Saddam : His Rise and Fall (27 page)

True to character, Saddam resolved that his enemies would be shown no mercy, and the manner in which he set to work purging the party demonstrated not only his mastery of the psychology of terror, but his own formidable organizational skills. His first move, then, was to relieve Mashhadi of his duties as secretary-general of the RCC. The removal of Mashhadi was astute, for he was the only Baathist opposed to Saddam who had the authority to convene the RCC to discuss Bakr's successor. With Mashhadi out of the way, the party's ability to challenge Saddam was severely limited. Mashhadi, furthermore, was subjected to the customary interrogation by torture which, by 1979, had become even more sophisticated. Mashhadi's family was brought into the room where the sedated form of the former RCC secretary-general was sitting. Mashhadi was given two choices: he either cooperated
with Saddam, and provided him with the list of names he required, or his interrogators would rape his wife and daughters in front of him before killing them. Mashhadi himself would be executed as an Israeli spy. Mashhadi went for the former option. Not only was Mashhadi persuaded to confess to any number of plots and conspiracies, he was willing to name his accomplices, who, conveniently for the new president, just happened to be the same people who were opposed to Saddam's accession.
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The stage, then, was set for Saddam to present his master class in state-sponsored persecution. Saddam was clearly delighted with the arrangements he had made for his Great Purge, so much so that he ordered that the entire proceedings be filmed for posterity, both as a warning to future opponents and to demonstrate his complete mastery over the regime's political and security structures. The venue chosen for the most brutal and far-reaching purge of his entire career was the Al-Khuld conference center in Baghdad, which resembled a large movie theater and was located opposite the Presidential Palace. On July 22, five days after his inauguration, Saddam convened an extraordinary conference of senior Baath Party members. Most of the one thousand or so delegates who had traveled from all parts of the country to attend this historic gathering would have been at least vaguely aware that the party's senior hierarchy had been indulging in yet another bout of infighting, but none of them could have guessed at the dramatic events that were about to unfold.

The film of the conference that was made especially for Saddam opens with Saddam nonchalantly sitting in a chair to one side of the platform, the personification of relaxation. As the proceedings get under way, he puffs, almost distractedly, on a large Cuban cigar. The conference opens with an address by Taha Yassin Ramadan, a close associate of Saddam who was the newly appointed vice president and head of the party's militia, the Popular Army. Other key loyalists are also visible on the stage including Izzat al-Douri, Saddam's second-in-command in the Baath and deputy secretary-general of the RCC; Tariq Aziz, the new foreign minister, and General Adnan Khairallah, the chief of staff and the cousin with whom Saddam had been raised by his uncle in Tikrit.

As Saddam looks on, his face almost concealed behind a plume of cigar smoke, Ramadan announces the exposure of “a painful and atrocious plot.” Ramadan speaks in a sad and melancholic voice, trying hard to give the impression that the betrayal of the party by some of its most prominent
members has caused him personal grief. The rapt audience is then moved to genuine astonishment when Ramadan announces that all the plotters are actually present in the conference room, and that they have been invited to the meeting without realizing that they are about to be exposed as traitors. Pausing for dramatic effect, Ramadan then invites Saddam to address the audience. Putting his cigar to one side, Saddam steps up to the podium. Dressed in a smart, tailor-made single-breasted suit with a neatly knotted tie, Saddam stands with his hands held loosely behind his back as he addresses the audience. His voice is measured and his demeanor oozes self-confidence. He speaks slowly, without notes, leaving lengthy pauses between each sentence for added impact. In the past, Saddam begins, he has always been able to rely on his sixth sense to warn him when there is trouble brewing. In this instance, however, although aware that the party was in danger—because of the planned merger with Syria—he has waited for the right moment before moving against his enemies. “We used to be able to sense a conspiracy with our hearts before we even gathered the evidence,” he says. “Nevertheless we were patient and some of our comrades blamed us for knowing this but doing nothing about it.”
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But now he believes he has sufficient evidence to denounce the traitors. At that moment Saddam invites Mashhadi, who has been brought from prison to attend the meeting, onto the platform to narrate the details of the “horrible crime.” Mashhadi, a middle-aged man with graying hair and a neat mustache, is also smartly dressed, and speaks in a measured tone as he explains the details of the plot, occasionally waving his finger in the air for emphasis.

Saddam had, in all probability, promised to spare Mashhadi's life in return for his agreement to address the conference and denounce his former colleagues. Certainly if he had known the true fate that awaited him it is unlikely that he would have been able to put on such a convincing show. As Mashhadi delivers his denunciation, the camera shows Saddam sitting back in his seat, puffing on his cigar and looking rather bored by the proceedings, as though he has heard it all before.

Mashhadi's speech has been well rehearsed. He provides the audience with full details of the conspiracy: dates, places of meetings, and, most shocking of all, the names of the participants. Mashhadi, a Shiite who has been a member of the Baath for twenty years, reveals how he has, since 1975, been part of a Syrian plot to overthrow both Saddam and Bakr in order to pave the way for a Syrian-Iraqi union. When the conspirators had realized that Bakr was about
to step down in favor of his deputy, Mashhadi relates, they tried to persuade the president to change his mind, knowing that if Saddam took over, the prospects of a union with Syria would be dashed. President Asad himself is alleged to have had several meetings with the plotters to advise them how to deal with Saddam.

When Mashhadi has finished his testimony, Saddam returns to the podium. He tells the audience how stunned he has been to discover that he has been betrayed by his closest colleagues. “After the arrest of the criminals,” he says, “I visited them in an attempt to understand the motive for their behaviour. ‘What political differences are there between you and me?' I asked, ‘did you lack any power or money? If you had a different opinion why did you not submit it to the Party since you are its leaders?' They had nothing to say to defend themselves, they just admitted their guilt.” Finally Saddam ends his speech by declaring, “The people whose names I am going to read out should repeat the party slogan and leave the hall.”
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Saddam produces a list, which is read out by one of the security officials. A sense of terror grips the room as the first of the alleged conspirators is led from the room, escorted by specially selected, armed members of the Baath Party's security apparatus. The security operation is overseen by Barzan al-Tikriti, Saddam's half brother, who has worked closely with Saddam in making the arrangements for the purge. One by one the denounced delegates are escorted from the conference hall by Barzan's guards while Saddam watches from his chair at the podium, occasionally puffing on his cigar.

A total of sixty-six people, including some of Saddam's closest Baath Party colleagues, are denounced. Before leaving the conference hall, the condemned men are required to recite the party oath: “One Arab nation with a holy message! Unity, freedom and socialism!” The only time that Saddam takes an interest in the procession is when one of the accused attempts to speak out against the injustice of the event. Without raising his voice, Saddam interrupts him and, referring to Mashhadi's speech, says, “The witness has just given us information about the leaders of the organization. Similar confessions were made by the ring leaders.” Then, with a distinct hint of menace entering his voice, Saddam simply states,
“Itla, itla.”
“Get out, get out!”

As this grotesque ritual proceeds, the surviving members of the audience begin to grasp the significance of what they are witnessing, the brutal exposition of their new leader's unconstrained power. Iraq is inexorably moving from a military dictatorship to a totalitarian regime where the will of the
supreme leader will be paramount. As their denounced Baathist colleagues are forcibly removed from the chamber, the surviving rump rise to their feet to acclaim the country's undisputed leader. “Long live Saddam!” they chant. “God save Saddam from conspirators,” they cry, along with “Let me die! Long live the father of Uday.” Some of the delegates are so overcome with emotion that they start sobbing. Saddam himself also seems moved by these sudden outpourings of loyalty, and can be seen reaching with one hand for a tissue to wipe away a tear while with the other he holds his cigar.

Once the alleged conspirators have been removed from the hall, Saddam invites the audience to discuss the day's events, which is the cue for the more sycophantic members to ingratiate themselves with Saddam. One delegate declares, “Saddam Hussein is too lenient. There has been a problem in the party for a long time…. There is a line between doubt and terror, and unbalanced democracy. The problem of too much leniency needs to be addressed by the party.” At this Saddam allows himself a wry smile. Another of the speakers is one of Saddam's cousins, Ali Hassan al-Majid, who will later earn himself the epithet “Chemical” Ali for deploying chemical weapons against the Kurds in 1988. “Everything that you did in the past was good and everything that you will do in the future is good. I say this from my faith in the party and your leadership.”
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After several more speeches, in which the delegates demand that other “traitors” are exposed, Saddam brings the meeting to a close by declaring, “We don't need Stalinist methods to deal with traitors here. We need Baathist methods.” At that point Saddam, as a gesture of solidarity, comes down off the podium and takes a seat in the main auditorium among the surviving members of the RCC. As a final touch he invites them to help form the firing squads that will carry out the executions of the denounced conspirators.

Among those who were led away on this unforgettable day in the history of modern Iraq were a number of senior Baathists, some of whom were long-standing associates of Saddam's who had actually assisted him in his rise to power. Five of the RCC's twenty-one members, for example, were implicated in the plot, including Mashhadi.
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Murtada al-Hadithi, the former oil minister who had laid the groundwork for the nationalization of the IPC in 1972, was among the victims. The most surprising name on the list was that of Adnan Hussein al-Hamdani, whom Saddam had only five days previously appointed his deputy prime minister and head of the president's office. Hamdani, an industrious and dedicated member of the Baath, owed his rise to the top of the party to Saddam's patronage. After the purge of the Baath
that had taken place in 1973 following the Kazzar affair, Hamdani had taken charge of Saddam's personal office and worked on a range of key issues, including helping to establish Iraq's nonconventional weapons program. According to one of Hamdani's former colleagues, Saddam regarded him as his principal troubleshooter. “Hamdani was Saddam's main fixer. If Saddam needed someone to solve a problem he would turn to Hamdani. He knew more about the running of the country than Saddam himself.”
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Hamdani had been an exemplary servant of Saddam's and was trusted to the extent that he and his wife Sanaa were regular dining companions of Saddam and Sajida.

Like so many capable Baath officials, the more success Hamdani achieved, the more he aroused Saddam's suspicious nature. Various theories have been advanced for the demise of a man who had played such a role in the regime throughout the late 1970s, particularly in drawing up the master plan for Saddam's weapons of mass destruction program. One theory is that Hamdani became too venal in his dealing with numerous shady arms dealers; another is that, as one of the few Shiites in Saddam's inner circle, he was suspected of nurturing secret sympathies with his rebellious coreligionists.
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Why Saddam should have promoted Hamdani just days before denouncing him is yet another mystery concerning this unsavory affair. Saddam's officials claimed that they knew about the so-called Syrian “plot” long before they acted, and so Saddam must have known he was about to destroy Hamdani when he appointed him to his new positions. The most likely explanation is that Saddam did not want to arouse suspicions about the macabre spectacle he was planning to affirm his complete mastery of the Baath. One of Hamdani's former colleagues claimed that two of Saddam's closest relatives were behind Hamdani's downfall. “I believe that the main reason he was purged is that he fell out with Barzan al-Tikriti and Adnan Khairallah”—Saddam's half brother and cousin respectively. “They simply did not like him, and they did not like the power he exercised. And so they had him denounced.”
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Hamdani, who believed he could speak his mind with Saddam, may also have expressed his reservations about Saddam's plan to replace Bakr. Hamdani was in favor of the union with Syria, and feared that Saddam's promotion would ruin the project. Certainly neither Hamdani nor his family had any inkling that he had caused Saddam mortal offense. On the day of Hamdani's execution his wife was on a shopping trip to Paris with Sajida Hussein.

The same day that Saddam exposed the “plot,” a special court, comprising seven of the surviving members of the RCC, was set up under Naim
Haddad, the deputy prime minister. A total of fifty-five Baathists were convicted of involvement in the plot, of whom twenty-two were sentenced to death through “democratic executions.” This form of capital punishment had been devised specially by Saddam, and required loyal Baathists to participate in the dispatch of their treacherous former colleagues. The executions were scheduled for August 8, and regional Baathist associations were each invited to send a delegate to participate in carrying out the death sentences. The executions were held in the courtyard of the same building in which the accused were alleged to have conceived their treachery. All those participating in the executions were personally provided with a handgun by Saddam, who led the way as the orgy of killing commenced.