The Arrogance of Power (99 page)

Nixon, whose Whittier College classmate John Richardson was CIA station chief in Saigon at the time, was outraged by news of the coup. In September 1971, just days after the outburst on the subject reported above, Nixon's confidant Charles Colson began trying to get
Life
magazine to run a story on Diem's murder.
Life
was never sufficiently convinced by the evidence to do so, but its reporter was shown “cables” suggesting Kennedy gave orders refusing Diem asylum, effectively sealing his fate. The cables were in fact fakes concocted by White House consultant, later Watergate burglar, Howard Hunt. Nixon later disclaimed all knowledge of the forgery attempt, but a recently released White House tape shows Ehrlichman disagreed. “My recollection,” he told Nixon, “is that this was discussed with you.” (“the way we got into Vietnam”: Schlesinger,
The Imperial Presidency
. op. cit., p. 262, citing
NYT
, Sept. 17, 1971; “started whole damn thing”:
WP
, Dec. 27, 1998, citing WHT, March 8, 1971; maneuvered by CIA: Sheehan, op. cit., p. 134; Eisenhower support: ibid., and Karnow, op. cit., p. 235; and John Newman,
JFK & Vietnam
, New York: Warner, 1992; advisers: Manchester, op. cit., p. 918, but see Karnow, op. cit., p. 267; 195 dead: Dept. of Defense statistics, NA; combat troops: Karnow, op. cit., p. 431 [they were two Marine battalions, deployed to defend Da Nang airfield]; JFK's intentions: Newman, op. cit.; Robert McNamara with Brian VanDeMark,
In Retrospect
, New York: Times Books, 1995, p. 86; Kennedy aides, coup: ibid., p. 41–; Wise,
Politics of Lying
, op. cit., p. 175–; Ball, op. cit., p. 370; Henry Cabot Lodge,
The Storm Has Many Eyes
, New York: W. W. Norton, 1973, p. 208–, and see especially fresh account at Grant, op. cit., p. 191; JFK admitted:
San Francisco Examiner
, Nov. 29, 1998; JFK memoir entry, Nov. 4, 1963, Cassette M, Side 2, Pres. Recordings, JFKL; Kennedy dismayed: ibid.; McNamara and VanDeMark, op. cit., p. 84; Karnow, op. cit., p. 326; Richardson: Prados, op. cit., p. 246; RN outraged: Postscript to RN to Dwight Eisenhower, Nov. 5, 1963; Post-Presidential Special Names Series, Box 14, DDEL;
Reader's Digest
, Aug. 1964;
AMII
, p. 30–; Colson,
Life
: E, Final Report, p. 125–, and Vol. 9, p. 3672;
WP
, July 19, 1974; Nixon insisted: May 8, 1973;
AOP
, p. 416, and see
MEM
, p. 844; Ehrlichman disagreed:
WHT
, Apr. 28, 1973, AOP, p. 371.)

11.
Nixon did make the “pledge” remark, to a New Hampshire audience. A memorandum in Republican National Committee files indicates that he also told a reporter, “I have a plan to end the war.” The allegation that he said he had a “secret” plan was apparently made in a UPI report out of Boston. (See analysis at Parmet,
Nixon
, op. cit., p. 506–.)

12.
The historian Joan Hoff has questioned whether Nixon really discussed a Madman Theory with Haldeman, surmising that the term originated with Kissinger. Hoff's doubt seems overdone, given Haldeman's characteristic precision and the further testimony along these lines cited in the next paragraphs of this book. Note meanwhile that Seymour Hersh misdates the Madman Theory exchange in his book
The Price of Power
. Haldeman made it clear in his memoirs, and later in an address to a discussion group, that the exchange occurred in the summer of 1968. (Hoff, op. cit., pp. 177–, 398; Hersh, op. cit., p. 52; Haldeman and DiMona, op. cit., p. 121; int. H. R. Haldeman in Miller Center, eds., op. cit., p. 82.)

13.
Nixon noted in his memoirs, with apparent approval, that he was told by a returning U.S. prisoner of war that “the North Vietnamese really thought that the President was off his rocker—was totally irrational. He said that it was absolutely essential for them to think that.” (
MEM
, p. 864.)

14.
Laird told the author that at the start of the presidency, Nixon believed he could win the war “without Vietnamization.” Nixon “had no program at all,” Laird said, adding that he convinced Nixon to press ahead with Vietnamization in March or April 1969. (Int. Melvin Laird, and see
AMII
, p. 277.)

15.
Thieu's reasons for eschewing involvement in the 1968 talks are neatly summarized by Professor Stephen Ambrose in the second volume of his Nixon biography. Nixon, and Henry Kissinger, would strive to make the case that the Thieu regime could have survived—even after the 1973 settlement and the American pullout—if only the U.S. Congress had not vetoed the use of American power and cut back on military aid. (Ambrose:
AMII
, p. 215; Nixon-Kissinger case:
MEM
, p. 889; Kissinger,
White House Years
, op. cit., p. 1470; Kissinger,
Upheaval
, op. cit., ch. 8.)

16.
Gallup gave Nixon a 44 percent to 36 percent lead over Humphrey on October 21. By November 2, two days after the bombing halt, his lead had fallen to only two points, 42 percent to 40 percent. According to the Lou Harris poll, Humphrey actually overtook Nixon at this point. (
TW68
, p. 445–;
AMII
, p. 212; but see
TW68
, p. 446.)

17.
In his memoirs Johnson would write that he had “no reason to think that Republican candidate Nixon was himself involved in this maneuvering, but a few individuals active in his campaign were.” The author agrees with historian Herbert Parmet, who believes Johnson was
“dissembling” because he “knew more than he would or could, let on.” To be forthright, the former president would have had to have revealed what he had learned from intelligence sources, some of which remains secret to this day. In 1971, when the memoirs were published, to have exposed Nixon would have been to expose a sitting president himself still wrestling with the Vietnam impasse. (“no reason”: Johnson, op. cit., p. 518; “dissembling”: Parmet,
Nixon
, op. cit., p. 521.)

18.
The most thorough study is “Woman of Two Worlds: Anna Chennault and Informal Diplomacy in U.S.-Asian Relations, 1950–1990,” a 1997 doctoral dissertation by Catherine Forslund, then at Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri.
A Tangled Web
, the 1998 book by former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs William Bundy, was also groundbreaking. The contents of the “X” envelope were referenced by Professor Robert Dallek in his 1998 biography of Lyndon Johnson,
Flawed Giant
(New York: Oxford University Press). (Bundy: William Bundy, op. cit.; ints., corr. Bundy; FBI documents: FBI 190-HQ-1204905, released with redactions, Dec. 1999.)

19.
Lieutenant General Claire Chennault in 1941 founded American Volunteer Group, the corps of American fliers known as the Flying Tigers, who helped defend China and Burma against the Japanese. The group merged in 1942 with the China Air Task Force, which eventually became the U.S. 14th Air Force under Chennault's command. In retirement after the war, the general had an honorary role with the Flying Tiger freight line. His wife, Anna, was the line's vice president of international operations.

20.
In a 1966 letter from Hong Kong, Anna Chennault wrote that when asked by State Department contacts about her “job,” she had replied that she was a tourist. A subsequent inquiry by her “U.S. connection,” however, had “made ‘The Agency' very unhappy.” (The CIA is widely referred to by cognoscenti as the agency.) In a recent publication and in a conversation with the author, Chennault recalled that her late husband had a relationship with the CIA. She denied, however, ever having worked for the CIA herself. (1966 letter: Anna Chennault to “Tom” [almost certainly Thomas Corcoran, Washington political fixer and Chennault's constant companion], Aug. 10, 1966, obtained by author; husband:
World Journal
(Taiwan), Apr. 21–26, 1994.)

21.
According to his friend Pat Hillings, Nixon tried to fend Chennault off during a Taiwan visit as late as 1967. Yet he kept up the contact in 1967 and 1968 and in September 1968 was writing to her in “Dick-Anna” terms. The authoritative scholar on Chennault, Catherine Forslund, speculated in her study that Nixon sometimes disparaged Chennault as a political maneuver. (Hillings:
JA
, p. 365; Forslund, op. cit., p. 14–; “Dick-Anna”: ibid., p. 28.)

22.
A blind memo in the “X” Envelope, probably written by Walt Rostow, read: “The damage was done via Thieu in Saigon, through low level Americans.” There is evidence elsewhere in this redacted material that the White House ordered investigations of Americans other than Chennault. Chennault told historian Herbert Parmet that “the full story was far from known, that more confidential messages went from Washington to Saigon through couriers and not through Ambassador Diem. . . . Asked to name the other couriers, however, Chennault refused.” (Blind memo: Nov. 4, 1968, “X” Envelope,
supra.
; story far from known: Parmet,
Nixon
, op. cit., p. 522.)

23.
It was previously thought that Chennault merely sent a letter to Nixon in Kansas City. Yet her calendar bears the entry “10/16 to meet R. Nixon in Kansas City, MO.” (Re: letter: Safire, op. cit., p. 90, and detail at Forslund, op. cit., p. 29–.)

24.
In her 1980 book Chennault said she responded by telling Mitchell she thought it unwise to “try to influence the Vietnamese.” This seems at odds with her interviews with the author, cited earlier, in which she said she was told to promise the South Vietnamese they would get a better deal with Nixon in the White House. (not “try to influence”: Chennault, op. cit., p. 190.)

25.
A report from Rostow to President Johnson, ten days after the event, said that the “phone call to the Lady was at 1:41
P
.
M
. EST. . . .” Agnew had arrived in Albuquerque at 1:15
P
.
M
. EST. Another Rostow report, drawing on FBI surveillance, states that Chennault left her Washington apartment at 1:45
P
.
M
. EST. In his reconstruction of the sequence of events for the president, Rostow referred to having received “new times” on Agnew's movements. The initial FBI report contained contradictory times. It also offered an earlier time—1:30
P
.
M
.—for Chennault's departure from home. (Rostow ten days after: Rostow to president, Nov. 12, 1968; re: Rostow and Chennault 1:45
P
.
M
.: Rostow to president, Nov. 2, 1968, both in “X” Envelope; initial FBI report: Cartha DeLoach to Clyde Tolson, Nov. 19, 1968, FBI 65-62098-266.)

26.
Chennault told both this author and another researcher that she did not remember having received a call from New Mexico. She speculated that if she had been overheard referring to New Mexico, she was probably meaning to refer to New
Hampshire
, home state of Robert Hill, one of those she had nominated to Nixon as go-betweens. The documentary record,
however, seems to be more reliable on this matter than Chennault's memory. (Other researcher: conv. Catherine Forslund.)

27.
It was Nixon who called Johnson, not vice versa, as is often reported. Having spoken with the president, the Senate minority leader Everett Dirksen had passed word that “something had to be done in a hurry to cool him off.” According to William Safire, Dirksen thought Johnson was “ready to blow his stack—and blow the whistle on the Nixon campaign's attempt to defeat his peace efforts by getting President Thieu to hold back. Anna Chennault's name was mentioned.” The message was so troubling that Nixon was roused from his bed and agreed to phone Johnson. (RN made call: Forslund, op. cit., citing LBJ sources, including Defense Communications Operations Unit; Safire, op. cit., p. 93, and
MEM
, p. 320, contradicting, for example, Witcover, op. cit., p. 442; “something had to be done”: Safire, op. cit., p. 93.)

28.
Anna Chennault insisted to the author in a 2000 interview that she had not spoken with Agnew while he was in Albuquerque. Clearly, however, Agnew was involved with the Vietnam issue and in touch with Nixon on the subject of a possible breakthrough in the peace talks. Nixon refers in his memoirs to a conversation with his running mate—in early October—in which Agnew briefed him on information he had learned on the subject from Johnson's secretary of state, Dean Rusk. On October 24, at a rally in St. Louis, Agnew said a development in the Paris peace talks was “fully expected.” (Chennault insisted: int., March 2000; Agnew briefed Nixon:
MEM
, p. 324; Agnew/St. Louis; Jules Witcover,
White Knight: The Rise of Spiro Agnew
, New York: Random House, 1972, p. 270.)

29.
Chennault said she was pressured not to talk by Herb Klein, Nixon law firm colleague Tom Evans, Senators Everett Dirksen and John Tower, and Robert Hill. (Chennault, op. cit., p. 193–; int. Herb Klein.)

30.
Chennault did not reveal what she knew for a long time, but it is not surprising that Nixon's people were nervous. Interviewed before the 1969 inauguration by Tom Ottenad, a reporter on the trail of the story, she said: “You're going to get me in a lot of trouble. . . . I can't say anything . . . come back and ask me that after the inauguration. We're at a very sensitive time. . . . I know so much and can say so little.” In September 1969 she asserted: “Whatever I did during the campaign the Republicans, including Mr. Nixon, knew about.” In 1974 she further amplified that statement: “From the first conversation [with the South Vietnamese] I made it clear I was speaking for Mr. Nixon. . . .” By 1979, with Nixon long disgraced, she was starting to offer more detail. The blanket denials of the Nixon side had upset her, but, she said resignedly, “It was a very vicious campaign. Politics is a very cruel game.” Tom Corcoran said in 1981: “People have used Chennault scandalously, Nixon in particular, I know exactly what Nixon said to her, and then he repudiated her.” (Jan. 1969 int.:
Boston Globe
, Jan. 6, 1969; Sept. 1969 int.:
Washingtonian
, Sept. 1969; 1974 int.: Howe and Trott, op. cit., p. 48; 1979 int.:
Washington Star
, Aug. 20, 1979; Corcoran:
WP
, Feb. 18, 1981, cited at Forslund, op. cit., p. 52, fn.)