Seize the Moment (25 page)

To affect the historical evolution of the Muslim world, we should not fashion a grand “Muslimpolitik” that applies one policy to all these countries. Instead, we should identify key pivot points for our presence. We should cultivate partnerships with select modernist countries that share common interests or parallel agendas and that carry real weight in the region. By working with them on political and security issues and by providing advice and assistance to further their economic development, their gradual emergence as success stories within the Muslim world will enhance the prospects for modernist forces throughout the region. Over one or two decades, they could become economic and political magnets, poles of attraction moving the entire region in a positive direction through peaceful change.

Four countries stand out as the most logical partners with which to pursue this approach:

—Turkey—the geographic and cultural bridge connecting
the Muslim and Western worlds—has had a working democratic government for nine years and provides more troops for NATO than any other member of the alliance. We should prod our European allies to admit Turkey into the European Community and the Western European Union. At the same time, we should encourage Turkey to take advantage of its historical and cultural ties to become more involved economically and politically in the Middle East. If the Arab-Israeli peace process moves forward, the issue of regional water supplies will move to the top of the agenda. In cooperation with the United States, Turkey, a water-rich country, could ease the problems of Israel, Syria, and other water-poor countries in the area through new aqueducts.

—Pakistan—the only major U.S. strategic partner situated between Turkey and Japan—has cooperated with the United States in recent decades to support the Afghan resistance, as well as to facilitate the rapprochement with China in 1972. Though Islamabad's policies sometimes clash with ours—especially regarding nuclear proliferation—no other country has shown comparable courage in serving as a frontline state against Soviet aggression. In order to avoid a potential nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India over Kashmir, we should urge New Delhi to end the massive violations of human rights by its security forces in the province and to negotiate an autonomy agreement with Kashmiri leaders. After winning democratic elections in 1990, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif moved Pakistan decisively toward free-market reforms, including lower tax rates, denationalization, and deregulation. As Islamabad implements these reforms, we should encourage U.S. businesses to invest in Pakistan, thereby reinforcing the process of reform.

—Egypt—whose population represents 35 percent of the Arab world—remains the only Arab state to have signed a
peace treaty with Israel. Ten years after the Camp David accords resulted in its expulsion from the Arab League, Cairo has reemerged as its natural leader. In advancing the Arab-Israeli peace process, we should form a united front with the Egyptians, who have earned a great deal of political capital through their actions in the Persian Gulf crisis. Also, as a result of the debt cancellations and aid packages Egypt received during the Gulf War, Cairo has a critical but momentary opportunity to set its economy on a free-market course without the danger of large-scale domestic unrest. We should help the Egyptian leaders adopt the right reforms so that future aid will feed Egypt's people, not its voracious bureaucracy.

—Indonesia—a 2,000-mile-long archipelago with the fifth-largest population in the world—has begun to make important strides economically, though it continues to be ruled by an authoritarian regime. Since President Suharto took power in 1967, Indonesia's per capita income has risen from $50 to $500 today. He adopted successful programs to slow his country's explosive population growth. A pioneer in free-market reforms in the Muslim world, Indonesia has opened its markets, lowered tariffs, and cut bureaucratic red tape. One of the world's largest oil exporters, Indonesia's earnings from nonoil exports exceeded those from oil exports by a two-to-one ratio by 1991. In addition, it has not defaulted on or rescheduled any loans from the United States or international lenders since 1967. This fiscal responsibility and commitment to free-market principles should be rewarded with a close U.S. partnership.

This does not mean that we should place on the back burner our relations with other modernist and pro-Western regimes. King Hassan, one of the Muslim world's most enlightened rulers, has instituted progressive policies in Morocco
and has worked closely with the United States on strategic issues. The Saudi monarchy has also forged important ties with the West, despite its authoritarian domestic system. But neither of these states represent viable pivot points. They lack the political weight to tip the evolution of the Muslim world in one direction or another.

Our policy of selective partnerships will not yield immediate success, but over a generation the United States could have a profound—though unintrusive—effect on the historical evolution of the Muslim world. Some extreme fundamentalist and radical regimes, particularly Iran and Syria, have recently entered severe economic downturns. Though their leaders could hold on to power through repression, they might have to strike a new bargain with their people because they lack the resources to buy social peace. If internal pressures erupt, these countries might look elsewhere for direction. If modernist states have succeeded, other nations will be more likely to see them as models.

At the same time, we must not embrace the modernist states so tightly that our relationship becomes a target for their domestic critics. Because the memories of colonialism in much of the Muslim world make Western influence a sensitive issue, our special relationship must not be patronizing. We should address modernist leaders not as errand boys, but as full and equal partners. The quickest way to nail their coffins shut would be to create the impression that they are merely convenient mouthpieces for the West.

Americans respond with outrage and confusion when a friendly foreign government is forced by domestic politics to oppose our policies. When Mexico votes against us in the United Nations, for example, most Americans decry its actions as irresponsible. But despite these votes—which are typically dictated by domestic opinion—the Mexicans remain
valued and important U.S. partners. Another recurring example can be found in our sometimes difficult relationship with the Philippines. On my visit to the Philippines in 1953, I expressed concerns to my host about reports of a speech by a prominent Filipino senator attacking U.S. foreign policy. My host reassured me that the senator was very pro-American. When I responded that he had a strange way of showing it, my host answered, “You don't understand Filipino politics. The recipe for success in the Philippines is to give the Americans hell and pray that they don't go away.” Regardless of the rhetoric in its domestic debates, the Philippines has been a crucial U.S. friend ever since its independence in 1946.

We must also accept the fact that at times it does not serve our interests for our friends in the Muslim world to support our positions on issues that are highly sensitive politically in their countries. When the United States bombed Libya in April 1986 in retaliation for terrorist attacks against American servicemen, many leaders in the region denounced us in public but cheered us in private. We should learn to look the other way when circumstances force our friends to give lip service to our foes.

The vital importance of developing special relationships in the Muslim world was evident during the Persian Gulf War. Troops from six Muslim nations—including Pakistan, Egypt, Morocco, and even the moderate elements of the Afghan resistance—joined the U.S.-led coalition. Though their contribution may have been minimal militarily, it was critical politically.

•  •  •

The Muslim world poses one of the greatest challenges to U.S. foreign policy in the twenty-first century. As the cold
war has waned, traditional rivalries frozen for forty-five years have begun to thaw. In a region where virtually every neighbor is at best a rival and at worst an enemy, potential instability poses a major threat to our interests. In two key zones of conflict—the Persian Gulf and the Arab-Israeli dispute—the need for U.S. action has become particularly pressing.

The victory in the Persian Gulf War has spawned dozens of easy recipes for enhancing the security of the region. If the United States is to forge an effective policy to strengthen Gulf security, it must recognize that the inherent complexity of the politics of the Muslim world will likely frustrate comprehensive solutions. Our policy must first avoid three fatal illusions:

The illusion of a comprehensive security framework
. Many academics argue that the Middle East needs a security pact. Some want to involve the United Nations, while others want to create an organization patterned on NATO or CSCE. But the deserts of the Middle East are littered with the skeletons of failed regional security arrangements:

—In 1950, Britain, France, and the United States issued the Tripartite Declaration, which provided unilateral guarantees of Middle East borders in return for pledges of nonaggression. The system collapsed when Britain and France used force to seize the Suez Canal in 1956.

—In 1951, Britain and the United States formed the Middle East Command to coordinate the efforts of all powers inside and outside the region who wished to strengthen its defenses. It failed after proving too unwieldy to work.

—In 1951, the West European powers and the United States launched the Middle East Defense Organization to develop defense plans for the region and to enforce limits on outside arms sales. It soon fell into disuse.

—In 1955, Britain, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and later the United States formed the Baghdad Pact to provide regional security. Four years later, all of these nations, with the exception of Iraq, revamped the organization, changing its name to the Central Treaty Organization. Both pacts fell victim to anti-Western coups in some member countries and languished in neglect.

—In 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine announced that the United States would use armed force if necessary to protect the countries of the Persian Gulf from “armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.” Though useful, the doctrine could not cope with the rise of threats of aggression by local powers.

—In 1980, the Carter Doctrine declared the Persian Gulf to be a “vital” U.S. interest and that any attempt by an outside power to seize it would be repelled by any means necessary, including military force. Since the United States lacked the forces required to back up its words, the doctrine represented a hollow warning at the time.

—In 1981, the Reagan administration sought to organize a “strategic consensus” in the Middle East in order to blunt the threat of Soviet expansionism. It failed because countries considered the threat from outside the region insignificant compared to threats from within the region.

The absence of stable regimes in key countries, the dearth of shared values, and the lack of a perceived common threat render the current fascination with comprehensive security systems for the Persian Gulf futile. Any such organization—which would inevitably grant veto authority over collective actions to every member—would short-circuit when local conflicts or even internal threats overloaded its capacity to respond. In the Muslim world, security structures sometimes serve as useful forums for discussion, but the rubber meets
the road only through concrete arrangements made at the bilateral level.

The illusion of regional arms control
. America's obsession with arms control flowered fully in the wake of the Persian Gulf War. Some analysts advocated a moratorium on arms sales to the Middle East. Others promoted the idea of an arms sellers' cartel to manage the flow of weapons into the region. Still others proposed strict restrictions on exports of technology related to chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or to ballistic missiles. A few even wanted to craft arms control treaties that would make the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction.

There are four reasons why conventional arms control proposals are inadvisable and unfeasible. First, a moratorium on arms sales would impede the ability of all states in the region—both friendly and hostile—to equip themselves to meet their legitimate defense requirements. Second, since most Middle East countries face multiple potential threats and varied terrain, no cookbook solution can create the equivalent of the CFE treaty or enable a cartel to determine the appropriate arms levels for each state. Third, the economic incentives for arms exporters—not only the former Soviet Union but also other powers such as China, Brazil, and North Korea—would soon lead to evasions or violations of agreed-upon limits. Fourth, conventional arms control, especially if imposed on the region by outside powers, would likely have the perverse effect of prompting countries to develop weapons of mass destruction as force equalizers.

Instead of comprehensive approaches, the United States should pursue a policy of discriminatory arms control that seeks to restrict arms flows only to states, such as Syria and Iraq, that pose threats to their neighbors. Arms sales to defensive powers, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, enhance
rather than diminish regional security. Top priority should go to restricting the availability of nuclear and ballistic-missile technologies. The Convention for the Limitation of the Spread of Missile Technology represents a good first step. We should not, however, delude ourselves about how much it can achieve. It can slow down but not stop the diffusion of weapons technologies. Maintaining the balance of military power remains the best formula for Middle East security, and selling arms represents an indispensable instrument in preserving that balance.

The illusion of redistributing regional wealth
. As soon as the guns fell silent in the Persian Gulf War, Western policymakers began calling for share-the-wealth schemes that would transfer billions of dollars from the oil-rich Arab states to the poorer Arab countries. The Gulf Cooperation Council quickly fell into line, endorsing a proposed $10-billion regional development fund. Unfortunately, the past history of such efforts provides few reasons for high hopes. Their focus has traditionally been political patronage rather than economic development. Funds, dispersed through government-to-government aid programs, have usually been spent without sound economic rationales, subsidizing staterun enterprises or wasteful infrastructure projects.