Resistance (31 page)

 

Recently we received a repetition of the order to carry out the clearance of Jews within the shortest possible time. Therefore, the Jews must also be taken out of the munitions industry and related economic enterprises. Until now, only Jews working for the war effort were left. These Jews were concentrated in large camps and were daily taken to work in the above-mentioned enterprises. But the wishes of the SS Reichsführer [Himmler] is that these Jews should stop working... I have studied the matter thoroughly with Lieutenant-General Schindler [responsible for armaments in the General Government] and it appears that [despite the wishes of Himmler] this is not possible because there are experts among the Jewish workers, skilled mechanics and experienced artisans in the various branches and it is difficult to find replacements for them among the Poles. [I] therefore address the Obergruppenführer, to kindly ask him to change his decision regarding the evacuation of the Jewish work force.

 

Shortly thereafter, Krüger was ousted from his position. It is uncertain whether the general decline of security in the General Government was the cause of his departure or whether his statement played a part in his dismissal.

In September 1942, the matter was argued in Hitler's presence by Himmler and the man responsible for the Reich's labor concerns, Fritz Sauckel. Hitler himself decided that, for the time being, the skilled Jewish workers should remain in the General Government. This situation undoubtedly forced Himmler, who had given the order to destroy the Warsaw ghetto, to maintain temporarily the Jews occupied in the munitions factories and to transfer them to camps set up for this purpose.

In addition, Himmler and the SS made every effort to establish their hold on the economy, especially in the field of munitions. If Jewish workers were to continue for the time being, Himmler saw to it that the workers, the factories, and the workshops were brought under the supervision or ownership of the SS. It was decided to transfer the factories and the large workshops to camps in Poniatowa and Trawniki in the Lublin region, which was the power center of the SS and of the executor of the death camps, Odilo Globocnik.

The task assigned to the SS and the police in Warsaw was not easy in light of the changes in the ghetto following the bloody conflict with the Jewish Fighting Organization. The Germans were obliged to separate the inhabitants of the ghetto from the workers in the factories designated for transfer to the work camps and convince them to move to the new location. The SS also had to see that equipment and materials in the ghetto were transferred to work camps.

To execute this plan, they behaved with comparative restraint toward the Jews, making promises and offering concessions. Walter Többens, the owner of the largest factory in the ghetto and the target of Himmler's sharp criticism and suspicion, was appointed commissar of the transfer action. He had to persuade the Jews that this was a transfer to another working location and not an expulsion to a death camp.

Some twenty thousand Jewish workers were to be transferred to the work camps and Többens signed a contract under which the factories would be evacuated and supervised by the SS, while production supervision would remain in the hands of the former owners.

One doubts whether the German entrepreneurs trusted the SS assurances that these newly located enterprises were ensured a certain permanence. More likely, this proposal seemed desirable from their point of view and provided some confidence that they would retain the enormous capital they had accumulated through the exploitation of Jews.

At the beginning of March 1943, Többens announced the departure of two clothing workshops, but of 1,600 workers only 280 appeared for transport, and some of them escaped while still in the transport queues. The Germans pursued and detained them under the supervision of the workshop guards, but members of the ZOB managed to extricate 60 of the detainees. The plan for transferring workers from the area of the brush workshops ended in failure. Out of 3,600 workers, only 30 turned up.

In the second half of March, two transports of workers from the workshop area of the ghetto were transferred to the camps in Poniatowa and Trawniki. Jewish foremen returned to the ghetto and confirmed that indeed this was not an expulsion but a move to a working camp. Többens claimed that the new location would enable the Jews to live with their families, that the children would have proper schools, and that he personally guaranteed the safety of "his" Jews and of those who would agree to move. Despite his coaxing, after the first wave of evacuees, the Jews became more obstinate and would nor volunteer.

The Jewish Fighting Organization addressed the workshop employees in a proclamation warning them that volunteering to move meant the destruction of the ghetto and the annihilation of the evacuees. On March 20, Többens entered the battle of proclamations, retaliating with a proclamation of his own. In this manner, the German responsible for the transfer conducted an open controversy with the Jewish Fighting Organization on the walls of the ghetto. Többens declared:

 

The last transport was not put to death ... Jewish munitions workers! Do not listen to those who wish to mislead you. They want to incite you into actions which may have unavoidable results.

 

Többens claimed that there was no security in the "shelters" or hiding places and no safe refuge among the Poles on the Aryan side. It was a fact, he added, that the Jews with money returned from the Aryan side because they could not abide what awaited them there, and they now wanted "to be among the transferred." Finally, Többens suggested that Jews put their trust only in the heads of the enterprises being transferred to the work camps of Poniatowa and Trawniki, and advised them to take their wives and children with them. (In fact, the Jews who were transported to these camps before the final destruction of the ghetto were murdered in a mass slaughter that took place in the Lublin area in November 1943—the slaughter known as "the harvest festival.")

In addition to the transfer of Jews to the work camps, the German owners of the workshops and factories surreptitiously, but not always successfully, moved the equipment and stocks of materials to these camps. The Jewish Fighting Organization used fires and other methods of sabotage to destroy equipment and materials that the Germans intended to transfer.

During this period, the idea of resistance was on the rise, although people with means and connections stepped up their attempts to find hiding places in the Aryan part of Warsaw. Amost every-remaining Jew in Warsaw participated in the construction of shelters and hiding places and in the preparation of equipment for survival in hiding. The shelters were readied in cellars and tunnels beneath the courtyards of buildings. The more secure were specially built for hiding, on the assumption that the enemy would find plans for all the houses and could then follow the outlines of existing cellars to find them.

The work of digging and preparing the bunkers was mainly done at night, mostly in rotation by the people who were to share the bunker. The earth that had been dug out was buried in the ordinary cellars, in order not to leave any trace of the work. Those individuals who formed a group to construct a bunker were obliged to pay a large sum of money to equip it adequately to be used as a hiding place. The work was done cleverly and with a great deal of thought. Wooden bunks were installed, sanitary arrangements made, and considerable attention was given to the stocking of foodstuffs. Smuggling provided for foods that would last.

A good bunker linked up with the central water supply system of the city, which passed under the ghetto and ensured the flow of fresh water. This applied to electricity as well. The organizers of the installation and occupation of the bunkers were very keen on having a medical doctor among them and on obtaining a supply of medicines. The best bunkers were not only well equipped but also had a camouflaged source of air. Exceptional bunkers also attached to a tunnel leading out of the ghetto or to the vacant area between the no man's land and the inhabited ghettos. Much thought was needed to plan the disguised entrances to the bunkers, which had to be completely invisible from the outside. Some professionals took part in their planning and construction, and frequently experts were hired for the purpose. Every bunker had its guiding group to ensure its efficient operation.

The number of houses in which there were no bunkers were few and far between, but there were courtyards in which two or three had been installed. At any rate, everyone tried to have a place in a bunker, just as they had a place to rest their heads above ground. And indeed, near the beginning of the final expulsion and destruction of the ghetto, almost the entire Jewish population of the central ghetto had places in bunkers. Seemingly overnight, the ghetto, particularly the central area, had become a city on two levels—houses above ground, and cellars and runnels below.

Between January and April 1943, the Jewish Fighting Organization was unified; the hierarchy of personnel and the strategic plans were laid down for the inevitable struggle. The period between the two expulsions was one of marked change and preparation for the last battle. The organization did not delude itself that its resistance would prompt the Nazis to give up the idea of wiping out the ghetto and to leave them alone; instead, the imminent annihilation required swift preparations since it was the enemy who would determine the date of the battle.

The Jewish Fighting Organization and the revisionist ZZW had learned a great deal from the January conflict. A German surprise attack could take place at any moment. As a result, after January, there was a hasty organization of fighting groups into squads attached to dwelling places, which also served as the central posts of their concentrated force. There they kept their personal arms and trained, maintaining an ambiance of semimilitary discipline. Members of the squads were forbidden to leave without permission from the officer in charge. Yet an atmosphere of intimacy and friendship existed among the young men and women who made up these squads.

Much of the time, the members of the groups kept busy reading books and discussing social or political questions. As some of the survivors of the ZOB have described, they resembled discussion societies rather than fighting squads. The food was simple—rationed portions of bread and jam, with the morning drink sweetened by saccharine. Lunch consisted of soup. They did not deviate from this rather poor diet later, when they commanded larger sums of money. The funds raised voluntarily or by force were dedicated to acquiring arms.

According to available data, there were twenty-two fighting groups composed of youth movement members. The Dror movement had five groups; Hashomer Hatzaír, the Bund, and the Communists had four groups each; while Akiva, Gordonia, Hanoar Hazioni, Po'alei Zion C.S., and the Left Po'alei Zion had single groups. Preserving the youth movement framework of separate fighting units was necessary in order to maintain continuity and to strengthen the bonds among the fighters. Many considered their membership in the Jewish Fighting Organization the natural culmination of the long path they had taken in the ranks of their movement.

At the same time, close relationships were established between the squads. They visited one another, and occasionally individuals transferred from squad to squad. Commanders of the squads were appointed based on the youth movments they belonged to, but their appointments were founded on seniority rather than on ideological convictions or intellectual qualities, as they had been in the past.

The ghetto was divided into three sections: the central ghetto, the large workshop area, and the brushmakers' area. The central ghetto was the primary focus of the organization, and its headquarters, led by Mordecai Anielewicz, was entrenched there. The commander of the local force, which consisted of nine fighting squads dispersed throughout the area, was Israel Kanal. In the workshop area, eight squads were led by Yitzhak Zuckerman, and in the brushmakers' area, five squads were under the command of Marek Edelman.

During the organization's formation, a strategic plan was developed that proved to be of great importance during the armed conflict. The members had no military experience and lacked understanding or knowledge of fighting methods, least of all military maneuvers in urban surroundings. Having no alternative, they had to base their strategy on a thorough knowledge of the area and on their recent experience. From the events of January, they knew that the organization could not engage in hand-to-hand battles in the streets or squares of the ghetto, as these would be decided by the crushing force of the Germans. In January this technique had worked, and changed the mood and stand of the ghetto, but in a calculated struggle over a period of time, different methods were required, including the deployment of forces in many places which could exploit the area and the element of surprise.

The organization's strategy was based on the reality of the situation. The houses in the ghetto were almost of equal height, between three and five stories, topped with tiled roofs that formed triangular attics. Between the roofs, passages were formed with ladders. At first, this route allowed for surreptitious movement from house to house. Over time, these passages were improved and became an element in the action plan. It was possible to appear at posts near the attics or the upper stories without moving about in the streets and to withdraw without being seen by the forces in the street. Clearly, in the familiar alcoves, on the narrow ladders, in the corners and crevices, the fighters had a marked advantage over the Germans, who feared entering the dark and little-known maze.

Positions were chosen from which to open fire, overlooking the crossroads through which German forces would pass to enter the ghetto. The weakest aspect of the plan was the lack of arms. In fact, after the events of January, many Jews sought to join the group but were refused due to the shortage of weapons. But by the beginning of April, every fighter in the fighting squads was armed with a revolver. In the interim the Jewish Fighting Organization "cleaned house." There were two fields of activity: the punishment and the execution of people in the ghetto who had collaborated with the Germans to the detriment of the Jews or had helped the Germans to carry out the expulsion. Emanuel Ringelblum named thirteen who were shot.