Return of a King: The Battle For Afghanistan (41 page)

Frenzied and foaming, the army of Firang

Did not delay the fight for a moment

All at once the entire horde

Attacked like a pestilential wind

With their cannonballs and gunfire

They made the very earth and heavens tremble

The Firangis appeared in those flames

As would the demons of hellfire.

Seeing the way the battle was going, and with a severe wound on his thigh, Dost Mohammad withdrew, leaving a hundred dead on the battlefield, but saving most of his forces to fight another day. He remained, however, undaunted and instead of retreating he headed on by goatpaths and dry riverbeds over the mountains towards Kabul, intent on meeting up with the Tajik insurgents in Kohistan.

This was both a brave and a risky strategy. Macnaghten had sent Burnes with ‘Fighting Bob’ Sale and two regiments to occupy the district headquarters at Charikar, and these troops were now blocking the main road between the Amir and the Kohistan rebels. Moreover, Dost Mohammad had many Kohistani enemies. Only a year previously the Kohistanis had risen against him as the British advanced on Kabul. But the Amir gambled that it was his best hope, and that a mutual hatred of the new Kafir government would for the moment trump earlier enmities. He sent emissaries ahead to the Tajik chiefs, and delegated his ally, the Safi Mir of Tagab, to persuade the sheikhs and mirs of Kohistan and Ghurband to combine under his leadership. He was therefore greatly relieved when his overtures received an immediate reply. Ghulam Kohistani, the author of the
Jangnama
, was himself from the area and recorded local memories of how Dost Mohammad’s arrival was greeted in Tagab:

The first to come forward was the triumphant warrior from Parwan

Wise and knowing, Rajab Khan was his name

‘You are the Amir and we are your servants,’ he said,

‘We bow our heads before your command

These unworthy hovels of ours, this land of rock and thistle

You have made worthy by your presence.’

At the Amir’s order, those courageous rebels

Rode their horses through the mountainous lands

Nowhere was there a moment’s respite or hesitation

Dreading in their hearts a Firangi attack

For fear that
he
would beat them to it –

That wretched Burnes at Charikar
93

There followed weeks of guerrilla warfare, with Dost Mohammad making surprise attacks on government outposts and inflicting casualties, but lacking the strength to take on the massed forces of the Company. Meanwhile General Sale systematically laid waste to rebel-held villages, destroyed the rebels’ trees and crops, and besieged the rebel-held forts around the Koh Daman, while Burnes tried to bribe the Kohistan chiefs to betray and hand over the Amir. By the end of September, Burnes had managed to pry the Mir Wali and his Uzbeks away from Dost Mohammad, leaving the Amir with just a few hundred Kohistani supporters; but still he eluded capture. ‘The fighting between the Amir and the English lasted two months,’ wrote Mirza ‘Ata. ‘There were 13 clashes and skirmishes, and never in that time did the English even glimpse the lovely face of victory. Rather it was the Amir who carried off the polo-ball of victory from the field of battle. Eventually the English abandoned their search and straggled back into Charikar half-dead, leaving much of their supplies and equipment behind.’

According to Mohan Lal, much of this fighting and destruction was anyway ill judged and unnecessary: the Kohistan chiefs had made it clear that they were willing to call a halt to their insurgency and only wished for the promises made to them the previous year to be honoured. One particularly important chief, Mir Masjidi Khan, the revered Naqsbandi Pir who was the most influential leader in the area, was actually on the verge of surrendering, and had given his word he would come into Kabul and ‘take refuge in the mausoleum of Timur Shah, and thence proceed to wait upon the Shah and the Envoy’. Burnes had agreed to this, when ‘contrary to previous arrangements’ Sale and Prince Timur set off to besiege Mir Masjidi’s fort. The fort at first proved too strong to storm, and the wounded and embittered Mir Masjidi managed to escape to Nijrow. In his absence his fort was destroyed, his family slaughtered and his lands distributed to his enemies. The brutality of the destruction of the fort and all its inhabitants horrified the Kohistanis. ‘They broke down its walls,’ wrote Ghulam Kohistani,

In every gold-spangled house

Bedecked like a spring garden

They set fire to the doors and roofs

Which carried their message up to the skies

They destroyed the central arch

They made it like a wasteland

No one saw any sign of life

No, no one had ever heard a more devastating tale
94

Thus, concluded Mohan Lal, ‘we made the Mir our enemy for ever’.
95
In due course, Mir Masjidi would return and succeed in driving the British out of Kohistan, pursuing the last survivors of the garrison to Kabul. Making an enemy out of him was one of the most serious errors made by the British in the whole campaign.

In mid-October, matters took another turn for the worse when a whole squadron of British-trained Kohistani troops in Charikar crossed over and joined Dost Mohammad.
96
Mohan Lal thought that this was one of the most serious threats the British would ever face in their occupation of Afghanistan, with the Amir on the loose, Kohistan in flames and the rest of the tribes waiting to see who would come out victorious, ‘the people and chiefs being equally discontented by our not adhering to the engagements and promises we had made them’.
97

When the two sides did finally clash, neither was expecting it. On 2 November 1840, Sale and Burnes had cleverly been drawn by the Amir across the Panjshir and away from their base at Charikar. They were moving up the wooded valley Parwan Darra, with its lines of mud-walled forts and rich apricot orchards, heading on to attack a distant rebel fortress, when intelligence came that Dost Mohammad was just ahead and riding fast towards them. Within minutes, the Amir and his 400 cavalry had appeared in view on an elevated piece of ground just ahead of the British. Sale’s guns were at the rear, so, without waiting for them to be brought up, those at the head of the column, including Burnes’s close friend Dr Percival Lord – known to the Afghan poets as ‘Daaktar’ – decided to lead the attack. The British officers spurred their horses into a charge, only to realise too late that their own Indian cavalry squadrons had turned and fled. What followed was for the Afghan poets a supreme moment of triumph for Dost Mohammad.

Then the
Daaktar
leapt up like smoke

With all the war-like cavalry that was with him

The Amir eyed up the
Daaktar

That wretched dog

And he leapt on his horse

With all speed, as fast as fire

Down from the granite hills

Went he, his cavalry following behind

Drawing the sword of rancour from its sheath

They leapt forward without delay

They pounced on the Christians,

The field grew warm with Firangi blood

The clamour of the brave rose up to the heavens

Dust filled the eyes of the Sun and of Jupiter

Soon the earth was ‘stained rose-red with heroes’ blood’.

The heroes slaughtered the men of Firang

That day of war was like as to the apocalypse

Then from under his saddle Afzal brought out his gun and fired

The shot entered the body of
Daaktar

It passed through his chest and out his back

His body was rent, and his soul fled out

The British began to retreat, ‘The brave ones of Kabul on their tail’.

Then Burnes, of swift decision, ordered them

To bring artillery to the fight

It roared and rumbled like the sky

The sound of it shook the world

At this, the hearts of the believers were astonished

The world had been darkened

They saw that there was nothing they could do

How can one drop of water conquer a river in spate?

So too went Afzal and the Amir

They hurried from the battlefield to the high mountains

There they chose a place to camp

And rested awhile from their trials, and their rage.
98

Two days later, on the evening of 4 November, a very anxious Macnaghten was taking his evening ride on the outskirts of Kabul in the company of his Military Secretary, George Lawrence, and a small escort of cavalry. The news of the death of Dr Lord and several other officers had arrived the day before, and had been followed that afternoon by an apocalyptic despatch from Burnes, urging that the British abandon all their positions north of Kabul and concentrate their troops in the capital. The day had been spent in nervous discussion – should the troops be pulled in? Should a second force be gathered and sent north? Was it wise to drain Kabul of yet more troops? ‘Just as we were approaching the Residency,’ remembered Lawrence, ‘we were surprised by a horseman suddenly riding up, who, pushing his horse between the Envoy and myself, asked me “if that was the Lord Sahib”.’

On my saying yes, he caught hold of Sir William’s bridle, exclaiming ‘the Ameer, the Ameer!’ The Envoy, surprised and agitated, called out, ‘Who, who? Where, where?’ Looking behind me on the instant, I saw another horseman close to us, who riding up, threw himself off his horse, and seized hold of the Envoy’s stirrup-leather and then his hand, which he put to his forehead and lips as a sign of submission. Sir William instantly dismounted and said to the Ameer, ‘You are welcome, you are welcome’; and then led him through the Residency garden to his own room. Dost Mohammad, on entering, prostrated himself in Oriental fashion, and taking off his turban, touched the floor with his forehead. On rising he delivered up his sword in token of surrender, saying ‘he had no more use for it.’ The Envoy immediately returned him the sword, assured the Ameer of every consideration being shown to him, notwithstanding he had so long opposed the British Government. To which the Ameer replied that ‘it was his destiny, and he could not oppose it.’

Dost Mohammad was ‘a robust, powerful man, with a sharp acquiline nose, highly arched eyebrows’ and an untrimmed beard and moustache. ‘He . . . told us that previous to the action of Purwan Durrah, he had made up his mind to surrender, and his temporary success in that affair did not in the least alter his determination . . .’ Lawrence added, ‘Tents were pitched for the Ameer’s reception, who was put under my immediate care, and a most anxious duty it was. I scarcely closed my eyes during the two nights he remained under my charge, every now and then getting up to look into the tent to see he was still there; it all seemed so much like a dream that
at last
we should have the Dost safe in our hands, that I could scarcely credit it except by frequent visits to his tent.’
99

If there was surprise on the British side at the arrival of the Amir, where it was presumed that he had not realised how close to victory he had come, from his own point of view Dost Mohammad was following normal Turko-Persian protocol by his surrender. It was not uncommon for defeated rulers of states to surrender to victorious and growing regional powers in the hope of becoming feudatories. The Durranis and Hotaki Ghilzais had both risen to power as Safavid governors in the late seventeenth century, and the Durrani Empire as it was expanding had often reappointed local rulers as their governors. The system allowed for continuity and stability, and, for the defeated rulers, preservation of life and the possibility of a return to power if circumstances changed.

As Mohammad Husain Herati put it: ‘When the English army advanced, like ocean waves one after the other, they had it proclaimed that whoever captured and delivered to them Dost Muhammad Khan would receive a reward of two lakh rupees. The Amir thought: “In this country where people murder each other for one rupee, or five people for five rupees, what chance do I stand of not being betrayed, with such a price on my head?”’ By riding into Kabul and surrendering to Macnaghten on his own terms, the Amir was recognising that for the time being the game was up and a new regional force had emerged. He clearly hoped that the British might sooner or later bring him back as ruler, or that their ultimate defeat would provide opportunities for his return on his own in the future. It was to prove a canny calculation.
100