The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (213 page)

¹
Cp. iv. c. 2.

²
iii. 1282
^b
18–30, Cp. 1280
^a
9 sqq.

³
Cp. iii. 1284
^b
28–34.

⁴
Cp. 1304
^b
4.

⁵
Cp. iv. 1294
^a
21.

⁶
Cp. iv. 1292
^b
11.

⁷
Cp. vii. 1333
^b
34.

⁸
Cp. iii. 1287
^a
7.

^9
a
26.

¹⁰
Cp. iv. 1296
^a
13.

¹¹
Cp. c. 6.

¹²
Cp. c. 5.

¹³
1301
^a
33 sqq.,
^b
35 sqq.

¹⁴
1. 32.

¹⁵
Cp. iii. 1284
^a
17.

¹⁶
Cp. 1304
^b
27.

¹⁷
Cp. iii. 1284
^b
8.

¹⁸
1301
^a
33.

¹⁹
Cp. ii. 1274
^a
12; viii. 1341
^a
29.

²⁰
Cp. 1311
^a
39.

²¹
Cp. 1302
^a
17.

²²
Cp. 1302
^b
23.

²³
Cp. 1302
^b
31, iv. 1300
^a
17.

²⁴
Cp. 1309
^a
14.

²⁵
Cp. 1310
^b
14; Plato,
Rep.
viii. 565
D
.

²⁶
Cp. 1310
^b
20.

²⁷
Cp. 1303
^b
2.

²⁸
1303
^b
37–1304
^a
77.

²⁹
1305
^b
2 sqq.

³⁰
i. e. the illegitimate sons.

³¹
Cp. iv. c. 7.

³²
Cp. 1303
^a
31.

³³
Cp. ii. 1270
^a
18.

³⁴
1302
^b
4, 1303
^a
20–25,
^b
17.

³⁵
Cp. iv. 1296
^a
32.

³⁶
Cp.
Nic. Eth.
v. 1129
^a
13.

³⁷
Cp. iv. 1297
^a
13–38.

³⁸
Cp. vi. 1321
^a
26.

³⁹
1305
^b
23 sqq.

⁴⁰
Cp. 1305
^a
7.

⁴¹
Cp. 1303
^b
17–31.

⁴²
Cp. 1306
^b
6–16.

⁴³
Cp. 1302
^b
18; iii. 1284
^a
17.

⁴⁴
Cp. 1316
^a
39.

⁴⁵
iv. 1296
^b
15, vi. 1320
^a
14. Cp. ii. 1270
^b
21 sq., iv. 1294
^b
37.

⁴⁶
Cp. viii. 1337
^a
14.

⁴⁷
Cp. iv. 1295
^b
17.

⁴⁸
Cp. Pl.
Rep.
viii. 556
D
.

⁴⁹
Cp. 1305
^a
8; Plato,
Rep.
viii. 565
D
.

⁵⁰
Cp. 1305
^a
15.

⁵¹
1. 2 sq.

⁵²
Cp. iii. 1285
^b
6.

⁵³
iii. 1279
^b
6 sq., iv. 1295
^a
19.

⁵⁴
Cp. iii. 1285
^a
24.

⁵⁵
Cp. 1284
^a
26.

⁵⁶
1310
^a
40 sqq.

⁵⁷
Cp. 1302
^b
2, 21, 1311
^a
25.

⁵⁸
Cp. i. 1259
^a
7.

⁵⁹
Cp. Plato,
Laws
, iii. 695.

⁶⁰
Cp.
Rhetoric
, ii. 1382
^a
12.

⁶¹
1302
^b
25–33, 1304
^b
20–1306
^b
21.

⁶²
1311
^a
15–22.

⁶³
Cp. vi. 1319
^b
27.

⁶⁴
1313
^a
35–1314
^a
29.

⁶⁵
Cp. 1308
^b
15.

⁶⁶
Cp. i. 1254
^a
25.

⁶⁷
This is an extract from the much fuller account in
Rep.
viii. 546
B.C.

⁶⁸
Rep.
viii. 544
C.

⁶⁹
Rep.
viii. 550
E.

⁷⁰
Rep.
viii. 551
D.

⁷¹
sc.
from oligarchy to democracy.

⁷²
Rep.
viii. 555
D.

⁷³
Rep.
viii. 557
C
, 564.

1
     We have now considered the varieties of the deliberative or supreme power in states, and the various arrangements of law-courts and state offices, and which of them are adapted to different forms of government.
¹
We have also spoken of the destruction and preservation of constitutions,
(35)
how and from what causes they arise.
²

Of democracy and all other forms of government there are many kinds; and it will be well to assign to them severally the modes of organization which are proper and advantageous to each,
(40)
adding what remains to be said about them.
³
[1317a]
Moreover, we ought to consider the various combinations of these modes themselves; for such combinations make constitutions overlap one another, so that aristocracies have an oligarchical character, and constitutional governments incline to democracies.
⁴

When I speak of the combinations which remain to be considered, and thus far have not been considered by us, I mean such as these:—when the deliberative part of the government and the election of officers is constituted oligarchically,
(5)
and the law-courts aristocratically,
or when the courts and the deliberative part of the state are oligarchical, and the election to offices aristocratical, or when in any other way there is a want of harmony in the composition of a state.
⁵

I have shown already
⁶
what forms of democracy are suited to particular cities,
(10)
and what of oligarchy to particular peoples, and to whom each of the other forms of government is suited. Further, we must not only show which of these governments is the best for each state, but also briefly proceed to consider
⁷
how these and other forms of government are to be established.
(15)

First of all let us speak of democracy, which will also bring to light the opposite form of government commonly called oligarchy. For the purposes of this inquiry we need to ascertain all the elements and characteristics of democracy, since from the combinations of these the varieties of democratic government arise.
(20)
There are several of these differing from each other, and the difference is due to two causes. One (1) has been already mentioned
⁸
—differences of population; for the popular element may consist of husbandmen,
(25)
or of mechanics, or of labourers, and if the first of these be added to the second, or the third to the two others, not only does the democracy become better or worse, but its very nature is changed. A second cause (2) remains to be mentioned: the various properties and characteristics of democracy,
(30)
when variously combined, make a difference. For one democracy will have less and another will have more, and another will have all of these characteristics. There is an advantage in knowing them all, whether a man wishes to establish some new form of democracy, or only to remodel an existing one.
⁹
Founders of states try to bring together all the elements which accord with the ideas of the several constitutions; but this is a mistake of theirs,
(35)
as I have already remarked
¹⁰
when speaking of the destruction and preservation of states. We will now set forth the principles, characteristics, and aims of such states.

2
     The basis of a democratic state is liberty; which,
(40)
according to the common opinion of men, can only be enjoyed in such a state;—this they affirm to be the great end of every democracy.
¹¹
[1317b]
One principle of liberty is for all to rule and be ruled in turn, and indeed democratic justice is the application of numerical not proportionate equality; whence it follows that the majority must be supreme,
(5)
and that whatever
the majority approve must be the end and the just. Every citizen, it is said, must have equality, and therefore in a democracy the poor have more power than the rich, because there are more of them, and the will of the majority is supreme. This,
(10)
then, is one note of liberty which all democrats affirm to be the principle of their state. Another is that a man should live as he likes.
¹²
This, they say, is the privilege of a freeman, since, on the other hand, not to live as a man likes is the mark of a slave. This is the second characteristic of democracy, whence has arisen the claim of men to be ruled by none,
(15)
if possible, or, if this is impossible, to rule and be ruled in turns; and so it contributes to the freedom based upon equality.

Such being our foundation and such the principle from which we start, the characteristics of democracy are as follows:—the election of officers by all out of all; and that all should rule over each,
(20)
and each in his turn over all; that the appointment to all offices, or to all but those which require experience and skill,
¹³
should be made by lot; that no property qualification should be required for offices, or only a very low one; that a man should not hold the same office twice, or not often, or in the case of few except military offices: that the tenure of all offices,
(25)
or of as many as possible, should be brief; that all men should sit in judgement, or that judges selected out of all should judge, in all matters, or in most and in the greatest and most important—such as the scrutiny of accounts, the constitution, and private contracts; that the assembly should be supreme over all causes, or at any rate over the most important,
(30)
and the magistrates over none or only over a very few. Of all magistracies, a council is the most democratic
¹⁴
when there is not the means of paying all the citizens, but when they are paid even this is robbed of its power; for the people then draw all cases to themselves, as I said in the previous discussion.
¹⁵
(35)
The next characteristic of democracy is payment for services; assembly, law-courts, magistrates, everybody receives pay, when it is to be had; or when it is not to be had for all, then it is given to the law-courts and to the stated assemblies, to the council and to the magistrates, or at least to any of them who are compelled to have their meals together. And whereas oligarchy is characterized by birth,
(40)
wealth, and education, the notes of democracy appear to be the opposite of these—low birth, poverty, mean employment.
[1318a]
Another note is that no magistracy is perpetual, but if any such have survived some ancient change in the constitution it should be stripped of its power, and the holders should be elected by lot and no longer by vote.
These are the points common to all democracies; but democracy and demos in their truest form are based upon the recognized principle of democratic justice,
(5)
that all should count equally; for equality implies that the poor should have no more share in the government than the rich, and should not be the only rulers, but that all should rule equally according to their numbers.
¹⁶
And in this way men think that they will secure equality and freedom in their state.
(10)

3
     Next comes the question, how is this equality to be obtained? Are we to assign to a thousand poor men the property qualifications of five hundred rich men? and shall we give the thousand a power equal to that of the five hundred? or, if this is not to be the mode, ought we, still retaining the same ratio, to take equal numbers from each and give them the control of the elections and of the courts?—Which,
(15)
according to the democratical notion, is the juster form of the constitution—this or one based on numbers only? Democrats say that justice is that to which the majority agree,
(20)
oligarchs that to which the wealthier class; in their opinion the decision should be given according to the amount of property. In both principles there is some inequality and injustice. For if justice is the will of the few, any one person who has more wealth than all the rest of the rich put together, ought, upon the oligarchical principle, to have the sole power—but this would be tyranny; or if justice is the will of the majority,
(25)
as I was before saying,
¹⁷
they will unjustly confiscate the property of the wealthy minority. To find a principle of equality in which they both agree we must inquire into their respective ideas of justice.

Now they agree in saying that whatever is decided by the majority of the citizens is to be deemed law. Granted:—but not without some reserve; since there are two classes out of which a state is composed—the poor and the rich—that is to be deemed law,
(30)
on which both or the greater part of both agree; and if they disagree, that which is approved by the greater number, and by those who have the higher qualification. For example, suppose that there are ten rich and twenty poor, and some measure is approved by six of the rich and is disapproved by fifteen of the poor, and the remaining four of the rich join with the party of the poor,
(35)
and the remaining five of the poor with that of the rich; in such a case the will of those whose qualifications, when both sides are added up, are the greatest, should prevail. If they turn out to be equal, there is no greater difficulty than at present, when, if the assembly or the Courts are divided,
(40)
recourse is had to the lot, or to some similar expedient.
[1318b]
But, although it may
be difficult in theory to know what is just and equal, the practical difficulty of inducing those to forbear who can, if they like, encroach, is far greater, for the weaker are always asking for equality and justice,
(5)
but the stronger care for none of these things.