic, but the problem was that the public probably believed them. TB was wanting to calm things down. For example, I wanted to do a discussion programme with Sambrook, but TB said do a letter instead. Then, when I did the letter, I got good advice from John Birt, who said claim victory and don’t rejoice. He said the BBC would not apologise and therefore there was no point pushing it. I should be magnanimous. He said they look ridiculous, they can’t answer the question if it’s true or not. Birt said he knew what it was like to be on the receiving end of injustice, which is what this was, but you have to live with it. He said the biggest worry was where these wretched weapons were. TB rewrote my statement to be a bit more emollient. It was not strong enough for me or the team. Hours of coverage all day. I felt it was OK for me but others thought it was too muddy.

Several chats with MoD, Pam Teare [MoD director of news], then Geoff H re the source. I felt we should get it out through the papers, then have a line to respond and let TB take it on at the Liaison Committee. TB felt we had to leave it to Omand/Tebbit judgement and they didn’t want to do it. We had to go for natural justice. GH said there was a problem that the source once gave evidence alongside Jack Straw. We were briefing that the BBC would eventually apologise. Wall to wall all day, source issue not moving. More calls for public inquiries. All went fine for me, but there were lots of difficult questions for the government as a whole. Jack was at home with food poisoning. Tessa good, Margaret B good on the media. The story was moving from me to WMD issue generally, on which not so good for us. TB was working up for the Liaison Committee tomorrow. I called my mum to tell her it was all going fine. She said she had not watched or listened to any of the news all day.

I was beginning to think I should say I’m going soon, maybe even this week. Source going better but not necessarily him. We were OK. John Scarlett was a bit worried that people felt I was running intelligence meetings. The agencies didn’t come out great. Lots of unanswered questions. The problem for TB was the Iraq WMD were not found. GH wanted to get up the source, Tom and Godric felt it was best to wait until tomorrow, we had to do it right. The story on the FAC report was the whole of
The World at One
, ten to fifteen minutes on news, thirty minutes on
Newsnight
– Donald Anderson was strong.

The papers were disgraceful. Even for me, though cleared, they managed to muddy the waters, e.g. the
Telegraph
saying they would constantly call for my resignation.
Mail
vile, and left press not that great. It was even worse for TB, and of course the issue was moving quickly on to WMD rather than BBC. Up to see TB in the flat who was preparing for the Liaison Committee. He said the papers were unbelievable, ‘It is truly Orwellian the world that we live in, I just don’t know what to do with this constant rewriting of history and moving of goalposts.’ Meeting with TB, JS, Scarlett, DM, etc. to go over the Liaison Committee. It was still not clear how we were going to handle the case of the MoD official.

Halfway through the TB evidence, I called Geoff Hoon. He was not remotely on top of the case. He said he had not checked out where we were on it. Also admitted he’d been crap on
Today
programme when asked who wrote the dossier and he hadn’t seemed to know it was John Scarlett. Said he should get going on the source issue, TB clear that we should leave the bureaucracy to deal with it. Scarlett on good form as ever. TB off to the House, did pretty well. Gave no quarter on Iraq/WMD/kitchen Cabinet. He was a bit dozy on the issue of Europe, didn’t push on the euro, OK on the reshuffle, overall a bit tired but OK. He came back and continued to try to sort the source issue. He met Scarlett and Omand and agreed to try to resolve it through a letter to Ann Taylor [ISC chair]. Word then came back she didn’t want a letter on it. That meant do it as a press release.

Jonathan, AC, Tom and Godric, John S and Kevin Tebbit went to Godric’s room and wrote a press release. Tebbit drafted a letter from GH to Gavyn Davies offering to give him the name of the source. Martin Howard had interviewed [Dr] David Kelly [government scientist and weapons expert], and was pretty convinced that he was the source, though of course we could not be sure. Tebbit took the draft away to the MoD and had to clear it with David Kelly, who was on a motorway. Then out by 6 and briefing mainly on the fact that the BBC put out a non-denial denial within two hours.