Stalin's General (24 page)

Interestingly, Rokossovsky compared the tempestuousness of his relations with Zhukov to the support and encouragement he received from Stalin. Expecting an abusive telephone call from Zhukov, Rokossovsky
picked up the phone and was pleasantly surprised to hear Stalin's “calm, even voice” and appreciative of the “concern displayed by the Supreme Commander.… The kind, fatherly intonations were encouraging and raised one's self-confidence.”
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Much like Zhukov, Rokossovsky saw in Stalin a mirror image of himself and his own command style.

While Zhukov fought the defensive battle of Moscow, Stavka was planning and preparing for a counteroffensive. As early as October 5 Stalin had decided to establish a strategic reserve of ten armies. Some of these were thrown into the battle to halt the German advance on Moscow but the bulk of them were reserved for the counteroffensive. According to Vasilevsky, at that time deputy chief of the General Staff, planning for the counteroffensive began in early November but was disrupted by renewed German attacks and did not resume until the end of the month.
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Zhukov's claim to have played a central role in the preparation of the counteroffensive plan
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seems exaggerated, given his responsibilities as Front commander. During the battle of Moscow Zhukov met Stalin in his Kremlin office only once (on November 8).
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On November 30 Zhukov submitted his Front's plan for a counterattack to Stavka. This called for an attack north of Moscow by Zhukov's right flank in the direction of Klin, Solnechnogorsk, and Istra, and by his left flank south of Tula in the direction of Uzlovaya and Boroditsk. To stop the Germans switching their forces Zhukov also proposed to launch a strong attack directly in front of Moscow. On Zhukov's proposal Stalin simply wrote: “Agreed. J. Stalin.”
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The aim of Zhukov's counteroffensive was to destroy the German forces attempting to envelop Moscow from the north and south. In the center the ambition was limited to pinning down German troops. At the same time, the possibility of a more substantial advance in the center was not ruled out if the situation developed favorably, including the prospect of a drive so deep that it would split German Army Group Center and open the road to Smolensk on the Mozhaisk–Viazma axis.

The Moscow counteroffensive was launched by Konev's Kalinin Front on December 5, followed by Zhukov's attack the next day, and
then an advance by Timoshenko's Southwestern Front. The Red Army's effective combat strength was 388,000 troops supported by 5,600 guns and mortars and 550 tanks. Opposing it were the 240,000 troops, 5,350 artillery pieces, and 600 tanks of Army Group Center.
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Progress was slow at first, and on December 9 Zhukov issued a directive to his army commanders. The aim, he reminded them, was “to defeat as rapidly as possible the flanking groups of the enemy, and finally, driving swiftly forward … destroy all the armies which are in front of our Western Front.” Zhukov complained, however, that some units were launching attacks on the German rearguard rather than carrying out swift encirclements, methods that played into the hands of the enemy and gave them the chance to withdraw to “new positions, to regroup, and to organize a new resistance to our forces.” The proper technique, instructed Zhukov, was to pin down the rearguard and outflank it, not to make head-on attacks on fortified positions.
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On December 12 Zhukov reported to Stalin that the Western Front had inflicted 30,000 fatalities on the Germans and liberated 400 towns and villages.
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Among the liberated areas was Zhukov's home village of Strelkovka, though the Germans had burned the village, including his mother's house. But she and Zhukov's sister's family had already been evacuated. Zhukov's mother did not survive the war, however, dying of natural causes in 1944.

On December 13 the Soviet press carried the news of Zhukov's stunning success in turning the tide at Moscow, including a large photograph of him. Zhukov also featured centrally in Soviet newsreels of the battle. The western media began to take notice of Zhukov, too. In January 1942 his picture appeared on the front page of the
London Illustrated News
with the caption: “Russia's Brilliant Commander-in-Chief Central Front: General Gregory [sic!] Zhukov.” In June 1942 Alexander Werth,
Sunday Times
correspondent in Moscow, wrote in his diary: “The name mentioned most frequently, next to those of Stalin and Molotov, is Zhukov's. Zhukov played a leading part in organising not only the Russian counter-offensive in Moscow, but it was largely he, and perhaps entirely he, who saved Leningrad in the nick of time. Somebody today remarked that when the well-informed German military attaché was asked, shortly before the war, who was the
greatest Russian general, he replied without a moment's hesitation: ‘Zhukov.' ”
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By the end of December the Red Army had advanced 100–150 miles along a broad front. (See
Map 12
: Zhukov's Moscow Counteroffensive, December 1941
.)

Zhukov's handling of the battle of Moscow was the beginning of the wartime Zhukov myth. From now on it began to be said that with Zhukov in charge success was assured. This was not true and Zhukov was to suffer many setbacks on the road to Berlin. But belief in the myth inspired confidence in him at every level of the Red Army, not least among the lower ranks to whom he became a legendary figure, a giant of Russian military history, the contemporary counterpart of Suvorov and Kutuzov, who had saved the motherland from Napoleon. Most Red Army soldiers were peasants or had a peasant heritage and Zhukov was one of their own. While he had a reputation for cruelty and crudeness he was also seen as the man who would get the job done and lead the troops to victory.

The success of the December counteroffensive opened up the possibility of a more ambitious offensive to encircle and destroy a significant part of Army Group Center and Stavka began to formulate such a plan from mid-December onward. Broadly, the goal was to advance to Rzhev and Viazma and to destroy all the German forces east of the line between the two cities. The mission was entrusted to Zhukov's Western Front with the support of the Kalinin Front commanded by Konev. Initially, the hope was that the Moscow counteroffensive could be expanded to encompass this second goal but it proved impossible when the Germans—on instructions from Hitler not to retreat—dug in for defense and held the line. In response, Stavka regrouped and launched what became known as the first Rzhev-Viazma operation.

The goal of the Rzhev-Viazma operation, set out in Stavka's directive to the Kalinin and Western Fronts on January 7, 1942, was the encirclement of Army Group Center in the Yukhnov-Viazma-Gzhatsk-Rzhev area. Some fifty divisions from Stavka's reserves were allocated
to the operation. Between them the Western and Kalinin Fronts had fourteen armies, three Cavalry Corps, and substantial air support—a total of 688,000 troops, 10,900 guns and mortars, and 474 tanks, as against the Wehrmacht's 625,000 troops, 11,000 artillery pieces, and 354 tanks. The operation began on January 8 with an offensive by the Kalinin Front in the direction of Rzhev. Two days later the Western Front joined in the attack, driving toward Yukhnov and Viazma, while Zhukov's 1st, 16th, and 20th Armies continued their attack in the direction of Gzhatsk. At the end of January Stavka established a Western Direction (the original one having been abolished in 1941) to coordinate the Western and Kalinin Fronts. Zhukov was appointed commander of the Direction with overall responsibility for the Rzhev-Viazma operation.

Although the Rzhev-Viazma operation made little headway, it persisted for more than three months. Stalin was convinced the Wehrmacht's failure to take Moscow meant that Operation Barbarossa could be rapidly reversed and the Germans driven out of Russia. On January 10, 1942, Stalin issued the following general directive to his commanders:

In line with this view of events, the Red Army launched attacks all along the Soviet-German front, but with little or no success. By the time the Rzhev-Viazma operation was called off on April 20 the Kalinin and Western Fronts had suffered in excess of 750,000 casualties. Nor was that the end of the matter. At the end of July the two fronts launched a second offensive in the Rzhev-Viazma area that continued until the end of September, again without success, and costing nearly 200,000 more casualties. In November–December the Soviets tried once more to break through with an operation code-named Mars. While Mars's goal was limited to the destruction of the German 9th Army in the Rzhev-Sychevka area, Stavka also had in mind a much
bigger encirclement of Army Group Center. Operation Mars failed, however, at the cost of 350,000 casualties including 100,000 dead.
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(See
Map 13
: Operation Mars—the Third Rzhev-Viazma Operation, November–December 1942
.)

During the first Rzhev-Viazma operation the 33rd Army, led by General M. G. Efremov, was given the job of capturing Viazma. In support were General P. A. Belov's 1st Cavalry Corps and the 11th Cavalry Corps from the Kalinin Front. Unfortunately, the attempt to take Viazma failed and Efremov's formation found itself surrounded by the Germans. Belov's cavalry and some other units managed to escape but the bulk of Efremov's forces, including Efremov himself, were destroyed. Zhukov devoted quite a lot of space in his memoirs to this episode. His treatment included some criticism of Efremov but his overall conclusion was more self-critical: “Viewing the events of 1942 critically I can say now that we misjudged the situation in the Viazma area. We had overrated the potential of our troops and underrated the enemy. He proved to be a harder nut to crack than we believed.”
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The loss of the 33rd Army has been a source of considerable controversy in Russia, with some historians arguing that Zhukov tried to take Viazma too quickly and then did not sufficiently support Efremov when the operation failed. Reading the contemporary documentation, however, it is clear that Zhukov did what he could to make the operation succeed and to save the 33rd Army. He failed for the reason stated in his memoirs: his forces were not strong enough to overcome the Germans in the given circumstances.
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Interestingly, during the second Rzhev-Viazma operation Zhukov received a rebuke from Stalin (and Vasilevsky) criticizing the Western Front's failure to aid three of its divisions encircled by the Germans. Dated August 17, 1942, the note pointed out that when German divisions were encircled the Wehrmacht did all it could to help them. “Stavka considers it a matter of honour that the Western Front command save the encircled divisions.”
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Stavka's persistence in the Rzhev-Viazma area reflected the High Command's belief that the decisive theater of the Soviet-German war was the Moscow-Smolensk-Warsaw-Berlin axis and that the key to a Soviet victory was the destruction of Army Group Center. The problem was that the Red Army proved incapable of delivering this objective
until 1944. One reason for failure was the limited forces available to the Red Army in the context of the demands of many other fronts; another reason was that the Soviets faced a tenacious and increasingly well dug-in enemy in heavily forested regions that lent themselves to defense.