Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (18 page)

In November 1943 Moscow Center notified Vasily Zarubin, New York
KGB station chief: "It is proposed to have agents on `Enormous' handed
over from the neighbors [GRU] to us." Anticipating this, Moscow pointed
out: "Charon [Kheifets] has a possible means of approach to Oppenheimer" and noted also that a West Coast KGB source, "Erie," knew Oppenheimer. "Erie" was Paul Nahin, a chemist working for the Union Oil
Company in California."

In February 1944 Moscow Center prepared a report summarizing
where "Enormous" stood. Somewhat more positive than in the prior year,
it noted that at long last the KGB had added some sources in America's
Manhattan atomic project to those it had in Britain's "Tube Alloys" project. But Robert Oppenheimer was not among the new sources, only on
a wish list of prospects:

"Of the leads we have, we should consider it essential to cultivate the following
people: `Chester'-Robert Oppenheimer, b. 1906, an Amer. Jew, secret member of the fellowcountryman org. [CPUSA], a professor at the U. of California,
works on `En-s' ["Enormous"] in the field of rapid neutrons; he oversees the
construction of the Califor. cyclotron. In view of the special significance and
importance of the work he does, he is supposedly kept under special security,
and as a result the fellowcountryman organization received orders from its
center to break off relations with `Ch.' to avoid his exposure. `Ch.' is of great
interest to us. The fact that he is a fellowcountryman, as well as his friendly attitude toward our country, gives us reason to expect that his cultivation will
yield positive results."

Not only was the KGB not in contact with Oppenheimer in February
1944, but it also didn't have anyone close enough to him to provide ac curate information about his work. He was a theoretical physicist, and it
was his colleague, Ernest Lawrence, who presided over the cyclotron.
Nor was there any indication that the KGB understood that Oppenheimer was by that time the director of the Los Alamos facility. It also
had his birthdate wrong (1904, not 1906). Nor was the KGB even certain as to whether GRU had succeeded in contacting him and had received no background briefing on what GRU had learned about him:
"`According to our information, the neighbors [GRU] have been cultivating `Ch.' ["Chester"/Oppenheimer] since June 1942. If `Ch.' has been
recruited by them, it is essential to make his transfer over to us official.
If he has not been recruited, obtain all available materials on `Ch.' from
the neighbors and begin actively cultivating him through the means of
approach available to us."' The report also suggested approaching Oppenheimer through Louise Bransten and Alfred Marshak, the same people who had been cited in 1943 and who had, for whatever reason, not
gotten the job done. It did suggest a third possible contact, Olga Neyman. Neyman was the Russian-born wife of a leading theoretical statistician and professor of mathematics at the University of California,
Berkeley. The KGB had recruited her in London in 1935. This report
also suggested that the KGB's American officers "`begin cultivating
`Ch.'s' brother-`Beam' [Frank Oppenheimer], also a professor at the
U. of California and a member of the fellowcountiyman organization,
though politically he is closer to us than `Ch."" Essentially, however, this
February 1944 report indicated that the KGB was no closer to contacting Oppenheimer than it had been earlier. 23

Moscow Center had been unhappy with Kheifets's performance as
San Francisco station chief for some time. In 1944 it recalled him to face
scathing assessments of his work: "`The facts indicate that for almost a
year `Charon' [Kheifets] has done nothing concrete."' He was accused of
failing to make progress on scientific/technical intelligence and specifically faulted for not actively cultivating Marshak and Frank Oppenheimer. A memo prepared in March 1944 for the new San Francisco station chief, Grigory Kasparov, tasked him to "undertake active cultivation
of individuals working on `Enormous"' and listed several prominent
Berkeley scientists as possible targets, among them Robert and Frank
Oppenheimer. Again, Oppenheimer remained simply on the KGB's wish
list with no evidence of contact. Nor had that changed by June 1944,
when Moscow Center sent another harshly worded complaint about the
limited success of the effort to obtain atomic intelligence. Moscow told
the new KGB New York station chief, Stepan Apresyan: "`In the entire time that we have worked on "E" ["Enormous"], in spite of our constant
reminders to implement various measures and a number of absolutely
concrete suggestions-where to work, what to work on-we have nothing besides "Fogel" [McNutt]. "Rest" [Fuchs] does not count, b/c he was
sent to you fully formed. We cannot consent to such a situation in the future."' Again, there was no indication of any progress in approaching
Robert Oppenheimer. 24

In July 1944 Pavel Fitin sent a review of "Enormous" to KGB chief
Merkulov that reported that Kheifets had "cultivated" Frank Oppenheimer. "Cultivation" in KGB tradecraft vocabulary was a term encompassing gathering background material and "feeling out" an individual either indirectly through intermediaries or directly. Often KGB officers used
contacts in the CPUSA for indirect cultivation, and Fitin had noted that the
lead to Frank Oppenheimer had been provided by Isaac Folkoff, the veteran California Communist leader. KGB officers under diplomatic cover,
such as Kheifets, vice-consul at the Soviet consulate in San Francisco, directly cultivated individuals that they met in the course of diplomatic activities and at social events. Cultivation might result in a judgment that the
target would be hostile or was otherwise inappropriate for recruitment as
a source. If, however, the judgment was that he was likely to respond positively, then a direct recruitment contact would follow. Fitin's report had no
details on the extent of contacts with Frank Oppenheimer, saying only "the
cultivation was conducted by `Charon' [Kheifets]." Aside from the cultivation of his younger brother, however, Fitin reported no progress on contacting Robert Oppenheimer: ""Chester" [Oppenheimer] was cultivated
by the neighbors [GRU], and as a result the issue of recruiting him for us
became moot, which we reported to "Charon" [Kheifets] on 15.01.43.
Since Enormous has been turned over to us, he must now be actively cultivated." This was Fitin's mid-1944 view of what should be done and reflected the reality that up to that point KGB officers in America, particularly Kheifets, had failed to achieve contact with Oppenheimer.25

Oppenheimer remained an elusive target. A plan of action on "Enormous" approved by Fitin on 5 November 1944 excoriated the American
station for recruiting only one agent working on the project-Russell McNutt-whose access was limited. (The KGB New York station had lost
touch with Fuchs at this point.) Most of the valuable atomic intelligence,
Fitin noted, was coming from England. Perhaps in part due to Moscow's
frustration with the lack of success in obtaining atomic information, the
KGB reorganized its apparatus in the United States. A Moscow Center
cable on 1o November 1944 appointed senior KGB officer Leonid Kvas nikov to head a semi-independent scientific/technical intelligence sector
with its own budget within the KGB New York station.26

The cable appointing Kvasnikov reminded him of the "importance of
`Enormous,' which interests Cde. Petrov personally." "Petrov" was the
cover name in KGB communication for the much feared Lavrenty Beria,
head of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, who would in
December formally take over supervision of the Soviet atomic bomb
program. Moscow Center suggested: "Renew ties with "Ernst" [Nahin] through "Huron" [Darling], with the aim of using him to cultivate
"Chester." "Chester"-Robert Oppenheimer, an Amer. Jew, a secret
member of the fraternal, works in camp "y" [Los Alamos] on the development of the atomic bomb." The KGB, however, had been unable to
get Darling, who worked in Detroit, to renew ties with Manhattan Project scientists in nearby Chicago, and nothing resulted from this suggestion that Darling go to the West Coast, where Nahin worked.27

In addition, Kvasnikov, despite having been given responsibility for
atomic intelligence, didn't at that time have a clear picture of the leadership of the Manhattan Project. He queried Moscow in mid-December
1944 for additional information on Robert Oppenheimer and George Kis-
tiakowsky because David Greenglass had mentioned them in one of his
reports. (Having lost touch with Fuchs, the KGB's only source at Los
Alamos then was Greenglass.) Moscow responded, "`All we know about
them is that they work at Camp-z [Los Alamos], and that O. [Oppenheimer] is a major authority who oversees the work at Camp-z."' (Kisti-
akowsky, a physical chemist, directed the "implosion department" that
designed the vital implosion trigger for the plutonium bomb.) By March
1945, however, Kvasnikov was able to report substantial progress. The
KGB New York station was by that point running five sources on "Enormous." Three were at Los Alamos-Klaus Fuchs (back in contact),
Theodore Hall (a recent "walk-in"), and David Greenglass-and two at
Oak Ridge-Alfred Slack (just hired) and Russell McNutt. As for Robert
Oppenheimer, there was no progress to report. He wasn't on the list of
sources, he was still on the wish list, and Kvasnikov could only note that
the KGB New York station would "work on the possibility of approaching Oppenheimer."28

Although the KGB New York station had gotten nowhere with approaching Oppenheimer as of March 1945, what of the San Francisco
station? In July 1945 Semen Semenov, back in Moscow after several years
as the senior technical/scientific intelligence officer of the KGB New York
station, prepared a report on Kheifets's leads at the time the latter had de parted from San Francisco in late July 1944. The contents suggest the
report was based on Semenov's review of Kheifets's reports and on
Kheifets's own defense of his tenure at San Francisco. On the Oppenheimer brothers, the report stated:

z. "Chester" is Robert Oppenheimer, a U.S. cit., born 1906, a secret fellowcountryman [Communist], a professor at the Univ. of Calif., works on the
Enormous problem in the field of fast neutrons and is construction chief of
the Calif. cyclotron. The lead for Chester was provided by Jack [Olga Neyman] and Uncle [Folkoff]. Cultivation was done by Charon [Kheifets]
through Uncle and Map [Bransten]. Chester is close friends with "Lion"
[Holland Roberts], who has a strong influence on Chester.

3. "Beam" is Frank Oppenheimer, a U.S. cit., a prof. at the Univ. of Calif., a
radio expert. The lead came from Uncle, the cultivation done by Charon.
Beam is a friend of Lion. Cultivation can be done through Uncle and Lion.
Contact through Uncle.

This report indicated a variety of things. It reflected Kheifets's and Semenov's limited understanding of whom and what they were dealing with.
Frank Oppenheimer was not a "radio expert" but a physicist who dealt with
radiation. And it repeated earlier faulty information that Robert Oppenheimer was "construction chief of the Calif. cyclotron" while not appearing
to know that Oppenheimer was director of the laboratories at Los Alamos
and the single most important scientist in the Manhattan Project.29

As with Fitin's July 1944 report, this July 1945 report noted that
Kheifets had cultivated Frank Oppenheimer. It went on to suggest that
the cultivation be renewed through Folkoff of the CPUSA and Holland
Roberts. Roberts was a professor of education at Stanford University.
Likely neither Kheifets nor Semenov knew that in 1944 Stanford had not
renewed his contract (he was untenured), an action possibly reflecting
disquiet with his radical political activity. He then joined the Communist-aligned California Labor School in San Francisco. In any event, while
the report stated that Roberts had been "prepared for recruitment as a
talent-spotter, background-checker, and recruiter," the recruitment had
not taken place before Kheifets departed, so nothing further had been
done to use Roberts to approach Frank Oppenheimer. This July 1945 report stated that Robert Oppenheimer had been recommended to
Kheifets by Folkoff and Olga Neyman and cultivated indirectly by Folkoff
and Louise Bransten up to the time of Kheifets's departure (July 1944).
Semenov recommended attempting to renew the cultivation through
Isaac Folkoff.

The most striking part of Semenov's report, however, was his declaration: "Since Charon [Kheifets] left, no work on XY has been done in
the Western U.S." Semenov's report, consequently, was not only a summary of how KGB scientific/technical intelligence (the "XY" line in KGB
terminology) stood on the West Coast in July 1944 but also where it stood
in July 1945. And with reference to Robert Oppenheimer, this indicated
only preliminary indirect cultivation through old Communist Party colleagues with not only no recruitment, but also no direct contact with the
KGB.30

The dearth of technical intelligence work from the KGB San Francisco station can be explained by poor leadership and the press of other
business. Kheifets hadn't been very effective at it; his replacement, Grigory Kasparov, had been transferred to Mexico City less than six months
after taking over; and Kasparov's replacement, Stepan Apresyan, was a
junior officer who had become acting New York station chief in 1944.
Apresyan had had a difficult time in New York, and at his new post he
concentrated on political intelligence and was consumed with preparations, both diplomatic and espionage-related, for the founding conference of the United Nations, held in San Francisco from April through
June 1945. In these circumstances, the small San Francisco station
pushed technical/scientific intelligence to the side. In his July 1945 report, Semenov urged establishing a dedicated XY section as part of the
KGB San Francisco station and possibly one in the KGB's even smaller
substation in Los Angeles as well.31

In the latter half of 1945 Robert Oppenheimer continued to be on
the KGB's wish list, not its agent list. Fitin again reviewed the KGB's work
on "Enormous" for Merkulov in August 1945, crediting his agency with
some success: "`Active agent cultivation of the problem of E. ["Enormous"] in the USA was begun in 1942. Since then, a network of agents,
with very interesting and important opportunities through their official
jobs, has been created within the NY station's organization. Distributed
among the most important centers of work on `En-s,' these agents give extremely valuable information, both on the substance of the scientific research and on the progress of research."' Fitin's memo named the KGB's
principal sources, and Oppenheimer was not among them. In September
Leonid Kvasnikov and Andrey Shevchenko, leading XY line officers at
the KGB New York station, sent a review of New York station activities
on "Enormous" operations to Merkulov. They reported that they had sent
Byron Darling to meet with Joseph Weinberg, the Berkeley physicist and
one-time Oppenheimer protege in hopes of using him as a link to Op penheimer. Darling met with Weinberg in New York in early October
1945, and Weinberg told him that "`he does not see `Yew' [Oppenheimer]
at all these days"' and, moreover, Oppenheimer "`had changed and was
losing his left convictions.' "32