Terrible Swift Sword (22 page)
It would be taken literally, to begin
with, by the President himself, and before long this was made clear.
Whether on Stanton's urging, on someone
else's, or on his own initiative, Mr. Lincoln on January 27 issued a strange, comprehensive
and rather baffling paper which bore the heading, "President's General
War Order No. One." It began: "Ordered that the 22nd. day of February
1862, be the day for a general movement of the Land and Naval forces of the
United States against the insurgent forces." It directed that the armies
in Virginia, in western Virginia, in Kentucky and in Illinois, along with the
gunboat flotilla on the Mississippi, be ready to move on that day, and that all
other contingents stand by in a condition of expectant readiness; and it specified
that the general-in-chief and all of his subordinates "will severally be
held to their strict and full responsibilities, for the prompt execution of
this order." A supplementary order, four days later, said that the Army of
the Potomac would march down to cut the railroad southwest of Manassas Junction.
11
On the surface, this
accomplished nothing whatever. When February 22 came the various armies went on
doing just what they had been doing before, even (in some cases) to the point
of continuing to do nothing at all. It is possible that the order was not
really intended to get specific action. It was a goad for the sluggish and a
warning to the heedless, it reflected Secretary Stanton's belief that
"the armies must move or the Government perish," and it was a reminder
that the threads of power ran finally to the White House.
12
In any
case, it quickly drew from General McClellan a detailed, carefully reasoned
statement of his own immediate plans. On the final day of January, McClellan
signed a lengthy letter to Secretary Stanton, telling the Secretary and the
President exactly what he proposed to do and how he proposed to do it.
He began by arguing vigorously against
the movement on Joe Johnston's position at Manassas Junction. He reverted to
the Urbanna plan, and he projected this with a wealth of detail which showed
that the idea had been getting some careful study. In substance, McClellan
wanted to flank the Rebels out of northern Virginia and to carry the war at
once to the region of the Confederate capital. This thrust would be coordinated
with advances by Buell and Halleck in the west; further, McClellan saw all of
these steps, in Virginia and in Kentucky alike, as parts of a great encircling
movement by which the Confederacy would be hemmed in and constricted by a huge
crescent, going counterclockwise all the way from Port Royal around to New
Orleans. In each segment of this crescent the Federals would be on the
offensive.
13
It was a solid program, not altogether
unlike the essence of old General Scott's Anaconda Plan, if anyone had stopped
to think about it; surprisingly in harmony with the strategic concept which Mr.
Lincoln had tried so vainly to impress on General Buell and General Halleck;
and General McClellan presented it persuasively and with much clarity. In the
end the general would have his way; that is, he would take the water route when
he moved against Richmond, although he would find it necessary first to make at
least a token advance toward Manassas Junction. But in presenting this paper he
had in effect endorsed the demand that the Army of the Potomac move at once. He
had outlined a program which called for concerted movements, and in the west
the movements were already under way. Any army which lagged would call
attention to itself in the most unmistakable way. Henceforward all generals
were apt to be judged by comparison with the one who had the most energy.
When
Thomas won his fight at Logan's Cross Roads the era of static warfare came to
an end, and if the point was still missed in Washington it was visible from end
to end of Kentucky. Farther west, while Thomas was making his campaign, the
Federals had confirmed their earlier suspicions that there was a soft spot in
the Confederate line, where the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers came north
across the Kentucky-Tennessee border, and this soft spot demanded attack: an
attack which was also demanded by the men who had discovered it and who must
eventually do the fighting. General Grant and the rugged sailor who represented
the salt-water navy on the rivers of the Middle West, Flag Officer Andrew
Foote. Even Halleck had seen it; he had written to Washington about it, and
just as McClellan was signing the excellent letter which called for concerted
action Halleck was telling Grant and Foote to start up the Tennessee and do the
things they had said they could do. In mid-January McClellan had warned Buell,
"You have no idea of the pressure brought to bear here upon the Government
for a forward movement." Now the pressure was being wondrously
intensified, and McClellan himself was the man who would feel it first.
14
War Department thinking abruptly
changed: evidenced by a singular trip through the Middle West made at the end
of January by Assistant Secretary of War Scott.
Scott was an old crony of Cameron's, and
as vice-president of the Pennsylvania Railroad had been associated with Cameron
in railroad operations. On this western trip he devoted himself to a study of
the way in which a major part of the Army of the Potomac could be moved to Kentucky
and used to complete the smashing of General Johnston's line there.
This project of course involved a
complete reversal of all plans for an offensive in Virginia, and it was clearly
worked out on Stanton's orders and with at least the passive approval of
General McClellan. On February 1, Scott sent Stanton his preliminary findings.
By combining the rolling stock of four railroads, he said, it would be possible
to send soldiers from Washington to Pittsburgh at the rate of 15,000 men a day.
Within six days, 60,000 men and their equipment—artillery, cavalry, baggage,
tents, munitions, and rations—could be placed on the Ohio River somewhere west
of Pittsburgh. Next day he amplified it: in just over five days, using
steamboats for the journey west of Pittsburgh, the army could be deposited at
Covington, Kentucky, across the river from Cincinnati. As a railroad man, Scott
had worked out the logistics with much care. He had talked to the Middle
Western governors, and he had also discussed the business with General Buell,
whom he considered "a very superior officer—calm, prudent and with great
power to control."
Buell told Scott that a column of
"from 30 to 50,000 good soldiers from the Army of the Potomac" would
enable the Federals to take and hold a good position between the Tennessee and
Cumberland Rivers at a point which would cut the railroad line connecting
Johnston's central position at Bowling Green with the Mississippi River
stronghold at Columbus, Kentucky. Once this was done, Buell could destroy the Confederates
at Bowling Green while Halleck disposed of the Rebel force at Columbus;
meanwhile the Potomac column could advance up the rivers, Nashville could be occupied,
and "with Nashville for a base of operations the so-called Southern
Confederacy could be effectually divided, and with reasonable facilities our
armies could soon be able to accomplish great work south and east of that
center."
15
McClellan was interested. His friend
Barlow warned him, on February 8, that Stanton definitely felt that McClellan
ought to go to Kentucky,
"if
there is to be action
there & none for the present in Va."; it was Barlow's belief that
Stanton wanted McClellan to distinguish himself before the abolitionists pushed
some other general into the limelight. Stanton told Scott that he had not
really been able to impress the importance of the move on McClellan, but he
hoped the man would come around before long; and McClellan was definitely
warming up to the idea. Apparently early in February, McClellan wrote to
Stanton: "Have you anything from Scott as to the means we can command in
the way of moving troops westward by rail & water. My mind is more &
more tending in that direction, tho' not fully committed to it. But there
should be no delay in ascertaining precisely
what
we can do
should it become
advisable to move in that direction. Please put the machinery in motion to
ascertain exactly how many troops we can move per diem to Kentucky, how many
days the transit would occupy, etc. Should we change the line I would wish to
take about 70
,000
infantry, 250 guns, 2500 cavalry—at least
3
bridge trains."
The words "I would wish to take" indicate clearly that McClellan was
thinking of going west in person.
18
The project hung in
the air for a short time and then dissolved and was heard of no more. It
dissolved because it suddenly became unnecessary, and for the best of reasons:
someone else had already done what was being planned so elaborately. On the
day when Scott talked with Buell about the great things that could be done if a
Federal army moved up the rivers and cut the Columbus-Bowling Green railway
line, General Grant and Flag Officer Foote captured Fort Henry, the
Confederacy's sole stronghold on the Tennessee, and Grant notified Halleck that
he would move twelve miles cross country and take the Rebel fort at Dover, on
the Cumberland. As an immediate result, Albert Sidney Johnston ordered his
subordinates to prepare for the evacuation of both Bowling Green and Columbus.
Before the month was out he would move to regroup his outnumbered forces in
the state of Mississippi, just below the southern border of Tennessee.
2.
Unconditional Surrender
A Belgian who
traveled across Kentucky at the end of 1861 wrote that the Confederates who
held Albert Sidney Johnston's line were fantastic. They had nothing much in the
way of uniforms, their weapons were antiquated, it was hard to tell officers
from privates and equally hard to tell soldiers from civilians, and the visitor
shuddered when he looked at these characters who brandished "their
frightful knives and who went about uncombed, unshaven, and unwashed. It seemed
to the Belgian's orderly European soul that they belonged to "a state of
society but little to be desired," and in their camps he saw more sickness
and less discipline than he had seen among the Federals; yet somehow the men
looked dangerous, for "their determination is truly extraordinary, and
their hatred against the north terrible to look upon, there is something savage
in it." They believed that they were fighting for their homes, their
families and their own precious lives, and they might be extraordinary
fighters.
1
The capabilities of these soldiers would
be shown in many battles, and they would be just as dangerous as the Belgian
imagined. But in this month of January they were in a desperately bad fix and
General Johnston did not quite see how he was going to get them out of it.
General Johnston saw disaster coming.
From the begin- • ning he had had too much territory to defend and too few men
to defend it with, and now the pay-off was at hand. Late in January he had
predicted that the Federals would soon attack Fort Henry and Fort Donelson and
then would move on Nashville, and there was not much he could do to stop them.
The two forts were unfinished and undermanned, with no more than 4000 men
between them; Johnston had only 23,000 men at Bowling Green, the strong point
which marked the center of his line, and he felt compelled to send 8000 of
these off to the vicinity of Clarksville, where the all-important railroad
from Columbus crossed the Cumberland twenty-five miles upstream from Fort
Donelson. He believed that Buell, who was obviously about to take the
offensive, had 80,000 men; an estimate that was only a little too high,
although more than a third of Buell's men were by no means ready for action.
Bowling Green was well fortified, and Johnston thought he could hold the place
if Buell made a frontal assault, but there was little chance that Buell would
do anything so foolish. He was much more likely to flank the Confederates out
by coming up the Cumberland, and Johnston simply did not have the manpower to
stop him.
The general complained, correctly, that
"our people do not comprehend the magnitude of the danger that
threatens," and he begged Richmond to send him more troops. This, for a
variety of reasons, most of them excellent, Richmond felt quite unable to do;
it did, however, send him General Beauregard, who reached Bowling Green on
February
4
and
learned to his amazement that General Johnston had no more than half the men
Beauregard supposed he had.
2
As always, Beauregard was preceded by a great
deal of tall talk, and when the Federals heard about his new assignment they
understood that he was bringing fifteen Virginia regiments of infantry with
him. This, to be sure, was not the case; but the fact that this false report
came on ahead of him was one of the things that triggered the Federal offensive
in Kentucky. If Beauregard, who was a host in himself, was bringing strong
reinforcements, it would be well to strike before the reinforcements arrived;
and this was an element in the thinking that sent Grant and Foote up the rivers
into Tennessee.
