Pearl Harbor Betrayed (11 page)

Back at sea, the new flag officer became Commanding Officer Cruisers, Battle Force. Early in 1939, he commanded a good will tour around South America with a division of three heavy cruisers, visiting ports in Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, and, via the Straits of Magellan, Chile and Peru. In June of that year, he was reassigned to the command of Cruisers, Battle Force (consisting of three divisions of light cruisers) in the Pacific Fleet, relieving his old friend from academy days, Rear Admiral Harold R. Stark, who had been appointed Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Kimmel hoisted his flag in the USS
Honolulu
.

As the months of 1940 came and went, it was clear to Kimmel and his fellow flag officers at Pearl that the Orange plan, which they had first encountered in an earlier form at the Naval War College, was moving ever closer to the execution phase. Japan was threatening to unleash a sixth initiative since 1896 to dominate the nations and territories of eastern Asia. In the Sino-Japanese War of 1896 she had seized the island of Formosa (Taiwan) off the southeastern coast of China. In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05, she had gained predominant control over Manchuria and Korea, annexing the latter in 1910. In 1931 she had seized the three northern provinces of China and formed them into a puppet state named Manchukuo. In 1937 she had invaded the major population centers of China—Peking (Beijing), Shanghai, and Nanking—and, by the following year, she had occupied almost all the principal cities, ports, and railroads of north and central China. In 1939 she occupied Hainan Island off the coast of China, and the Spratlys, coral islands that lie between southern Vietnam and Borneo, athwart the sea-lanes between Singapore and Manila—perfect submarine bases.

Two events in September 1940 demonstrated that Japan's appetite was hardly sated. First, as a result of Germany's defeat of France, she stationed troops in northern French Indochina. The U.S. government, which earlier, in July, had responded to Japan's continuing war in China by placing an embargo on exports to Japan of aviation fuel and the highest grades of iron and steel scrap, now cut off all grades of those metal exports. And, second, on 27 September, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, which provided that the three powers would come to one another's assistance if one of them was attacked by a nation not yet involved in the European or Sino-Japanese wars. Emboldened by her Axis partnership, and fueled by ambitions to establish a western and southwestern Pacific empire that she euphemistically styled the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japan now cast ravenous eyes in the direction of southern Indochina and other European colonies to the south of her: the Dutch East Indies, whose oil fields had become a strong attraction after the mother country's surrender to Germany; and rubber and tin-rich Malaya, only half-protected by a beleaguered Great Britain. If the Japanese fleet moved south against those colonies of nominal allies of the United States, it was possible that the United States Navy Pacific and Asiatic Fleets would become engaged; it was certain if the list of Japanese targets was enlarged to include the U.S. territory of the Philippine Islands.

*   *   *

Rear Admiral Kimmel was still in command of Cruisers, Battle Force, when, on Sunday, 5 January 1941, after returning to the Pearl Harbor fleet landing following a round of golf with his chief of staff, Captain Walter S. DeLany, at the Army's Fort Shafter course, he was met by a staff officer who announced that the admiral was to report immediately aboard the fleet flagship, then alongside one of the docks. Upon going aboard, Kimmel was escorted to the quarters of the chief of staff, who showed him a dispatch from the Navy Department to Admiral James O. Richardson, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (CINCUS). The dispatch read that, effective 1 February 1941, Admiral Richardson was relieved of his command, and that President Franklin D. Roosevelt had appointed in his stead as CINCUS and as Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) Husband E. Kimmel, with the designated rank of admiral. DeLany was with him when he received the news. “The blow dazed him,” DeLany told the Associated Press. “I've never seen a man more surprised.”
31

Kimmel went at once to Admiral Richardson's quarters in Honolulu to assure him that he had in no way sought this appointment, second only in the Navy to that of Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, and to express his conviction that, from his knowledge of Richardson's efficient command of the fleet, there was no justification for his being relieved only thirteen months into his command. Kimmel, furthermore, sent a letter, dated 12 January 1941, to CNO “Betty” Stark:

When I got the news of my prospective assignment, I was perfectly stunned. I hadn't any intimation that Richardson's relief was even being considered; and even had I known that his relief was being considered, I did not in my wildest dreams really think that I would get the job. Nevertheless, I am prepared to do everything I can when I take over on about the first of February.
32

Some months later, Kimmel would learn why Richardson was relieved. He had angered President Roosevelt during a White House luncheon meeting on the previous 8 October by opposing, in what Roosevelt considered disrespectful language, the permanent stationing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor. Prior to May 1940 Pearl had been home base for only a Hawaiian detachment, consisting of a carrier, heavy cruisers, and destroyers. Roosevelt thought that the presence of the fleet in mid-Pacific waters would deter Japan from seizing European colonies in the Far East. Richardson had disagreed and had argued, furthermore (and too boldly for Roosevelt's taste), that only the bases on the U.S. West Coast could provide the dockyard and supply services, the manpower, and the auxiliary vessels that the fleet would need for war. Kimmel would also learn that he had not been the President's first choice to replace him. That had been Rear Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, chief of the Navy's Bureau of Navigation, which had charge of all naval training and all officer appointments. Widely admired in the Navy, Nimitz was also a Roosevelt confidant, and thus he probably was not overly surprised by the President's offer. But knowing that he was being jumped over fifty more senior officers, thus risking their ill will (though it had not bothered Stark to be promoted over fifty seniors when he was made CNO in 1939), he respectfully declined. In his stead he recommended for CINCUS and CINCPAC his old cadet-mate Kimmel, who would jump only thirty-one numbers. “He had an excellent service reputation,” Nimitz would write in 1962, “so good—in fact—that he was promoted from grade to grade after having been selected by Selection Boards. His reputation was good enough to persuade me, as Chief, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy Dept., to nominate him as the relief of Admiral J. O. Richardson, C-in-C Pacific Fleet.”
33
Pointing out that he and Kimmel had known each other since their academy days, former CNO “Betty” Stark said of Kimmel in a 1966 interview: “We became warm friends in those early days and our contacts were many through the years. In 1941 when a vacancy occurred in the command of the Pacific Fleet I strongly urged [upon the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox] the appointment of Admiral Kimmel for that most important Command, and he was so appointed. I could have paid him no higher compliment.”
34

When Knox and Stark then presented Kimmel's name to the President, Roosevelt responded, “Of course! Why didn't I think of him?”
35

After the appointment was publicly announced, it was greeted with approval throughout the service; it is not recorded how many, if any, of the senior flag officers over whom Kimmel was jumped manifested a grievance. As for the U.S. Army, it took cautious measure of the man. Under the date 7 February 1941, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall wrote to the newly installed Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, commandant of the Army's Hawaiian Department:

My dear Short: I believe you take over command today; however, the reason for this letter is a conversation I had yesterday with Admiral Stark.

He spoke of Admiral Kimmel, the new Fleet Commander, regarding his personal characteristics. He said Kimmel was very direct, even brusque and undiplomatic in his approach to problems; that he was at heart a very kindly man, though he appeared rather rough in his methods of doing business. I gather that he is entirely responsive to plain speaking on the part of the other fellow if there is frankness and logic in the presentation. Stark went so far as to say that he had in the past personally objected to Kimmel's manners in dealing with officers, but that Kimmel was outstanding in his qualifications for command, and that this was the opinion of the entire Navy.

I give you this as it might be helpful in your personal dealings with Admiral Kimmel, not that I anticipate that you would be supersensitive, but rather that you would have a full understanding of the man with whom you are to deal.
36

When shown this communication by the writer in May 2000, Admiral Kimmel's sole surviving son, Edward R. Kimmel, commented, “Sounds like my dad. He kept us three boys in line.”
37
(Husband and Dorothy Kimmel had three sons: Manning Marius, born 22 April 1913, was graduated from the Naval Academy and entered the submarine service. During the Second World War Commander Kimmel became skipper of the submarine USS
Robalo,
which was sunk by a mine in the Balbac Strait north of Borneo, on 2 July 1944, with the loss of all hands. Thomas Kinkaid was born on 29 September 1914. Also an academy graduate, he commanded surface ships during the war. He died, a retired captain, at Annapolis on 24 January 1997. Edward Ralph was prevented from entering the academy by poor eyesight. He served as a reserve naval officer during the war, rising to the rank of lieutenant commander.

In 1966, middle son Tom recalled:

The most outstanding impression I have of my father [who was still alive] from the very first day I can remember is his complete honesty, forthrightness, and sense of fairness. He simply would not be a party to anything that was not completely honest and above board. He was a very poor bargainer, because he much preferred to pay a fair price and not enter into any “deals” with anyone. He had a quick temper and would not tolerate disobedience or willful neglect or carelessness. Such infractions he dealt with immediately in no uncertain terms. However, when the incident was over, it was completely finished and he held no grudges. My two brothers and I have always had the greatest respect and admiration for our father. In times of crisis, when something “big” came along, he was always ready to deal with the problem quickly, intelligently, and thoroughly. He seemed to save his temper for the small, relatively unimportant matters.
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If, indeed, there was a sometimes harsh surface to Kimmel, as Stark informed Marshall, and as son Tom appeared to acknowledge, one understands better the gossip, widespread in the Navy, that Roosevelt wanted the “two toughest sons-of-bitches” in the Navy to run the Pacific Fleet and the Atlantic Fleet (before 1 February 1941 called the Atlantic Squadron).
39
For commander in chief of the latter theater (CINCLANT) he had chosen, effective 1 February 1941, Admiral Ernest J. King, about whom Roosevelt stated gleefully, “He shaves with a blowtorch.” One of King's six daughters had her own assessment: “My father is the most even-tempered man in the Navy; he is always in a rage.”
40

On Saturday morning, 1 February 1941, Husband E. Kimmel stood under the guns of turret No. 4 on the quarterdeck of the fleet flagship
Pennsylvania
for the change of command ceremonies. After a reading of orders with Admiral Richardson, the new CINCUS and CINCPAC watched as his four-starred flag was broken from the maintruck. Every high-ranking officer at Pearl watched with him, but not his wife and sons.

Dorothy had remained on the mainland when Kimmel began his latest tour in the islands; Manning and Tom were serving together on board the submarine
S-38
based in the Philippines; and Ned was a junior at Princeton. The father of the family cut a fine, athletic figure in his starched white uniform. Five feet ten inches tall, with his ramrod straight posture he seemed taller. A ruddy youthful complexion formed the background to a prominent nose and clear blue eyes. His dark blond hair was turning prematurely gray. When he spoke the voice was soft Kentuckian.

Kimmel knew that, from this day, he would wear the coveted four stars of fleet command on his shoulder boards. But for how long? His new rank of admiral was a designated rank that went with the office, not with the officer. If relieved, he would revert to his permanent lower grade. This first-ever change of fleet command ceremony to take place at Pearl Harbor was not an occasion for vainglory. Realism, even humility, were the uniform of the day. What had happened to Richardson, for whatever reason, could also happen to him.
41

After a formal luncheon attended by the two principals, and members of their staffs, incoming and outgoing, Kimmel repaired to his flag cabin in the
Pennsylvania,
where his communications officer handed him a dispatch from CNO Admiral Stark. It informed him of the contents of a telegram sent on 27 January by U.S. Ambassador Joseph C. Grew in Tokyo to the State Department. A member of Grew's embassy staff, first secretary Edward S. Crocker, had been advised by the Peruvian minister, Ricardo Rivera-Schreiber, of a rumor circulating in Tokyo to the effect that, in the event of broken relations between Japan and the United States, the Japanese fleet intended to make a full-scale surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The dispatch concluded:

The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese naval and army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable [
sic
] future.
42