Riding Rockets (19 page)

Poof.
With Abbey’s words TFNG camaraderie vaporized. I don’t believe there was ever again a social gathering of all TFNGs. As a group wallowing in a common uncertainty and united in a common distrust of our management, it had been easy to share a beer at the Outpost. Now we had been cleaved into haves and have-nots. There was a pecking order; some of us were better than others. I tried my best to be rational—somebody
had
to be first. We couldn’t all be. But I couldn’t accept that rationale and I doubted any of the others could either. We were too competitive. It was
The Right Stuff
syndrome as described by Tom Wolfe. The seven flight-assigned TFNGs had more of that
stuff
than the rest of us. We, the
unassigned,
had been left behind. I would later see first-flight assignments have the same effect on every astronaut class. Their all-for-one and one-for-all camaraderie would end just as abruptly as ours had. The effect could have been somewhat assuaged if Young and Abbey had been open about the flight assignment process, but all Abbey left us with was “Hopefully we’ll get more people assigned soon.” That wasn’t a lot to hang on to. Abbey’s and Young’s silence on the mechanics and calendar of flight assignments was earning them a growing enmity.

With George’s announcement still echoing in my brain, I wished for a hole in the earth to open and swallow me. I wanted to nurse my wounded ego in private, but that wasn’t an option. Like the also-rans at the Academy Awards, I had to don a fake smile and shake the hands of the winners. They were incandescent. You could feel the heat from their faces. Several of the blessed tried to mollify us with comments like, “You’ll be getting a flight soon” and “Your day is coming, too.” I was being pitied. I didn’t think I could feel lower. But I was wrong. I heard Sally comment, “George told us of the assignments a week ago, but he wanted us to keep it quiet until the press release.” I wondered how many times in the past week I had been eating lunch in the cafeteria with Rick Hauck or John Fabian and whining about the delay in flight assignments, and all the while he had been silently celebrating his mission appointment. God, I felt so pathetic.

As I drifted from the room, I heard Fred Gregory’s sotto voce growl, “This is bullshit!” His head and shoulders slumped in depression. Another casualty. Then it dawned on me. He had not just been passed over for an early flight assignment. He was black. He had just been passed over as the first African American in space. Guy Bluford would seize that title on STS-8. I was just a white guy. My name would never be on anybody’s Trivial Pursuit card regardless of when I flew. But Guy Bluford would be history. And Sally Ride, as the first American woman in space, would become an icon. Some had lost more than just a mission assignment with Abbey’s announcement. Some had lost history and the payday that came with celebrity. Sally Ride, in particular, had just been handed a free ticket through life. As the first American woman in space she could look forward to book deals, speech honorariums, corporate board seats, and consulting fees that could earn her millions.

As the seismic wave of Abbey’s announcement was tearing apart the TFNGs, we were blissfully ignorant of another 9.0 wave moving through the system. Five months earlier, one of the eight O-rings on STS-2’s recovered right-side booster had shown heat damage. This discovery had shocked the SRB engineers. Since the boosters were twelve feet in diameter, had a hollow center, and burned from the inside toward the outside, the perimeter-installed O-rings were far from the 5,000-degree gas throughout most of the burn. The unburned propellant served as an insulator. (In the final seconds of the burn, other insulation material at the walls kept the heat from the O-rings.) The O-rings should never show heat damage. And in seven ground tests and one mission (STS-1), involving a total of sixty-four primary and sixty-four backup O-rings, no heat damage had ever been recorded. The fact that an O-ring inside STS-2’s right-side booster had been damaged was an indication that, at some point in flight, it had not held the nearly 1,000-pounds-per-square-inch pressure inside the tube and a finger of fire had worked between the segment facings to touch it. This suggested a serious problem with the joint design. But no consideration was given to stopping shuttle flights and conducting more ground tests. The NASA PR machine had promised Congress and the American public a rapid expansion of the shuttle flight rate with a vehicle turnaround time measured in a few weeks.
Schedule
had become the 800-pound gorilla in shuttle operations. Nobody wanted to wrestle with it. Instead, engineers at Thiokol and NASA searched for a way to continue operations in spite of the STS-2 anomaly. So they intentionally damaged an O-ring to a much greater degree than the damage they had observed on STS-2, put it in a laboratory test article, and pressurized it to three times the pressure developed by a burning SRB. The damaged O-ring held the pressure. Armed with these impressive results the Thiokol engineers endorsed their product as flight worthy. Lost in this process, however, was the fact something never expected and not completely understood had been accepted.

No astronaut was aware of the SRB O-ring problem. In fact, most of us were ignorant of the entire SRB design. There was only a single indication of SRB performance available in the cockpit of a launching shuttle. As the tube pressure fell to less than 50 pounds per square inch, a message flashed on the computer screens giving a warning that burnout and separation were near. Since we had little insight and no control over a burning SRB, we didn’t waste our time in studying its design. We had too many other things into which we did have insight and over which we did have control (the liquid-fueled engines, hydraulics, electrical system, etc.). We devoted our time to learning the design and operation of these systems. We were convinced the SRBs were just big, dumb skyrockets, as safe and reliable as a hobby store model rocket. It was the SSMEs, which periodically blew up in ground tests, that we feared most.

The Thiokol and NASA SRB engineers were buoyed when STS-3’s boosters returned with no O-rings damaged. It was full speed ahead with the shuttle program.

And the program shifted into overdrive on July 4, 1982. It was then that President Ronald Reagan and the First Lady celebrated Independence Day at Edwards AFB by personally welcoming Ken Mattingly and Hank Hartsfield back from space after their successful STS-4 mission. Reagan called attention to the latest orbiter to join the shuttle fleet,
Challenger.
Fresh from the nearby Rockwell factory, that vehicle was mounted atop its 747 carrier aircraft ready to take off for Florida as soon as the president finished his comments. It was an incredibly intoxicating sight.
Columbia
sat on the cracked dirt of the lakebed looking every bit the veteran of four spaceflights, with her nose and fuselage streaked with soot from four blazing reentries.
Challenger
sparkled in her virgin newness. It was the perfect backdrop as the president continued his speech and declared the space shuttle program “operational.”

That label had never really been defined, but it was easy to sense how most of NASA and all of the public interpreted it.
Operational
meant the shuttle was nothing more than a very high-flying airliner. I doubt there was a single military aviator astronaut who believed that. Fighter jets of far less complexity than the shuttle routinely suffered malfunctions resulting in crashes. We were certain one awaited the shuttle, too, and when it happened, it would mean death for her crew. While the operational label was nebulous, it did contain one certainty—all future shuttle missions would be flown in vehicles with no in-flight escape system. There were no ejection seats in
Challenger
’s cockpit and the two in
Columbia
would soon be removed. That had been the plan from the very beginning. President Reagan’s “operational” declaration was merely photo-op tensile. But contained in it was a shuttle design feature that would condemn some of us to death.

With flight crews named to all the planned missions through 1983, I knew I would not be getting a flight assignment for many months, perhaps even a year or more. But at least my purgatory of Spacelab support had ended. I was now assigned to shuttle software checkout in the Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIL). My frequent partner in that facility was the now very pregnant Rhea Seddon. She and Hoot Gibson had married in 1981 and their first child was due in July. In the SAIL cockpit I would watch Rhea’s nine-month distended belly crowd the control stick as she flew simulations to perfect landings. It was a sight certain to have sent some of the old Mercury astronauts fumbling for their nitro pills. Rhea would ultimately give birth to a son, one of the rare boys born to astronauts. We had long noticed a propensity for astronauts to sire daughters and wondered if the G-forces of our jet-jockey training were pushing male sperm to the end of the line. As Hoot and Rhea were being congratulated at a Monday meeting, one pilot shouted, “This proves Hoot isn’t an astronaut.” I answered, “No. It proves Hoot isn’t the father.” Rhea had a good laugh at that.

I enjoyed Rhea immensely. Like Judy, she was a smart and capable beauty with a limitless tolerance for us AD males. She frequently parried our sexist BS with biting humor. I once saw Hoot, our AD King, skewered with it. One of the men chosen to sit on an upcoming astronaut interview board had ducked his head into our office and asked for inputs on the selection criteria for the new class of astronaut candidates. Hoot gave Rhea a body-appraising scan and answered, “Yeah, how about selecting some women with big breasts and small asses instead of the other way around.” Rhea smiled wickedly at her husband and replied, “Robert, some night while you’re asleep, I’m going to amputate your penis [she was a surgeon] and graft it to your forehead, and when you come to work people are going to think it’s a zit.” Hoot had married perhaps the only woman on the planet who was his equal. When they were together it was a laugh a minute. I loved them both.

By 1982, like the other AD men, I had learned my boundaries around the six females. Rhea’s and Judy’s were the widest. Sally’s were the tightest. Though I repeatedly warned myself to watch my mouth around Sally, I would have relapses, as when I once observed, “The female cosmonauts are sure ugly.” Sally snapped, “Have you ever thought they might be good at their job?!”

Alcohol always held the potential to wreck my resolve. One evening, as Donna and I walked from a local restaurant (after a dinner that included more than a few beers), a friend stopped Donna and they fell into conversation. As I dallied, I noted Sally and Steve Hawley at another table dining with an attractive woman I didn’t recognize. At the time, Steve was dating Sally so there was nothing surprising about seeing them together. With my wife engaged I walked over and said, “Hey, Stevie, are you getting cookie recipes from these girls?” Sally glared at me like I was something growing in her bathroom grout. Hawley cringed as if he had taken a bullet to the gut and shot Sally a glance that said, “I don’t know this guy.” There was an awkward silence during which the unidentified woman examined me as if I were whale shit, the lowest thing on the planet. Finally, I bid a good-bye and escaped back to my wife, my hands discreetly checking the zipper of my fly as I walked. The threesome’s rude reaction made me wonder if I had forgotten to zip up after my last visit to the urinal. Nope, everything was secure.

As I returned, Donna’s friend gushed, “You know her?!”

Of course, I assumed she was referring to Sally.

“Sure, that’s Sally Ride.”

“No, not her. The other woman.”

“No. I wasn’t introduced.” I was still puzzled by that table’s hostility toward me. Was it something I said?

“That’s Jane Pauley.”

I shrugged. The name was a mystery to me. “Who’s Jane Pauley?”

Donna’s friend nearly had a seizure. “Who’s Jane Pauley!? You don’t know? She’s the NBC
Today
show newswoman.”

I honestly didn’t know. I didn’t watch much TV. I certainly didn’t watch those chatty morning shows. If she wasn’t in
Aviation Week & Space Technology
magazine, I wouldn’t know her.

With this new bit of knowledge, it slowly dawned on me why I had been stonewalled at Sally’s table. No doubt Ms. Pauley was talking to her about her recent flight selection. I could just imagine how my cookie recipe comment must have played with those two pioneering females. I made Hugh Hefner look like a beacon of enlightenment. I guess it’s no surprise I was never invited to the
Today
show.

On October 5, 1982, three more TFNGs were named to a flight, STS-10 (later to be designated STS-41B).
^*
I wasn’t among them.

I put on another happy face and congratulated the winners. A few weeks later Norm Thagard became the eleventh TFNG to draw an assignment when he was retroactively assigned to STS-7. NASA was growing concerned about the incidence of space sickness and wanted Thagard, a physician, to run some experiments on what was being officially labeled Space Adaptation Syndrome (SAS). SAS had impacted the recently landed STS-5 mission in a very big way. One of the two spacewalkers on that flight had been so stricken with vomiting the crew had asked MCC for permission to delay their EVA (Extra-Vehicular Activity, i.e., a spacewalk) to give him time to recover. Vomiting inside a spacesuit could kill an astronaut. The emesis could smear the inside of the helmet visor and blind the spacewalker, making it impossible to respond to a suit emergency. Also, because there was no way to remove the fluid, the astronaut could inhale it and choke to death or it could clog the oxygen circulation system and suffocate the victim. The STS-5 space-walk, which was to have been the first from a shuttle, had just been a demonstration exercise (and was ultimately canceled for a suit malfunction), but in future missions spacewalks would be essential for mission success. Norm Thagard would be the first of many physicians sent into space to determine the cause of SAS. He, like all who would follow, would have their studies seriously hampered by astronaut paranoia. Spacewalking was the most sought-after prize for MSes. It filled a powerful need to be in ultimate control. The pilots had their shuttle landings to fulfill them. Their hands and eyes delivered a 200,000-pound orbiter to a runway. It was the same with a rendezvous mission. A pilot’s personal skill brought two 17,300-mile-per-hour objects together 200 miles above the earth. It was heroic work. On the other hand, much MS work was mundane—throwing a switch to release a satellite, drawing blood, changing a data tape on some scientist’s experiment. Spacewalks and, to a somewhat lesser degree, robot arm operations were the exception in MS jobs. Like a pilot feeling the kiss of the runway on the space shuttle wheels, MSes could enjoy a powerful sense of being in control as they assembled structures or repaired satellites or performed other hands-on spacewalking tasks.