The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (241 page)

15
     In dealing with prejudice, one class of argument is that whereby you can dispel objectionable suppositions about yourself.
[1416a]
It makes no practical difference whether such a supposition has been put into words or not,
(5)
so that this distinction may be ignored. Another way is to meet any of the issues directly: to deny the alleged fact; or to say that you have done no harm, or none to
him
, or not as much as he says; or that you have done him no injustice, or not much; or that you have done nothing disgraceful, or nothing disgraceful enough to matter: these are the sort of questions on which the dispute hinges. Thus Iphicrates, replying to Nausicrates, admitted that he had done the deed alleged,
(10)
and that he had done Nausicrates harm, but not that he had done him wrong. Or you may admit the wrong, but balance it with other facts, and say that, if the deed harmed him, at any rate it was honourable; or that, if it gave him pain, at least it did him good; or something else like that. Another way is to allege that your action was due to mistake, or bad luck, or necessity—as Sophocles said he was not trembling, as his traducer maintained, in order to make people think him an old man,
(15)
but because he could not help it; he would rather
not
be eighty years old.
¹⁹
You may balance your motive against your actual deed; saying, for instance, that you did not mean to injure him but to do so-and-so; that you did not do what you are falsely charged with doing—the damage was accidental—‘I should indeed be a detestable person if I had deliberately intended this result.’ Another way is open when your calumniator, or any of his connexions,
(20)
is or has been subject to the same grounds for suspicion. Yet another, when others are subject to the same grounds for suspicion but are admitted to be in fact innocent of the charge: e. g. ‘Must I be a profligate because I am well-groomed? Then so-and-so must be one too.’ Another, if other people have been calumniated by the same man or some one else, or, without being calumniated, have been suspected,
(25)
like yourself now, and yet have been proved innocent. Another way is to return calumny for calumny and say, ‘It is monstrous to trust the man’s statements when you cannot trust the man himself.’ Another is when the question has been already decided. So with Euripides’
reply to Hygiaenon, who, in the action for an exchange of properties,
(30)
accused him of impiety in having written a line encouraging perjury—

Euripides said that his opponent himself was guilty in bringing into the law-courts cases whose decision belonged to the Dionysiac contests. ‘If I have not already answered for my words there, I am ready to do so if you choose to prosecute me there.’ Another method is to denounce calumny, showing what an enormity it is,
(35)
and in particular that it raises false issues, and that it means a lack of confidence in the merits of his case.
[1416b]
The argument from evidential circumstances is available for both parties: thus in the
Teucer
Odysseus says that Teucer is closely bound to Priam, since his mother Hesione was Priam’s sister. Teucer
²¹
replies that Telamon his father was Priam’s enemy, and that he himself did not betray the spies to Priam. Another method, suitable for the caluminator, is to praise some trifling merit at great length,
(5)
and then attack some important’ failing concisely; or after mentioning a number of good qualities to attack one bad one that really bears on the question. This is the method of thoroughly skilful and unscrupulous prosecutors. By mixing up the man’s merits with what is bad, they do their best to make use of them to damage him.

There is another method open to both calumniator and apologist. Since a given action can be done from many motives,
(10)
the former must try to disparage it by selecting the worse motive of the two, the latter to put the better construction on it. Thus one might argue that Diomedes chose Odysseus as his companion
²²
because he supposed Odysseus to be the best man for the purpose; and you might reply to this that it was, on the contrary, because he was the only hero so worthless that Diomedes need not fear his rivalry.

16
     We may now pass from the subject of calumny to that of Narration.
(15)

Narration in ceremonial oratory is not continuous but intermittent. There must, of course, be some survey of the actions that form the subject-matter of the speech. The speech is a composition containing two parts. One of these is not provided by the orator’s art, viz. the actions themselves, of which the orator is in no sense author.
(20)
The other part is provided by his art, namely, the proof (where proof is needed) that the actions were done, the description of their quality or their extent, or even all these three things together. Now the reason
why sometimes it is not desirable to make the whole narrative continuous is that the case thus expounded is hard to keep in mind. Show, therefore, from one set of facts that your hero is, e. g. brave, and from other sets of fact that he is able, just, &c. A speech thus arranged is comparatively simple, instead of being complicated and elaborate. You will have to recall well-known deeds among others; and because they are well-known,
(25)
the hearer usually needs no narration of them; none, for instance, if your object is the praise of Achilles; we all know the facts of his life—what you have to do is to apply those facts. But if your object is the praise of Critias, you
must
narrate his deeds, which not many people know of …

Nowadays it is said, absurdly enough, that the narration should be rapid. Remember what the man said to the baker who asked whether he was to make the cake hard or soft: ‘What,
(30)
can’t you make it
right
?’ Just so here. We are not to make long narrations, just as we are not to make long introductions or long arguments. Here, again, rightness does not consist either in rapidity or in conciseness,
(35)
but in the happy mean; that is, in saying just so much as will make the facts plain, or will lead the hearer to believe that the thing has happened, or that the man has caused injury or wrong to some one, or that the facts are really as important as you wish them to be thought: or the opposite facts to establish the opposite arguments.
[1417a]

You may also narrate as you go anything that does credit to yourself, e. g. ‘I kept telling him, to do his duty and not abandon his children’; or discredit to your adversary, e. g. ‘But he answered me that, wherever he might find himself, there he would find other children’,
(5)
the answer Herodotus
²³
records of the Egyptian mutineers. Slip in anything else that the judges will enjoy.

The defendant will make less of the narration. He has to maintain that the thing has not happened, or did no harm, or was not unjust, or not so bad as is alleged. He must therefore not waste time about what is admitted fact,
(10)
unless this bears on his own contention; e. g. that the thing was done, but was not wrong. Further, we must speak of events as past and gone, except where they excite pity or indignation by being represented as present. The Story told to Alcinous
²⁴
is an example of a brief chronicle, when it is repeated to Penelope in sixty lines.
²⁵
Another instance is the Epic Cycle as treated by Phayllus,
(15)
and the prologue to the
Oeneus.
²⁶

The narration should depict character; to which end you must know what makes it do so. One such thing is the indication of moral
purpose; the quality of purpose indicated determines the quality of character depicted and is itself determined by the end pursued. Thus it is that mathematical discourses depict no character; they have nothing to do with moral purpose, for they represent nobody as pursuing any end.
(20)
On the other hand, the Socratic dialogues do depict character, being concerned with moral questions. This end will also be gained by describing the manifestations of various types of character, e. g. ‘he kept walking along as he talked’, which shows the man’s recklessness and rough manners. Do not let your words seem inspired so much by intelligence, in the manner now current, as by moral purpose: e. g. ‘I willed this; aye, it was my moral purpose; true,
(25)
I gained nothing by it, still it is better thus.’ For the other way shows good sense, but this shows good character; good sense making us go after what is useful, and good character after what is noble. Where any detail may appear incredible, then add the cause of it; of this Sophocles provides an example in the
Antigone
, where Antigone says she had cared more for her brother than for husband or children,
(30)
since if the latter perished they might be replaced,

If you have no such cause to suggest, just say that you are aware that no one will believe your words, but the fact remains that such is your nature,
(35)
however hard the world may find it to believe that a man deliberately does anything except what pays him.

Again, you must make use of the emotions. Relate the familiar manifestations of them, and those that distinguish yourself and your opponent; for instance, ‘he went away scowling at me’.
[1417b]
So Aeschines described Cratylus as ‘hissing with fury and shaking his fists’. These details carry conviction: the audience take the truth of what they know as so much evidence for the truth of what they do not. Plenty of such details may be found in Homer:

a true touch—people beginning to cry do put their hands over their eyes.
(5)

Bring yourself on the stage from the first in the right character, that people may regard you in that light; and the same with your adversary; but do not let them see what you are about. How easily such impressions may be conveyed we can see from the way in which we get some inkling of things we know nothing of by the mere look
of the messenger bringing news of them.
(10)
Have some narrative in many different parts of your speech; and sometimes let there be none at the beginning of it.

In political oratory there is very little opening for narration; nobody can ‘narrate’ what has not yet happened. If there is narration at all, it will be of past events, the recollection of which is to help the hearers to make better plans for the future. Or it may be employed to attack some one’s character,
(15)
or to eulogize him—only then you will not be doing what the political speaker, as such, has to do.

If any statement you make is hard to believe, you must guarantee its truth, and at once offer an explanation, and then furnish it with such particulars as will be expected. Thus Carcinus’ Jocasta, in his
Oedipus
, keeps guaranteeing the truth of her answers to the inquiries of the man who is seeking her son; and so with Haemon in Sophocles.
²⁹

17
     The duty of the Arguments is to attempt demonstrative proofs.
(20)
These proofs must bear directly upon the question in dispute, which must fall under one of four heads. (1) If you maintain that the act
was not committed
, your main task in court is to prove this.
(25)
(2) If you maintain that the act
did no harm
, prove this. If you maintain that (3) the act was
less
than is alleged, or (4)
justified
, prove these facts, just as you would prove the act not to have been committed if you were maintaining that.

It should be noted that only where the question in dispute falls under the first of these heads can it be true that one of the two parties is necessarily a rogue. Here ignorance cannot be pleaded, as it might if the dispute were whether the act was justified or not. This argument must therefore be used in this case only, not in the others.
(30)

In ceremonial speeches you will develop your case mainly by arguing that what has been done is, e. g., noble and useful. The facts themselves are to be taken on trust; proof of them is only submitted on those rare occasions when they are not easily credible or when they have been set down to some one else.

In political speeches you may maintain that a proposal is impracticable; or that,
(35)
though practicable, it is unjust, or will do no good, or is not so important as its proposer thinks. Note any falsehoods about irrelevant matters—they will look like proof that his other statements also are false. Argument by ‘example’ is highly suitable for political oratory, argument by ‘Enthymeme’ better suits forensic.
[1418a]
Political oratory deals with future events, of which it can do no more than quote past
events as examples. Forensic oratory deals with what is or is not
now
true, which can better be demonstrated, because not contingent—there is no contingency in what has now already happened. Do not use a continuous succession of Enthymemes: intersperse them with other matter,
(5)
or they will spoil one another’s effect. There are limits to their number—

‘as
much
’ says Homer, not ‘as
will
’. Nor should you try to make Enthymemes on every point; if you do,
(10)
you will be acting just like some students of philosophy, whose conclusions are more familiar and believable than the premisses from which they draw them. And avoid the Enthymeme form when you are trying to rouse feeling; for it will either kill the feeling or will itself fall flat: all simultaneous motions tend to cancel each other either completely or partially.
(15)
Nor should you go after the Enthymeme form in a passage where you are depicting character—the process of demonstration can express neither moral character nor moral purpose. Maxims should be employed in the Arguments—and in the Narration too—since these do express character: ‘I have given him this, though I am quite aware that one should “Trust no man”.’ Or if you are appealing to the emotions: ‘I do not regret it,
(20)
though I have been wronged; if he has the profit on his side, I have justice on mine.’

Political oratory is a more difficult task than forensic; and naturally so, since it deals with the future, whereas the pleader deals with the past, which, as Epimenides of Crete said, even the diviners already know. (Epimenides did not practise divination about the future; only about the obscurities of the past.
(25)
) Besides, in forensic oratory you have a basis in the law; and once you have a starting-point, you can prove anything with comparative ease. Then again, political oratory affords few chances for those leisurely digressions in which you may attack your adversary, talk about yourself, or work on your hearers’ emotions; fewer chances, indeed, than any other affords, unless your set purpose is to divert your hearers’ attention. Accordingly, if you find yourself in difficulties,
(30)
follow the lead of the Athenian speakers, and that of Isocrates, who makes regular attacks upon people in the course of a political speech, e. g. upon the Lacedaemonians in the
Panegyricus
,
³¹
and upon Chares in the speech about the allies.
³²
In ceremonial
oratory, intersperse your speech with bits of episodic eulogy, like Isocrates, who is always bringing some one forward for this purpose.
³³
And this is what Gorgias meant by saying that he always found something to talk about. For if he speaks of Achilles,
(35)
he praises Peleus, then Aeacus, then Zeus; and in like manner the virtue of valour, describing its good results, and saying what it is like.

Now if you have proofs to bring forward, bring them forward, and your moral discourse as well; if you have no Enthymemes, then fall back upon moral discourse: after all, it is more fitting for a good man to display himself as an honest fellow than as a subtle reasoner.
[1418b]
Refutative Enthymemes are more popular than demonstrative ones: their logical cogency is more striking: the facts about two opposites always stand out clearly when the two are put side by side.

The ‘Reply to the Opponent’ is not a separate division of the speech; it is part of the Arguments to break down the opponent’s case,
(5)
whether by objection or by counter-syllogism. Both in political speaking and when pleading in court, if you are the first speaker you should put your own arguments forward first, and then meet the arguments on the other side by refuting them and pulling them to pieces beforehand. If, however, the case for the other side contains a great variety of arguments, begin with these, like Callistratus in the Messenian assembly, when he demolished the arguments likely to be used against him before giving his own.
(10)
If you speak later, you must first, by means of refutation and counter-syllogism, attempt some answer to your opponent’s speech, especially if his arguments have been well received. For just as our minds refuse a favourable reception to a
person
against whom they are prejudiced, so they refuse it to a speech when they have been favourably impressed by the speech on the other side.
(15)
You should, therefore, make room in the minds of the audience for your coming speech; and this will be done by getting your opponent’s speech out of the way. So attack that first—either the whole of it, or the most important, successful, or vulnerable points in it, and thus inspire confidence in what you have to say your-self—

where the speaker has attacked the silliest argument first. So much for the Arguments.

With regard to the element of moral character: there are assertions which,
(25)
if made about yourself, may excite dislike, appear tedious, or expose you to the risk of contradiction; and other things which you cannot say about your opponent without seeming abusive or illbred. Put such remarks, therefore, into the mouth of some third person. This is what Isocrates does in the
Philippus
³⁵
and in the
Antidosis
,
³⁶
and Archilochus in his satires. The latter represents the father himself as attacking his daughter in the lampoon

and puts into the mouth of Charon the carpenter the lampoon which begins

So too Sophocles makes Haemon appeal to his father on behalf of Antigone as if it were others who were speaking.
³⁷

Again, sometimes you should restate your Enthymemes in the form of maxims; e. g. ‘Wise men will come to terms in the hour of success; for they will gain most if they do’.
³⁸
(35)
Expressed as an Enthymeme, this would run, ‘
If
we ought to come to terms when doing so will enable us to gain the greatest advantage,
then
we ought to come to terms in the hour of success.’