Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (103 page)

"Myrna" stated that our refusal to finance the "Complex" `compels' her
not only to break off relations with us but also spurs her and "Scott" [John
Reynolds, official owner of USSSC] to resort to assistance from government
agencies. "Myrna" showed a story in a newspaper she had with her about the
latest summons of Communist Party leaders-Browder and the brother of
Cde. Molotov's wife-to appear for questioning before the Un-American Activities Committee. "Myrna" declared threateningly that her and "Scott's" testimony would be very interesting for the committee and American newspapers.
When I commented that "Scott's" threats don't scare us, "Myrna" corrected
herself, saying that she completely supported him, because he was not only
her business partner (I took that to mean that "M." was sleeping with "Scott"),
and went on to say: "`So." ["Sound"/Golos] and I created the "Complex" and
used it for 1o years for you and against you. Now you're not going to get rid of
this business so easily. We have no choice but to liquidate the "Complex," but
neither "Scott" nor I will ever again have any dealings with any Russians, because they are all gangsters and care only about Russia.' When I tried to clarify
what she meant, M. couldn't say anything that made sense, she just assured me in a drunken monotone that she has hated us for 1o years, but at the same
time she `hasn't sold out and won't sell out' our people, mainly because they
are `Americans.' .. .

Then M. said that a while ago Heller had made her an indirect offer to become an FBI agent for the investigation of the "Complex." Supposedly she rejected the offer. "M." stated that the fact that for 1o years So. had repeatedly
told her it was impossible to work honestly with the Russians was not the only
thing she had concealed from us. "M." declined to clarify what she meant.
During the discussion "M." attempted several times to get into obviously slanderous comments about the Amer. Com. Party ('a band of foreigners'), about
"Sound" ('only death prevented him from making an extremely important decision that the whole country would have found out about,' or otherwise `only
death prevented us from moving to South America, where you would have
never found us'), about "X" [Katz] ('as soon as I see him, I'll kill him'), about
"Albert" [Akhmerov] (`he tried to rape me'), but she said all this in a disjointed
and confused manner.

So as not to aggravate relations with M., I turned the conversation to neutral topics, and after a while concluded it altogether. I scheduled the next
meeting for the beginning of November; she quietly agreed to this. Our conclusions from the foregoing discussion with "M.":

i. M.'s shenanigans are not accidental, and they attest to the fact that, although she has worked with us for a long time, she is a person who is alien
and hostile to us.

z. Judging by her behavior, she hasn't betrayed us yet, but we cannot rely on
her. Unfortunately, she knows a great deal about us.

3. The latest `eruption' occurred as a result of our firm position with regard to
the C-plex-the refusal to finance, the `insulting' (in her words) contract
sent by Intourist, the failure to mention in the contract that the C-plex has
the exclusive right to send parcels to the Sov. Union and so forth. "M." is
dragging in all these extraneous `arguments' in order to break off with us.

4. Considering that M. won't go anywhere voluntarily, and could cause serious
harm to us here, there is only one way left, the most radical one, to get rid
of her."'52

While the KGB's foreign intelligence arm had occasionally assassinated or kidnapped its enemies, such extraordinary measures were rare.
KGB head Vsevolod Merkulov replied personally to Gorsky and urged a
renewed effort to placate Bentley. Thinking that she might be angling for
a better deal for USSSC, he urged another meeting at which Gorsky
should calmly reassure her of the KGB's good wishes: "`Point out to her
that her many years of productive work with us, which have been appro priately honored with a government award, obligates us to provide her
with not only moral but also material support. Tell her that we are prepared to provide necessary financial assistance to her personally (up to
3,000 dollars [$35,000 in 20o8 dollars])."' She also should be informed
that "`in appreciation of M's [Myrna/Bentley's] personal work for us, we
are prepared, for her personally, to exert possible influence on Intourist
in a favorable direction"' for settling a contract with USSSC. If she continued to make threats, "`deflect them firmly and confidently and say that
we don't advise her to employ means of that kind, first because the Americans among whom she enjoys such great trust will never forgive her for
this, to put it mildly, disloyal act and will stigmatize her for the rest of her
life, and second because it's not only not beneficial to her, it's dangerous.
Suggest to her at this point that in the current political situation the
American government agencies are unlikely to take the step of using M.'s
`exposes' against us. Therefore the consequences of M.'s impetuous act
will fall personally on her and the Americans."' He also instructed Gorsky
"`under no circumstances is she to be released from our influence or let
out of our field of vision.' '153

Gorsky met with Bentley again in late October. This time she was
sober and apologized for her prior behavior, although she claimed not to
remember anything she had said. She put forward a number of demands
on behalf of USSSC. Nevertheless, the conversation was cordial, Bentley
accepted $2,000, and they discussed what she would do if the FBI questioned her in the aftermath of Louis Budenz's defection since he might
know something about her and Golos's activities.54

The KGB had known for several years that the Golos-Bentley networks
had been a disaster waiting to happen but had little choice in order to
avail itself of the rich intelligence resources they provided. It had tried to
minimize the risk by introducing professional officers into their operations, isolating Bentley, and enforcing more stringent security procedures.
But it could not change the fact that dozens of its government sources
were veterans of the Washington Communist underground, had worked
and socialized together, and knew about each other's activities. If the FBI
ever looked closely, most or all would be exposed. And the one person
who knew everything about these networks was an embittered, lonely,
promiscuous alcoholic. Every effort to neutralize her had backfired badly.

Gorsky went to New York on 21 November 1945 to meet again with Bentley. She was calm and sober, and they had another discussion about
the complex relationship of USSSC with its hidden financier, the CPUSA,
and about the possible risks posed by Budenz and her former lover, Peter
Heller. Gorsky might have thought the meeting a sign that things had stabilized except that he spotted a car tailing him after he left Bentley. He
ducked into the subway, lost it, and returned to Washington. He was sure
he had come to the meeting "clean" and that it had been Bentley who had
been followed to the rendezvous. It was worse than that. The next day he
got a cable from Moscow that Bentley had gone over to the FBI. She had
set him up. The KGB had reaped a rich harvest of intelligence from the
Golos-Bentley networks. Now it was time to pay the piper. 55

The KGB's London station had cabled Moscow on zo November, relaying information from Harold "Kim" Philby, senior officer at the British
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) and a KGB spy; he had heard that
"`the Americans are currently investigating another Soviet intel. organization in the U.S."' Philby reported that J. Edgar Hoover had told William
Stephenson, chief of British Security Coordination (an SIS office operating
in America in liaison with the U.S. government) that Bentley had come to
the FBI in early November with the story that World Tourists and USSSC
had been covers for Soviet intelligence. The FBI had succeeded in identifying some thirty Soviet agents but thus far had given the British only the
names of Peter Rhodes and Cedric Belfrage (see chapter 3). And the news
only got worse. Bentley completed and signed on 3o November a io8-page
typed comprehensive deposition summarizing her career in Soviet espionage and identifying scores of sources that she and Golos had turned over
to the KGB. Hoover quickly gave a copy to Stephenson, who dutifully forwarded it to London, where Philby picked it up, and the KGB London station forwarded a summary to Moscow Center on 4 December that listed
forty-one Soviet sources Bentley had given to the FBI.56

Bentley's defection was by any measure a catastrophe, dismantling in
one moment much of what the KGB had constructed from 1942 to 1945.
That the KGB got her FBI deposition only five days after she signed it
was a partial silver lining that allowed it to contain the damage better
than it might have expected. After Philby's warning, Moscow Center ordered Gorsky on 23 November to break off contact with a host of sources,
warn them to deny any covert ties to Bentley, destroy compromising documents, arrange passwords for future contacts, issue advance payments
to compensated agents, and otherwise prepare to hunker down. Assuming that the FBI had observed and photographed his meeting with Bentley, it ordered Gorsky to settle his affairs and return to Moscow. Having been clearly identified by the FBI as an intelligence officer, his usefulness
in America was at an end. It also recalled Akhmerov, chief of the illegal
station, and Vladimir Pravdin, chief of the New York station, back to
Moscow, and as the extent of Bentley's acquaintance with other officers
(or of Golos's acquaintance that might have been conveyed to Bentley)
became clear, additional withdrawal orders followed.57

Philby's warning allowed the KGB to shut down dangerous or risky
operations, alert vulnerable agents, and prepare them for the storm that
was about to come. By the time the FBI began to watch them or came to
interrogate them, Bentley's American agents had their excuses and cover
stories thought out and their cries about political persecution of progressives well rehearsed. With the exception of Louis Budenz, who had
already been talking to the FBI, none of the people Bentley named would
ever speak honestly about their work for Soviet intelligence or even admit
to passing along confidential information to the CPUSA.

Before he left the country, Gorsky raised again the notion of Bentley's
"physical liquidation." One option was to use a slow-acting poison: "soak
a pillow or handkerchief or food that would be delivered to M's ["Myra's"/
Bentley's] room and left there." But Gorsky didn't have such a poison on
hand and had no way to obtain it. He did possess three guns, but they
"would be too noisy," and "a car accident or pushing her under a train
would be unreliable." He thought that Bentley would be willing to meet
with Joseph Katz, who could drop poison in her wine or on her makeup.
Alternatively, Katz could use his locksmith skills to break into her room
and use: "a cold steel weapon or stage a suicide. That's unreliable, since
M. is a very strong, tall and healthy woman and X. [Katz] lately has not
felt well." Merkulov put an end to these revenge scenarios, writing that
Beria had agreed that assassination was not advisable.58

While rapid damage control prevented the FBI from getting sufficient corroboration to bring criminal charges, Bentley's information, reinforced by the Venona decryptions (available in significant quantities
starting in 1946), as well as information flowing from other defectors (Budenz, Whittaker Chambers, and Hede Massing), allowed the FBI to neutralize the bulk of the KGB's American sources. Combined with the recall of most of the KGB's experienced officers from America, the lack of
active sources crippled the KGB's activities in the United States during
the first years of the Cold War. Nor did the damage stop there. Bentley
and Chambers testified publicly in 1948, and a series of congressional investigations exposed the CPUSAs assistance to Soviet espionage and irreparably tainted the American Communist movement with treason. Given the richness of the intelligence the Soviet Union had gained from
its use of CPUSA-based networks in World War II, perhaps the trade-off
was worth it, but the ultimate price was high.

Station chiefs Gorsky, Akhmerov, and Pravdin all departed in 1946, along
with Leonid Kvasnikov, Anatoly Yatskov, Alexander Feklisov, and other officers with extensive American experience. Their replacements faced
daunting problems. Grigoiy Dolbin, who succeeded Gorsky as the Washington station chief, had a particularly rocky tenure. Gorsky's departure
was sudden and unplanned, and Moscow Center had no ready replacement. Dolbin had been preparing for assignment to Japan and was a lastminute choice to head the American station. He complained to Moscow
Center:

"Two days before my departure to Japan, to a job for which I had been trained,
I unexpectedly received instructions to go to Carthage [Washington]. A country and city which, as I have already said, I did not know. The only training I
had received in Center with regard to this country were two brief conversations with Cde. Vetrov [Graur] and Cde. Gennady [Ovakimyan]. These conversations touched on descriptions of the overall situation in the country, and I received virtually no practical advice. I couldn't speak English. Now, one year
later, I feel that my grasp of the language has increased significantly. I read
English-language newspapers practically without the aid of a dictionary I
translate serious articles from English to Russian, and I can talk to an American about any topic. However, I believe this is not enough, especially when it
comes to speaking fluently on everyday topics."

Moscow Center was unsympathetic and responded with a withering,
"`Your work abounds in grammatical mistakes and inaccurate wording,
as a consequence of insufficient familiarity with facts and a flawed understanding of current events."' Nor did it respond to his complaints that
the officers withdrawn in 1946 had not been replaced and the Washington station had few staff. Moscow Center recalled Dolbin in 1948 after
he showed signs of a mental breakdown.59