Tested by Zion (52 page)

The following moments left many in the Oval Office squirming. The president once again said he would not cram anything down the Israelis’ throats and said he knew “T and T” were rebellious. This was probably a reference to things I had told him: Turbo and Tourgeman were deeply anxious about the conference for two reasons. They were worried about the pressure that might be brought on Israel, and in my view they were also worried about Olmert. Might the international setting and the possibility of widespread praise, so different from the terrible pressures and attacks he faced back home, lead Olmert
to make concessions they would both view as excessive? Olmert responded graciously to the president, saying he was grateful for the very hard work and dedication both the president and Secretary Rice had put in. Your leadership and Condi's were essential.

So you're not mad at her? the president asked with a smile. Although no one could have been surprised that he was aware of the tensions between Condi and the Israelis, there was something close to shock that he was bringing them to the surface – right there in the Oval Office and in front of the full U.S. and Israeli delegations. No, said Olmert, with a stiff smile, but I can argue with her.

They would return to the subject of Condi in the post-Annapolis meeting, but then the president continued on the topic of the conference, saying its purpose is to lay out a vision, and then it will be up to you and Abbas to negotiate what a Palestinian state would look like. That is exactly right, I thought to myself; this conference is about some grand vision and not about the actual on-the-ground work we should be doing in the West Bank. The president went on and once again showed his awareness of the tensions between us and the Israelis. Anyway, calling it a meeting or a conference, who cares, he said to Olmert.

Olmert replied stiffly that we had all agreed on the term “meeting,” and the agreement was the point. It's important there are no more misunderstandings on the way, he said. He then turned to Gaza and terrorism, which was safer ground, and told us that Israel would act freely to protect Israeli citizens. We won't ask anyone, he said. We will do all we can to complete these new negotiations next year, but we will not give up our opportunity to defend ourselves. That raises the issue of Gaza and just what commitments the Palestinians have met. While Gaza is in terrorist hands, they have not met their Roadmap commitments about terrorism. He then warned us, as he and Barak repeatedly did throughout 2007 and 2008, that Israel might well launch an operation into Gaza if the rocket and mortar attacks from there did not cease.

This warning did not faze the president and he returned to his basic point: The Palestinians need a clear vision of a state, although it was obvious that implementation of any agreement could not happen while he was president and could, he added, take as long as a decade. They need a vision of a state; the state may take a while, he said. Perhaps Abbas was not the man who could lead them to a state but he could negotiate the vision.

At his meeting with the president, Abbas reiterated his desire to launch negotiations immediately and conclude an agreement the following year, while President Bush was still in office. This is a historic moment that can alter the balance between hope and despair, the president replied. You and the Israelis must get to the definition of a state. But, he added, the Roadmap is vital; peace cannot be achieved if we do not follow the Roadmap. But the vision is vital; it changes everything. This is how the president is squaring the circle in his own mind, I thought as I listened. On the one hand, he has the Roadmap and the Israeli insistence on following its sequence, and on the other he has Condi
saying we need to jump to talks on Phase III and talk about a Palestinian state. So he wants both.

Why are we having this conference? the president then asked. There are three or four reasons to have a big meeting like this. First, it makes Rice feel good. Second, it is important for the Arab world to be involved so that when you finally reach an agreement with Israel, they are on board. Third, it gives Israel confidence that the agreement with you helps them with the Arab world. Fourth, the donors are watching, and we want them present so it is easier to get a “yes” when we knock on the door. Otherwise, we could have just held a three-man meeting, with you, me, and Olmert.

I knew the president had long felt very strongly about Arab involvement, wanting broad representation at Sharm el-Sheik in 2003, at Sea Island in 2004, and now at Annapolis. In Olmert's first visit to the White House, in May 2006, the president had told him ruefully that the error Clinton made was not to line up the Arabs. They wouldn't even take his call in the end, Bush said, and it was clear that he would work to avoid any such outcome on his own watch.

Abbas had only one substantive request: that the president not talk about Israel as a “Jewish State.” The goal here is to reach a Palestinian state, he said; we are not here to define the character of the state that is next door to us. They can define themselves any way they want. The President shook his head. I can't do that, he answered, because I have already said it and I have to say it again. You're about four speeches too late. Four years too late, Rice added.

At Annapolis the next morning, on November 27, the president arrived by helicopter from the White House and the three men held a trilateral meeting. It was a presidential pep talk, but the president also used it to define his role as he saw it. If you want me to negotiate the deal, he said, I won't do it. The American position is clear: We want you two to solve the problem, but I will be as engaged as you want me to be. I am a phone call away, so call me. The goal is an agreement on the definition of a state. If you think it is important, now is the time to get it done. Do not waste this opportunity; do not let it slip through your fingers. Now is the time; there's no telling what the next group will do. I’m not a timetable guy, but the timetable is me leaving office.

With considerable difficulty, we finally got the “Annapolis Declaration
,” a text that both Israelis and Palestinians could live with. Its key parts reaffirmed the launching of final status negotiations, the deadline of December 2008, the two tracks (Abbas-Olmert and
a “steering committee”), and the American role in judging who was implementing the Roadmap and who was not. We actually set up a mechanism to judge compliance, under a three-star Air Force general, Will Fraser, who provided reliable information – though little was done with it in the remaining year. The Israelis won, in the final paragraph, the language
they wanted about implementation of any peace treaty agreed to by the parties: It would be subject to the sequence of the Roadmap:

In furtherance of the goal of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security, we agree to immediately launch good-faith bilateral negotiations in order to conclude a peace treaty, resolving all outstanding issues, including all core issues without exception, as specified in previous agreements.

We agree to engage in vigorous, ongoing and continuous negotiations, and shall make every effort to conclude an agreement before the end of 2008. For this purpose, a steering committee, led jointly by the head of the delegation of each party, will meet continuously, as agreed.

The steering committee will develop a joint work plan and establish and oversee the work of negotiations teams to address all issues, to be headed by one lead representative from each party. The first session of the steering committee will be held on 12 December 2007.

President Abbas and
Prime Minister Olmert will continue to meet on a biweekly basis to follow up the negotiations in order to offer all necessary assistance for their advancement.

The parties also commit to immediately implement their respective obligations under the performance-based road map to a permanent two-state solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, issued by the Quartet on 30 April 2003 – this is called the road map – and agree to form an American, Palestinian and Israeli mechanism, led by the United States, to follow up on the implementation of the road map.

The parties further commit to continue the implementation of the ongoing obligations of the road map until they reach a peace treaty. The United States will monitor and judge the fulfillment of the commitment of both sides of the road map. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, implementation of the future peace treaty will be subject to the implementation of the road map, as judged by the United States.
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The president used the meeting with Abbas the following day, November 28, to deliver two messages. I hope one myth I dispelled yesterday was that I won't spend time on the issue, he said. I will, and I will travel to the Middle East. The number of trips is not an indication of desire, anyway, he added. I will work hard and so will Condi. She doesn't go out there and freelance. I will tell Olmert the same thing; I won't let it happen that Bush means this but Rice means that, the president said. Why the president felt it necessary to deliver either message was not at all clear to me, especially not at that moment. But the issue of Condi arose again, more dramatically, at the Olmert meeting later that day.

Olmert began his account of the Annapolis conference by saying he admired the efforts of Dr. Rice. No you don't, she pisses you off, the president replied. There was no squirming among all the members of the U.S. and Israeli delegations now; jaws seemed to hang open. Well, sometimes, Olmert said, but we work together – and we remain friends, Condi added, in a very smart effort to end this particular discussion. But Olmert did not take the hint and added
that whatever his good relationship with Rice, he would never hesitate to talk to Bush directly. There is no difference between us; don't try to drive a wedge between us, the president pushed back, adding that he had just told Abbas the same thing. Now that Olmert saw the subject was on the table, he reiterated his position: Condi and I will work together, but if we disagree, I will present the disagreement to you. This made Rice mad and she shot back: You will get the same answer. When you say something is wrong, I tell the president. Olmert objected: But I need the freedom to call the president so I can explain why a position you hold may seem so wrong to me. I don't freelance, Rice replied, and the president and I are never apart on these issues. The stiff smiles were all gone now.

I understand that, Olmert now explained at some length. But I have an obligation to my people. I have an obligation to the State of Israel and to the Jewish people. It is so different, the history of our people. I am the prime minister of a society that throughout history has lived through the constant threat of annihilation. When you hear Ahmadinejad raving, you aren't worried about it; you can wipe him out in one minute. I am the prime minister of six million Jews who were thrown out of their countries. The most powerful experience in their lives comes to me as prime minister when Ahmadinejad says “annihilate.” It is not a game; it is a reality. So when I argue with you, this is on issues of life and death. I would betray my responsibility if I stop because I cannot convince Condi Rice. I must go to the president. That is the lesson of recent experience, some of it not happy. We have to define in the most accurate way the red lines that are essential for us. I don't want to surprise you or to be surprised. I don't want the slightest misunderstanding between the prime minister of Israel and the president of the United States.

The rest of the meeting was calmer, but that exchange was as remarkable as any I heard in eight years working at the White House. Like the conversation with the president about al-Kibar, here was Olmert at his best, explaining that he had a responsibility for the security of a state whose security was always on the line – and for a people who had learned from history what happens to Jews without security. Israelis knew of neither conversation, and many – most, according to polls – saw Olmert as a cynical politician. That side of him existed, but so did this one.

It has to be added that this tactic – going around Condi to the president – was never a successful one. Dubi Weissglas explained the problem in a conversation we had several years later: Olmert seriously believed that if he was having any problems with Condi Rice, he did not have a real reason to be worried because at the end of day his close friend would take his position. He seriously believed that Bush was his close friend. And during the very short period I was still there [in the Prime Minister's Office after Sharon's stroke] I told him, “Don't be mistaken; you might be dear to him, I don't know. But nothing is even close to his relationship with Condi. And don't be that stupid to try to end up between them – because you're going to break your head. We [under Sharon], we never ever ever did it,” Dubi had concluded.

Weissglas was right; Olmert almost always made a mistake when he sought to go around Rice to the president. He would have been better off having Turbowitz or Tourgeman contacting Hadley or me, explaining their views fully and asking that we reconsider. We had the chance in an internal process to change Condi's mind, something Hadley could try to do just through force of argument, or to bring decisions to the president. However, in a head-on dispute between Condi and a foreign leader, the president was never going to undercut his secretary of state.

The tensions were, in any event, out on the table now and would remain there throughout 2007 and 2008; they would spike again in January 2009 in the final days of the Bush administration. But Annapolis was now behind us and Condi had not only gotten the international conference she had wanted but also had gotten negotiations
started. However Olmert described it, he had agreed to jump to Phase III of the Roadmap and start negotiating final status issues. The debate about “parallelism versus sequentialism,” about whether Phase I had to be entirely completed before negotiations could start, was over.