Terminator and Philosophy: I'll Be Back, Therefore I Am (37 page)
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Authors: Richard Brown,William Irwin,Kevin S. Decker
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4
Disclaimer: despite what we, or our more delusional or conspiracy-theory-minded readers, might think,
T2
is not a documentary. It is a big-budget, action-packed Hollywood blockbuster. So we think that the Terminator is generally working under something like the Code Model. There are, of course, instances in the film where it might seem otherwise. Nobody’s perfect or perfectly consistent. James Cameron does come close . . .
Disclaimer: despite what we, or our more delusional or conspiracy-theory-minded readers, might think,
T2
is not a documentary. It is a big-budget, action-packed Hollywood blockbuster. So we think that the Terminator is generally working under something like the Code Model. There are, of course, instances in the film where it might seem otherwise. Nobody’s perfect or perfectly consistent. James Cameron does come close . . .
5
At least superficially, the T-1000 is far more fluid in its conversational abilities. Before stealing a man’s motorcycle, it says smugly, “Say, that’s a nice bike.” Maybe Skynet changed its approach.
At least superficially, the T-1000 is far more fluid in its conversational abilities. Before stealing a man’s motorcycle, it says smugly, “Say, that’s a nice bike.” Maybe Skynet changed its approach.
6
The term “pragmatics,” as it relates to linguistic theorizing, originated with C. W. Morris,
Foundations of the Theory of Signs
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1938). Morris defined the term as the study of conditions and effects surrounding a system of signs, and how that system relates to its interpreters. Linguistic pragmatism should not be confused with American Pragmatism, a philosophical movement and outlook developed by Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey.
The term “pragmatics,” as it relates to linguistic theorizing, originated with C. W. Morris,
Foundations of the Theory of Signs
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1938). Morris defined the term as the study of conditions and effects surrounding a system of signs, and how that system relates to its interpreters. Linguistic pragmatism should not be confused with American Pragmatism, a philosophical movement and outlook developed by Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey.
7
For more on ambiguity, see “Terminating Ambiguity: The Perplexing Case of ‘The,’” by Richard Brown in this volume.
For more on ambiguity, see “Terminating Ambiguity: The Perplexing Case of ‘The,’” by Richard Brown in this volume.
8
The term “Inferential Model” comes from Sperber and Wilson’s
Relevance
.
The term “Inferential Model” comes from Sperber and Wilson’s
Relevance
.
9
Both are reprinted in H. P. Grice,
Studies in the Way of Words
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1989).
Both are reprinted in H. P. Grice,
Studies in the Way of Words
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1989).
10
There is a lot of debate about whether or not there is such a thing as sentence-meaning. For an example of one who denies that sentences involving pragmatic features have any such thing as sentence-meaning, see F. Récanati,
Literal Meaning
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004). For an example of one who claims that there is a meaning, albeit an incomplete one, see K. Taylor, “Sex, Breakfast, and Descriptus Interruptus,”
Synthese
128 (2001): 45-61. Some thinkers claim that most sentences, regardless of whether they involve pragmatic features, have compete sentence-meanings; see H. Cappelen and E. Lepore,
Insensitive Semantics
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005).
There is a lot of debate about whether or not there is such a thing as sentence-meaning. For an example of one who denies that sentences involving pragmatic features have any such thing as sentence-meaning, see F. Récanati,
Literal Meaning
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004). For an example of one who claims that there is a meaning, albeit an incomplete one, see K. Taylor, “Sex, Breakfast, and Descriptus Interruptus,”
Synthese
128 (2001): 45-61. Some thinkers claim that most sentences, regardless of whether they involve pragmatic features, have compete sentence-meanings; see H. Cappelen and E. Lepore,
Insensitive Semantics
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005).
11
Sometimes literal meaning is referred to as the
semantic content
of an utterance. The semantic content of an utterance is thus distinguished from whatever else is supplied by a speaker—namely, the
pragmatic content
. Where exactly to draw the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is a hot topic in contemporary philosophy of language.
Sometimes literal meaning is referred to as the
semantic content
of an utterance. The semantic content of an utterance is thus distinguished from whatever else is supplied by a speaker—namely, the
pragmatic content
. Where exactly to draw the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is a hot topic in contemporary philosophy of language.
12
For a look at how philosophers have used this inferential perspective to decide whether machines think or not, see Antti Kuusela’s chapter, “Wittgenstein and What’s Inside the Terminator’s Head,” in this volume.
For a look at how philosophers have used this inferential perspective to decide whether machines think or not, see Antti Kuusela’s chapter, “Wittgenstein and What’s Inside the Terminator’s Head,” in this volume.
13
In
Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines
, the T-101 says that it has been programmed with some basic knowledge of human psychology. Prior to
T3
, there is no indication that it has such knowledge. The knowledge the T-101 claims to have in
T3
appears to deal only with emotions and their impact on behaviors. The knowledge does not seem to include information about cognition or thought, let alone knowledge of how to infer the content of others’ thoughts.
In
Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines
, the T-101 says that it has been programmed with some basic knowledge of human psychology. Prior to
T3
, there is no indication that it has such knowledge. The knowledge the T-101 claims to have in
T3
appears to deal only with emotions and their impact on behaviors. The knowledge does not seem to include information about cognition or thought, let alone knowledge of how to infer the content of others’ thoughts.
14
We would like to thank Marc Berger, Elizabeth Berger, Sam Berger, and Kristen Lee. We especially thank the editors of this volume for their very helpful comments.
We would like to thank Marc Berger, Elizabeth Berger, Sam Berger, and Kristen Lee. We especially thank the editors of this volume for their very helpful comments.
18
TERMINATING AMBIGUITY: THE PERPLEXING CASE OF “THE”
Richard Brown
Maybe they should never have called the first movie
The Terminator
. After all, there’s more than one Terminator. That may seem like a picky point, but believe it or not, philosophers have long been obsessed with trying to determine the meaning of the word “the.” Indeed, much controversy swirls around this seemingly innocuous definite article. Specifically, the controversy focuses on whether or not
definite descriptions
are
ambiguous
.
The Terminator
. After all, there’s more than one Terminator. That may seem like a picky point, but believe it or not, philosophers have long been obsessed with trying to determine the meaning of the word “the.” Indeed, much controversy swirls around this seemingly innocuous definite article. Specifically, the controversy focuses on whether or not
definite descriptions
are
ambiguous
.
A definite description is a phrase that begins with the word “the,” like “the Terminator,” “the leader of the resistance in 2029,” and “the mother of John Connor,” just to name a few examples. These kinds of phrases are called “definite” descriptions since they single out one unique thing, the thing that fits the description.
1
A word, or phrase, is
ambiguous
when it has multiple meanings. There are at least two kinds of ambiguity. The first kind is
syntactic
ambiguity, as in the sentence “Visiting Terminators can be dangerous.” This sentence has two meanings, depending on how we understand it. It could mean that having a Terminator as a houseguest can be dangerous, or it could mean that going to visit a Terminator could be dangerous (both are likely true!). But notice that no word or phrase in this sentence has multiple meanings; it is the sentence
as a whole
that’s ambiguous. Contrast the following sentence: “The Terminator went to the bank.” The word “bank” has at least two meanings, and so the sentence could mean either that the Terminator went to the bank of some river or that it went to some financial institution. The question, then, is this: is the word “the”
semantically
ambiguous like “bank,” thus admitting multiple meanings?
1
A word, or phrase, is
ambiguous
when it has multiple meanings. There are at least two kinds of ambiguity. The first kind is
syntactic
ambiguity, as in the sentence “Visiting Terminators can be dangerous.” This sentence has two meanings, depending on how we understand it. It could mean that having a Terminator as a houseguest can be dangerous, or it could mean that going to visit a Terminator could be dangerous (both are likely true!). But notice that no word or phrase in this sentence has multiple meanings; it is the sentence
as a whole
that’s ambiguous. Contrast the following sentence: “The Terminator went to the bank.” The word “bank” has at least two meanings, and so the sentence could mean either that the Terminator went to the bank of some river or that it went to some financial institution. The question, then, is this: is the word “the”
semantically
ambiguous like “bank,” thus admitting multiple meanings?
Listen and understand. That Terminator is out there.
It can’t be bargained with, it can’t be reasoned with. It
doesn’t feel pity, or remorse, or fear, and it absolutely
will not stop. Ever. Until you are dead.
—Kyle Reese
Consider this sentence: “The real-life Terminator can’t be bargained with.” Is it true, false, or meaningless? The sentence certainly seems false as it stands, since there is no real-life Terminator. But if the sentence is false, then its opposite, “The real-life Terminator
can
be bargained with,” should be true. This sentence, however, seems just as false as the first one. We typically think that for any pair of sentences, one of which affirms (“The real-life Terminator can’t be bargained with”) and one of which denies (“The real-life Terminator can be bargained with”), one of them must be true and the other must be false. So we’re faced with a bit of a puzzle.
can
be bargained with,” should be true. This sentence, however, seems just as false as the first one. We typically think that for any pair of sentences, one of which affirms (“The real-life Terminator can’t be bargained with”) and one of which denies (“The real-life Terminator can be bargained with”), one of them must be true and the other must be false. So we’re faced with a bit of a puzzle.
Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), in his famous 1905 paper “On Denoting,” proposed an answer to this puzzle.
2
According to Russell, the
grammatical
structure of the sentence doesn’t really clue us in to its
logical
structure. Logically speaking, the sentence really says something like this: “There is a unique object which is the real-life Terminator and which can’t be bargained with.” This phrasing, although clunkier, is helpful because it shows us that there are really two ways to make the sentence false. One way is the way that we previously considered, namely, to say that the Terminator
can
be bargained with. But we can also consider the opposite, or “negate” the first part (“There is a unique object which is a real-life Terminator”) to get “There is
no
unique object which is a real-life Terminator.” With this change made, our original sentence is false, because there is no real-life Terminator. And its negation is
true
(“There is no real-life Terminator”), so the puzzle we started with is solved. This is Russell’s famous theory of descriptions, which enjoys wide support among philosophers who are in the know.
2
According to Russell, the
grammatical
structure of the sentence doesn’t really clue us in to its
logical
structure. Logically speaking, the sentence really says something like this: “There is a unique object which is the real-life Terminator and which can’t be bargained with.” This phrasing, although clunkier, is helpful because it shows us that there are really two ways to make the sentence false. One way is the way that we previously considered, namely, to say that the Terminator
can
be bargained with. But we can also consider the opposite, or “negate” the first part (“There is a unique object which is a real-life Terminator”) to get “There is
no
unique object which is a real-life Terminator.” With this change made, our original sentence is false, because there is no real-life Terminator. And its negation is
true
(“There is no real-life Terminator”), so the puzzle we started with is solved. This is Russell’s famous theory of descriptions, which enjoys wide support among philosophers who are in the know.
Russell’s theory has an interesting implication in that phrases with the word “the” in them are not
referring expressions
. They do not refer to any particular individual but rather just describe the world as being some way or other. Yet P. F. Strawson (1919-2006) vigorously attacked Russell’s theory in his paper “On Referring.”
3
Suppose that the Terminator is at the door and you are about to open it when Kyle Reese springs in, shouting, “Don’t open the door! The Terminator will kill you!” Kyle
seems
to be referring to the particular Terminator at the door, and not merely saying that there is some object (“the Terminator”) and that this object will kill you. Strawson thinks that Russell is wrong, that definite descriptions
are
referring expressions, like names (“Kyle,” “Sarah,” “John”) and
demonstratives
(words like “this” and “that”). Russell failed to notice the difference between an
expression
and the
use
of that expression.
referring expressions
. They do not refer to any particular individual but rather just describe the world as being some way or other. Yet P. F. Strawson (1919-2006) vigorously attacked Russell’s theory in his paper “On Referring.”
3
Suppose that the Terminator is at the door and you are about to open it when Kyle Reese springs in, shouting, “Don’t open the door! The Terminator will kill you!” Kyle
seems
to be referring to the particular Terminator at the door, and not merely saying that there is some object (“the Terminator”) and that this object will kill you. Strawson thinks that Russell is wrong, that definite descriptions
are
referring expressions, like names (“Kyle,” “Sarah,” “John”) and
demonstratives
(words like “this” and “that”). Russell failed to notice the difference between an
expression
and the
use
of that expression.
To see why this difference matters, consider the sentence “The Terminator cannot be bargained with.” Kyle says this to Sarah in
The Terminator
, and, let’s suppose, Sarah says it to John in
Terminator 2: Judgment Day
. Both Kyle and Sarah use the very same sentence, but they make very different
uses
of this sentence. In the first movie Kyle uses it to refer to the T-101, whereas in the second movie Sarah would be referring to the T-1000 (let’s say). It is true on
both
these occasions, since it is said in the movie (if I said it in real life, the sentence would be false, of course). Strawson concludes that the
sentence type
(the words that Sarah, Kyle, and I all use) is neither
true
nor
false
. It becomes true or false only when someone uses it in a specific situation to refer to something. As Strawson says, “Referring is not something an expression does; it is something that someone can use an expression to do.”
4
What this really means is that for Strawson, the meaning of any expression is the set of general directions for using that expression. In the case of “the,” the directions command us to use this word to refer to a familiar object. So, according to Strawson, we cannot decide the truth or falsity of the sentence
type
at all. All we have are instructions for the use of the expression. Nor can we say who the sentence type is about. It can be used to refer to different people (or robots) on different occasions and so can be about many people (or robots).
The Terminator
, and, let’s suppose, Sarah says it to John in
Terminator 2: Judgment Day
. Both Kyle and Sarah use the very same sentence, but they make very different
uses
of this sentence. In the first movie Kyle uses it to refer to the T-101, whereas in the second movie Sarah would be referring to the T-1000 (let’s say). It is true on
both
these occasions, since it is said in the movie (if I said it in real life, the sentence would be false, of course). Strawson concludes that the
sentence type
(the words that Sarah, Kyle, and I all use) is neither
true
nor
false
. It becomes true or false only when someone uses it in a specific situation to refer to something. As Strawson says, “Referring is not something an expression does; it is something that someone can use an expression to do.”
4
What this really means is that for Strawson, the meaning of any expression is the set of general directions for using that expression. In the case of “the,” the directions command us to use this word to refer to a familiar object. So, according to Strawson, we cannot decide the truth or falsity of the sentence
type
at all. All we have are instructions for the use of the expression. Nor can we say who the sentence type is about. It can be used to refer to different people (or robots) on different occasions and so can be about many people (or robots).
In addition to this problem, Strawson points out another flaw in Russell’s approach. The phrase “the Terminator,” according to Russell, tells us that there is a unique object that fits the description, but this just isn’t the case. The T-101 that Arnold Schwarzenegger plays is just one of many, many T-101s. So when Kyle says, “The Terminator can’t be bargained with,” he is literally saying something false because there are many T-101s. But this seems like a counterintuitive conclusion, because Kyle seems to be saying something that is straightforwardly true.
I can hear it now. He’s going to be called the goddamned phone book killer.
-Lieutenant Traxler
Keith Donnellan (1931- ) entered into this discussion about the role of “the” by publishing a paper called “Reference and Definite Descriptions,” in which he pointed out that in a sense, both Strawson and Russell were right.
5
He argued that any given definite description can be used to refer, but it can also be used in what he called an “attributive sense.”
5
He argued that any given definite description can be used to refer, but it can also be used in what he called an “attributive sense.”
So consider Lieutenant Traxler’s statement above. He makes the statement when he finds out that someone is going around and killing all of the Sarah Connors in the phone book, but he has no idea who this person is. Suppose that Lieutenant Traxler says, “The phone book killer has no pity.” This is an attributive use of the description. It is true of whoever is correctly described as “the phone book killer.” But now suppose that this description caught on in the press (it doesn’t) and that Sarah, after she learns about the Terminator, says the same thing as Traxler: now she is arguably
referring
to the Terminator. In the one kind of use, we’re merely trying to tag a property (lack of pity) to some object or other. In the other kind of use, we’re trying to refer to some object or person that we have in mind. The difference between these two kinds of uses turns on what makes them true. In Traxler’s attributive case the truth depends only on whether the description fits some individual, whereas in Sarah’s referential case, the truth of the sentence depends on the person being referred to, whether or not the description is true of them.
referring
to the Terminator. In the one kind of use, we’re merely trying to tag a property (lack of pity) to some object or other. In the other kind of use, we’re trying to refer to some object or person that we have in mind. The difference between these two kinds of uses turns on what makes them true. In Traxler’s attributive case the truth depends only on whether the description fits some individual, whereas in Sarah’s referential case, the truth of the sentence depends on the person being referred to, whether or not the description is true of them.
So suppose that Lieutenant Traxler (wrongly) thinks that Kyle Reese is the phone book killer. Then if he were to say, “The phone book killer has no pity,” intending to refer to Kyle, the truth of what he says depends on whether Kyle Reese has pity, regardless of the fact that Kyle is
not
the phone book killer. It would then be false, since Kyle does have pity. On the other hand, if he were to use it in the attributive sense, not speaking about Kyle Reese but rather talking about anyone who would kill in the manner that the phone book killer does, then the sentence’s truth will depend on whether the T-101 has any pity. It would then be true, since the Terminator has no pity.
not
the phone book killer. It would then be false, since Kyle does have pity. On the other hand, if he were to use it in the attributive sense, not speaking about Kyle Reese but rather talking about anyone who would kill in the manner that the phone book killer does, then the sentence’s truth will depend on whether the T-101 has any pity. It would then be true, since the Terminator has no pity.
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