The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy Into Action (23 page)

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Authors: Robert S. Kaplan,David P. Norton

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Canse-and-Effect Relationships

A strategy is a set of hypotheses about cause and effect. Cause-and-effect relationships can be expressed by a sequence of if-then statements. For example, a link between improved sales training of employees and higher profits can be established through the following sequence of hypotheses:

If
we increase employee training about products
, then
they will become more knowledgeable about the full range of products they can sell
; if
employees are more knowledgeable about products
, then
their sales effectiveness will improve
. If
their sales effectiveness improves
, then
the average margins of the products they sell will increase.

A properly constructed scorecard should tell the story of the business unit’s strategy through such a sequence of cause-and-effect relationships. The measurement system should make the relationships (hypotheses) among objectives (and measures) in the various perspectives explicit so that they can be managed and validated. It should identify and make explicit the sequence of hypotheses about the cause-and-effect relationships between outcome measures and the performance drivers of those outcomes.
Every measure selected for a Balanced Scorecard should be an element of a chain of cause-and-effect relationships that communicates the meaning of the business unit’s strategy to the organization.

Outcomes and Performance Drivers

As discussed in the previous four chapters, all Balanced Scorecards use certain generic measures. These generic measures tend to be core outcome measures, which reflect the common goals of many strategies, as well as similar structures across industries and companies. These generic outcome measures tend to be lag indicators, such as profitability, market share, customer satisfaction, customer retention, and employee skills. The performance drivers, the lead indicators, are the ones that tend to be unique for
a particular business unit. The performance drivers reflect the uniqueness of the business unit’s strategy; for example, the financial drivers of profitability, the market segments in which the unit chooses to compete, and the particular internal processes and learning and growth objectives that will deliver the value propositions to targeted customers and market segments.

A good Balanced Scorecard should have a mix of outcome measures and performance drivers. Outcome measures without performance drivers do not communicate how the outcomes are to be achieved. They also do not provide an early indication about whether the strategy is being implemented successfully. Conversely, performance drivers—such as cycle times and part-per-million defect rates—without outcome measures may enable the business unit to achieve short-term operational improvements, but will fail to reveal whether the operational improvements have been translated into expanded business with existing and new customers, and, eventually, to enhanced financial performance.
A good Balanced Scorecard should have an appropriate mix of outcomes (lagging indicators) and performance drivers (leading indicators) that have been customized to the business unit’s strategy.

Linkage to Financials

With the proliferation of change programs under way in most organizations today, it is easy to become preoccupied with such goals as quality, customer satisfaction, innovation, and employee empowerment for their own sake. While these goals can lead to improved business-unit performance, they may not if these goals are taken as ends in themselves. The financial problems of some recent Baldrige Award winners give testimony to the need to link operational improvements to economic results.

A Balanced Scorecard must retain a strong emphasis on outcomes, especially financial ones like return-on-capital-employed or economic value-added. Many managers fail to link programs, such as total quality management, cycle time reduction, reengineering, and employee empowerment, to outcomes that directly influence customers and that deliver future financial performance. In such organizations, the improvement programs have incorrectly been taken as the ultimate objective. They have not been linked to specific targets for improving customer and, eventually, financial performance. The inevitable result is that such organizations eventually become
disillusioned about the lack of tangible payoffs from their change programs.
Ultimately, causal paths from all the measures on a scorecard should be linked to financial objectives.

We can illustrate the applications of these three principles in two case studies: Metro Bank and National Insurance.

M
ETRO
B
ANK

Metro Bank was confronted with two problems: (1) excessive reliance on a single product (deposits) and (2) a cost structure that made it unprofitable to service 80% of its customers at prevailing interest rates. Metro embarked upon a two-pronged strategy to deal with these two problems:

  1. Revenue Growth. Reduce volatility of earnings by broadening the sources of revenue with additional products for current customers.
  2. Productivity. Improve operating efficiency by shifting nonprofitable customers to more cost-effective channels of distribution (e.g., electronic banking).

The process of developing a Balanced Scorecard at Metro translated each of these strategies into objectives and measures in the four perspectives. Particular emphasis was placed on understanding and describing the cause-and-effect relationships on which the strategy was based. A simplified version of the results of this effort is shown in Figure 7-1. For the revenue growth strategy, the financial objectives were clear: broaden the mix of revenues. Strategically, this meant that Metro would focus on its current customer base, identify the customers who would be likely candidates for a broader range of services, and then sell an expanded set of financial products and services to these targeted customers. When customer objectives were analyzed, however, Metro’s executives determined that its targeted customers did not view the bank, or their banker, as the logical source for a broader array of products such as mutual funds, credit cards, mortgages, and financial advice. The executives concluded that if the bank’s new strategy were to be successful, they must shift customers’ perception of the bank from that of a transactions processor of checks and deposits to a financial adviser.

Having identified the financial objective,
broaden revenue mix
, and the new customer value proposition,
increase customer confidence in our financial advice
, dictated by the financial objective, the scorecard design process then focused on the internal activities that had to be mastered if the strategy were to succeed. Three cross-business processes were identified: (1) understand customers, (2) develop new products and services, and (3) cross-sell multiple products and services. Each business process would have to be redesigned to reflect the demands of the new strategy. The selling process, for example, had historically been dominated by institutional advertising of the bank’s services. Good advertising plus good location brought the customers to the banks. The branch personnel were reactive, helping customers open accounts and providing ongoing service. The bank did not have a selling culture. In fact, one study indicated that only 10% of a salesperson’s time was spent with customers. The bank launched a major reengineering program to redefine the sales process. The new sales process was designed to create a relationship-selling approach where the salesperson became more of a financial adviser. Two measures of this process were included on the Balanced Scorecard. The cross-sell ratio—the average number of products sold to a household—measured selling effectiveness. This “lag indicator” would tell whether or not the new process was working. The second measure, hours spent with customers, was included to send a signal to salespersons throughout the organization of the new culture required by the strategy. A relationship-based sales approach could not work unless face time with customers increased. Hours with customers therefore was a lead indicator for the success of this piece of the strategy.

Figure 7-1
The Metro Bank Strategy

The internal objectives led naturally to a final set of factors, on improving employee effectiveness, to implement the revenue growth strategy. The learning and growth component of the scorecard identified the need for (1) salespersons to acquire a broader set of skills (to become a financial counselor with broad knowledge of the product line), (2) improved access to information (integrated customer files), and (3) realignment of the incentive systems to encourage the new behavior. The lag indicators included a productivity measure, average sales per salesperson, as well as the attitudes of the work force as measured by an employee satisfaction survey. The lead indicators focused on the major changes that had to be orchestrated in the work force: (1) the upgrading of the skill base and qualified people—strategic job coverage ratio, (2) the access to information technology tools and data—strategic information availability ratio, and (3) the realignment of individual goals and incentives to reflect the new priorities—personal goal alignment.

These measures, in turn, provided the basis for introducing entirely new management processes. For example, consider the measure, strategic job coverage ratio. Every strategy for change, including Metro Bank’s, ultimately requires a selected set of the work force to be reskilled and equipped to take on the new demands. The availability of these strategic competencies is either an asset (when you have them) or a liability (when you don’t). Developing such intellectual assets is usually the longest-lead event for determining the ultimate success of the business unit’s strategy. The most effective measure that we have found for strategic competencies, deceptive in its simplicity, is derived from the answers to three questions: (1) What are the required competencies?, (2) What currently exists?, and (3) What and how large is the gap? The strategic job coverage ratio measure defines the strategic liability (recall the gap displayed in Figure 6-4). While the measure is fundamental and simple, very few organizations are able to construct it because their human resource and planning systems are unable to answer the three questions posed above. The definition of this measure has caused several companies to redesign the basic structure of their staff development process. Figure 7-2 illustrates the relationship of the scorecard measures to the strategic initiative that was instituted to close the strategic job coverage gap. The logic of defining the strategic priorities and the measures that best describe it led to the redefinition of a basic management program required to execute the strategy. Had it not been for the construction of the Balanced Scorecard and the logical systems thinking that it fostered, these organizations would most likely not have addressed the staff deficiencies in such a focused way with such a sense of urgency.

Figure 7-2
Increasing Employee Productivity

Figure 7-3 summarizes the objectives and measures for Metro Bank’s Balanced Scorecard, indicating the mixture of leading and lagging indicators. Not surprisingly, the financial and customer measures contain few lead indicators; most of the leading or driving indicators occur for the internal-business-process and learning and growth measures. Figures 7–1 and 7–3 show how Metro’s scorecard describes a system of cause-and-effect relationships, incorporating a mix of leading and lagging indicators, all of which eventually point to improving future financial performance.

Figure 7-3
Metro Bank’s Balanced Scorecard

N
ATIONAL
I
NSURANCE
C
OMPANY (LONG LAG TIMES)

The importance of linking outcome measures to performance drivers is perhaps most powerfully illustrated in the insurance industry. Insurance is an information-and measurement-intense industry characterized by long delays between the time that routine decisions are made and the corresponding outcomes occur. For example, the effectiveness of the central event of underwriting—evaluating a risk and pricing it—is not known until subsequent claims are made and resolved. The incidence of insured events and resolution through the claims process can take between two and five years, although in extreme cases, as in asbestos litigation, the exposure can go on for decades. In such a setting, having a mixture of leading and lagging measures is vital for motivating and measuring business unit performance.

National Insurance was a major property and casualty insurance firm that had been plagued by unsatisfactory results for the past decade. A new management team was brought in to turn the situation around. Its strategy was to move the company away from its generalist approach—providing a full range of services to the full market—to that of a specialist, a company that would focus on more narrowly defined niches. The new senior executive team identified several key success factors for its new specialist strategy:

  • Become better at understanding and targeting desired market segments;
  • Better select, educate, and motivate agents to pursue these segments;
  • Improve the underwriting process as the focal point for executing this strategy; and
  • Better integrate information about claims into the underwriting process to improve market selectivity.

National’s executives selected the Balanced Scorecard as the primary tool for the new management team to use to lead the turnaround. They selected the scorecard because they believed it would help clarify the
meaning of the new strategy to the organization, and provide early feedback that the ship was turning.

In the first step, the executives defined the strategic objectives for the new specialist strategy, shown in the lefthand column of Figure 7-4. They selected measures to make each objective operational by gaining agreement on the answer to a simple question, “How would we know if National Insurance achieved this objective?” The answers to this question yielded the measures shown in the center column, “Core Outcomes,” of Figure 7-4. The core outcome measures were also referred to as “strategic outcome measures” because they described the outcomes that the executives wished to achieve from each part of their new strategy.

Figure 7-4
The Balanced Scorecard at National Insurance

As with many outcome measures, the measures shown in the center column were the obvious ones that any company in the property and casualty insurance industry would be using. The scorecard would not be meaningful if such industry-specific measures did not appear, but these measures, by themselves, would be inadequate to signal the factors that would lead to superior performance within the industry. Having only industry-generic measures at this point in the scorecard development process highlighted an additional problem. Every one of the outcome measures was a lagging indicator, the reported results for any of the measures reflected decisions and actions taken much earlier. For example, if new underwriting criteria were implemented, the results would not be reflected in the claims frequency for at least a year; the impact on the loss ratio would occur with an even longer delay.

The strategic outcome measures presented a “balanced” view of the strategy, reflecting customer, internal process, and learning and growth measures, in addition to the traditional financial ones. But a scorecard consisting only of lagging indicators would not satisfy management’s goal of providing early indicators of success. Nor would it help to focus the entire organization on the drivers of future success: what people should be doing day-by-day to produce successful outcomes in the future. While the issue of balancing lagging outcome measures with leading performance driver measures occurs for all organizations, the extremely long lags between actions today and outcomes in the future was more pronounced in the property and casualty insurance company than in any other we have encountered.

National Insurance executives went through a second design iteration to determine the actions that people should be taking in the short term to achieve the desired long-term outcomes. For each strategic outcome measure, they identified a complementary performance driver—see righthand column of Figure 7-4. In most cases, the performance drivers described how a business process was intended to change. For example, the strategic outcome measures for the underwriting process were:

  • Loss ratio
  • Claims frequency
  • Claims severity

Improving performance of these measures required a significant improvement in the quality of the underwriting process itself. The executives developed
criteria for what they considered good underwriting. The criteria defined the actions desired in underwriting a new opportunity. The executives introduced a new business process, to audit, periodically, a cross-section of policies for each underwriter to assess whether the policies issued by the underwriter conformed to these criteria. The audit would produce a measure, the underwriting quality audit score, that would show the percentage of new policies written that met the standards of the redesigned underwriting process. The theory behind this approach is that the underwriting quality audit score would be the leading indicator, the performance driver, of the outcomes—loss ratio, claims frequency, and claims severity—that would be revealed much later. In addition to the underwriting quality audit, similar programs were developed for outcome objectives related to agency management, new business development, and claims management. New metrics, representing performance drivers for these outcomes were constructed to communicate and monitor near-term performance. These included:

Outcome Measure
Performance Driver Measures
Key agent acquisition/retention
Agency performance versus plan
Customer acquisition/retention
Policyholder satisfaction survey
Business mix (by segment)
Business development versus plan
Claims frequency and severity
Claims quality audit
Expense ratio
Headcount movement; indirect spending
Staff productivity
Staff development versus plan; IT availability

The righthand column of Figure 7-4 shows the new set of leading indicators, the performance drivers, selected by National Insurance.

Figure 7-5 presents the Balanced Scorecard graphically, illustrating two directional chains of cause and effect: from learning and growth and internal-business-process objectives to customer and financial objectives; and with each outcome measure in the customer, internal, and learning perspectives linked to a performance driver measure.

The National Insurance case again illustrates how the process of building a Balanced Scorecard creates change and produces results. Development of the metrics for the performance drivers forced executives to think through the way that work should be done in the future, and to introduce entirely new business processes—the underwriting quality audit, the claims quality audit, and specific programs to enhance staff skills and expand information technology to employees. In addition to providing measures for the scorecard, the criteria developed by the executives for the underwriting quality and claims quality audits helped develop improved underwriting and claims processes that could be communicated to the work force. The underwriting and claims quality audit scores were not off-the-shelf measures. The executives developed customized measures to reflect the new underwriting and claims processes they wished to implement at National Insurance.

Figure 7-5
National Insurance—Cause-and-Effect Relationships

The detailed contents of the measures described National’s strategy for success. The chain of cause-and-effect relationships diagrammed in Figure 7-5 represents the executives’ hypotheses about the relationship of processes and decisions done today that were expected to favorably impact various core outcomes in the future. The underwriting and claims quality audit measures were not intended to be used punitively. The action after revelation of poor underwriting or claims-processing performance would be additional training, not dismissal. Therefore, the measures were intended to communicate the specifics of new work processes to the organization. The logical process of identifying the strategic priority, the strategic outcomes, and the performance drivers led to reengineered business processes. The process of measurement was indeed “the tail that wagged the dog” (of operations).

The ultimate success of this turnaround program at National Insurance will take some time to play out (we describe the evolution of the Balanced Scorecard at National Insurance in
Chapter 12
), and will, of course, be influenced by many factors beyond the measurement system. But executives readily concurred that the Balanced Scorecard has been a major part of their turnaround strategy and near-term success. The scorecard, by providing short-term indicators of long-term outcomes, has become National Insurance’s guidance system to the future.

The Metro Bank and National Insurance cases illustrate the translation of an SBU business strategy into a measurement framework. In this macro-level design process, we have emphasized the importance of specifying the relationships among the measures as a basis for describing the strategy more than the construction of the individual measures themselves. Having established this overall strategic framework, however, the design and selection of specific measures or subsets of measures is where the execution of strategy begins. The Balanced Scorecard is not really a strategy formulation
tool. We have implemented scorecards in organizations where the strategy has already been well articulated and accepted in the organization. But, more often we have found that even when the senior executive team thought it had prior agreement on the business unit’s strategy, the translation of that strategy into operational measurements forced the clarification and redefinition of the strategy. In effect, the disciplined measurement framework enforced by the Balanced Scorecard stimulated a new round of dialogue about the specific meaning and implementation of the strategy. It is this debate that usually leads to elevating specific management processes into matters of strategic necessity.

Having a linked set of performance measures also enables organized learning at the executive level. By making explicit the cause-and-effect hypotheses of a strategy, managers can test their strategy and adapt as they learn more about the implementation and effectiveness of their strategy, a theme that we explicate in greater detail in
Chapter 12
. Without explicit cause-and-effect linkages, no strategic learning can occur.

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