Prisoner of the Vatican (48 page)

Papal flight, in Crispi's estimation, was a crucial part of the larger French designs for war secretly backed by the Vatican. In June 1889, just a few days after the Bruno dedication, Crispi wrote himself a note about the suspicious activities of France's ambassador to the Vatican, Béhaine. After a flurry of meetings with Cardinal Rampolla and two additional meetings with the pope, the French ambassador, Crispi wrote, had hastened off to Paris. Something big was afoot. He was sure of it.

A few days later, he sent an urgent telegram to his ambassador in the French capital. "In Paris," Crispi told him, "they are now in the midst of negotiating a pact between the Holy See and the Government of the [French] Republic in which, under certain conditions, France promises to bring back temporal power."
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On June 15, with Béhaine still in Paris, his chargé d'affaires, Monbel, had the honor of a private audience with the pope. Monbel's report to Paris reveals how misplaced were Crispi's fears. "The pope has no illusion about the help that can come to him from foreign governments," Monbel wrote. "Austria is tied to Germany and to Italy. Spain is absorbed by domestic matters. For its part, France, threatened by two enemies at the same time, can do no more than make token protests on behalf of the Holy See. The pope is therefore isolated, but he is nonetheless resolved to resist and to do everything he can."

Their conversation then turned to the question of the pope's abandonment of Rome. It was Monbel who brought the subject up, referring to news accounts about the archbishop of Barcelona's recent offer of refuge for the pontiff. "The Holy Father," the French envoy wrote, "assures me that it is not his intention to leave Rome at the present, and that he learned of the offer of a residence in Barcelona only from the newspapers."

"But, if the necessity of departure arises," Leo hastened to add, "I believe I will have an embarrassment of choices. Spain would certainly receive me with enthusiasm. Austria, for its part, has offered me hospitality, as have Switzerland and Belgium. And who knows?" he said. "Perhaps France, in the midst of all this solicitude, would not think it beneath itself to give me shelter there."

Revealingly, in reporting this pointed question, Monbel recalled: "I was unable to respond positively."
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Throughout the summer, rumors of the pope's imminent departure spread rapidly, with the Catholic press using the threat to push its own intransigent message.
Civiltà Cattolica
went so far as to attribute the recent uncertainty in Rome's stock exchange to "the fear that the Holy Father has already decided, in the extraordinary meeting of the cardinals in the Vatican, to leave Rome." These suspicions were heightened by the outpouring of new offers by various cities and archbishops to welcome the pope: from Malta to Barcelona, Grenada, Seville, and Majorca in Spain to Auch in southwest France.
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Monbel's reports to Paris in early July reveal that the French too were increasingly worried that the pope was about to leave. "I have been convinced," Monbel wrote on July 6, "by the conversations that I have had in recent days with various people of the real importance that must be attributed to the rumors of the pope's departure." He explained: "The likelihood of a European war—which is viewed at St. Peter's as very great and would pit the French against the Italians—along with the recent language of the Italian prime minister, who is doing his best to portray the Vatican as continually conspiring with France against Italy, has led to extreme anxiety." In order to prepare for such an eventuality, Monbel wrote, the Holy See was working feverishly to find the pope a place of refuge. "I have every reason to believe," he added, "that the Sovereign Pontiff's preferences are directed toward Spain."
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Monbel followed this brief message with a much longer letter the following day, marked "Confidential. On the Pope's departure." It heralded a new stage in the discussion of the pope's plans.

When he had first heard of the pope's secret meeting with the cardinals the previous week, Monbel wrote, he thought that the threats of leaving had been made simply "to give more weight to the Holy Father's complaints, and to excite the interest of the Catholic world in the papacy's situation." This had been the previous pattern. So often had the Vatican brandished such threats that people had become inured to them. But, Monbel reported, things had taken an unexpected turn. "The language that Cardinal Rampolla has used with me, in two consecutive audiences, allows no doubt that this issue of the departure from Rome—so often dropped and then taken up again—has today assumed great seriousness."

"The pope has been forced into the most painful of situations," Rampolla had told him. "After the Giordano Bruno demonstrations, the most slanderous and hurtful words possible for the Holy Father have suddenly been coming from as high up as the Senate gallery, portraying the pope as a personal enemy of Italy, conspiring against it with France. They are duplicitously interpreting each of his acts in a way designed to excite the Italians' hatred."

"The cardinal," Monbel recounted, "finished, in a bout of melancholy, by leaving me to understand that, in his opinion, the struggle between the monarchy and the papacy was uneven, and that the papacy would, over time, lose what prestige remained to it if it agreed to continue to suffer the humiliations that it had come to be subjected to." From Rampolla's perspective, Monbel concluded, "departure had been imposed on them for more than one reason, including the good of the Church, the most important consideration after that of the personal security of Leo XIII himself."

The French envoy had himself now become convinced that it would be best for the pope to flee. "Necessity," he wrote, "does not allow the pope any other choice than what his secretary of state has in mind. Under the current circumstances, Spain alone can offer the head of Catholicism a safe shelter, for it is assumed that Spain will remain neutral in the European conflict and that its climate, better than others, is most agreeable given the Holy Father's age and health."

Monbel's efforts to determine how far the Vatican's discussions with Spain had gone led him to the Spanish chargé d'affaires, who claimed to know nothing of any negotiations. But he did not allay the French envoy's suspicions, for he found out that the Spanish ambassador to the Holy See had recently been recalled to Madrid for confidential discussions with his government. And, in response to Monbel's queries, the chargé d'affaires admitted that Cardinal Rampolla had, not long before, asked him which of the Spanish crown's palaces would be most suitable for a papal residence.
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Alarmed, but also excited, Monbel sought out friendly cardinals to help him piece together what was going on. He first spoke to Cardinal Placido Schiaffino, a fifty-nine-year-old Benedictine monk who, although Monbel did not know it, had served with one of the pope's secret groups of advisers on the question of leaving Rome. Schiaffino, Monbel wrote, saw things the same way Rampolla did. The situation was unstable. The pope's life was in danger, and members of the Sacred College could not walk down Rome's streets without being insulted and threatened. "His Eminence," Monbel reported, "gave me the impression that he believed that war would break out soon, at the latest by October." Little time was left for the pope to make his escape.

Of the cardinals Monbel spoke to, none was more influential than Lucido Parocchi. Cardinal vicar of Rome since 1884—a post he would hold for fifteen years—Parocchi was trusted by Leo, who had also appointed him to the prestigious position that he himself had occupied before becoming pontiff: chamberlain of the Sacred College of Cardinals.

Cardinal Parocchi, it turned out, was not only urging the pope to depart but was also making clear his displeasure that the pope had so often threatened to leave without ever following through.

"There are things that one does and of which one does not speak," the cardinal vicar told the French envoy. "The pope has, besides, many reasons for leaving Rome." Cast as Italy's enemy, in league with a hostile foreign power, Leo was already a prisoner. True, the pope's departure would, at least in the short run, be disastrous for Italy. But, Parocchi insisted, the Church's cause must come first:

"I myself, although born in Italy, and although I love my country and my language a great deal, can't understand how one could sacrifice the Church's least interest to it. There are questions that are more important than Italy, just as there are nations that are much more important [here Monbel noted parenthetically: "alluding to France"] which the Church should prefer over it. Consequently I don't understand how any hesitation is possible."
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Crispi, meanwhile, was doing all he could to convince his allies of the pope's plan to launch a war on Italy. The pope's idea, Crispi charged, was to take refuge abroad, hoping to return behind a triumphant French army. Some of Crispi's spies in the Vatican offered him grist for his mill. Béhaine, they claimed, had written from Paris on July 8, urging the pope to act immediately. "If the Holy See can do nothing more than talk," Béhaine was said to have warned him, "France cannot act." To which, in this account, the Vatican responded by telegram: "Act quickly, because all is ready."
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On July 11 Crispi told Domenico Farini, the president of the Italian Senate, he was certain that war with France would begin before fall. When Farini reported this to Umberto, the king initially dismissed the alleged plot as a product of Crispi's all-too-fertile imagination. But on the thirteenth Crispi himself went to see Umberto, a meeting he described telegraphically in his diary entry for that day: "I am with the King at 10 o'clock. I inform him of the possibility of an attack. The necessity for defensive measures. He must see the minister of War, Bertole, and a special council must be formed." The king, still skeptical but now uncertain, agreed to Crispi's request to establish a special four-member war council, presided over by the king himself and including Crispi and the minister of war.

On the sixteenth Crispi met with the Italian ambassador to London, whom he had recalled to Rome for urgent consultations. Crispi described the meeting in his diary: "I inform him that in France they are ready for war, and their intention would appear to be to attack us by sea. The plan is a bold one, I might also say a foolhardy one, but as the information came to me from a perfectly trustworthy source, we must believe the report, and prepare to defend ourselves." Crispi told the ambassador to find out what the British government was prepared to do. "Should we be defeated," Crispi pointed out, "England would lose a faithful ally on the seas."

Two days later Crispi again went to see the king. "I give him the latest news from the Vatican," Crispi wrote, "which causes him much surprise." That same day, the prime minister sent a dramatic telegram to the Italian ambassador in Paris: "I have received news from the border that French troops are massing there with hostile intent. That, combined with pressures coming from the French embassy to the Vatican, is aimed at forcing the pope to abandon Rome." Crispi added, by way of reproach: "I am amazed at Your Excellency's silence."
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That evening, after midnight, Crispi telegraphed his ambassadors in Berlin, Vienna, and London to tell them that war was at hand: "The redoubled weaponry on the French border and the news that comes from Paris confirm that we are close to war ... The pope's departure from Rome, on the advice of the government of the [French] Republic, seems to have been decided upon." By getting the pope to leave Italy, he charged, "France is trying to manufacture a pretext for a conflict that, in our view, would lead to war." The ambassadors were to speak of the threat with the German, Austrian, and British foreign ministers.

Yet Crispi failed to get the other governments to support his campaign. Typical was the reaction reported in a telegram that Costantino Nigra, the Italian ambassador to Vienna, sent on July 18. The ambassador had hurriedly arranged a meeting with Kalnoky and had read him Crispi's telegram. "He has asked me to tell you," wrote Nigra, "that he does not believe that France has the least intention of making war on Italy at this time, nor that the pope intends to leave Rome any time soon ... Nor does Kalnoky believe in any conspiracy between France and the pope on this subject."
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Nigra's response angered Crispi, who summoned him immediately to Rome. Crispi described their meeting: "I acquaint him with the news we have from France and with what we know about the Vatican. I point out that the pressure brought to bear by M. de Monbel [to get the pope to leave Rome] is meant seriously, and he has failed so far simply owing to the pope's indecision." Crispi went on to attribute the Austrian government's refusal to see the danger to the incompetence of their ambassador to the Holy See. But Nigra was unmoved, insisting that any plans for papal departure could not be concealed from Kalnóky.

Crispi would have none of it. "Be that as it may," he said, "we must know what Austria would do in case we are attacked by France. She would be in duty bound to defend us." Should Austria and Germany come to Italy's aid, Crispi added, "the joint action of the three fleets would overpower France, and if, as is probable, England should join us, we might be sure of victory."
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By this time, the French envoy to the Holy See was having second thoughts about his earlier report that the pope was about to leave Rome. "It would seem," he wrote to the French foreign minister, "just as I had initially believed, that the Holy See has raised this burning question both to rekindle Catholics' sentiments for the Head of the Church and to slow the hostile acts that the Italian government and a part of the Italian nation have shown themselves so willingly to aim at the papacy." What prompted Monbel's turnabout was a recent meeting with Rampolla, who had told him that the decision to abandon Rome was being put off.

Monbel added that Italy's leaders, despite their feigned nonchalance, were terrified by the thought that the pope might go, believing that neither the government nor the monarchy itself would last long with the pope outside Italy. He explained: