Tank Tracks to Rangoon (15 page)

First, they got on with the task that they had originally crossed the Mayu range to perform, the capture of Buthidaung, during which they supported first 7th and later 26th Division in operations which lasted throughout March. The closer the British and Indian troops pressed to the town, the more frenzied the Japanese resistance became. They had been ordered to hold to the last man, and with no thought other than literal obedience, that was exactly what they did; when the infantry overran one position, killing 120 of them, they found that both of their officers had committed
hara kiri
rather than see the shame of their failure.

During these operations, the tanks constantly employed the bunker-busting technique that had been perfected in the Admin Box, which not only saved the infantry heavy casualties, but also saw them onto their objectives whilst the enemy still had their heads below ground.

At the end of this period, Colonel Frink left the regiment to command a brigade in the Middle East, and was replaced by Lt-Colonel R. Hearder, RTR. The regiment crossed the Kalapanzin River, and was engaged almost continuously in prising the Japanese from their remaining positions around Kyaukyit. Here were encountered bunkers that were not only well concealed, but which also had no less than six feet of earth for head-cover; these were proof against anything less than medium artillery and the direct fire of the tanks, although in one instance it took ten minutes of close concentrated pounding from eight Lees before the bunker succumbed. In addition, Japanese held villages were set on fire, and the tanks brought up ammunition and water for the infantry, and engaged enemy sampan traffic on the river. On one occasion, a tank commander, ordered to deal with a sniper, found that his guns would not bear, so he dismounted and stalked his opponent, killing him with his tommy gun.

The Japanese were now desperately rushing reinforcements
into the area. Their Arakan strategy had backfired so badly that General Christison was able to release 5th and 7th Indian Divisions, for use on the Central Front, whilst they, on the other hand, were having to commit reserves which might have had a critical effect on the success of their main offensive. The arrival of the enemy’s reinforcements was made clear by the replacement of the ragged scarecrows 15 Corps had been fighting with fit men ‘wearing good new clothes who had large packs and a lot of rice’.

Early in May the newly arrived Japanese went over to the offensive, attacking with great vigour and recovering ground. In one action A Squadron was in action for nine hours covering the withdrawal of the infantry into their boxes and bringing off their wounded. However, the enemy had left his counter attacks too late, for the monsoon was beginning to break, and of course in the Arakan this was particularly severe.

Gradually fighting in the area spluttered to a halt as movement became more and more difficult. Many of the Dragoons’ tanks became bogged down whilst in close and violent contact with the enemy, making recovery a difficult and dangerous task. When the front stabilized to await the arrival of better weather, the regiment was withdrawn from the line, and returned to India.

Only A Squadron was to see action again, during the mopping up operations of May and June 1945. 25th Dragoons were disbanded in 1947, having had an active life of only six years, but they will always be remembered by anyone who fought in the Arakan as having been a major factor in smashing the myth of Japanese invincibility. For the Japanese, pockets stuffed with Indian money for their ‘March on Delhi’, it was the first of many painful and humiliating lessons they would learn from British and Indian armoured regiments. From now on, the contest would be influenced by 14th Army’s highly professional use of its armour, and by the almost total failure of the Japanese to grasp its potential.

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The History of the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment.

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‘In the Autumn of 1943, my brother, who was commanding 4 Corps at Imphal, arranged for me to visit him. He asked me to recce his two main axes, the road to Tamu and the Tiddim road. I later told him that I was quite sure that tanks could operate on both axes, though on strictly limited frontages. He said he would ask for my Brigade to be sent up to Imphal. I returned to my Brigade in India, to be met by my second-in-command, Claud Pert, who said that in my absence the DMT from GHQ had visited the Brigade, and told the officers that if they wished to see anything of the war, they should take steps to transfer to the infantry, as tanks would never be used in Burma. Assuming that my job as a Brigade Commander was about to end, and that I had nothing to lose, I took the next aeroplane to Delhi. Here I had interviews with the Auk and Alan Hartley, the Deputy Commander, and with the DMO and DMT, whose names I cannot remember. I pointed out as strongly as I could that the tanks
could
be used in Burma, and would eventually have to be used, and that GHQ would be caught short. The DMT asked me how long I had been in India, and I told him six months. He replied, “We have been here many years and we know India,” to which I replied, “Well at least I have walked the course on my own feet, which I suspect is more than anyone in this HQ has done!” After which I swept out.

‘The unfortunate action at Donbaik had grave repercussions, as it resulted in few infantry battalions of brigades ever being trained with tanks or knowing their capabilities, all of which had then to be learned on the battlefield. The net result was that we commenced operations in 1944 with only one brigade of tanks employed. This allowed no reserve and with the constant demand for tank support, meant that both tanks and crews were pretty heavily flogged’.—Extract from letter written by Major-General Sir Reginald Scoones to the author.

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This was not Messervy’s first experience of narrow escapes. At the start of the Gazala battle in North Africa his HQ had been overrun and he had been captured, although he had escaped shortly afterwards. When taunted with German superiority and skill at arms, he is said to have tartly suggested to the officer concerned that if he would care to examine himself carefully before turning in for the night, he would be surprised to discover that he was made just like anyone else.

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No study of the use of armour during the campaign in Burma would be complete without due tribute being paid to this outstanding Regiment, who referred to another Grenadier regiment whose headquarters is in Birdcage Walk as ‘our London branch’.

When tanks are operating in close country where the enemy has every opportunity of lurking amongst the dense foliage, they must have the immediate protection of infantry; the need for this had been appreciated very early by 7th Armoured Brigade. However, it is better if the infantry are specialists, and the Bombay Grenadier battalions had been chosen to train for this very exacting and dangerous work. One has only to read the words of the historian of 150 Regiment RAC, which have been echoed, and in some cases quoted, by every armoured regiment which had the good fortune to work with the Grenadiers, to see how well they performed their role.

‘They relieved (the Regiment) of all its worries as to the safety of its tanks, acted as its eyes in spotting targets, came with it where other infantry hesitated to follow, and accepted casualties in safeguarding their charges which perhaps a less loyal and literal interpretation of their duties might have avoided.

‘Despite the almost complete inability of the men of 150th Regiment and these brave Jats to understand a word of each other’s language, they established between them that odd lingo by means of which British and Indian troops have conversed for so long. With this lingo was also created an unbreakable confidence in each other’s abilities and friendship which eased the hardest tasks.’

At the personal level, Colonel Critchley of 19th Lancers, who exercised command from well forward, has told the author that on numerous occasions he owed his life to a Grenadier whose presence he did not even suspect.

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Indian soldiers fighting for the Japanese.

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The feeling is faithfully mirrored in 14th Army’s newspaper,
SEAC.
Reporting on the fighting at Kohima, it printed several paragraphs describing how a Japanese soldier had had his eyes gouged out in hand to hand fighting with a British infantryman. The general opinion was that this was a good thing, and so it must have seemed at the time.

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Ball of Fire.

Note

The recapture of the Tunnels Road was completed by the Major-General Francis Festing’s 36th Division, supported by the Shermans of C Squadron 149 Regiment RAC. One tunnel was used by the Japanese as an ammunition dump; on 27 March this erupted in a series of thundrous explosions when a Sherman fired a round into the tunnel mouth, enabling the attacking infantry to take possession.

The best way for the British to reconquer Burma would have been by means of an amphibious operation which secured Rangoon, followed by an advance northwards. The Japanese armies, deprived of their major source of supply, would wither on the vine and die for want of succour.

However, in 1944 landing craft of all descriptions were at a premium, being required for the landings in Normandy and the south of France and for countless operations against enemy held islands in the Pacific. Therefore, Burma would have to be conquered from the north by conventional means.

Since the end of the 1942 fighting, the Central Front had rested on the Une of the Chindwin, whilst in the north Stilwell and his Chinese divisions occupied the upper reaches of the Hukawng Valley. In his original plan, General Slim envisaged Stilwell advancing down the Hukawng to effect the capture of Myitkina and Mogaung, aided by Wingate’s Chindits who would be landed right on top of the Japanese line of communication, whilst the British 4 Corps, commanded by Lt-General G. A. P. Scoones, advanced to the Chindwin and effected a crossing.

However, Slim’s opponent, General Kawabe, the commander of the Burma Area Army, was already mounting an offensive of his own. He had been told that as the war was not going well elsewhere, the last thing the people of Japan wanted to hear was bad news from Burma.

Kawabe’s problem was simple. He was confident that he could contain Stilwell’s Chinese without difficulty, but he felt that the long line of the Chindwin was too vulnerable to be guarded adequately, and that he must therefore find an alternative line which would be impregnable. Such a line existed along the crest of the Naga Hills, beyond the Chindwin and across the Imphal Plain, and he felt that once he had secured that objective the
British would never be able to break out of India proper to resume operations in Burma, since routes through the towering hills were few and could be easily guarded. Kawabe called his offensive
U-Go
, although the advance publicity to the troops referred to it grandiloquently as the March on Delhi.

Strategically, therefore, Kawabe was in pursuit of a defensive objective. For his purposes he had available the 15th Army, commanded by Lt-General Renya Mutaguchi, an unlovable table-thumping officer possessed of a foul temper, a burning ambition and the build of a Sumo wrestler, who had earned himself numerous laurels in Malaya. 15th Army consisted of three good divisions: 31st, under the able Major-General Sato, which had been briefed to isolate the British 4 Corps on the Imphal plain by cutting the road behind it at Kohima; Major-General Yamauchi’s 15th Division, which would attack from the north and east, pressing the defenders against the veteran 33rd Division under Major-General Yanagida, who would be closing in from the south and west, with a column detached to support 15th Division. Mutaguchi would have all the support Burma Area Army could give him, as much air cover as possible, and tanks. Once the original food and medical supplies ran out, they could be replaced from captured British stocks, as they always had been in the past.

When word of Kawabe’s preparations reached Slim, he decided to modify his own plans. Stilwell’s advance and the Chindit air-landing operation would proceed, but 4 Corps would concentrate its divisions on the Imphal Plain, where they would be supplied by air. Here the Japanese 15th Army would be allowed to batter itself to pieces against the defensive boxes, and here the British tanks could be used to the best effect. When the Japanese had exhausted themselves, 4 Corps would go over to the offensive.

At this stage 4 Corps consisted of Major-General Cowan’s 17th Indian Division, now a fully trained and formidable fighting formation, operating well to the south in the Tiddim area; 23rd Indian Division, under Major-General Roberts, concentrated at Imphal, with its brigades ready to move to any threatened point; and 20th Indian Division, under Major-General Gracey, in the Kabaw valley, to the east.

Also at Imphal were HQ and two regiments of 254 Indian Tank Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Reginald Scoones, the brother of the Corps Commander. Immediately available to him
were 3rd Carabiniers with their Lees under Lt-Colonel Ralph Younger, and 7th Light Cavalry, equipped with Stuarts, the first Indian cavalry regiment to take the field in armour.

During the days of doubt after the failure of the first Arakan offensive, both Brigadier Scoones, an RTR officer, and Colonel Younger, who had been 7th Hussars’ second-in-command during the retreat, had argued forcibly that there
was
a vital role for tanks to play in Burma, and had demonstrated their ideas at numerous training exercises. Now these ideas were put to a most exacting test.

By the beginning of March, it became evident that the Japanese were on the move. They marched in small company columns along parallel routes, unencumbered by transport save for their mules and guns, and they travelled quickly. In the Kabaw valley, 20th Division reported tie presence of several light tanks, so A Squadron 3rd Carabiniers, under Major Pettit, was sent down to them, arriving on 1st March.

Although the Lees patrolled the valley continuously, they saw no sign of the enemy until the 14th, when one of their wounded was found. The same day, Pettit’s despatch rider disappeared, and it was thought he had been ambushed.