Spies and Commissars: The Bolshevik Revolution and the West (20 page)

The People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs lost much of its earlier influence. It was obvious that Chicherin would never dominate policy. Lenin and Trotsky wanted him to operate as an expert executant of their wishes, and generally he was willing to comply. Chicherin in any case had his hands full coping with ‘subordinates’ who showed him no deference. The People’s Commissariat seethed with its own disputes. Radek was an unrepentant advocate of ‘revolutionary war’ whereas Karakhan favoured compromise with the Allies. Radek put it about that Karakhan – ‘a donkey of classical beauty’ – was not up to the job. Karakhan thought Radek a hothead who was too sharp-tongued by half. The rivalry suited Lenin, who
could play them off against each other – or at least this was how Lockhart assessed the situation.
¹⁴

Trotsky at any rate was again seeing eye to eye with Lenin; and when the new People’s Commissar for Military Affairs finally left for Moscow on 16 March, he took Lockhart on the same train.
¹⁵
Sadoul dismissed the Scot as ‘un bon bourgeois’ and regretted that the Allies had sent out no genuine socialist among their diplomats.
¹⁶
But Lockhart at least counted for more with the Bolsheviks than Robins did. Trotsky disliked Robins for his lack of enthusiasm for the October Revolution and his past association with ‘imperialists’ like President Theodore Roosevelt.
¹⁷
Lenin felt the same, and when Albert Rhys Williams put in a good word for Robins, Lenin exclaimed: ‘Yes, but Robins represents the liberal bourgeoisie of America. They do not decide the policy of America. Finance-capital does. And finance-capital wants control of America. And it will send American soldiers.’
¹⁸

Lenin and Trotsky were also sceptical about Lockhart but thought he might come in useful while the Bolsheviks were looking for chances to play off the Allies and Germany against each other. Trotsky was hoping to get assistance as he built up the Red Army. Lockhart was a willing helpmate, assuring London that the Bolsheviks had been ‘wonderfully patient’.
¹⁹
The Allies could perhaps be persuaded to lend a hand if they judged that the Russians might one day soon break with the Germans. But his words increasingly fell on deaf ears. Foreign Secretary Balfour, while encouraging him to be frank in his reports, complained that he had supplied no evidence of genuine anti-German purposes among the Bolshevik leaders.
²⁰
General Alfred Knox, the British military liaison officer in Siberia, was blunt about those Allied representatives who continued to press the case for accommodation with the Kremlin. In a report to London he wrote that Lockhart’s bland commentaries on Soviet politics were ‘criminally misleading’.
²¹

Anti-Bolshevik Russians were angry about liaison between the Allies and the Reds. E. D. Trubetskoi and fellow monarchists warned the French consul-general Fernand Grenard in Moscow that Allied policy was wrong in every way. They stressed that Lenin had not the slightest intention of fighting Germany. If France and Britain continued to indulge Sovnarkom, the result might be to push Russian patriots into seeking help from the Germans. Trubetskoi’s words were
ignored and the Allies went on probing the possibilities of cooperation with the Soviet leadership.
²²

Lenin’s manoeuvres annoyed the German high command. Rudolf Bauer, head of Germany’s military intelligence in Russia, threatened a German occupation of Petrograd unless Sovnarkom showed full compliance.
²³
But generally there was satisfaction in Germany at the closure of the eastern front. On 7 March the Germans signed a treaty with the White Finnish government and helped General Mannerheim to crush the remnants of the Finnish Reds and eliminate the prospect of socialist revolution in Helsinki. In April they tore up their treaty with the Central Rada in Kiev and installed Pavlo Skoropadskyi as a client ruler. Ukraine became a colony in all but name. The German military campaign stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea and was accomplished with ease, enabling the high command to divert men and equipment to the western front. Not only the Allies but also the Bolsheviks hoped that Germany’s onslaught in northern France would prove ineffective. The fate of the October Revolution rested on the resilience of the French and British armies in their cold, wet trenches. If the Germans overwhelmed the Allies, they would rip up the Brest-Litovsk treaty and turn their power against Sovnarkom.

The Western Allies were exasperated by a treaty that allowed the Germans to concentrate their forces against them in northern France. But Soviet leaders were pleased at least that London, Paris and Washington left their diplomats in Russia. President Wilson declined to do anything further to assist Sovnarkom. He replied politely but blandly to overtures from Lenin and Trotsky.
²⁴
He was simply being diplomatic. Things did not need to be made worse by an offensive telegram from the White House. Wilson disliked the British and French proposal for the Japanese to intervene in Russia from Siberia. He refused to contemplate a similar expedition by the Americans – and he insisted that in any case the outcome of the Great War was about to be decided on the western front.
²⁵

The staff of the European embassies returned from Finland to Russia and joined the Americans and Japanese in Vologda. They all absolutely refused to transfer to Moscow even though they maintained consuls or other representatives there. Bruce Lockhart watched all this from afar: ‘It was as if three foreign Ambassadors were trying to advise their governments on an English cabinet crisis from a village in the Hebrides.’
²⁶
He thought no Allied ambassador was up to the task. Francis in his eyes was ‘a charming old gentleman of nearly
eighty’ and he recorded that Trotsky dubbed Noulens ‘the Hermit of Vologda’. Noulens supposedly shaped his attitude according to ‘the prevailing policy of his own party in the French Chamber’, whereas Della Torretta spoke Russian but allowed himself to be bullied by Noulens. Rumours proliferated in Vologda’s fetid diplomatic atmosphere; and Lockhart had to chuckle when Noulens, who had heard that the Germans had installed one of Nicholas II’s ministers in power in Petrograd, nervously asked whether the story was true.
²⁷
Moves were afoot behind the scenes to send expeditionary forces to protect Allied interests. The British were gathering troops for a landing in the Russian north at Murmansk and the Japanese were planning the same for eastern Siberia. Sovnarkom would receive no prior notice. The idea was to do the deed before anyone noticed, but the Bolsheviks got wind of Japan’s intentions and sought to pre-empt them by making pleas to the other Allies.

In April, the United Kingdom landed a force of 2,500 men in Murmansk, mainly British but also including some French and Serbs.
²⁸
Their stated purpose was to protect Allied military supplies from falling into German hands. Trotsky retorted: ‘This is what the wolf said to the hare whose leg it had just snapped.’
²⁹
But there was nothing he could do to get rid of the British, and anyway he wanted their help in enhancing Soviet security. The operation in northern Russia had been kept strictly secret out of concern for British popular opinion and also in order to avoid letting Berlin know what was afoot. The troops led by Brigadier General Finlayson had been trained in seclusion in the Tower of London. The force was kept in the dark about its destination when it boarded the train at King’s Cross Station in London; and the officers were informed only when their ship,
City of Marseilles
, was already at sea. Things went awry early on when Spanish influenza afflicted the crew and the troops. Indian Muslim stokers succumbed first. As it was the month of Ramadan, they had had to fast daily until dusk. Soldiers and then even officers had to shovel coal before the ship docked in Murmansk.
³⁰

Lenin and Trotsky were shocked by the British action, but they soon surmounted this. Increasingly the Allied landings appeared a helpful counterweight to Germany’s rapacity. The Bolsheviks had assumed that they would keep control of Crimea; but this did not stop the Germans from invading and imposing their control over the northern coast of the Black Sea. Rostov-on-Don, Yekaterinodar, Voronezh and Kursk too fell under German occupation.
³¹
The treaty
in March had drawn a line from the Baltic Sea only as far south as Brest-Litovsk. Trotsky, while concentrating on his ploy of ‘neither war nor peace’, had overlooked the need for agreement on Russia’s new frontiers. This was an elementary blunder, and the Russian and Ukrainian governments were still negotiating over the line to be drawn between Russia and Ukraine until well into the autumn.
³²
No one in the Central Committee, least of all Lenin, had foreseen the consequences as Russian-inhabited cities continued to fall to the Germans. Nevertheless even the German high command held back from a total invasion. It assisted the Cossack leader General Krasnov in building up an army that one day might be deployable against the Reds. Yet already on 2 April 1918 Stalin was questioning the point of the treaty and mooted the idea of forming an anti-German military coalition with the Ukrainian Central Rada when the Germans seized Kharkov.
³³
Stalin’s change of stance was a sign of the panic in Sovnarkom. Rather than a breathing space, Brest-Litovsk appeared to have produced an opportunity for suffocation.

The Central Committee met in emergency session on 10 May. Six members were in Moscow and available, and it was the most tumultuous gathering since the discussions of January and February. Sokolnikov, the very man whose hand had signed the treaty, argued that Germany’s recent military actions had breached the terms of the Soviet–German agreements. What lay behind this, according to Sokolnikov, was a confluence of interests between the Russian bourgeoisie and German imperialism. He urged the pursuit of ‘a military agreement with the Anglo-French coalition with the objective of military co-operation on certain conditions’.
³⁴
Lenin rebutted this proposal and persuaded the Central Committee to stick by its peace policy. Sokolnikov did not give up. On 24 May he wrote in
Pravda
: ‘Should Germany break the Brest peace treaty, the Soviet government will have to ask itself whether it should not try and obtain military help from one imperialist power against another. The communists are in no way opposed to such methods as would cause the imperialists to break each other’s heads.’
³⁵
This was no more than Trotsky had been thinking since November 1917; it had also been in Lenin’s mind at the time when the treaty was signed. But no one had previously made such a suggestion on the pages of the central party newspaper.

Trotsky appealed for five hundred French officers to assist with the Red Army.
³⁶
France’s diplomats and military attachés, with the exception of Sadoul, were sceptical. Georges Petit said: ‘All this sterile
and hypocritical blustering ought not to be taken seriously.’ Henri-Albert Niessel of the French military mission went further. After hearing Trotsky blame the Allies for the Brest-Litovsk treaty, Niessel lost his temper and addressed him ‘in a way that no general would dare to speak to a subordinate officer’.
³⁷
Niessel’s comrade Jean Lavergne sent officers into Ukraine to cause trouble for the ‘Austro-Germans’. Despite telling Lenin he would assist in training the Red Army, Lavergne doubted that Sovnarkom would meet the French condition that the Reds should demonstrably prepare to fight Germany.
³⁸
Trotsky had greater success with the United Kingdom. For advice on a Soviet air force he enlisted the British intelligence officer George Hill and appointed him inspector of aviation, and two or three times a week he laid aside half an hour for Hill to instruct him in aeronautics. Hill relished the queerness of being asked to teach the arts of war to a man who was famous for having opposed militarism throughout Europe. His task was to enable the communists to build up an air force that could take on Germany’s fighter and reconnaissance planes in the event of war.
³⁹
Ambassador Francis tried to appear helpful, cabling Robins on 3 May 1918: ‘You are aware of my action in bringing about the aid of the military missions towards organizing an army.’
⁴⁰

This support pleased Trotsky, who asked Lockhart on 5 May to request the help of the British government in building the Red Army and for the dispatch of the Royal Navy to ‘save the Black Sea fleet’. In exchange he promised to allow the large contingent of Czech ex-POWs to proceed to Murmansk and Archangel for shipment across the North Sea to the western front against the Central Powers.
⁴¹
Serb volunteers had already done this with Soviet consent. Negotiations about the Czechs, based mainly in Penza, had gone on since shortly after the Brest-Litovsk treaty. The Bolsheviks sniffed the danger that the British in the north might treacherously deploy them against the Red Army; they also worried about how the Germans might react to such a deployment of the Czechs.
⁴²
Trotsky therefore tried to persuade Czech units to join the Red forces. But the Western Allies had to be appeased if he wanted anything from them, so he sanctioned an arrangement for the Czechs to make their way out of Russia via Vladivostok for onward transportation to Europe.
⁴³
Trotsky ignored the taboo against assisting one of the two military coalitions in ‘the imperialist war’. He assured Lockhart that the British force could keep its stores undisturbed in northern Russia.
⁴⁴
The British pushed
for more. Rumours grew that the Germans were about to march on Petrograd and there was a danger that the entire Baltic Sea would fall under their control. The Admiralty in Whitehall instructed Francis Cromie, the naval attaché in Petrograd, to explore ways of scuttling the ships as a precaution. On 11 May Cromie set off for Moscow to see whether Trotsky would make trouble; he also spoke to Lockhart and the Red Army General Staff.
⁴⁵