Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (52 page)

Duggan's "new position" (head of the State Department's Division of
the American Republics) also led the KGB to assign a more senior officer to work with him. Akhmerov, Bazarov's chief aide in the illegal station,
replaced Borodin. Akhmerov informed Moscow that he had held his first
meeting with Duggan in August 1937:

"From the very first meeting we were able to establish a candid and sincere
rapport. He is a straightforward and sincere person. Meeting and working with
him is a pleasure compared to what it was like with "lo" [Ludwig Lore] or
James [Thomas Schwartz]. At the same time, working with "1g" [Duggan] invests me with a great deal of responsibility in terms of my ideological influence
over him. His ideological closeness to us is the foundation of our work. In
terms of ideology he is not yet firmly formed as our man. He lives and moves
in a circle of Surrogate [State Department] bureaucrats who form a rather
privileged and conservative caste in Washington. The newspapers, which he
reads every day, are primarily of an anti-Soviet character. Because he is exceptionally busy, he is unable to read Marxist literature or our fraternal newspapers. Without a doubt, these factors play a significant part in his hesitations.
These hesitations have yet to disappear. At the very first meeting he made
somewhat venomous remarks about the ongoing arrests in Hammer [USSR]."

Despite Duggan's continued "hesitations," Akhmerov added:

"One week after my first meeting, i.e., on August 30, he gave me Surrogate
[State Department] telegrams, numbering roughly 6o pages, for one hour.
These documents were photographed and are included in this mailing. At the
third meeting on September 13, he gave me a second batch of documents totaling about loo pages-also for an hour. Managing to switch taxis and take photographs in under an hour requires exceptional speed. At present, I meet with
him to receive documents approximately once every two weeks. I spoke with 1g
[Duggan] about making these receiving meetings weekly. He has not given a
firm promise yet, but I hope to achieve this in the future. I photographed the
materials in Julia's [unidentified] apartment. Granite [Borodin] accompanies
me to Washington. He waits for me in the apartment with a camera ready and
goes home with the materials once they have been photographed."

(In particular, the materials Naval Communications for the State Department, which were sent to the State Dept. for information by the Naval Dept.,
have been received.) "It is difficult to meet with him more frequently to receive materials because he has a very heavy workload and cannot leave the
Surrogate very often without being noticed. These materials are in his hands
only during the workday. By the time office hours are over, they are sent back
to the chief of archives' office. He is sent for quite often by the Secretary of State or his assistant, and his workday schedule is also known to the secretary
in ig's division.-s5

In October Moscow Center warned Akhmerov to be on the alert for
signs that Duggan and Noel Field had been in communications: "`Ernst's
[Field's] influence on 19 [Duggan] is still a pressing matter. The connection with Ernst has been disrupted again, and it is possible that one of the
traitors will try to influence him. For this reason, take special care to learn
about the correspondence between 19 and Ernst and about the attitudes
both of the latter and of 19 himself."' Moscow's comment that the "connection with Ernst [Field] has been disrupted again" was a circumspect
allusion to another defection. Walter Krivitsky had been the KGB's chief
liaison with Noel Field. He had also been Poretsky's friend. In the aftermath of his friend's murder, Krivitsky decided he was also a marked man,
and when he was recalled to Moscow in early October, he defected.66

Anxious to create a channel that would enable Duggan to transmit
urgent material between his regularly scheduled meetings, Akhmerov
suggested using Kansas-born Helen Lowry, Earl Browder's niece, as a
courier. (Lowry had earlier worked with Vasily Zarubin.) He described
her as "very serious, quiet and thoughtful ... devoted to us with all her
heart." Akhmerov planned to relocate her from New York to Washington
and enroll her in a secretarial school. Whenever Duggan had the time, he
could stop at her apartment and "dictate important, urgent reports to
her." This plan was never put into effect, but Akhmerov and Lowry fell
in love and married; she later accompanied him back to the Soviet
Union.67

The excitement generated by Duggan's burst of productivity for the
KGB quickly subsided. After returning from vacation in December 1937,
he asked not to meet more than once every two weeks. A month later,
early in January 1938, he told Akhmerov that he wanted to sever his ties
because of a new round of Soviet purges. Akhmerov reported: "`He says
that he just can't wrap his mind around the events in the Soviet Union;
he believes that something is fundamentally wrong and that there can't
be so many oppositionists on the right and left who have become traitors."' Akhmerov further told Moscow that Duggan was also worried that
the Soviet state really was honeycombed with traitors: -19 is very attached to his family-his wife and child, and he values his career. He has
repeatedly asked me if there are any traitors in our department and if it
weren't possible that he will be exposed."'"s

Given his confusion and fear about what was happening in the Soviet Union, it is not surprising that Duggan was in a near panic when he met
with Akhmerov on 3 March 1938. He explained that at the end of February he had been summoned to a meeting with one of Secretary of State
Hull's assistants and warned about his ideological views, radical connections, and Marxist books in his home. He was convinced he was under investigation and that his house had been searched. Akhmerov also suspected that Duggan "`has been very frightened by the recent arrests of
German spies in NY and fears that such traitors, like Yagoda and others,
could expose his collaboration with us."' (Yagoda was accused of cooperating with German intelligence.) Akhmerov had no choice but to accept
what he said but also told Moscow that Duggan was so nervous about his
safety that he might have made up the story in order to justify interrupting contact.69

Duggan was out of contact for three months, but in June he met with
Akhmerov, who observed that he was "nervous and frightened" and reported:

"Our fairly agonizing conversation lasted more than three hours. At the beginning of the conversation, having expressed to him my happiness that our
friendly connection had once more been restored, I explained to him how fascism was mobilizing reactionary forces against progressive humanity, how fascism and fascist imperialism [spills] the blood of hundreds of thousands of
workers in Spain and China, and how fascism is brewing a world war. I explained to him the exceptional significance of his help precisely at this time
and explained again how by helping Hammer [USSR], he was simultaneously
helping the worldwide working class and progressive humanity in general. I
explained the significance of Hammer as a historically important factor in the
fight against fascist imperialism and the fascist reaction. On the basis of all this
I asked him to renew our collaboration and to do everything in our power to
benefit our mutual cause."

Akhmerov was convincing enough that Duggan continued meeting on an
irregular basis and for the next year occasionally turned over State Department reports and summaries or copies of diplomatic telegrams, gave
accounts of inside gossip about policy matters, and provided an assessment of Laurence Steinhardt, appointed ambassador to the USSR in
1939.'0

But when Akhmerov met with Duggan on z October 1939, an anguished Duggan reported that he, as he had long feared, had been compromised by a "`traitor."' Duggan's distress had been precipitated by the
meeting a month earlier between Whittaker Chambers and Assistant Sec retary of State Berle, at which Chambers had identified several dozen
government officials as hidden Communists and hinted of their involvement in espionage. Seven of them were State Department employees,
and Laurence Duggan was one of them. In his diary two days later Berle
recorded the incident and wrote that it involved "Russian espionage" and
that "it becomes necessary to take a few simple measures."'r

Nothing in the records of the State Department indicates that Berle
informed State's own personnel security office of the Chambers interview. He did not turn his notes of the meeting over to the FBI until 1943,
after it contacted him, having heard of the meeting from Chambers. And
until now it has never been clear what Berle actually did. But Berle did
act, after a fashion, and that was why at the October 1939 meeting
Akhmerov reported that Duggan was "sullen and broken-hearted."
Akhmerov told Moscow Center:

"A week ago, mechanic's assistant [Berle], who had been very friendly with
Nineteenth [Duggan] in the past, called him into his office and told him that
the Surrogate [State Department] is in possession of intelligence confirming
that he had collaborated with Hammer [USSR] and provided the latter with
secret material and information. The assistant then said that it would be in his
best interest to find another job. The assistant also said that his case would ultimately be decided upon the return of Mechanic's deputy [Welles], who is
currently presiding over a conference in the South. Nineteenth's division is
under the deputy's jurisdiction. Moreover, the deputy had previously taken
Nineteenth under his wing and thought of him as his man. Nineteenth said
that he is completely isolated in the Surrogate and subjected to intolerable
conditions. He says he is already looking for another job. He said that this was
a huge blow for him, that he has suffered terribly this whole time, and that all
this puts him in a very difficult position.

I expressed deep sympathy and cheered him up with examples from the
experience of the struggles of revolutionaries, who had sacrificed their lives for
the victory of our ideas.... I explained to him that there was absolutely no evidence of any kind attesting to his collaboration with us. He says that apparently someone in your chain turned out to be a traitor, and this traitor informed on him. I told him that nothing of the sort had happened and that he
was known to a very limited and loyal inner circle made up of two or three
workers, that his name had never been used for anything.... He repeatedly
and earnestly asked to sever all ties with me. I tried my best to convince him
to meet with me, if only z or 3 months from now, in order to find out how this
matter had ended and, if necessary, to give him our advice. He practically
begged me not to do this, telling me not to put him in the unpleasant position of forcing him to say that he can no longer meet with us.... I expressed to
him our deep gratitude for all his services rendered to us.

He said that in time he would return to the fraternal movement [Communist Party], that he is not leaving the movement forever, and that ideologically,
he stands on the fraternal side. He said that international events had not had a
negative effect on his views. We parted ways like close friends. He spoke very
convincingly and sincerely about everything mentioned above. I don't think he
made the whole thing up. Of course, it's possible that he became very frightened as a result of the sensationalistic hunt for our kind of people and for the
officials connected to the fraternal movement and chose to make up the entire
aforementioned story as a valid reason for severing ties with us. If he remains
at his current job, then this explanation will be closer to the truth."

Moscow Center recalled Akhmerov in November 1939, and the depleted
KGB New York station had no one available to meet with Duggan. It
briefly considered having Hede Massing renew ties to Duggan, but nothing appears to have come of that notion.72

Moscow inquired whether Duggan was still at the State Department
in April 1940, pointing out: "`If he is still working there, then we must assume that he has not been completely exposed; otherwise, he would long
since have been fired."' It also reminded New York that Akhmerov had
earlier given Duggan passwords and conditions for renewed contact. In
December 1938 Akhmerov had reported to Moscow Center:

"Our worker should tell 1g [Duggan] over the phone that Hansen is speaking
and that he would be very happy to have lunch with him. 1g will set the date
without indicating the time. At 1:30 P.M. on the agreed-upon date, our worker
will be waiting for 1g at Scholls Cafe, 1032 Connecticut Av., Wash-n D.C.
There should be a book with a red binding on the table where our worker
will be sitting. Our worker should sit at a table near the entrance. 1g will
approach our worker and ask him whether he is Mr. Hansen. At this, our
worker, having greeted him, hands him the enclosed envelope containing a
green receipt, telling 1g that it is from Alexander. After opening the envelope,
1g will ask how his son is doing. 1g knows me under the name Alexander
Hansen."73

Duggan was still at the State Department, but it wasn't until the fall
of 1940 that the under-strength New York station could reach him.
"elan," a KGB New York officer, called Duggan on the phone on 21 October and identified himself as "Hansen." "elan" reported that initially
Duggan did not recognize the name; once he realized who was calling, he
tried to put him off, claimed he was busy, and asked him to call back in a week. "Glan" did so, but a woman who answered the phone said Duggan
wasn't home and was very busy. Meanwhile, Moscow Center spotted a
story in the New York Times that caused it to make Duggan a high priority. An excited Moscow Center report read: "According to the `NYT' from
3.11.40, our source in Circus [State Department], "19" [Duggan], has
been appointed personal adviser to Hull. In this connection, he has access to absolutely all of the SD's [State Department's] information.... 1.
Activate 19 immediately. z. Send a special agent to Washington ... for
contact with 19." The report also noted that the need to use the KGB
New York station was due to the fact that "there hasn't been an operative
at the embassy in Washington since May 1940."74