Reagan: The Life (103 page)

Gorbachev told George Shultz of his decision when the secretary of state visited Moscow. Gorbachev had previously seen Shultz as Reagan’s mostly silent partner, but in Moscow he learned to appreciate him as a diplomat of the highest order. “
I realized, maybe for the first time, that I was dealing with a serious man of sound political judgment,” Gorbachev recalled. They discussed an INF deal and sketched the outlines of an agreement. They shared the hope that a treaty could be signed by year’s end.

R
EAGAN HOPED SO
too. But he hoped for more. An INF pact would be very important; it would be more than any president had ever achieved on arms control. But it wasn’t enough. Reagan still wanted to lift the nuclear cloud from humanity’s future. This had been his goal from the beginning. He had come close at Reykjavík. And with his time in the White House dwindling, he felt a greater need than ever to tackle the big missiles, the ones that threatened Armageddon. “
Now we must finish the task,” he told the
National Security Planning Group. “I don’t accept the suggestions of some that it is too late for us to get a START agreement before I leave office.” Reagan knew he faced skeptics, even within his administration, and he made clear he wouldn’t cut a deal for the sake of a deal. “I want a START agreement,” he said, “but
only
if it is a good one, one we can verify and which enhances our security.”

Caspar Weinberger remained distrustful of any agreement. He deemed Reykjavík a disaster narrowly averted. He didn’t like the idea of an INF accord, though he judged he could no longer oppose it frontally. He definitely didn’t want a START deal. He warned Reagan and the planning group against any concessions to the Soviets. Better no START agreement at all than one that required concessions, he said.

George Shultz supported both an INF pact and a START treaty, and he opposed Weinberger. He suspected that Weinberger was opposing START as a way of sabotaging INF. Shultz declared that START was essential to INF. “It is very easy for the Soviets to deploy more missiles, and it is hard for us,” he said. An INF treaty would be worthless if not followed by START, he said, for the Soviets could simply deploy new strategic missiles to replace the intermediate missiles eliminated.

Weinberger denied wanting to scuttle either START or INF. “I agree with you on the need for START,” he said. “But that is no reason for us to give in to the Soviet demands. We’ve got a good agreement in INF because we hung tough and we can do the same in START.”

Reagan elevated the discussion to the realm of first principles. “You’ve got to remember that the whole thing was born of the idea that the world needs to get rid of nuclear weapons,” he said. “We’ve got to remember that we can’t win a nuclear war and we can’t fight one. The Soviets don’t want to win by war but by threat of war. They want to issue ultimatums to which we have to give in. If we could just talk about the basic steps we need to break the log jam and avoid the possibility of war—I mean, think about it: Where would the survivors of the war live? Major areas of the world would be uninhabitable. We need to keep it in mind that that’s what
we’re about. We are about bringing together steps to bring us closer to the recognition that we need to do away with nuclear weapons.”

Weinberger played to Reagan’s desire to eliminate nuclear weapons. “We have to be very careful in this area, Mr. President, because what we want to do is get rid of nuclear weapons, and if we handle this badly, we will not be able to get rid of them,” he said. “We can’t live with nuclear weapons if they are used. We can’t get rid of them because there are no defenses against them. We must do nothing to inhibit our ability to defend against nuclear weapons. We need to defend early; we need to defend our continent, not just a few sites.”

Weinberger was among those who had sighed relief that Reagan at Reykjavík had refused to constrain SDI. He worried that Reagan’s evident desire for START might cause him to wobble in a future meeting with Gorbachev. He now declared that SDI must not be limited in any way. There could be no restrictions on America’s ability to test or deploy.

Frank Carlucci pointed out that at Reykjavík the president and Gorbachev had agreed in principle not to withdraw from the
ABM Treaty before 1996.

“Yes, but we’re walking back from that, and we’re really making progress,” Weinberger said.

Reagan interjected, “Why can’t we agree now that if we get to a point where we want to deploy we will simply make all the information available about each other’s systems so that we can both have defenses? So that if either side is ready to deploy, both agree to make available to the other all the results of their research.”

“I don’t believe that we could ever do that,” Weinberger said. The secretary of defense had never so flatly contradicted this fundamental facet of Reagan’s conception of strategic defense. But the president said nothing.

Weinberger’s allies joined in. General
Robert Herres, the vice-chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, “Mr. President, there is great risk in exchanging technical data. Much of our technology is easily convertible into other purposes and into an offensive area.”

Ken Adelman took a similar view. “Mr. President, that would be the most massive technical transfer that the western world has ever known,” the arms control director said. And it would defeat the purpose of strategic defense. “If they understood our system that well, it would be easy for them to move to countermeasures.”

Now Reagan objected. “Once we deploy something, won’t they know about the system? So won’t they try to counter it anyway? So what differ
ence does it make if they get the information and counter it or if we simply provide it to them?”

Weinberger ignored the president’s questions. “The key here is the price that they are asking is too high. We ought to just hold tough.”

Technical discussion ensued. The president listened distractedly. Finally he said, “There has to be an answer to all these questions, because some day people are going to ask why we didn’t do something now about getting rid of nuclear weapons. You know, I’ve been reading my Bible and the description of Armageddon talks about destruction, I believe, of many cities, and we absolutely need to avoid that. We have to do something now.”

“We certainly need to avoid Armageddon,” Carlucci agreed.

“The answer is SDI,” Weinberger said.

G
ORBACHEV WAS PLEASED
that George Shultz was the one to greet him when he landed in Washington in early December. America’s Geneva negotiators had reached agreement on INF with their Soviet counterparts, producing a signature-ready treaty. Gorbachev belatedly accepted Reagan’s Reykjavík invitation for a Washington summit and winged west.

The secretary of state thought the general secretary had never looked better. “
He was upbeat, positive, animated and eager,” Shultz recalled. “He talked about the changes taking place in his country and his desire to close out the Cold War with the United States.” Gorbachev inquired as to American opponents of the
INF Treaty. “What about critics in the U.S.?” he asked Shultz.

“The vast majority of Americans support what President Reagan is doing,” Shultz answered. There were indeed critics, but the way to deal with them was by making further progress.

“I work very hard,” Gorbachev told Shultz. “I drive people and wear them out. I go at it all the way. If I tire, someone else will take over.” Shultz didn’t expect weariness to be a problem. “He looked as if he would never tire,” Shultz wrote.

T
HE NEXT MORNING
Gorbachev and Reagan picked up where they had left off in Reykjavík. “
A good rousing meeting” was Reagan’s diary description of their opening round. Gorbachev complained about Reagan’s Berlin speech. “
Mr. President, you are not a prosecutor and I am not on trial,” he said. “Like you, I represent a great country and therefore
expect our dialogue to be conducted on the basis of reciprocity and equality. Otherwise there will be no dialogue.”

Reagan considered Gorbachev’s admonishment to be part of the game. “
I enjoyed the debate and I think he did, too,” the president wrote later. “We agreed to disagree.”

They adjourned to the signing ceremony. The East Room of the White House was filled with diplomats, members of Congress and the executive branch, Gorbachev’s entourage, and the media. Reagan took the lead. The president was understandably proud. “
This ceremony and the treaty we’re signing today are both excellent examples of the rewards of patience,” he said. “It was over six years ago—November 18, 1981—that I first proposed what would come to be called the zero option. It was a simple proposal—one might say, disarmingly simple.” Reagan smiled amid the expected laughter. “Unlike treaties in the past, it didn’t simply codify the status quo or a new arms buildup; it didn’t simply talk of controlling an arms race. For the first time in history, the language of ‘arms control’ was replaced by ‘arms reduction’—in this case, the complete elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles.” Reagan acknowledged the opposition his proposal had encountered. “Reaction, to say the least, was mixed. To some the zero option was impossibly visionary and unrealistic; to others merely a propaganda ploy. Well, with patience, determination, and commitment, we’ve made this impossible vision a reality.”

Reagan’s researchers had scoured Russian literature for an appropriate reference. The president turned to Gorbachev and said, “General Secretary Gorbachev, I’m sure you’re familiar with
Ivan Krylov’s famous tale about the swan, the crawfish, and the pike. It seems that
once upon a time these three were trying to move a wagonload together. They hitched and harnessed themselves to the wagon. It wasn’t very heavy, but no matter how hard they worked, the wagon just wouldn’t move. You see, the swan was flying upward; the crawfish kept crawling backward; the pike kept making for the water. The end result was that they got nowhere, and the wagon is still there to this day.” Fortunately, the American and Soviet governments knew better. “Strong and fundamental moral differences continue to exist between our nations,” Reagan granted. “But today, on this vital issue, at least, we’ve seen what can be accomplished when we pull together.”

Reagan tallied the accomplishment. All of the Soviet Union’s ground-launched intermediate-range missiles would be destroyed, with their more
than fifteen hundred warheads. America’s entire complement of Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles, with some four hundred warheads, would be destroyed as well. “But the importance of this treaty transcends numbers,” Reagan continued. “We have listened to the wisdom in an old Russian maxim. And I’m sure you’re familiar with it, Mr. General Secretary, though my pronunciation may give you difficulty. The maxim is: Doveryai no proveryai—trust, but verify.”

Gorbachev smiled for the cameras. “You repeat that at every meeting,” he said. The audience of notables laughed.

“I like it,” Reagan protested. More laughter. He expressed hope that the
INF Treaty would lead to progress on strategic arms but also on conventional weapons, regional conflicts, and human rights. He cited another Russian proverb (“as you can see, I’m becoming quite an expert in Russian proverbs,” he said, to further chuckles): “The harvest comes more from sweat than from the dew.” He invited Gorbachev to speak.

Gorbachev said he would leave to future generations to pronounce on the importance of this single treaty. But the act of agreeing had a broader significance that was obvious even now. “For everyone, and above all, for our two great powers, the treaty whose text is on this table offers a big chance at last to get onto the road leading away from the threat of catastrophe. It is our duty to take full advantage of that chance and move together toward a nuclear-free world, which holds out for our children and grandchildren and for their children and grandchildren the promise of a fulfilling and happy life without fear and without a senseless waste of resources on weapons of destruction.”

He turned to Reagan. “We have covered a seven-year-long road, replete with intense work and debate,” he said. “One last step towards this table, and the treaty will be signed.” He added, “May December 8, 1987, become a date that will be inscribed in the history books, a date that will mark the watershed separating the era of a mounting risk of nuclear war from the era of a demilitarization of human life.”

T
HE GOOD FEELING
of the signing ceremony persisted throughout Gorbachev’s visit. But it didn’t make additional agreements any easier. Reagan and Gorbachev went straight to the Cabinet Room for a discussion of the next steps. Reagan wanted to talk about strategic arms and press on toward START, but Gorbachev unexpectedly pushed the issue
of conventional weapons. He didn’t say so, but the principal appeal of a conventional-forces agreement was that it promised greater cost savings.

Reagan answered that he would be willing to talk about conventional arms, though he considered START the priority. Yet in either realm, trust was essential. “
It is not armaments that create distrust,” he said, “but distrust that creates armaments.” He noted that the INF Treaty, historic as it was, still had to be ratified. Anything that caused distrust would jeopardize ratification.

Gorbachev said he had his own ratification problems. The Soviet Union was destroying four times as many missiles as the United States. The
Supreme Soviet, which, with two thousand members, was far larger than the American Senate, would ask why he had been so generous to the Americans. Many in his country distrusted the United States and therefore disarmament. “People ask how it is possible to have disarmament when the Soviet Union is ringed with U.S. bases. People ask how Gorbachev can bow down to the U.S.” Referring again to Reagan’s Berlin speech, Gorbachev said the American government accused the Soviet Union of all sorts of sins, but the Americans themselves had plenty to answer for. “During the forty-five years since the war, so much has piled up that if we just go on with the complaints—on the Soviet side there are all sorts of doctrines to complain about: the
Truman Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the
Carter Doctrine—we will put each other on trial.” This was not the constructive approach people wanted. Looking beyond the Reagan years, Gorbachev turned to Vice President Bush. “Unless policy reflects what people want, you can win an election but not succeed in the long term,” he said.