The Battle of Hastings (19 page)

Then followed a period of waiting which must have tried the nerves of William and all his men. It is possible that he deliberately delayed to some extent, knowing of Hardrada’s invasion. It would suit William well to let his two rivals hammer out their differences, leaving him with one rather than two enemies to defeat. He may also have thought that the later he left it the more likely that Harold would have problems keeping his army and fleet at the ready. The eventual timing of his trip worked perfectly. But it cannot have been all calculation.

The Norman sources make it clear that he had to wait for a favourable wind for the vital crossing, and chafed at the delay. The weather was against him for several weeks. William of Poitiers says they waited a month in the mouth of the Dives, at Dives-sur-Mer, which was not far from Caen and lay between Varaville to the west and Bonneville to the east. He kept his troops under strict discipline, provisioning them well and forbidding forage. ‘Weak or unarmed, any man might move about the district at his will, singing on his horse, without trembling at the sight of soldiers.’
48

According to the
Carmen
: ‘for a long time foul weather and ceaseless rain prevented [William] from leading the fleet across the Channel, while [he] awaited the favour of the winds; and the troubled sea forced [him] to put back, and gusts of the east wind curled the ocean waves’.
49
It is almost certain that William would have come to England earlier had the weather allowed it, so he had fortune as well as planning on his side.

His fleet assembled at the mouth of the Dives, and in neighbouring ports. On 12 September he was able to move, but only as far as St-Valery-sur-Somme, at the mouth of that river, and that with difficulty. Probably from the weather, William suffered a set-back on the short journey from the Dives to St-Valery, and men were drowned. William of Poitiers says they were buried in secret, obviously so as not to dishearten the army. Perhaps to rebuild morale, and to ask for a favourable wind, William organised a religious ceremony, parading the relics of St-Valery before the men. It was at St-Valery that William of Poitiers says they received the standard (vexillum) from Pope Alexander II (1061–73), which put them under the protection of St Peter.
50

The
Carmen
says that at St-Valery they faced another ‘long and difficult delay’ … looking ‘to see by what wind the weathercock of the church was turned’; it was ‘cold and wet, and the sky hidden by clouds and rain’.
51
A recent article has discussed the problems for William’s fleet facing the possible dangers of a lee shore, the difficulties of the tricky Channel tides, and the weather conditions most likely caused by Atlantic lows.
52
There is no doubt that William was wise to be cautious in deciding when to sail. He may also have been well informed as to developments within England, with his own frigates operating at sea during the period of waiting.
53

At last on 27 September the wind relented, and the crossing began. Masts were raised, horses brought on board, sails hoisted, arms stowed. Soldiers flocked on to the ships like doves into a dovecote.
54
A herald announced the positions for the ships in the fleet on the voyage. By evening, the force was embarked and they set sail, to the sound of drums, trumpets and pipes, anchoring just out to sea. William’s ship was the
Mora
, given him by his wife Matilda, which further enhances the likelihood of a considerable input to the fleet from Flanders. Wace says it had a figurehead of a boy with a bow and arrow, which pointed towards England as they sailed.
55

When they began the invasion crossing, William’s own ship led the way with a lantern fixed to its mast for others to follow, while a trumpet was used for signals. It must have been a somewhat motley fleet, gathered from all possible sources as it was, and with leaders who had little experience of such endeavours. Much of the fleet consisted of transports, and many were loaded down with men, provisions and horses. William’s ship found itself moving too far ahead, and contact was lost with the fleet.

Whether by fortune or by planning, the English fleet as well as the men of the land fyrd had been disbanded when William sailed, and such troops as could be raised had been taken off north, so there was no opposition to the crossing or the landing. At first light, the look-out from the masthead could not see the fleet. The Conqueror’s ship weighed anchor and waited until the others appeared. William, to show he was not dismayed, ate a breakfast accompanied by spiced wine, ‘as if he were at home’. Then the look-out spotted the first four ships, and soon the fleet hove into view ‘like a forest of sails’. Before long they were reunited, and sailed into Pevensey Bay where they disembarked on 28 September, completing the process during the afternoon. It was said that very few men were lost on the crossing; one who did perish was the unfortunate soothsayer, who had failed to forecast his own demise.
56

Notes

  
1
.  Barlow,
Edward
, p. 213; Barlow (ed.),
Vita
, p. 6.

  
2
.  Barlow,
Edward
, p. 300.

  
3
.  Barlow (ed.),
Vita
, p. 112.

  
4
.  Barlow (ed.),
Vita
, p. 116.

  
5
.  Barlow (ed.),
Vita
, p. 122.

  
6
.  Barlow (ed.),
Vita
, pp. 80–2, 112, 118–20, 122–4; Barlow,
Edward
, pp. 249–52; Wace, ed. Taylor, p. 93; Wace, ed. Holden, ii, pp. 101–2, ll. 5809–10. On the latter see M. Bennett, ‘Wace and warfare’,
ANS
, xi, 1988, pp. 37–58;
Bayeux Tapestry
, pl. 30.

  
7
.  John of Worcester, eds Darlington and McGurk, p. 598.

  
8
.  Barlow (ed.),
Vita
, pp. 151–3; Barlow,
Edward
, pp. 269, 282.

  
9
.  
Bayeux Tapestry
, pl. 29–30.

10
.  John of Worcester, eds Darlington and McGurk, p. 601; Whitelock
et al.
(eds),
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
, p. 140;
Bayeux Tapestry
, pl. 31.

11
.  
Bayeux Tapestry
, pl. 31.

12
.  Douglas,
William
, pp. 181–2; William of Poitiers, ed. Foreville, p. 146; John of Worcester, eds Darlington and McGurk, pp. 590–2, 600; Whitelock
et al.
(eds),
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
, p. 140; Cubbins (ed.),
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
, p. 79.

13
.  Barlow (ed.),
Vita
, p. 48.

14
.  John of Worcester, eds Darlington and McGurk, p. 602: ‘
pedestrem exercitum locis opportunis circa ripas maris locabat
’.

15
.  M. Swanton,
The Lives of the Last Englishmen
, x, ser. B, New York, 1984: from BL Harleian MS 3776, dated about 1205; the story sounds suspiciously like confusion with Godwin.

16
.  Whitelock
et al.
(eds),
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
, p. 140; Cubbins (ed.),
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
, p. 79.

17
.  John of Worcester, eds Darlington and McGurk, p. 602.

18
.  Whitelock
et al.
(eds),
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
, p. 140, and n. 8; John of Worcester, eds Darlington and McGurk, p. 598; F.M. Stenton,
Anglo-Saxon England
, 2nd edn, Oxford, 1947, p. 578–9.

19
.  Whitelock
et al.
(eds),
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
, p. 141; Cubbins (ed.),
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
, p. 79.

20
.  W.M. Aird, ‘St Cuthbert, the Scots and the Normans’,
ANS
, xvi, 1993, pp. 2–3, 7.

21
.  Sturlusson,
King Harald’s Saga
: the following account of Hardrada’s early career uses the saga, which is chronological: quoted and significant passages are on pp. 30–1, 45, 61, 64, 90, 93, 109, 113, 128, 136, 138, 144, 152.

22
.  This is probably Jaroslav I of Kiev (1018–55).

23
.  Ulf was brother of Gytha, wife of Earl Godwin of Wessex.

24
.  Whitelock
et al.
(eds),
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
, p. 141.

25
.  John of Worcester, eds Darlington and McGurk, p. 602.

26
.  John of Worcester, eds Darlington and McGurk, p. 602: he disbanded the fleet and the infantry forces.

27
.  John of Worcester, eds Darlington and McGurk, p. 602; Geoffrey Gaimar, ‘The History of the English’, in Stevenson, ii, pt II, 1854, p. 793.

28
.  John of Worcester, eds Darlington and McGurk, p. 602; Whitelock
et al.
(eds),
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
, p. 143; F.W. Brooks,
The Battle of Stamford Bridge
, East Yorkshire Local History Society series, no. 6, 1963, p. 12. Brooks is presumably thinking as others have that, like the march south, it was an infantry march, but there is no reason to believe this was any more true of the march north than of the march south.

29
.  A.H. Burne,
More Battlefields of England
, London, 1952, p. 92, suggested a different position for the early bridge, P. Warner,
British Battle Fields, the North
, London, 1975, p. 21, and W. Seymour,
Battles in Britain
, i, London, 1975, p. 9, both agree with Burne; but the argument is not convincing. Brooks,
Stamford Bridge
, p. 19, disagrees with Burne.

30
.  D. Howarth,
The Year of the Conquest
, London, 1977, p. 106, reports on small horse-shoes being found in the locality in the nineteenth century, but gives no reference. In any case: 1) it is difficult to give credence to Sturlusson’s cavalry; 2) even if relating to transport horses, it still seems unlikely to have any connection with the battle (lots of killed and abandoned horses from the winning side?).

31
.  Whitelock
et al.
(eds),
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
, p. 144–5.

32
.  Whitelock
et al.
(eds),
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
, p. 144.

33
.  Sturlusson,
King Harald’s Saga
, p. 151–3; Whitelock
et al.
(eds),
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
, p. 142; John of Worcester, eds Darlington and McGurk, p. 604.

34
.  Sturlusson,
King Harald’s Saga
, pp. 154–5; Whitelock
et al.
(eds),
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
, p. 142.

35
.  Whitelock
et al.
(eds),
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
, p. 144. John of Worcester, eds Darlington and McGurk, pp. 602–4, has 500, with twenty ships for the return; Gaimar in Stevenson, p. 793, also has twenty.

36
.  Brooks,
Stamford Bridge
, p. 21; Orderic Vitalis, ed. Chibnall, ii, p. 168.

37
.  William of Poitiers, ed. Foreville, p. 154.

38
.  Wace, ed. Taylor, pp. 97–107; Wace, ed. Holden, ii, pp. 107–15, the quote is l. 6048; has William fitz Osbern in favour of going, and William taking counsel.

39
.  For example, Wace, ed. Taylor, p. 98: ‘he perjured himself for a kingdom’; Wace, ed. Holden, ii, p. 106, l. 5947.

40
.  William of Poitiers, ed. Foreville, p. 151; Orderic Vitalis, ed. Chibnall, ii, p. 144.

41
.  Wace, ed. Taylor, p. 120: ‘I remember it well, although I was but a lad, that there were 700 ships less four’; Wace, ed. Holden, ii, p. 123, ll. 6424–5: ‘
bien m’en sovient, mais vaslet ere –/que set cenz nes, quatre meins, furent
’.

42
.  C.H. Lemmon, ‘The campaign of 1066’ in
The Norman Conquest its Setting and Impact
, London, 1966, p. 85 gives some previous estimates (varying from 10,000 to 60,000) and adds his own; P.P. Wright,
Hastings
, Moreton-in-Marsh, 1996, estimates 7,500 including combatants. C.M. Gillmor, ‘The naval logistics of the cross-Channel operation, 1066’,
ANS
, vii, 1984, pp. 105–31, has some interesting speculation, but vainly attempts to estimate the size of the fleet with precision, and even the number of workmen and trees felled; see also B. Bachrach, ‘The military administration of the Norman Conquest’,
ANS
, viii, 1986, pp. 1–25.

43
.  M. Bennett, ‘Norman naval activity in the Mediterranean c. 1060–c. 1108’,
ANS
, xv, 1992, pp. 41–58.

44
.  Wace, ed. Taylor, p. 117; Wace, ed. Holden, ii, p. 120.

45
.  
Bayeux Tapestry
, pl. 35–6.

46
.  Foreville (ed.),
Gesta Gulielmi Ducis Normannorum et Regis Anglorum
. The introduction includes an excellent account of the chronicler’s career. Key information in the following section to the landing in England comes from pp. 12, 30, 42, 100, 104, 146, 150–62.

47
.  Wace, ed. Taylor, p. 76; Wace, ed. Holden, ii, p. 94. Wace is interesting at this point, telling us that he is using more than one source: one which has the forbidding, and one which says it was to promise the crown: ‘how the matter really was I never knew’, and nor do we.

48
.  William of Poitiers, ed. Foreville, p. 152, translation from R.A. Brown,
The Normans and the Norman Conquest
, 2nd edn, Woodbridge, 1985, p. 132.

49
.  
Carmen
, eds Morton and Muntz, p. 4, ll. 40–4.

50
.  See D. Bates,
William the Conqueror
, London, 1983, p. 65, where he accepts the banner story; Orderic Vitalis, ed. Chibnall, ii, p. 170.